This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 001261 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2014 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV OVIP YM COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 
TOWNSEND 
 
REF: A. 02 SANAA 1945 
     ¶B. SANAA 468 
 
Classified By: CDA Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.5 (b. and d.) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Embassy Sanaa warmly welcomes your first visit to 
Yemen.  You will find President Saleh and senior ROYG 
officials keen to hear from you the Washington perspective on 
bilateral and regional CT cooperation as well as the broader 
GWOT.  Since 9/11 Saleh has met with President Bush in 
Washington, received a visit from VP Cheney (March, 2002) and 
multiple visits by DCI Tenet, and FBI Director Mueller.  In 
addition to Saleh (whom you will meet in the Red Sea port 
city of Hodeidah), you will meet with: 
 
-- Acting Foreign Minister Mohieddin al-Dhabi (FM al-Qirbi 
represented Yemen at the AL summit and has not yet returned); 
 
-- Minister of Interior Dr. Rashad al-Alimi (responsible for 
both the Central Security Forces (CSF) and the Yemen Coast 
Guard (YCG), both key CT assets); 
 
-- Political Security (i.e. intelligence) Chief GEN Ghalib 
al-Gamish (who oversees ongoing intel exchange and holds 
security detainees); and 
 
-- Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Finance Alawi Salah 
al-Salami (time permitting) 
 
¶2. (SBU) Your visit is especially timely as Saleh has 
accepted President Bush,s invitation to visit Sea Island in 
conjunction with next month's G-8 summit.  Saleh will also 
see Kofi Annan in NYC and stop in Washington for TBD meetings 
with U.S. officials.  We recommend that your visit conclude 
with a brief airport press conference highlighting the strong 
U.S.-Yemen CT relationship and drawing attention to Saleh's 
acceptance of the POTUS invitation to Sea Island. 
 
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CT Cooperation: Yemen a Partner in GWOT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Your basic message on Yemen's continued progress is 
simple: Yemen is a valued partner in the Global War on 
Terrorism.  Saleh sees Yemen,s pro-U.S. stance in the GWOT 
as a vital Yemeni interest, particularly since the 11/02 
attack on the oil tanker M/V Limburg off Yemen,s southern 
coast.  Security in Yemen is vastly improved compared to a 
year or two ago, and the ROYG continues to log important 
progress, including: 
 
-- The March recapture of USS Cole suspects Jamal Muhammad 
Ahmad  Ali al-Badawi and Fahd Muhammad Ahmad al-Quso; 
 
-- Aggressive CT deployment in the Abyan region involving 
coordination among military and MOI assets (including a 
U.S.-equipped force). 
 
-- The imminent trial of terrorist suspects in four cases: 
the 9/02 incident in an al-Qaida safehouse in Saaa; the 10/02 
M/V Limburg bombing; the 11/02 Hunt Oil Company helicopter 
attack; and an al-Qaida cell rolled up in fall 2003 with a 
long list of targets in Yemen, including the U.S. Ambassador. 
 The trial of the Cole suspects has been delayed until after 
this trial. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Since the awkward period of friction with the FBI 
at the outset of the USS Cole investigation, Saleh has made 
critical decisions to align with the U.S. and confront 
al-Qaida,s in-country presence.  In the face of stiff 
domestic criticism he acknowledged the 11/3/02 Predator 
strike as a joint Yemeni-U.S. operation despite unilateral 
U.S. disclosure that initially embarrassed the ROYG.  At 
present the USG is training the CSF and Yemen,s Special 
Forces.  FMF and IMET funds continue the revitalization of 
Yemen's armed forces and have created the YCG, which hit the 
water last month with eight 44-foot U.S. EDA boats.  Fruitful 
post-9/11 security cooperation set the stage for the return 
of USAID last year and the launching of an ambitious 
development assistance program designed to complement our 
direct CT engagement. 
 
¶5. (U) The following paragraphs provide background on topics 
likely to arise during your visit. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Terrorist Financing and Zindani: Need ROYG Action 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6. (S) Despite nascent efforts to build an effective 
anti-money laundering regime, the ROYG,s capability to stop 
the flow of money is limited.  Since the 2003 passage of a 
money laundering law, Central Bank officials, MFA contacts 
and representatives of private banks have made repeated 
requests for U.S. assistance to build their infrastructure. 
Nevertheless ROYG officials tend to view terrorist financing 
as a problem more for regional neighbors than for Yemen, and 
have expressed to us concern over Gulf financing of extremist 
charities operating in Yemen (ref A).  ROYG officials would 
welcome any information you may wish to offer on U.S. 
strategy to interdict and deter terrorist financing in the 
region. 
 
¶7. (C) The ROYG's non-supportive public posture on the UN 
action freezing Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani's assets 
reflects the domestic sensitivity of his position as a public 
figure widely seen more as a fund-raiser for Palestinian 
humanitarian relief rather than a terrorist.  Saleh dislikes 
him, however, and in February a senior aide told us there was 
"no disagreement or difference" between Yemen and the U.S. on 
Zindani (ref B).  Presidential Advisor Dr. Abdul Karim 
al-Iryani told the Ambassador in March that the ROYG had 
apprehended two couriers with Gulf money intended for 
Zindani.  To date, that is the only visible indication of 
ROYG compliance with the UN sanctions.  The ROYG has used the 
excuse of requesting legal documentation on Zindani's 
culpability and Gulf charities mentioned above to delay 
further action.  With Saleh and (if you see him) Salami you 
may wish to underscore the ROYG,s UN-mandated obligation to: 
 
-- freeze Zindani's financial assets and ensure that funds 
are not made available to designated individuals; 
 
-- prevent Zindani from traveling within the region; and 
 
-- share information on ROYG actions pursuant to UNSCR 1267 
and 1526 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Grey Arms: Need Improved Border Control 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S/NF) In recent months Yemen and Saudi Arabia have 
announced joint efforts to tighten border security, but 
improvement to date appears limited and uneven.  Past 
examples of weapons smuggled from Yemen turning up at attack 
sites in KSA and elsewhere are well known, so the security of 
the country,s land and maritime borders must be a priority 
concern.  You might underscore this point with Interior 
Minister Alimi as well as Saleh.  The USG has installed the 
pisces system here and just initiated the EXBS program for 
further assistance. 
 
¶9. (S/NF) Saleh may mention the case of light weapons seized 
from a dhow of the coast of Yemen by a U.S. Navy ship.  Crew 
and boat were returned to the ROYG, but the weapons remain 
aboard a U.S. vessel required for duty elsewhere.  Saleh 
wants the guns.  In coordination with CENTCOM, we reached 
agreement with the Yemenis that the weapons might/might be 
handed over to Yemen pending a joint USG -ROYG investigation. 
 Should President Saleh raise it, we suggest you praise the 
U.S.-Yemeni cooperation to date on the incident and stress 
that both must work together to ensure that these weapons do 
not fall in the wrong hands. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Future Areas for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Embassy Sanaa has two requests in the area of law 
enforcement cooperation which, as appropriate, you could 
raise: 
 
-- (S/NF) Full biographical data, including photographs and 
fingerprints, for ROYG detainees.  Yemen has emulated Egypt 
in conducting systematic "dialogue" with terrorist suspects 
and releasing those who (a) have committed no crime and (b) 
repent their extremist leanings.  About 200 were released 
last winter, and we have requested biodata on remaining 
detainees prior to any further release.  This is an issue for 
both Interior Minister Alimi and PSO Chief Gamish. 
 
-- (S/NF) Rendition of Badawi and Quso.  The ROYG provided a 
temporizing response -- requesting further documentation -- 
to the formal U.S. rendition request we presented last month. 
 Rendition of Yemeni citizens is forbidden under the Yemeni 
constitution, so a "Yes" is not likely.  You might 
nevertheless probe Alimi on the issue and underscore that 
they are indicted in the United States. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Needed: Funding to Strengthen CT Cooperation with Yemen 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Your exchanges with Saleh and other senior ROYG 
officials will have a strong, positive impact on the CT 
relationship.  There is another step that could increase that 
impact back in Washington.  Current foreign assistance 
legislation prohibits use of FMF for training or equipping 
non-Ministry of Defense forces.  This stricture hurts us in 
Yemen, where the CSO, a paramilitary force of the MOI, is the 
CT unit of choice and has proven itself repeatedly.  State 
and Defense are engaged in seeking a legislative remedy.  An 
additional push from the NSC could help sustain the CT 
engagement that has borne fruit for U.S. interests in Yemen 
since 9/11. 
MISENHEIMER