This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 004506 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SNAR CO GOV
SUBJECT: U/S GROSSMAN MEETS WITH VICE-PRESIDENT SANTOS 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 04176 
 
     ¶B. BOGOTA 04278 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) On April 29, U/S Grossman met Vice-President Santos. 
Grossman said that the USG supports Plan Patriota, and 
praised the GOC's accomplishments in combating narcotics and 
terrorism.  The U/S stressed that the USG will insist on 
maintaining extradition as an effective law enforcement tool, 
and cautioned that much still needs to be done to improve the 
human rights situation.  End Summary. 
 
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Pressing Forward with Security Strategy 
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¶2.  (C) U/S Grossman lauded GOC success combating 
narcoterrorism, and expressed USG support for Plan Patriota 
and the consolidation of Plan Colombia.  The U/S thanked the 
GOC for assistance in the search for the American hostages, 
and said Plan Patriota could bring us even closer to locating 
them.  GOC public security forces must focus on: (1) 
improving cooperation between the military and the police; 
and (2) severing forever ties between the public security 
forces and the paramilitaries by imposing strict discipline. 
The Ambassador highlighted Vice Admiral Soto's response to 
the "Gloria" narcotics incident as an example of quick, 
forceful action. 
 
¶3.  (C) Santos said the GOC agreed with both recommendations. 
 Although military-police cooperation in the field has been 
good, cooperation at the national level needs improvement. 
Santos added that the paramilitaries pose a particular 
challenge, given their strong support in certain communities. 
 However, he is seeing a decline in support by sectors that 
have traditionally supported paramilitary groups; more 
importantly, military and police leaders have also noted this. 
 
¶4.  (C) Grossman asked about the impact of increased public 
security presence, and noted the high level of desertions by 
illegal armed groups.  Santos agreed the desertion results 
were impressive.  He does not expect the same results this 
year, however, since those remaining in the terrorist 
organizations are more likely to be hardcore members.  Santos 
expressed surprise that the FARC had not put up more of a 
fight defending territory.  Perhaps the GOC had overestimated 
the FARC's strength.  Alternatively, perhaps the FARC 
mistakenly expect the GOC to withdraw from FARC areas and, 
more fundamentally, are waiting out Uribe's term.  Santos 
said the FARC must be concerned about Uribe's possible 
re-election, since they lack the resources to last eight 
years of Uribe.  Capture of another key FARC leader could 
start splintering the group. 
 
¶5.  (C) Santos asked for an update on FARC leader "Sonia's" 
extradition.  He also requested additional U.S. support for 
the Colombian Navy (COLNAV), as river operations will be 
crucial in Plan Patriota.  The Ambassador said "Sonia's" 
extradition is proceeding.  He also noted that her capture 
would not have been possible when he arrived last August; the 
improvements in the military's ability to conduct small, 
specialized operations has improved dramatically.  The 
Ambassador added that U.S. assistance to COLNAV increased 
this year, and the Embassy has asked for additional funds for 
it the next two fiscal years. 
 
¶6.  (C) Grossman asked about the possibility of peace 
negotiations with the ELN.  Santos responded that there has 
been no progress either in the GOC or the Catholic Church 
tracks.  The ELN is weak and lacks leadership.  Moreover, its 
cumbersome decision-making process inhibits consensus.  The 
Ambassador added that some believe the ELN's window of 
opportunity ) when they were weak enough to want peace, but 
strong enough to be able to negotiate ) has closed. 
 
¶7.  (C) Santos was puzzled why the price of cocaine has not 
increased, despite the record-levels of aerial and manual 
eradication.  Grossman observed that overall coca production 
went down in the Andean region by 15 percent.  The Ambassador 
added that eradication is working: during 2002-3, 270 tons of 
cocaine was destroyed; however, we lack the knowledge of 
inventory and markets that would allow us to accurately gauge 
the impact. 
 
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The Future of the Paramilitary Peace Process 
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¶8.  (C) Grossman expressed his appreciation for President 
Uribe's April 27 statement on the paramilitary peace process 
(ref B).  He stressed that extradition cannot be a bargaining 
chip in negotiations and asked whether the paramilitaries 
would now be confronted on the battlefield. 
 
¶9.  (C) In response, Santos said: 
 
-- As Uribe has said, this is the paramilitaries' last chance 
to escape military confrontation.  AUC leader Carlos Castano 
had a moderating influence, and his removal means hardliners 
are solely in control of the negotiating process (ref A).  If 
the paramilitaries do not want to negotiate, the military 
will need to challenge them on the battlefield.  The GOC is 
concerned that its public security forces are not capable of 
combating the guerrillas and the paramilitaries 
simultaneously.  Santos added that the paramilitaries are 
more politically savvy than the FARC and enjoy greater 
popular support than the guerrillas. 
 
-- Although extradition is off the negotiating table, there 
might be a need in the future for the GOC to offer a way out 
to those who have demonstrated their commitment to peace and 
renunciation of crime.  Grossman said that there should not 
be any hint that this might be a bargaining chip; Santos 
agreed. 
 
¶10.  (C) The Ambassador asked about paramilitary threats 
against the President.  Santos said there have been instances 
of joint FARC-paramilitary terrorism, and this could grow 
over the next year.  Santos thanked the USG for assistance 
with Uribe's protective security. 
 
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Increase Focus on Human Rights 
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¶11.  (C) Grossman said that the State Department's human 
rights certification process was much more controversial this 
year.  Critics question accountability in the Prosecutor 
General's Office ("Fiscalia"), ties between paramilitaries 
and public security forces, and large-scale detentions.  The 
Ambassador noted the General Del Rio case.  The GOC must deal 
with these issues.  Grossman said that the MOD's recent 
statement about registering NGOs in Choco (septel) had raised 
concerns among human rights groups.  Santos assured Grossman 
that the GOC will continue working hard to improve Colombia's 
human rights situation. 
 
¶12.  (C) The Ambassador expressed concern with the level of 
corruption and paramilitary collusion within the Prosecutor 
General's Office, and called for the establishment of an 
effective anti-corruption unit.  Santos responded that he 
supports Prosecutor General ("Fiscal") Osorio's recent 
dismissals of corrupt officials.  He expressed confidence 
that Osorio will continue cleaning up the Prosecutor 
General's Office, especially with the support of his 
exceptional deputy.  He also lauded the Prosecutor General 
Office's Human Rights Unit, and noted concern for the safety 
of the unit's prosecutors due to their aggressive 
investigations. 
WOOD