This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002965 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2014 
TAGS: MOPS PREL YI SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPAIN QUESTIONS EFFECTIVENESS OF REMOVING CAVEATS 
IN KFOR 
 
REF: STATE 162868 
 
Classified By: KATHLEEN M. FITZPATRICK, POLITICAL COUNSELOR. 
REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Spain is reviewing restrictions it may have placed on 
Spanish forces that are participating in KFOR but would 
prefer to help strengthen Kosovo police forces to improve 
KFOR's effectiveness, according to Kosovo specialists at the 
Spanish Foreign Ministry.  Following the outbreak of violence 
in Kosovo in March, Spain is more likely to remain committed 
to KFOR in support of its overall policy to help maintain 
peace and security in Europe, according to MFA experts.  End 
summary. 
 
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Removing national caveats 
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¶2. (C) We met with Enrique de Yturriaga, Special Assistant to 
the Director General of the Coordination Unit for Spain's 
Participation in the UNSC at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs August 2 to deliver reftel points on how to make KFOR 
more effective and urge Spain to remove national caveats on 
its KFOR forces.  Yturriaga covers Europe, Africa, and 
non-proliferation issues in the UNSC and also has 
responsibilities for Kosovo issues in the MFA.  He told us 
that he would have to review the issue of restrictions placed 
on Spanish forces in KFOR.  Spain sees the proposal to remove 
national caveats as an ongoing dialog within NATO that may 
not affect Spain's participation in KFOR.  Yturriaga 
explained that Spanish KFOR forces are engaged in rural areas 
where they carry out activities such as traffic control and 
reconstruction projects.  They are less likely to be involved 
in the type of violence that occurred in March in urban areas 
like Mitrovica, Yturriaga stated.  The Spanish position is 
that removing restrictions on Spanish KFOR or getting KFOR 
more involved in internal security matters in general may not 
be the best solution to improve KFOR's security preparedness. 
 
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Improving KFOR 
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¶3. (C) Poloff asked Yturriaga what types of measures Spain 
would propose to make KFOR more effective.  Yturriaga 
responded that greater cooperation between KFOR, UNMIK and 
OSCE to strengthen the Kosovo police force would be a better 
way to prevent violence and make KFOR more effective over the 
long term.  If KFOR becomes more involved in internal 
security matters, such as controlling domestic conflicts or 
protecting property, it may send a negative message that the 
KFOR was getting too involved in domestic matters or was 
giving special treatment to the Serb minority.  Such a move 
would cast KFOR in a peacekeeping mode when the goal was to 
move toward peace building, Yturriaga said.  Spain would be 
more willing to help improve how the Kosovo police force 
protects civilians rather than to pursue a domestic legal 
process to remove any national caveats that may exist on its 
forces in KFOR. 
 
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Spain's KFOR commitment 
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¶4. (C) Poloff asked Yturriaga how the new Spanish government 
planned to remain engaged in KFOR.  Yturriaga replied that 
Spain's posture was to honor its international commitments 
and involve more civilian authorities rather than military 
forces in its international peace activities.  However, 
following the violence that occurred in Mitrovica in March, 
Spain was unlikely to pursue a policy of replacing troops 
with civilian authorities in KFOR, Yturriaga stated. 
 
¶5. (C) The Spanish Foreign Ministry had yet to formulate a 
policy position on Kosovo, according to Yturriaga.  Foreign 
Minister Moratinos and State Secretary Bernardino Leon have 
only made general statements expressing Spain's commitment to 
increasing security and stability in Europe--including 
Kosovo--and is now more focused on its foreign policy efforts 
in the Middle East, Western Sahara, Afghanistan and Haiti. 
Meanwhile, the Spanish Ministry of Defense is more involved 
in setting the pace of Spain's continued troop presence in 
KFOR. 
 
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Comment 
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¶6.  (C) We will continue to pursue dialogue on this issue 
with the GOS and NATO experts, most of whom have already 
departed on traditional summer leave.  We suggest that the 
Department and/or US NATO also pursue this with their Spanish 
counterparts also.  End comment. 
MANZANARES