Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04ANKARA3728, THE TURKISH MILITARY: OZKOK TRIES TO STRIKE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04ANKARA3728.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA3728 2004-07-01 12:03 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL TU PINR
SUBJECT: THE TURKISH MILITARY:  OZKOK TRIES TO STRIKE 
BALANCE AS DECEMBER 2004 APPROACHES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reasons:  1.4 (B and D). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Turkish General Staff (TGS) CHOD GEN Ozkok continues 
to balance the promotion of Turkey's EU membership prospects 
by reducing the Turkish military's past position at the 
commanding heights of politics with a desire to ensure that 
the Turkish military is able to intervene in domestic 
politics if/when necessary and appropriate.  While skeptical 
about PM Erdogan's intentions and capabilities, Ozkok 
continues to be reluctantly open to working with Erdogan on 
those reform areas that he deems necessary to give Turkey the 
best shot possible at securing a favorable response from the 
EU in December.  He understands the concern of his service 
chiefs, other senior officers and the rest of the secular 
establishment that PM Erdogan and the AK Party (AKP) aim to 
weaken the "secular" state.  At the same time, he has taken 
measures to control the message by clamping down on the 
service chiefs and other members of the Turkish military, 
including restricting their access to USG officials.  This 
has produced an apparently contradictory attitude by some 
senior military officers and other committed secularists who 
simultaneously attribute AKP's coming to power to 
unwarranted, conspiratorial US support, and are increasingly 
trying to woo US support. 
 
2. (C) We expect these disgruntled senior military officers 
to increase their efforts to reach out to US officials to try 
to express their concerns and possibly undermine what Ozkok 
and Erdogan appear to be doing to make the best case for 
Turkey in December 2004.  We recommend that Washington and 
others, if approached, encourage TGS interlocutors to use 
existing official channels to convey their views to ensure 
that we stay on message and speak with one voice.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
UNLIKELY BEDFELLOWS, BUT (CURRENTLY) NO CHOICE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (C) TGS CHOD GEN Ozkok and PM Erdogan are not comfortable 
in their relationship with one another.  They continue to 
meet (often one-on-one) as they have since Ozkok became CHOD 
in August 2002.  While their reasons may differ, Ozkok and 
Erdogan share the view espoused by the majority of the 
Turkish public that a Turkey anchored in the West and the EU 
is the best recipe for political and economic success.  Each 
has a segment of his constituency that is wary of the EU and 
does not believe it is in Turkey's interest to make the 
necessary reforms to secure a date for accession talks in 
December.  Yet, there is no love lost between the two, and 
the question remains whether the modus vivendi they appeared 
to have established initially has held up as Ozkok has become 
disillusioned with Erdogan's and AKP's behavior. 
 
4. (C) Erdogan and Ozkok engaged in a complex game of 
maneuver on Cyprus, with Ozkok making it crystal clear in his 
unusual mid-April press briefing that he considered Erdogan 
and the government to have veered away from the 
government-military understanding on Cyprus reached at the 
January 23 National Security Council meeting.  How closely 
the two are coordinating on Iraq also remains an unresolved 
question for us. 
 
5. (C) By all accounts, Ozkok is as ardent a defender of the 
secular republic as any senior military officer and, as such, 
remains highly distrustful of Erdogan and AKP's intentions. 
The recent controversy over a government proposal to reform 
higher education and give graduates of vocational high 
schools (including religious high schools) greater access to 
high education intensified the establishment's suspicion. 
But the divisions between AKP and the secular establishment 
are more than philosophical:  Erdogan, his government and the 
Anatolian heartland they represent threaten the 
establishment's traditional monopoly of control over the 
economy.  Thus, while philosophical controversies like that 
with vocational high schools may be resolved or indefinitely 
postponed, the differences between AKP and the secular elite 
remain profound. 
 
6. (C) Nonetheless, Ozkok is a pragmatist and a realist: with 
AKP firmly in charge of the political landscape in Turkey and 
without an effective political opposition, Ozkok has no 
viable alternative with whom to work.  While some within the 
Turkish military and the public see the military as the only 
existing, functioning opposition to AKP, Ozkok correctly 
recognizes the limitations (some of which have been 
self-imposed by Ozkok) on the military's ability to directly 
govern the country in 2004.  No one is looking for the 
Turkish military to take over running the country, a step 
that would be the kiss of death for Turkey's EU bid and 
likely for Turkey's economy as well. As a result, Ozkok has 
little real alternative but to work with Erdogan to the 
extent he can while allowing the military to look for ways 
indirectly to exploit and exacerbate Erdogan's and AKP's 
manifest weaknesses. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
OZKOK:  IN CONTROL, TIGHTENING THE REIGNS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Ozkok continues the process of strengthening his 
control over the TGS and the services he began at his first 
High Military Council meeting as CHOD in August 2003.  Many 
of the three-star generals who ran divisions at TGS were then 
retired or reassigned, and replaced by individuals with 
similar backgrounds and outlooks as Ozkok.  Ozkok's 
preference for officers with broad international experience, 
including assignments at NATO and deployments to Bosnia and 
Kosovo, can be seen down to the 06 (colonel) branch chief 
level in TGS.  Ozkok is expected to strengthen his control 
over TGS and the services through the annual promotion and 
assignment process this August.  For example, we do not 
expect him to have difficulties with First Army Commander 
(and former TGS deputy) GEN Buyukanit if the latter becomes 
Land Forces Commander this summer (as expected), since 
Buyukanit wants to succeed Ozkok as CHOD. 
 
8. (C) Ozkok also has re-instituted the monthly TGS press 
conference, where TGS deputy Basbug ("the face of TGS," 
according to one well-connected MFA official) delivers 
lengthy statements on important foreign policy (Iraq and 
Cyprus) and domestic issues, and takes questions from the 
press.  The purpose of these press conferences is two-fold: 
to remind governing AKP and the Turkish public that the 
military is following closely the many important foreign and 
domestic policy issues that confronting Turkey; and two, to 
let the same group know that TGS -- as opposed to the service 
chiefs or retired generals -- speak for the Turkish military. 
 Two recent signs of efforts by Ozkok and Basbug to control 
access (and thus the message) involve us:  one, TGS (through 
the MFA) denied the Ambassador's request to meet with the 
Service chiefs (we had requested the appointments after 
hearing from well-connected contacts that the Service chiefs 
were feeling neglected); and second, TGS declined an 
invitation from the Deputy Chief of Mission to host TGS J5 
Lt. Gen. Babaoglu and his J5 general officers for a working 
lunch.  This kind of limited access was more the norm before 
the Iraq War; reinstituting these restrictions increases 
Ozkok's control over the content and timing of messages 
emanating from the military.  At the same time, Ozkok and 
Basbug continue to make themselves readily accessible to 
visiting US officials and the Ambassador, and, in a departure 
from their predecessors, Ozkok and Basbug also meet with the 
UK Ambassador here. 
 
9. (C) The service chiefs and other senior members of the 
military remain highly suspicious of AKP and are convinced 
that Ozkok is selling out the military and the Republic 
through his reluctant willingness to work with Erodgan to 
move the country forward.  Most of these individuals were 
selected by Ozkok's predecessors, do not possess his 
international experience or Western outlook, and question 
whether secular Turkey and the Turkish military will be 
better off with Turkey as a member of the EU.  While a number 
of senior military officers attribute AKP's coming to power 
to unwarranted, conspiratorial US support, they paradoxically 
also appear to be searching for unconventional ways (i.e. 
conferences in Europe) to get their message across to 
sympathetic senior US official officials. 
 
------------- 
DECEMBER 2004 
------------- 
 
10. (C) We expect Ozkok and Erdogan to continue warily to 
work together during the next six months to take the 
necessary steps to secure an EU accession negotiation date 
from the EU in December.  While Ozkok's hand is likely to be 
further strengthened by the retirement of two of the most 
outspoken service chiefs (Land Forces Commander GEN Yalman 
and Jandarma Commander GEN Eruygur) this summer, he is still 
likely to face some opposition within the military as he 
attempts to move the military and the country forward.  The 
remaining two service chiefs and other senior military 
officers who are distrustful of Ozkok's perceived 
accommodation with Erdogan and fearful that the military's 
sacred place in Turkey's society might be weakened by 
Turkey's drive for entry in to the EU can be expected to 
complicate Ozkok's efforts.  We expect these disgruntled 
senior military officers to increase their efforts to reach 
out (both directly and through intermediaries) to US 
officials to try to express their concerns and possibly 
undermine efforts by Ozkok and Erdogan to secure a favorable 
decision from the EU this December.  We recommend that 
Washington and others, if approached, encourage GOT officials 
to use existing official channels to convey their views to 
ensure that we stay on message and speak with one voice. 
EDELMAN