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Viewing cable 04ANKARA4503, TIP IN TURKEY: AUSTRALIAN INVESTIGATION REPORT I

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA4503 2004-08-11 08:57 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 004503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR G/TIP, G, INL, DRL, EUR/PGI, EUR/SE 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/IC/TIPOFF, CA/VO/L/C 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2014 
TAGS: KCRM KVPR PGOV PHUM PREF SMIG TU AU PINR TIP IN TURKEY
SUBJECT: TIP IN TURKEY: AUSTRALIAN INVESTIGATION REPORT I 
 
REF: ANKARA 4502 
 
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.4 
(b,d). 
 
ΒΆ1. (C) The following confidential investigation report 
compiled by Australian Federal Police agent Shawn Selles 
includes names and contact information for suspected human 
smugglers described in reftel. 
 
TURKISH-BASED PEOPLE SMUGGLING NETWORK OPERATING TO AUSTRALIA 
AND OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
Background 
 
Under a  whole-of-government, approach to combat people 
smuggling to Australia, the Australian Government has funded 
a dedicated joint agency People Smuggling Strike Team (PSST) 
comprising both Australian Federal Police and Immigration 
officials.  This team has an intelligence and investigation 
component and targets all aspects of organised people 
smuggling to Australia. 
 
On 4 November 2003, an Indonesian fishing vessel "Minasa Bone 
2" (designated Suspect Illegal Entry Vessel 14 - SIEV 14), 
arrived at Melville Island carrying 14 Turkish nationals and 
4 Indonesian crew members on board.  The 14 Turkish nationals 
had been attempting to illegally enter Australia.  Operation 
SALVINI is the PSST investigation into the incident. 
 
The PSST has identified a people smuggling network operating 
within Turkey and Indonesia with some Australian connections 
as being responsible for this venture.  The aim of Operation 
SALVINI is to disrupt or dismantle this network. 
 
The principal member, Mehmet SERIBAN, was arrested in March 
2004 by the PSST and is currently before court in Australia 
facing several people smuggling charges.  Another 
investigation focus at the present is the collection of 
evidence against Ali CETIN, residing in Sydney Australia, for 
his involvement in the above venture.  Longer term aspects of 
the investigation will include prosecuting Muslim SERIBAN, 
Bayram ASLAN, and Eyup BASAR, for their involvements in 
people smuggling to Australia.  To enable such outcomes, the 
assistance of Turkish and Indonesian law enforcement 
authorities will be important. 
 
This document provides a basic overview of the various 
persons of interest within this network.  Source documents 
for this information are retained by PSST members. 
 
 
Overview - "Seriban" People Smuggling Network 
 
The "Seriban" people smuggling network operates within Turkey 
and Indonesia, and has some Australian connections.  The 
network is predominantly comprised of Turkish-born persons, 
some of whom have obtained Australian citizenship.  The 
network also obtains significant assistance from a number of 
Indonesian nationals.  There are a number of family 
connections between the Turkish born persons in this network. 
 
 
Australia is the main destination country for the potential 
illegal immigrants (PIIs) used by this network.  Based on 
intelligence obtained from various Australian authorities, 
this network is believed to be responsible for the arrival of 
over 250 Turkish / Kurdish illegal immigrants to Australia on 
14 separate vessels from 1993 to the present. 
 
In addition to Australia, there is intelligence which 
indicates that the network may have smuggled persons to 
Germany in the mid to late 1990,s.  More recently, 
intelligence has been received indicating that the network is 
now shifting its focus to other possible destinations 
including Canada, New Zealand, and possibly also Korea (B2). 
 
The cost for smuggling to Australia has ranged from $4,000 to 
$12,000 USD per person but generally averages between $5,000 
- $7,000 USD per person.  For the most recent venture (SIEV 
14), the majority of the PIIs paid about $7,500 USD each.  In 
almost all instances, part payment would be made in Turkey to 
cover the cost of airline tickets to Indonesia (the transit 
country used by the network) plus some initial profit gain, 
with the bulk of the monies to be paid after arrival in 
Indonesia. 
 
Source Country / Recruiting 
 
Turkey is the source country of the PIIs for this network. 
People of Kurdish ethnicity and of Alevi faith from the 
Gaziantep and Adiyaman regions of south-eastern Turkey near 
the Syrian border are the main targets for this network. 
Turks are also targeted from these regions but to a lesser 
extent.  The PIIs are recruited through word of mouth (the 
network has an established reputation in the region), and 
also through active recruiting.  Regarding the former, there 
were a number of locations of interest known to be frequented 
by the network members.  These were mostly local coffee shops 
and sometimes local travel agencies.  Any person wishing to 
seek out the network would go to those locations and ask the 
relevant questions to establish contact. 
 
In terms of active recruiting, individual PIIs are known to 
be approached by members of the network and are asked to 
recruit a certain number of people for upcoming ventures in 
exchange for the waiving of their own cost of travel.  At 
other times the network members themselves would personally 
travel in the region seeking  clients,. 
 
The members / smugglers known to operate in Turkey for this 
network include (but are not limited to) Muslim SERIBAN, Eyup 
BASAR, Bayram ASLAN, Hakan KARAOGLU, and Murat KARAOGLU. 
Note that both Hakan and Murat operate Karaoglu Turizm - a 
travel agency in Gaziantep which has an integral role in the 
functioning of the network as will be described shortly. 
Brief profiles of these people are also below. 
 
As would be expected, part of the recruitment process 
involves marketing the destinations (at least for Canada and 
Australia).  Consistent reports indicate that the network 
members describe favourable working and living conditions. 
Often the earning potential in Australia is grossly 
exaggerated.  The network members also emphasise their 
previous successes to the PIIs - typically, the PIIs will be 
told of other people in their own town or region who have 
been smuggled by the network.  It is normally around this 
time that network members also provide information relating 
to the immigration processes (Australia) to the PIIs and also 
give them some initial coaching as to what to say when they 
arrive in Australia to increase their success for refugee 
claims.  They are also coached as to what to say to law 
enforcement officials if asked questions about the network 
itself (eg, told to use false names and false descriptions, 
told to tell officials they are tourists etc). 
 
Once a PII decides to engage the services of this network, 
the smugglers would then provide them with information about 
how to obtain airline tickets (always return air tickets to 
avoid suspicion from authorities) and passports.  The tickets 
are almost always organised by Hakan and Murat KARAOGLU of 
the Karaoglu Turizm located in Gaziantep.  Typically, the PII 
is quoted an inflated price for the ticket and Hakan/Murat 
then keep the balance as their  commission,.  Further 
details about Hakan and Murat are below. 
 
The PIIs typically apply for their own passports prior to 
departing.  In cases where this is not possible, the network 
members ask the PIIs to supply passport photographs of 
themselves and personal information as well as some 
additional cash (usually a few hundred dollars).  They then 
use their own contacts (some reports indicate these are 
government officials.  One witness has said this was a "high 
ranking" official) to obtain the passports.  The passports 
themselves are reportedly produced and manufactured 
 normally, and, except on a few known occasions, are 
generally in the correct name of the PII.  As the passports 
are collected by the network in Indonesia or disposed of by 
the passengers prior to arriving at the destination country, 
no examples have been obtained by the PSST. 
 
Prior to departing for Indonesia (the transit country used by 
this network - see next section), the PII,s are given some 
further basic instructions.  Often this takes place at a 
local coffee shop or the Karaoglu Turizm travel agency. 
Except on a few rare occasions, each PII is told they will be 
met at Jakarta airport by an agent of the network.  In most 
cases a name for this agent is provided prior to departing. 
In some cases, the PIIs are told that the agent will approach 
them.  They are also instructed to pay that particular agent 
the remaining amount of money.  These instructions are often 
given to small groups of PIIs and to a lesser extent on a 
one-on-one basis. 
 
The PIIs typically make their own arrangements to travel to 
the international airport (almost always Istanbul).  The PIIs 
often travel in small groups to Istanbul generally no more 
than five persons in each group.  In most cases these are the 
same PIIs who had earlier received instructions together. 
Similarly, the PIIs often travel to Indonesia in small groups 
at staggered times.  Many PIIs have described meeting other 
PIIs either at the international airport, on the flight, and 
at Jakarta airport by chance (eg, were previously unaware of 
the others). 
 
Except on rare occasions, the network members are not at the 
point of departure nor do they travel with the PIIs on the 
plane.  The PIIs interviewed have indicated they travelled 
with either Gulf-Air, Emirates, Malaysian Airlines or Turkish 
Airlines.  Gulf-Air appears to be preferred as it is cheaper 
than the others.  The route is normally via a stop-over in 
Bahrain and/or Dubai or Abu Dhabi, then a further stop-over 
in either Bangkok or Singapore or Kuala Lumpur, then onto 
Jakarta. 
 
There have been instances of PIIs being detained and 
questioned at Istanbul airport by the Istanbul Airport 
Police.  The questioning has been in relation to their 
destination, at other times in relation to the smugglers. 
Some of the questions asked points to the Turkish authorities 
having some knowledge about the existence of this network. 
In some cases the PIIs are released, in others they have paid 
bribes to be released. 
Transit Country Activity 
 
Indonesia is the transit country used by this network.  There 
are a variety of favourable conditions for the network: they 
have a wide range of local and Turkish-born contacts in 
Indonesia;  labour, and infrastructure (eg, crew and 
vessels) is cheap; officials can be bribed; law enforcement 
authorities operate in  silo,s,; external and internal 
borders are relatively porous; and there is an absence of 
people smuggling legislation and therefore no Mutual 
Assistance / Extradition treaties (at least with Australia). 
Of course, Indonesia is also in close geographic proximity to 
Australia and New Zealand. 
 
When the PIIs arrive in Jakarta they are met either by Mehmet 
SERIBAN or by an Indonesian associate after going through the 
customs line.  Some PIIs have stated that they encountered 
problems with the Customs or Immigration officials by the 
Indonesian authorities but these were successfully resolved 
with a small bribe.  The PIIs are then conveyed to a local 
hotel or pension, usually one which has been used previously 
by the network such as the Hotel Menteng 1 and 2 (these are 
discussed later in this document), for a brief stay.  The 
PIIs are then moved to an outlying island, sometimes there 
are several transits to these islands.  The final staging 
points have included Bali, Larantuka and Maumere (Flores), 
Kupang (Timor), Makassar (Sulawesi), to name a few.  As in 
Jakarta, both hotels and pensions are used to accommodate the 
PIIs on these islands.  As noted previously, the PIIs 
typically arrive in staggered small groups to Jakarta.  These 
small groups gradually accrete at points along the way right 
up to the final departure point.  The isolation of these 
small groups by the network is effective such that the PIIs 
often are not aware what their final number will be until at 
the point of departure. 
 
At all times, an Indonesian assistant or two maintains vigil 
over each group to ensure that the PIIs do not encounter any 
problems.  Without exception, none of the Indonesian 
associates used has spoken or understood Turkish.  Mehmet 
SERIBAN himself keeps at arms length from the PIIs with only 
sporadic visits to the hotels/pensions.  On these visits 
Mehmet provides further instructions about the venture and 
further coaching about what details to tell the authorities 
if detected.  Likewise, it is normally during one of these 
visits that payment is made. 
In early ventures, the network often accepted payment at 
relatively late stages of the venture, that is, at the second 
or third transit point or in some cases even at the final 
point of departure.  However, by that stage the PIIs had 
often spent a proportion of their dedicated  smuggling, 
monies or refused to pay the full amount until after they had 
arrived in Australia.  Therefore, in more recent ventures the 
network asked for payment from the PIIs very shortly after 
arrival in Jakarta.  In addition to ensuring they got their 
agreed monies this had the added effect of increasing the 
feelings of vulnerability in the PIIs in Indonesia and thus 
increased their dependence on the network. 
If the PIIs expressed any doubts about the venture or refused 
to pay they were not physically threatened.  Instead, they 
would be subtly told they would be left to their own devices 
in Indonesia.  Abandonment was certainly seen as a threat by 
the PIIs as they did not know anything about the local 
conditions or language, they often had already had given 
their passports and airline tickets to the smugglers, and 
they had already outlaid significant sums of monies.  Unlike 
other networks known to operate to Australia, all the PIIs 
spoken to said they were never threatened with, or subject to 
physical violence at any stage, nor were any firearms/weapons 
seen. 
 
In several instances, the PIIs were detected by Indonesian 
law enforcement officials (in the "Gnowangerup" venture, the 
police in Kupang actually turned back the same PIIs on three 
occasions after arriving from Bali).  There are no known 
examples of a venture being wholly disrupted by Indonesian 
law enforcement officials but there has been interference 
with has meant that plans were changed such as using a 
different departure point.  There are several mentions of 
Indonesian law enforcement officials being bribed to either 
ignore the PIIs and, in some cases, to facilitate their 
movement. 
 
Information from PIIs travelling on the last several most 
recent SIEVs, is that Mehmet SERIBAN made the arrangement for 
the vessels only after the PIIs had arrived or begun to 
arrive in Indonesia.  Evidence indicates, and Mehmet SERIBAN 
himself has admitted, that he often used local Indonesians as 
interlocutors with local fishermen to make the arrangements 
for the fishing vessels and crew to take the PIIs to 
Australia.  In the most recent venture (SIEV 14), Mehmet 
SERIBAN paid 130 million Indonesian Rupiah (roughly $20,000 
AUD) for the hiring of the vessel and four Indonesian crew 
members (one of which was the boat owner).  Anecdotally, 
Indonesian crew members will try and avoid apprehension by 
Australian authorities.  However, it is well known that if 
they are caught their sentence will be relatively light 
(typically several months for first offenders) and that 
conditions in Australian prisons can actually be more 
favourable to their own normal living conditions. 
 
Once a vessel is arranged, the PIIs are given only short 
notice that they will be departing.  They are then conveyed 
to a secluded departure location, usually a deserted stretch 
of beach.  In some cases the vessel was at the location 
already but in most cases the PIIs were required to hide and 
wait for several hours sometimes days until the vessel 
arrived.  The unreliability of the Indonesian crew and vessel 
resulted in many  false starts, at the final departure 
point.  Mehmet SERIBAN himself is sometimes at the final 
departure point, but more often delegates that role to an 
Indonesian associate.  It is normally just before the PIIs 
are about to board the vessel that the airline tickets and 
passports are collected.  It is likely they are not collected 
earlier in case the PIIs are approached by local authorities. 
 
 
In all instances, the vessels used have been wooden 
Indonesian fishing vessels of limited size, and powered by 
sail and diesel engine.  As expected, the food on these 
vessels is of poor quality (often rotten) and water is 
limited.  Lifejackets are non-existent.  Unlike some other 
people smuggling networks, Mehmet and others have never 
 invested, in upgrading or reconditioning the engine or 
vessel.  Many PIIs were led to believe, whether by design or 
otherwise, that they would travel on large metal-hulled ships 
to Australia.  Understandably they were shocked when they saw 
their transport. 
 
The network members take advantages of any opportunities that 
present themselves.  In a number of ventures other well known 
people smugglers in Indonesia have partnered with Mehmet 
SERIBAN and arranged for their own PIIs to travel on vessels 
organised by him (eg, SIEVs "Ord", "Isa", Tabletop").  In the 
case of SIEV 06 ("Draco") the roles were reversed and Mehmet 
had in fact arranged for his PIIs to travel on a vessel 
organised by others. 
 
Arrivals in Australia 
With the exception of SIEV 14 (Melville Island) and SIEV 
"Draco" (Christmas Island), all vessels from this network 
went to Ashmore Reef which is an outlying territory of 
Australia in the Timor Sea - about 840 kilometers west of 
Darwin and 610 kilometers north of Broome.  After September 
2001 this reef/island system (amongst others) was excluded 
from Australia,s migration zone by the Government as a 
policy response to the increasing problem of illegal boat 
arrivals. 
 
The network often relied on Australian media coverage to 
learn of the success of their venture.  Some PIIs actually 
contacted the network members by phone and informed them they 
had arrived.  For example, in the"Gnowangerup" matter Mehmet 
stated that he was contacted by at least two of the 14 PIIs 
who told him not only that they had arrived, but also that 
they had reported him to the authorities due to the anger 
they felt at the "condition" of the boat and the 
circumstances of their voyage. 
 
Other PIIs (particularly the "Ord" and "Warrego" SIEVs) have 
stated that Mehmet SERIBAN has used associates and relatives 
in Australia to contact them.  The common theme in these 
phone calls is that Mehmet SERIBAN had indicated that he was 
poor, that things were not well in Indonesia as the 
Australians and Indonesians were pursuing him, and he then 
asked those persons if they could transfer some money to him 
to help them out.  It appears that Mehmet believed that the 
PIIs owed him for the service he provided and believed he was 
still on good terms with these people - a sentiment not 
shared by those PIIs he contacted.  In March / April 2004, 
just before his arrest, Mehmet contacted a witness whom had 
been approached by the media and told them various 
information about Mehmet SERIBAN.  On this occasion Mehmet 
indicated he would "settle accounts" (eg, threatened) with 
the witness for reporting those things in the media. 
Activity of the Network Since Mehmet SERIBAN,s Arrest 
 
In February 2004, the PSST received information that Bayram 
ASLAN and Muslim SERIBAN were recruiting PIIs in Gaziantep 
and Adiyaman for an upcoming venture (F6).  In March 2004, 
further information was received indicating that Muslim 
SERIBAN was about to travel to Indonesia with a group of PIIs 
(C3).  In April 2004, checks confirmed that Muslim SERIBAN 
and three Turkish nationals (identified by the PSST) had 
travelled to Indonesia.  Their activities were monitored in 
Indonesia.  An overt approach was eventually made by 
Indonesian and Australian law enforcement authorities to 
Muslim and the three PIIs at their hotel.  They all stated 
they were tourists and denied any involvement in people 
smuggling.  Within a few days they had all returned to 
Turkey. 
 
Although not confirmed, PSST intelligence strongly points to 
Muslim SERIBAN attempting to put those three persons on a 
vessel being organised by another well-known smuggling group. 
 It is believed that this vessel was bound for New Zealand. 
 
The PSST has information that Muslim is now residing in 
Gaziantep.  He is reported as saying that the Indonesian 
authorities were  cracking down, on Turks in Indonesia, 
that he now wanted to travel to New Zealand to live and would 
take three or four persons with him to New Zealand to fund 
his own travel.  It is not known how he intends to enter New 
Zealand.  He has also mentioned sending people to Canada but 
has said it is difficult to send people there.  These details 
have been provided to the relevant New Zealand and Canadian 
authorities. 
 
Information obtained in late June 2004 was that an associate 
of Mehmet SERIBAN, Garip BUKDACI, who is living in Indonesia, 
together with a person called "Mahmut" (no further details), 
had received a number Turkish PIIs in Indonesia.  These PIIs 
had allegedly travelled to  Indonesia via Thailand.  The 
intended destination for this nascent venture is not yet 
known. 
 
PSST members were until recently in regular contact with the 
SIEV 14 PIIs (these persons were refused entry to Australia, 
later detained in Indonesia, and then deported to Turkey). 
These persons stated they had made a complaint to the local 
Adiyaman police after their attempts to get their money back 
from the organisers (notably Bayram ASLAN who was still in 
Adiyaman at the time) had been unsuccessful.  In April 2004 
these persons reported that Bayram ASLAN had been arrested by 
the local authorities as a result of their complaint.  The 
PSST has requested details from the Turkish authorities to 
confirm this information as well as the nature of the 
charges, however, no details have yet been received. 
However, the PSST has obtained six copies of the statements 
provided by those PIIs. 
 
In July 2004, one of the witnesses reported that Bayram ASLAN 
had been released on bail and had fled to Korea about one 
month previously.  This has not been corroborated and the 
reliability of this witness is questionable (eg, this fact 
had not been mentioned in previous correspondence with the 
PSST). 
 
Recent HS information arising from this investigation 
indicated the presence of at least two other people smuggling 
networks operating in Besni and Gaziantep respectively who 
are smuggling people to Canada.  The Gaziantep network is 
alleged to have previously assisted in recruiting passengers 
for SERIBAN to send to Australia.  The Besni network is 
alleged to have attempted to enter partnership with the 
SERIBANs some time ago, but they (the SERIBANs) reportedly 
refused.  Both the Besni and Gaziantep networks are still 
apparently active and this information has been passed to the 
relevant Canadian authorities. 
 
DATE OF REPORT: 2 AUGUST 2004 
EDELMAN