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Viewing cable 04ROME2631, ITALIAN OFFICIALS DISCUSS GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ROME2631 2004-07-07 05:30 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 002631 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2014 
TAGS: MARR PREL IT GLOBAL DEFENSE FORCES IN ITALY
SUBJECT: ITALIAN OFFICIALS DISCUSS GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW 
    WITH US DELEGATION 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON FOR 
REASONS 1.5(B)(D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  A DELEGATION LED BY LINCOLN BLOOMFIELD JR., 
A/S FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DISCUSSED ITALY-SPECIFIC 
GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW (GPR) PROPOSALS WITH ITALIAN OFFICIALS 
FROM THE DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF AND THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS ON JUNE 16.  CHIEF OF DEFENSE (CHOD) ADMIRAL 
GIAMPAOLO DIPAOLA WAS POSITIVE ABOUT THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF 
THE CHANGES PROPOSED FOR SETAF (VICENZA), NAVEUR (NAPLES), 
6TH FLEET (GAETA) AND SIGONELLA NAVAL AIR STATION 
(SIGONELLA/AGUSTA BAY) BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT POLITICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS WILL NEED TO BE WORKED. (NOTE: THE DEFENSE 
MINISTER AND HIS DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR WERE IN LONDON AND HENCE 
UNAVAILABLE TO MEET WITH THE DELEGATION.  END NOTE.) 
CONSOLIDATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) IN EUROPE AT 
SIGONELLA/AGUSTA BAY WILL LIKELY INVOLVE AN INCREASED US 
FOOTPRINT AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS THAT WILL NEED TO BE 
CAREFULLY EVALUATED, HE SAID.  FREEDOM TO DEPLOY QUICKLY FROM 
SIGONELLA AND VICENZA ALSO WILL BE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE, BUT 
HE NOTED THAT A PARTICULARLY FAVORABLE POLITICAL CLIMATE 
EXISTS NOW FOR FINDING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT FOR 
RAPID RESPONSE-TYPE DEPLOYMENTS. 
 
2. (C) IN A SEPARATE MEETING, MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR 
GIAMPIERO MASSOLO ASSURED THE DELEGATION THAT THE MFA, IN 
COORDINATION WITH THE MOD, WILL CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE US GPR 
PROPOSALS AND WILL THINK CREATIVELY ABOUT WAYS TO ACCOMMODATE 
THE US'S NEED TO BE ABLE TO RAPIDLY DEPLOY FROM ITALIAN 
    INSTALLATIONS. END SUMMARY. 
 
POSITIVE MILITARY RESPONSE 
-------------------------- 
3. (C) A/S BLOOMFIELD AND DEFENSE DASD ANDY HOEHN REVIEWED 
THE PROPOSALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR CHANGES TO US FORCE 
POSTURE IN ITALY DURING A JUNE 16 MEETING WITH THE CHOD, HIS 
CHIEF OF STAFF ADMIRAL BENELLI MANTELLI AND THE HEAD OF 
DEFENSE POLICY AND PLANNING GENERAL MARANI.  BLOOMFIELD 
EXPLAINED THAT IN EUROPE THE GPR IS INTENDED TO POSITION US 
FORCES TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO TODAY'S THREATS, AND TO 
SUPPORT NATO TRANSFORMATION EFFORTS.  WHILE TERRORISM, THE 
GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND PARTS OF ASIA POSE NEW CHALLENGES, 
BLOOMFIELD STRESSED THAT THE US REMAINS COMMITTED TO ITS 
TREATY OBLIGATIONS WORLDWIDE, INCLUDING IN EUROPE.  HOEHN 
NOTED THE NEED FOR US FORCES TO CHANGE IN COORDINATION WITH 
NATO EFFORTS TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE, MOBILE AND RESPONSIVE, 
INCLUDING TO OUT OF AREA THREATS.  HE STRESSED THAT TODAY'S 
THREATS MEAN THAT US AND NATO FORCES MUST BE ABLE TO DEPLOY 
QUICKLY, WHEN AND WHERE NEEDED.  THIS MAKES IT IMPERATIVE 
THAT APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS BE IN PLACE IN ADVANCE TO ALLOW 
QUICK RESPONSE FORCES SUCH AS SOF OR THE 173RD BRIGADE TO 
SURGE WITHOUT DELAY, HE SAID. 
 
4. (C) DIPAOLA SAID THE PROPOSALS TO ADD A THIRD BATTALION TO 
SETAF AT VICENZA, CONSOLIDATE NAVEUR/6TH FLEET HEADQUARTERS 
AT NAPLES, LEAVE THE 6TH FLEET FLAGSHIP AT GAETA AND 
CONSOLIDATE SOF AT SIGONELLA MAKE OPERATIONAL SENSE, FROM A 
MILITARY PERSPECTIVE.  HE NOTED THAT THE CHANGES MAY PROVIDE 
USEFUL OPPORTUNITIES FOR MORE BILATERAL TRAINING AND 
COORDINATION, WHICH ITALY WOULD WELCOME.  HOEHN AGREED THAT 
    THE PROPOSALS OFFER MORE OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOINTNESS, BETTER 
BILATERAL COORDINATION AND CLOSER MIL RELATIONS FROM THE TOP 
ON DOWN.  HOEHN, ALONG WITH EUCOM REAR ADMIRAL GOODWIN, 
CLARIFIED THAT THE CURRENT SOF PROPOSAL ENVISIONS EXPANDED 
OPERATIONS AT NAS SIGONELLA AND NEIGHBORING AGUSTA BAY; 
COMISO IS NOT BEING CONSIDERED FOR USE.  DIPAOLA ADVISED THAT 
INCREASING THE US FOOTPRINT AT SIGONELLA AND FINDING 
ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR RAPID, FLEXIBLE DEPLOYMENTS OF 
SOF AND SETAF FORCES WILL BE SENSITIVE POLITICAL ISSUES.  ANY 
ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AT SIGONELLA WOULD ALSO NEED 
TO BE EVALUATED.  IT WOULD BE IN THE US'S INTEREST TO WORK 
OUT THESE ISSUES NOW, UNDER THE PRO-AMERICAN BERLUSCONI 
GOVERNMENT, DIPAOLA STRESSED. 
 
5. (C) DIPAOLA FLAGGED THE SLOW PROGRESS ON COMPLETING THE 
TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS (TAS) CALLED FOR UNDER THE 1995 MOU 
BETWEEN DOD AND THE MOD (THE "SHELL AGREEMENT") AS ANOTHER 
BILATERAL POLITICAL ISSUE THAT MUST BE SOLVED SOON.  HE 
EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT RECENT NEGOTIATING DELAYS AND 
STRESSED THAT, AFTER NEARLY TEN YEARS, THE TAS NOW NEED TO BE 
CONCLUDED.  BLOOMFIELD RESPONDED THAT A STRONG PARTNERSHIP 
WITH THE ITALIAN MILITARY AND A SHARED PERCEPTION OF NEW 
 
ROME 00002631  002 OF 003 
 
REQUIRE A NEW SECURITY 
STRATEGY THAT INCLUDES BEING ABLE TO QUICKLY DEPLOY MOBILE 
FORCES LIKE SOF AND SETAF. DIPAOLA ASSURED THE DELEGATION 
THAT HE AND OTHER SENIOR ITALIAN OFFICIALS FULLY UNDERSTAND 
THE TERMS UNDER WHICH THE US NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO USE SOF AND 
UNITS OF THE 173RD, INCLUDING FOR US PURPOSES THAT MAY NOT 
ALWAYS BE CONSISTENT WITH ITALIAN POLICIES.  HE NOTED ITALY'S 
LONG HISTORY OF PERMISSIVE MILITARY COOPERATION WITH US 
FORCES AT ITALIAN INSTALLATIONS, WHICH TIGHTENED UP SOMEWHAT 
AFTER THE 1998 CAVALESE CABLE CAR ACCIDENT. ITALY WILL ALWAYS 
TAKE A REALISTIC APPROACH WITH THE US, DIPAOLA SAID, BUT THAT 
DOES NOT MEAN ITALY CAN OR WILL TURN A BLIND EYE. 
 
6. (C) THE FIRST STEP IN FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT TO 
ACCOMMODATE US REQUIREMENTS IS FOR THE US TO CLARIFY HOW MUCH 
FREEDOM OF ACTION IT NEEDS, HE SAID. IF THE US DEFENSE AND 
STATE DEPARTMENTS PRESENT A STATEMENT OF INTENT, DIPAOLA 
SAID, THE ITALIAN MILITARY WILL REVIEW IT AND MAKE A 
RECOMMENDATION TO ITALIAN POLITICAL LEADERS.  HE DISCOURAGED 
PURSUING AN APPROACH THAT INVOLVES PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW OR 
APPROVAL, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE VERY SENSITIVE.  HE 
SUGGESTED THE US MAY WANT TO CONSIDER LINKING US MILITARY 
ACTIVITIES TO COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS, WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE 
A POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE UMBRELLA TO COVER A WIDE RANGE OF 
OPERATIONS. HOEHN AGREED THAT A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WOULD BE 
NEEDED TO AUGMENT EXISTING BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS IN WAYS 
THAT WOULD, IDEALLY, WORK AS WELL AS CURRENT ONES HAVE OVER 
THE YEARS. 

MFA OFFICIALS ALSO RECEPTIVE 
---------------------------- 
7. (C) THE DELEGATION ALSO MET WITH THE MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL 
GIAMPIERO MASSOLO AND OTHER MFA REPRESENTATIVES ON JUNE 16. 
MASSOLO SAID US EFFORTS TO RATIONALIZE ITS MILITARY PRESENCE 
IN A STRATEGIC LOCATION SUCH AS ITALY WERE SENSIBLE.  MFA 
NATO AFFAIRS OFFICE DIRECTOR GIOVANNI BRAUZZI EXPRESSED GREAT 
SATISFACTION THAT US TRANSFORMATION IS OCCURING IN THE 
CONTEXT OF NATO TRANSFORMATION SINCE NATO CONTINUES TO BE THE 
PRIMARY BASIS FOR THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN ITALY.  WHILE 
EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BUILT-IN FLEXIBILITY THAT ALLOW 
ITALY TO EXTEND ACCESS FOR BILATERALLY AGREED PURPOSES, 
INITIATIVES OUTSIDE THE NATO CONTEXT OFTEN REQUIRE 
PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT AND MORE POLITICAL DISCUSSION THAN 
THOSE UNDER A NATO UMBRELLA, HE EXPLAINED.  NOT ALL 
OPERATIONS WILL BE NATO MISSIONS, BLOOMFIELD RESPONDED, AND 
THE US WILL NEED AN AGILITY TO USE RAPID RESPONSE FORCES LIKE 
SOF AND THE 173RD.  THE US WOULD LIKE TO ESTABLISH A 
HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING THAT REFLECTS A SHARED 
PERCEPTION OF NEW THREATS AND THE NEED TO POSITION MILITARIES 
TO RESPOND QUICKLY, HE SAID.  IT WILL BE USEFUL TO CLARIFY 
WHAT INFORMATION ITALIAN LEADERS WOULD NEED TO KNOW IN ORDER 
FOR US FORCES TO DEPLOY FROM ITALIAN INSTALLATIONS WITHOUT 
PROTRACTED PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION, HE ADDED.  MASSOLO NOTED 
THAT US-ITALIAN MILITARY RELATIONS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN EXTREMELY 
FLEXIBLE AND SAID ITALIAN OFFICIALS WILL CAREFULLY CONSIDER 
THE US PROPOSALS AND LOOK FOR CREATIVE APPROACHES. 
 
8. (C) IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HOEHN CLARIFIED THAT INPUT 
FROM ALLIES WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO A REPORT FOR PRESIDENT 
    BUSH THIS SUMMER THAT WILL INDICATE REMAINING ISSUES TO BE 
RESOLVED AND UPDATE CURRENT GPR PROPOSALS.  DETAILS OF THE 
PROPOSALS WILL THEN BE NEGOTIATED WITH HOST NATIONS. 
IMPLEMENTATION WILL TAKE SEVERAL YEARS, DEPENDING ON THE 
NATURE OF THE CHANGES INVOLVED FOR DIFFERENT LOCATIONS.  THE 
US WILL WORK WITH ITALY ON THE TIMELINE FOR IMPLEMENTING 
PROPOSED CHANGES ONCE THE DETAILS HAVE BEEN AGREED, HE SAID. 
 
 
9. (C) COMMENT. THE DELEGATION'S DISCUSSIONS WERE PRODUCTIVE 
AND CLARIFIED THAT THE ITALIAN MILITARY SEES NO SIGNIFICANT 
MILITARY OR TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO THE ITALY-SPECIFIC GPR 
PROPOSALS.  A POTENTIAL POLITICAL HURDLE MAY BE THE US NEED 
FOR ASSURANCES THAT SOF AND THE 173RD FORCES CAN BE DEPLOYED 
RAPIDLY AND UNILATERALLY FROM ITALIAN INSTALLATIONS BASED ON 
OPERATIONAL NEED.  THE CONSQ