This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 SANAA 002055 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR PM A/S BLOOMFIELD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2014 
TAGS: PARM MASS PREL ASEC PTER YM OVID COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF A/S BLOOMFIELD TO YEMEN 
 
REF: STATE 180556 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Embassy Sana'a warmly welcomes the visit of PM 
Assistant Secretary Bloomfield to Yemen.  You will find 
President Saleh and senior ROYG officials ready to discuss 
the proposed USG buy-back and destruction assistance for 
illicit Yemeni MANPADS.  The ROYG wants this program, and 
they want to keep it running.  Be prepared for the ROYG to 
seek extending the buy-back to cover other weapons systems. 
Although your primary goal is ROYG buy-in and cooperation in 
this limited buy-back, the timing is right to push for 
greater SA/LW inventory controls and a rational ROYG 
acquisition policy.  Should you arrive with C-130 licensing 
agreements in your pocket it will buy good-will by removing a 
long-standing irritant in U.S. - Yemeni military cooperation. 
 
¶2. (C) You can expect at least initial ROYG resistance to 
sharing a serialized inventory of their official MANPADS 
stock, as well as to any appearance of outside interference 
in their acquisitions policy.  The ROYG has asked that we 
keep the U.S. role in providing technical and financial 
assistance for MANPADS recovery and destruction secret -- 
citing potential backlash from the tribes, price gouging by 
the merchants, and opposition from the street.  Although the 
fact of your visit will be public, we should not publicize 
its main purpose. 
 
--------------- 
President Saleh 
--------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In the last two years, President Ali Abdullah Saleh 
transformed Yemen's domestic security picture with  major 
counter-terrorism achievements:  the 11/02 apprehension of 
al-Qa'ida HVT Abu-Assem al-Mekki, aggressive CT operations 
against the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, and the 9/03 round-up of 
an emerging al-Qa'ida cell with plans to target the U.S. 
Ambassador and other American and Western interests. 
 
¶4. (C) Saleh's modus operendi vis-a-vis CT cooperation is to 
leverage these successes into further U.S. military and 
security cooperation, intelligence support, development 
assistance and food aid.  Saleh has determined that his 
interests lie in his pro -U.S stance in the GWOT.  The 
MANPADS buy-back is part of our continuing CT partnership, as 
well as an opportunity to build on the relationships 
established by his visit to Sea Island and participation in 
the G-8 Summit. 
 
¶5. (S) Saleh is now embroiled in an armed-struggle against 
the supporters of rebel Shi'ite cleric al-Houthi in the 
northern Sa'da region.  His difficulty in quelling the 
conflict, and his reported fury at discovering the insurgents 
are better armed with more advanced weapons than ROYG forces, 
may lead to a realization that the traditional arms-loving 
Yemeni culture, if unchecked, can seriously threaten regime 
interests.  However, while such thinking aids our push for 
greater controls over the flow of illicit SA/LW in and out of 
Yemen, it also feeds the ROYG hunger for acquiring new more 
advanced weapons for its own arsenal.  (Note:  Saleh has 
requested Embassy assistance both for vehicular and airborne 
countermeasures to defeat SAMs.  End Note.) 
 
----------------- 
Notional Schedule 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  We have not scheduled meetings outside the Embassy 
for August 30.  On August 31 you will meet with President 
Saleh, Deputy Director of the National Security Bureau Ammar 
Saleh (in charge of illicit weapons recovery in Yemen), 
Minister of Defense Abdullah Ali Alaiwa, and Minister of 
Interior Rashad al-Alimi.  The Presidential Palace will 
likely inform us on the timing of your meeting with Saleh 
shortly before it occurs, and your subsequent meetings will 
follow.  A working lunch with key players is expected to take 
place at one of the Ministries.  The Ambassador would like to 
host a small dinner at his residence on August 31 or 
September 1 with Ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign 
Affairs, NSB Deputy Ammar Saleh, and Dr. Iryani.  We are 
waiting for ROYG response to the invitation.   We have 
requested to tour MANPADS storage sites on September 1, and 
it may be possible for you to visit a weapons souk outside of 
Sana'a, pending resolution of security and logistical issues. 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Ammar Saleh and the National Security Bureau 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In response to the Secretary's letter, President Saleh 
tapped his nephew, Deputy Director of the National Security 
Bureau (NSB) Ammar Saleh, as the ROYG lead for MANPADS 
buy-back (Note: Ammar Saleh's lead was confirmed to Charge by 
Foreign Minister al-Qirbi and Defense Minister Alaiwa.  End 
Note.)  Ammar Saleh is expected to take the reins as NSB 
Director soon.  He will have his work cut out for him 
wrestling NSB's new portfolio from the other security 
organizations, chiefly the Political Security Organization 
(PSO). 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) Ammar is charged with the illicit weapons recovery 
account, and is already engaged in his own buy-back of all 
sorts of materiel.  On August 23 he told us he recently met 
with an arms dealer who claimed there are Strela 1, 2 and 3's 
as well as Stingers for sale on the Yemeni black market. 
Ammar gave him the funds to purchase them.  All MANPADS 
recovered would become part of our buy-back.  (Note:  He was 
not convinced on the Stingers, but promised to inform us 
immediately if he recovers any.  End Note.)  Ammar reported 
that he is also buying back C-4 and explosives detonators 
from the market. 
 
¶9. (S/NF) Ammar is a frank and direct interlocutor.  In 
private he speaks about his difficulties in dealing with the 
Ministry of Defense, which he often describes as an 
impediment.  The ROYG envisions the NSB operating as a joint 
NSC-CIA type organization modeled on the Jordanian GID.  Our 
main CT interlocutor, PSO Chief Gamish, will be the unseen 
elephant in the room during your discussions with NSB.  You 
can capitalize on this tension -- Ammar needs to succeed in 
this, his first major assignment. 
 
------------------------------- 
The Case of the Missing MANPADS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) The ROYG is ready to sell and destroy the 79 systems 
it currently claims are its only illicit MANPADS stock.  Your 
challenge will be getting the ROYG to provide a serialized 
inventory of their official MANPADS stock. 
 
¶11.  (S) ROYG cooperation rises and falls along a predictable 
"what have you done for me lately" pattern.  After an initial 
July 2003 inspection, the ROYG rebuffed Embassy requests to 
inventory ROYG recovered MANPADS stocks.  Following delivery 
of Secretary Powell's letter, offering assistance to buy-back 
and destroy MANPADS, we were allowed to view current stocks 
in July 2004.  In the latest inspection, Emboffs viewed 79 
SA-7's which appeared inoperable, vice 1,100 in the same 
storage facility in 2003.  (Note: You will be touring this 
facility during your visit.  End Note.) 
 
¶12.  (S/NF)  NSB Ammar Saleh told us on August 18 that the 
Ministry of Defense re-distributed all usable systems to its 
own forces.  "They bought them, they own them, they can do 
what they like with them," said Ammar.  As for the remaining 
79, they will be destroyed as part of the tabled buy-back. 
He assured us that all U.S. buy-back funds will be handled by 
his organization and promised complete control of the systems 
from collection to destruction. 
 
¶13. (S/NF) Ammar has developed his own proposal for storage 
and control of recovered MANPADS under the U.S. proposal.  He 
has twice raised his idea for a joint USG-NSB effort.  "You 
build the warehouse, I'll buy the land."  He wants to use 
non-Ministry of Defense facilities to prevent acquired 
illicit MANPADS from becoming "mixed up" with MOD stocks. 
 
--------------------------- 
Official Inventory Controls 
--------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S/NF)  You can expect Minister of Defense Alaiwa to 
balk at our request for a serialized account of official 
MANPADS stocks.  Ammar described this information as "Top 
Secret" and exclaimed "Why would you want to know?"  Your 
 
SIPDIS 
answer is simple:  MANPADS leaked from Yemen's official stock 
were used in al-Qa'ida operations in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and 
Yemen.  The ROYG position is that these weapons were smuggled 
out during the chaos of the 1994  civil war, but that current 
controls are much better.  However, in reality they share our 
concern and are highly motivated to prevent any recurrence 
given the damage it could do to the U.S. - Yemeni CT 
partnership and therefore their growing USG development 
assistance account.  Ammar Saleh has suggested that our 
demand for a serialized inventory account would be better 
received if couched in an offer of technical assistance to 
modernize and computerize inventories of the Yemeni Armed 
Forces arsenal. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Continued Acquisition and Destruction of Illicit MANPADS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶15.  (S/NF)  Presently, the ROYG uses a list of 29 approved 
arms dealers to collect illicit weapons from the grey market. 
 MANPADS buy-back will create an additional demand in the 
local arms market.  This is to our advantage if we can 
destroy additional non-Yemeni systems floating in from HOA. 
What we want to avoid, however, is a secondary arms market 
for cheap North Korean MANPADS that cost less to produce than 
what we are offering to pay for recovered systems.  Given 
that the ROYG has violated its bilateral agreement not to 
deal with North Korea, we should impress upon them our 
concerns regarding control of future buy-back acquisitions. 
 
---------------- 
New Acquisitions 
---------------- 
 
¶16.  (S/NF) President Saleh will claim the sovereign right to 
determine Yemen's defense needs.  You will want to press 
Saleh and Alaiwa that the purpose of this buy-back is not to 
fund illegitimate acquisitions of more advanced MANPADS 
systems for ROYG forces. (See other channel reporting.) 
 
¶17. (C)  The ROYG described initiatives to Senior Advisor 
Bodine and NSC Deputy Townsend in 2003 to negate all current 
end-user licenses and increase MFA involvement in the 
acquisitions process by issuing new certificates through 
overseas embassies -- there has been no action on this 
commitment. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Proliferation of SA/LW beyond MANPADS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (C)  Ammar is hoping this buy-back will lead to other 
SA/LW buy-backs -- which will expand his portfolio.  He and 
the ROYG are motivated for success in the hope that 
additional buy-backs for SA/LW will follow.  This visit is an 
opportunity to study the greater issue of weapons 
proliferation in Yemen. 
 
¶19.  (C) Yemen has a gun loving culture and has long been a 
regional center for weapons smuggling.  A dhow interdicted by 
the U.S. Navy in early May with a shipment of 500 AK-47s 
bound for Somalia underscores the continuing problem.  Saleh 
must balance political support from the northern tribes with 
the fact that so many of them are heavily involved in weapons 
smuggling operations. 
 
--------------------------- 
Grey Arms:  Border Control 
--------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) Yemen and Saudi Arabia have announced joint efforts 
to tighten border security, but improvement and application 
to date is limited and uneven.  The security of Yemen's land 
and maritime borders remains a priority concern.  The USG has 
installed the Pisces system here and just initiated the EXBS 
program for further assistance.  The Yemeni Coast Guard is up 
and running.  Still, tackling the issue remains well beyond 
Yemen's current border control capacity, particularly along 
the long and largely unregulated boarder with Saudi Arabia. 
 
-------------------- 
The Al-Houthi Factor 
-------------------- 
 
¶21. (S/NF) The difficulty of the Yemeni Army and Central 
Security Forces to end the bloody conflict with the armed 
supporters of rebel Shi'ite cleric al-Houthi in the northern 
region of Sa'da is causing some ROYG officials to rethink its 
traditional hands-off policy on SW/LA flow in and out of 
Yemen.  It appears al-Houthi supporters are better armed with 
newer weapons than ROYG forces.  This thinking presents us 
with a double-edged sword.  We can capitalize on it by 
pressing for strong cooperation on illicit MANPADS recovery. 
At the same time, it is likely to feed ongoing ROYG efforts 
to acquire new, technologically advanced weapons. 
KRAJESKI