This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

241225Z Sep 04

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001656 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NI ASEC DELTAVIOLENCE
SUBJECT: RIVERS STATE FLARES UP AGAIN 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 1486 
 
     ¶B. LAGOS 1892 
     ¶C. LAGOS 1820 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Delta continues as a flashpoint of 
communal/political problems in Nigeria.  The political and 
economic environment there has given rise to competing gangs 
of criminals, militias and political opportunists (Ref A). 
President Obasanjo has spoken of a desire for a peaceful 
solution to the crises, but a recent GON assault on one of 
the militias threatens to terminate the possibility for a 
negotiated solution to the problems and bodes ill for the 
future.  The fighting has gone far beyond a dispute between 
gangs (Ref C), involves the governor of the state, and is not 
business as usual. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) The Delta region continues to be the flashpoint of 
communal/political problems for Nigeria and President 
Obasanjo.  The political manipulation from the 2003 elections 
created an environment that fostered confrontation in a 
region already prone to altercations, and overflowing with 
well-armed militias funded by major oil thieves that are 
major political players (Ref A).  In the recent spate of 
attacks and counterattacks in Rivers state, the Port Harcourt 
area -- the center of Nigeria's oil industry -- has become 
the epicenter of the most critical problem in the region. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶3. (C) The entire Delta area remains prone to ethnic violence 
that can be divided into three distinct issues: 
 
a) marginalization of the Ogonis and other minorities in the 
east; 
b) intra-Ijaw and political problems in the center, and 
c) conflict between the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo in the west. 
 
There are also four types of armed militias to undertake that 
violence:  ethnic, cults, criminal, and political.  While 
each militia is often a mix of them, they have their own 
dynamics and very different goals.  Most credible observers 
attribute a very small percentage of the conflict to actual 
"cult" violence.  The term cult, properly describing 
indigenous religious practices, is sometimes used freely by 
Nigerian officials to refer to criminal and ethnic militia 
activity in order to misdirect responsibility and heighten 
the fear and concern of residents.  The eastern and western 
conflicts in the Delta are properly attributed primarily to 
ethnic tensions over economic issues, and fueled by criminal 
activity.  The Port Harcourt conflict, while described as 
"cultism" by the GON, is more properly attributed to the 
possibilities for personal enrichment through criminal and 
political activity, and occurs primarily within the Ijaw 
tribe. 
 
NEW MILITARY OPERATIONS 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Ambassador and Poloff spoke recently to an 
Australian national who originally came to Nigeria as a 
consultant for Shell Oil and is now freelancing, and who also 
claims a close relationship with President Obasanjo by having 
served as Obasanjo's intermediary separate from official 
government channels.  He said he had been able to arrange 
discussions between Obasanjo and Alhaji Dokubo Asari, leader 
of one of the militias in Rivers state.  The Australian said 
they had reportedly agreed on or about September 7 to a 
ceasefire and to negotiations headed by EFCC Chairman Nuhu 
Ribadu on Ribadu's return from an overseas trip.  On 
September 16, only a couple of days before that first 
negotiations, a source close to Asari reported that the 
Nigerian military had just launched a new campaign "aimed at 
eliminating him" (Ref C). 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Sources in the Asari camp say that the attack was 
"expected" and that the fighters were able to disperse into 
the jungle.  That and earlier fighting in and around Port 
Harcourt has primarily been a power struggle between two 
major power brokers, Rivers State Governor Peter Odili and 
his former henchman Asari.  Asari now questions both his 
safety and Obasanjo's sincerity, and reportedly says he will 
only conduct negotiations by one of his many cell phones. 
One contact reported that Asari told him "this is personal 
and I will shock Nigeria."  He has also threatened to storm 
Rivers capital Port Harcourt and occupy "Government House," 
and assassinate Rivers Governor Odili even at the expense of 
his own life. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) A lone press article in the newspaper "This Day" on 
September 17 reported the fighting, but a member of Asari's 
group and a State Security Service (SSS) officer stationed at 
the Presidential Villa in Abuja confirmed the facts.  The 
various reports agree that a major operation was launched by 
"land, sea and air" and that the battle has not gone well for 
the Nigerian military.  While some sources claim that 200 
soldiers have been killed, our SSS source could only confirm 
200 "casualties" among the military.  "The situation is 
grave," he said, "and every effort is being made to keep it 
out of the press."  This SSS source said Chief of Staff Gen. 
Ogomudia has assumed personal command of the ongoing 
operation and at least 500 soldiers are involved. 
Reinforcements are expected from Calabar, perhaps as many as 
400 more men.  The SSS source related that he was present at 
a September 21 meeting at the Villa where Ogomudia lashed out 
at SSS head Kayode Are and Chief of Army Staff Martin Agwai, 
shouting that "if you don't know how to handle this, I will 
do it myself." 
 
¶7. (C) It appears the fighting has slowed since September 21, 
but the situation is still unsettled.  According to a 
journalist in Abuja, many reporters in Port Harcourt have 
been detained, slapped and "threatened directly" with bodily 
harm if they pursue the story of the military operation. 
Rumors have emerged about the use of "chemical weapons" but 
remain rumors at this point.  The use of any sophisticated CW 
is highly unlikely, but tear gas is plentiful in Nigeria. 
 
ONE MAN'S ASSESSMENT 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (S/NF) The Australian consultant gave Ambassador and 
Poloff an overall assessment of the region that meshes 
closely with Embassy's (Ref A).  The consultant said that 
Obasanjo has finally realized that the problems in the Delta 
would not succumb to a military solution alone.  For this 
reason, Obasanjo has been seeking dialog in order to halt the 
violence.  The Australian also claimed that Obasanjo has 
"realized that Governor Odili is a crook and a large part of 
the problem."  With that in mind, Obasanjo reportedly asked 
the source to facilitate bartered settlements for the various 
conflicts. 
 
¶9. (S/NF) With the intervention of the "Coventry Cathedral 
Group" in Ogoniland, some of the disputes in the eastern 
Delta appeared "headed for a solution," the Australian 
averred.  Obasanjo reportedly met with MOSOP (Movement for 
the Sovereignty of the Ogoni People) leader Ledum Mittee 
recently and agreed on engagement to resolve ongoing 
disputes.  In the western Delta, there is a ceasefire between 
many combatants but breaches are becoming more common.  The 
ethnic and political dimension of this dispute renders it 
difficult to resolve with an overhaul of the political system 
at some level.  The Australian said that Obasanjo is not 
concentrating on this issue at the moment, and militants from 
the Ijaw and from the O'odua Peoples Congress have not been 
fighting in the area for some months.  Still, delays in 
incorporating political gains could create friction again in 
the near future (Ref B). 
 
¶10. (S/NF) While the east and west appear to be comparatively 
quiet for the moment, the center is boiling.  Recent military 
actions demonstrate the potential for this conflict to create 
even bigger headaches than the other two have been. 
According to Obasanjo,s Australian consultant, the center 
part of the Delta region, in Rivers and Bayelsa states, is 
the most troubling problem.  While Governor Odili has blamed 
Asari for the violence, Asari claims that the clashes in and 
around Port Harcourt were carried out by the leader of 
another militia, Ateke Tom, and another militia called the 
Okrika Peacemakers operating out of Bayelsa since Tom drove 
them from Rivers. 
 
¶11. (S/NF) The Australian judges that Obasanjo is hamstrung 
by domestic politics and but is generally receptive to 
innovative measures to limit the violence.  He said Obasanjo 
was also receptive to an increased international presence in 
the Gulf to restore the GON's sovereignty and the Rule of 
Law.  Obasanjo was looking for increased participation from 
the oil companies too, and supposedly would welcome "external 
powers" patrolling the region to combat the oil 
thieves/smugglers that the GON is unable to control. 
 
SOME HISTORY ON GOV. ODILI, ASARI AND TOM 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) When Nigeria held its 1999 election, Odili reportedly 
hired Asari and another strongman, Ateke Tom, to ensure the 
PDP victory in Rivers State.  A Rivers State security 
official admitted recently that she had been instrumental in 
hiring Asari and was aware of, but not involved in, hiring 
Tom.  Asari was also able to assist Bayelsa Governor 
Alamieyeseigha in winning his state for the PDP.  By the time 
the 2003 elections took place, Asari was having second 
thoughts about working for Odili and Obasanjo, and said he 
was basing his change of heart on Obasanjo's perceived 
neglect of the oil region during his first term in office. 
¶13. (C) Asari claims to have been a part of rigging the 
Rivers, Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom elections in favor of the PDP 
and admits to carrying out attacks on government and oil 
installations in the regions.  He justifies his attacks by 
saying that he wants to "liberate" Okrika-speaking areas, 
claiming an 1893 treaty with the UK recognized the 
independence of the region.  He says that the way out of the 
"illegal amalgamation" of the Nigerian state is for a 
national conference and referendum on the continuation of the 
federation.  Since his defection from Odili's camp, he has 
vowed to "crush" Tom and Odili. 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14. (S/NF) President Obasanjo's intentions remain unclear. 
The alleged link between Obasanjo's son Gbenga and Gov. Odili 
and their involvement in oil smuggling and other activities 
is said by administration critics to have the President's 
blessing.  While Governors have enough influence to gain 
military action -- one of the reasons President Obasanjo gave 
for sacking Plateau Governor Dariye was that Dariye did not 
quell militia fighting -- it is also unlikely that the 
military would have launched the September 16 assault on 
Asari against Obasanjo's direct orders. 
 
¶15. (C)  The situation around Port Harcourt remains, by all 
accounts, grave.  At least hundreds have died, perhaps 
thousands wounded or made homeless, mostly innocent 
civilians.  With Asari,s knowledge of the area and his 
determination to exact a measure of revenge, the fighting is 
not likely to end soon. 
CAMPBELL