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Viewing cable 04AMMAN5100, RJ CEO SEES A GOOD YEAR BUT CHALLENGES IN 2004

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04AMMAN5100 2004-06-23 07:47 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Amman
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 005100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
USDOC 4520/ITA/MAC/OME/PTHANOS 
CPA FOR BROWN/MYROW 
DEPARTMENT FOR EB FOR WAYNE/MERMOUD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2014 
TAGS: EAIR BEXP KPRV JO IZ
SUBJECT: RJ CEO SEES A GOOD YEAR BUT CHALLENGES IN 2004 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 3488 
     B. AMMAN 1471 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Royal Jordanian Airlines (RJ) CEO Samer 
Majali briefed ECON/C and SCO on prospects for RJ over the 
near-to-medium term during a June 20 courtesy call at RJ 
headquarters.  Majali believes that despite substantial 
challenges to the airline resulting from higher fuel prices 
and uncertainty following the turnover of authority in Iraq, 
RJ is on track to perform well in 2004, perhaps setting the 
company up for a partial privatization in the near future. 
He also complained of the long lag time that RJ will face 
prior to receiving the 737s that will replace its 
short-to-medium range fleet, but held out hope of an 
additional Boeing purchase.  Majali's insights are useful; he 
may however be on his way out as RJ boss.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------ 
GOOD START TO 2004, BUT FUEL WORRIES 
------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Majali described this year as a renewed chance for 
RJ to dig its way out of the hole into which it has fallen 
over the past three years.  Following the first six months of 
2003, and especially the month-long war in Iraq, during which 
RJ had had "virtually zero" passengers, RJ has seen a steady 
climb in traffic and was now performing substantially better 
than average.  For evidence of this trend, Majali pointed to 
2004 Q1 statistics on seat occupancy on RJ flights (72 
percent vs. a usual percentage in the low sixties) and 
profitability (a small profit for RJ in the quarter vs. a 
usual small loss in Q1 in most years).  Majali attributed the 
increased traffic (and resultant profit increase) to two 
primary factors: a revival in the Jordanian tourism industry 
(septel), and a substantial increase in business travel due 
to Iraq-related business. 
 
3. (SBU) A significant dampener on Majali's profit 
expectations, however, has been the high price of fuel, which 
Majali says is "killing the industry."  According to Majali, 
the crude price swings over the course of the year will 
likely mean the difference between overall profit and loss 
for RJ in 2004.  The surcharge RJ has imposed on tickets 
covers only 20 percent of increased fuel costs, and Majali 
complains that the Jordan Petroleum Refinery Co. (from which 
RJ receives all of its fuel) has given RJ no breaks on price, 
"despite the fact that they are getting all of their oil for 
free." (NOTE: Even if this statement were pertinent, it is 
not entirely accurate - Reftel A) 
 
4. (SBU) The 2004 results take on added importance in view of 
RJ's privatization plans.  Once slotted for a partial (49 
percent) sale to a potential strategic partner, RJ's 
privatization was put on hold in the wake of September 11, 
when a precipitous decline in tourist traffic made RJ's 
balance sheet extremely unattractive to most potential 
partners - many of which suddenly found themselves strapped 
for cash in any case.  With good results in 2004, however, 
Majali anticipates that the government will put ten to thirty 
percent of the company on the block in an IPO in 2005. 
 
---------- 
IRAQ PLANS 
---------- 
 
5. (SBU) Longer-term, RJ continues to view its operations in 
Iraq as a key portion of its overall strategy.  Majali 
downplayed the profit that RJ is making on its twice-a-day 
Amman-Baghdad flight, but implicitly admitted the substantial 
knock-on effects that the route has in increasing traffic on 
its other routes.  He also talked of RJ's interest in 
eventually serving some of the secondary Iraqi airports, 
including Basra and Mosul, saying that while there is not yet 
enough demand to make them profitable, he expects economic 
growth to spur rapid increases over the medium term, assuming 
an acceptable level of security. 
 
6. (SBU) Majali complimented the professionalism of the new 
Iraqi Minister of Transport and the new Iraqi Airways (IAC) 
president - the fourth since the end of the war.  He 
expressed frustration, however, with the uncertainty 
surrounding the end of the CPA.  For example, Majali noted 
that he had been repeatedly told that RJ will no longer be in 
charge of baggage handling at Baghdad International Airport 
(BIAP) after June 30.  However, he has been told just as 
frequently that RJ's successor (IAC) is not ready to take 
over the job.  Further on in the post-transition era, Majali 
expects bruising negotiations with IAC over use of the 
Jordan-Iraq air routes.  Majali says that RJ agreed at the 
beginning of the month to pay "nominal" royalties to IAC on 
its Amman-Baghdad flight (according to the IAC country 
director in Jordan, RJ will pay IAC US $15 per Amman-Baghdad 
one-way passenger, but not retroactively).  Majali appears to 
believe, however, that this is a stopgap and that IAC will 
soon be back for a bigger piece of the pie.  On a positive 
note, however, he knows of no missiles fired against any 
aircraft coming into or out of BIAP in the past three months. 
 All the same, he is trying to keep RJ's profile low, and 
recently refused an interview with a U.S. newspaper on the 
Amman-Baghdad flight. 
 
-------------- 
U.S. CODESHARE 
-------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Another long-term step forward by the airline is the 
impending conclusion of its codeshare agreement with America 
West airlines, which Majali believes should take place within 
the month, after the visit of an auditing team from America 
West and applications by both RJ and America West for 
antitrust waivers.  The agreement will strengthen RJ's direct 
routes from Amman to New York (JFK) and Chicago (O'Hare).  It 
does not however provide any further support to RJ's other 
major routes (primarily to Europe).  Majali also does not 
expect to be able to get a substantial percentage of the 
heavy USG traffic traveling to (and through) Amman until such 
time as RJ is able to fly to Washington (to which America 
West does not fly).  For these reasons, RJ is continuing to 
actively pursue membership in the Star alliance (United, 
Lufthansa, etc.), and to a lesser extent, OneWorld (American, 
British Air, etc.).  It has written off SkyTeam entirely 
after repeated instances of obstructionism by Air France. 
 
--------------- 
BOEING PURCHASE 
--------------- 
 
8. (SBU) SCO raised the planned RJ purchase of five Boeing 
737 aircraft (to replace RJ's aging medium-range A320 fleet - 
Reftel B), and Majali replied that a seven-person team from 
Boeing was currently working out the details of the purchase 
with RJ staff.  He reiterated his frequent complaint about 
the difficulty in getting a quick delivery time for purchased 
aircraft, saying that the decision by Boeing to throttle back 
production to such a large extent in the wake of September 11 
had left a serious backlog of aircraft orders and resulted in 
higher leasing prices for Boeing aircraft - major 
disincentives for airlines wishing to purchase or lease 
Boeing aircraft.  Majali expects to receive only two 737s 
next year, and he said that he is considering elimination of 
only one A320 from the fleet in order to make the RJ fleet a 
bit larger until the other three 737s are delivered in 2006. 
Delivery dates of the four leased 737 aircraft are unknown, 
as the lessor has not yet been selected 
 
9. (SBU) Majali also noted that RJ is looking to increase the 
extent of its regional service due to the rise in 
intra-regional tourism in the Middle East, and that it 
therefore plans to expand the fleet of its short-haul 
subsidiary Royal Wings.  RJ is considering purchase of one or 
more Boeing 717 aircraft to fill this need, though other 
regional jet manufacturers are in the running as well. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (C) RJ is quickly approaching a point of decision, after 
which it will be expected to sink or swim.  The long overdue 
privatization of the line is increasingly viewed as an 
anomaly in a generally successful GOJ privatization program, 
and pressures are building up from several directions for 
Jordan to be opened to free competition.  Not brought up at 
the meeting, but worthy of mention, was last month's GOJ 
pledge for a full Open Skies policy at all Jordanian airports 
by 2007.  In a market with increasingly cutthroat competition 
from a larger and larger array of regional airlines (some 
heavily subsidized by their home governments in the Gulf), RJ 
will need a much more streamlined business model to remain 
afloat, let alone expand.  The airline is betting heavily on 
its operations in Iraq to provide it with a base of 
profitability and a competitive advantage, but events there 
seem likely to quickly diminish RJ's advantage on these 
routes. 
11. (S/NF) RJ's final lunge towards sustainable profitability 
as a private company will likely happen without Majali, 
however.  The 25-year RJ veteran appears to be on his way 
out, the victim of too many disappointing years and too 
little initiative in reforming the company.  In a meeting 
with the Ambassador, King Abdullah noted that he had secretly 
contracted with a consulting firm - without informing RJ or 
his brother Prince Faisal, the "godfather" of aviation in 
Jordan - to undertake an outside review of options for the 
company.  That the King would take such a step is indicative 
of his deep dissatisfaction with the company's performance 
and his belief that radical measures are required to remedy 
the situation.  Jordan's civil aviation sector will likely 
see substantial transformation over the coming 2-3 years. 
GNEHM