This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001557 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL CG MONUC
SUBJECT: EASTERN TURN FOR THE WORSE 
 
 
Classified By: Amb Roger Meece, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Septel describes worrying events in eastern Congo 
following the weekend attack on the Gatumba refugee camp in 
Burundi, and effects on the fragile DRC transition government 
and peace process.  While the Burundi refugee attack did not 
in itself provoke a complete change in transition dynamics, 
it has significantly heightened tensions and exacerbated 
divisions and fears already present.  A decision by Vice 
President Ruberwa to withdraw from the transition government, 
a similar RCD-Goma institutional move, or a military 
miscalculation or &accident8 in the east could have major 
negative consequences for what is at best a volatile 
situation in the region. 
 
¶2. (C) There are at least three major Congolese military 
forces operating right now in the east.  Rebel General 
Nkunda,s forces, the militia controlled by North Kivu 
Governor Serufuli, and FARDC forces.  The latter are composed 
of various factions, and include at least some units of 
questionable loyalty.  Likewise it is unclear when and under 
what circumstances Serufuli might seek to use his militia, or 
to what purpose.   There are probably also scattered 
Congolese Mai Mai forces of varying interests, capability, 
and loyalty depending on the individual group, and Rwandan 
Hutu extremists (e.g., FDLR, Interahamwe) in the area, 
although it is difficult to impossible to obtain an accurate 
estimate of the size or capabilities of these groups.  It is 
unlikely that anyone holds a decisive military advantage 
right now.  The introduction of any foreign forces from 
Burundi, Rwanda, or elsewhere, of course would significantly 
alter the equation.  The latter would also have major 
negative political effects in Kinshasa. 
 
Political Moves 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) On the political front, President Kabila apparently 
decided to participate in meeting(s) in Dar es Salaam 
following the SADC Mauritius summit, a useful act that should 
at minimum help to open communications with Burundi 
officials.  We have also received reports from various 
sources that President Mbeki has been active, among other 
things to encourage Vice President Ruberwa to remain in the 
transition government.  We assume that he is also seeking to 
defuse explosive feelings in Kigali and Bujumbura, as well as 
in his contacts with Kabila. 
 
¶4. (C) SRSG Swing was able to speak with Ruberwa August 17 to 
encourage him to remain engaged.  Swing indicated that 
Ruberwa still seems to be considering his options.  (Comment: 
 Ruberwa is likely motivated by personal fears as well as 
political calculations.  End Comment.) 
 
What We Can Do 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) There are two major problems that we believe need to 
be addressed.  One related to the political process in the 
DRC; the other potential military mistakes that could lead to 
wider conflicts in eastern Congo. 
 
¶6.  (C) Regarding the domestic Congolese poltical aspect, the 
Ambassador has been trying to reach Ruberwa August 18 to 
convey a similar message to that of SRSG Swing.  Ruberwa is 
currently in Goma with other RCD leaders, and phones are not 
being answered.  While unsuccessful thus far, the Ambassador 
will continue to try to get through.  We are also requesting 
a one on one meeting of the Ambassador with President Kabila 
on the latter,s return to Kinshasa to discuss the issue, 
encourage negotiation to maintain the integrity of the 
fundamental transition process, and avoid unhelpful military 
actions. 
 
¶6. (C) The communique issued by the Department in Washington 
on Monday, August 17, was very useful, and the re-issued 
communique distributed by the Mission in Kinshasa has sought 
to disseminate the text as widely as possible.  (It was read 
verbatim on 8 major radio channels, and appears in 7 of the 
leading newspapers.)  We believe in all public and private 
statements in Washington and the region, it is useful to 
reiterate the basic themes of that communique, i.e. 
condemnation of the attack, the need for a full 
investigation, and the need for cooperation among government 
in the region to maintain peace and security. 
 
¶7.  (C) The planned trilateral meeting in Kampala next week 
will provide a potentially very useful forum to try to 
stimulate dialogue between Kinshasa, Kigali, and Kampala.  In 
the interim, we believe it would be useful to encourage 
strongly governments in all regional capitals to avoid 
inflammatory rhetoric, much less provocative military moves 
or actions, that could set off wider conflicts in the 
uncertain military environment of the east.  Calls from a 
senior Department official to appropriate officials could 
help underscore the seriousness with which we view the 
current situation. 
 
¶8. (C) Finally, pending the actions described above, we 
believe it would be useful for Embassies in relevant 
capitals, including Pretoria, London, Paris, and Belgium, to 
consult with host country to share information and encourage 
coordinated action. 
MEECE