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Viewing cable 04MADRID1180, Consular response to Terrorist attacks in

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04MADRID1180 2004-04-07 14:49 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Madrid
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 001180 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR CA/OCS STEVE SENA, CA/OCS/PRI JANE SIGMON 
 
TAGS: CASC CPAS CVIS CMGT PTER SP
SUBJECT: Consular response to Terrorist attacks in 
Madrid on March 11, 2004:  Lessons Learned 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
1. Summary:  March 11, 2004, eleven bombs went off in 
Madrid, killing 191 people and injuring almost 1,500 in 
a series of attacks on commuter trains coming into 
Madrid and at three separate train stations between 
7:30 and 8:00 am.  Both the Consular Section and 
Embassy went into immediate action.  The Consular 
Section had three major goals the first day: obtaining 
information, communicating that information, and 
providing assistance.  By the second day, those goals 
changed to: providing assistance, verifying 
information, and communicating broader information.  In 
addition, attaining information about the alleged 
perpetrators was essential so the visa unit could check 
for lookout information we might have on those 
individuals.  The following is a summary of actions 
taken by the consular section in response to the 
terrorist attack, and we hope can serve as a helpful 
framework for other consular sections.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Obtaining Information 
--------------------- 
 
2.  The consular section immediately recognized their 
need to know what had happened and if there were any 
American citizen victims.  We came together as a group 
for a brief meeting at OOB, we shared the information 
we had individually gathered, and specific tasks were 
assigned.  All of us were in shock, many concerned 
about family and friends, and coming together as a 
section initially was an important first step. Through 
regular group meetings and clear assignment of duties, 
everyone contributed to our ability to respond as a 
team to the crisis. Some staff performed regular duties 
like interviewing the visa and passport applicants who 
appeared for service.  Processing these routine walk- 
ins and pre-scheduled visa interviews, was critical to 
providing a semblance of normality and freed up other 
staff to focus on crisis response tasks.  We recognized 
that it was vitally important that everyone felt he/she 
was doing valuable work and through the clear 
designation of tasks and maintaining office 
communication through frequent short meetings to touch 
base, the sense of teamwork was enhanced. 
 
     -One FSN tracked news reports and recorded solid 
     leads and factual development.  Radio and TV 
     monitors in the Consular Section were tuned into 
     different major news sources.  They provided us 
     with a source of immediate information and 
     prevented us from falling behind in communal 
     updates.  One FSN's task was to gather and 
     corroborate the information coming from the 
     various sources allowing us to be sure we had 
     accurate and timely information. 
 
     -Each person was asked to reach out to his/her 
     best contacts in local police, media and emergency 
     assistance providers.  (For example, someone might 
     have had a friend/relative working at the train 
     station or in the press at the scene.)  These 
     informal contacts created a network of resources 
     for information, which was not available through 
     media broadcasts. 
 
     -Given that we have a large number of student 
     groups, we had our intern reach out to directors 
     of major university programs to ask them to 
     confirm the welfare of their students.  We could 
     use this information in responding to calls, e.g. 
     Syracuse University, NYU, Arizona State, Oberlin, 
     etc. have been contacted and confirmed all their 
     students are OK.  (Throughout the year we maintain 
     an active outreach program with the Universities, 
     and the good contacts with program directors 
     really helped us in this situation.) 
 
     -Throughout the day we used an email collective 
     among consular section chiefs in Madrid to share 
     information continually, touching base on reported 
     injuries/deaths and on travel advice. 
 
     -One FSN and one FSO kept track of all the call-in 
     sheets (see item on Talking Points below), to see 
     if any likely victims could be identified from 
     information provided by callers. 
 
     -The Spanish government put a list of injured 
     victims who had been identified on the Internet. 
     We were able to search that site and provide the 
     reference to callers so they could check 
     personally. 
 
     -The FSOs began running the Internet list of 
     injured victims through PIERS to see if we could 
     find any matches. We would print out and call 
     likely matches, and we were able to eliminate a 
     number of possible victims in this way, when we 
     could confirm that the match in PIERS was safe and 
     sound.  FSNs ran any possible hits through the ACS 
     registration system 
 
     -About 3pm, the CG and Senior ACS FSN went to the 
     three major hospitals providing assistance to the 
     majority of victims and to the morgue to search 
     for American victims.  We offered to be alert to 
     other foreign victims who might come to our 
     attention, and told the other consular section 
     chiefs at other embassies in Madrid through our CG 
     email collective. 
 
------------------------- 
Communicating Information 
------------------------- 
 
3.  We found that obtaining information and 
communicating that information regularly were 
inextricably linked.  Both the Department and the front 
office were eager for any concrete information about 
victims.  We provided regular reports throughout the 
day. 
 
     -First we called the Operations Center and asked 
     to speak to the Consular Duty officer to inform 
     her of the bombings.  We had limited information, 
     but this served as a heads up to establish a line 
     of communication. 
 
     -Each section/agency in the embassy was asked to 
     confirm that all staff were accounted for.  We 
     told everyone in the embassy to call home to be 
     sure our families were ok and to inform our 
     families of our own well being. 
 
     -We contacted colleagues at other embassies in 
     Madrid through an email collective among consular 
     section chiefs, which was already established and 
     active.  This group was very supportive and email 
     allowed us to keep track without waiting for calls 
     to go through.  Phone systems were disrupted most 
     of the day. 
 
     -The Embassy held an early morning briefing and 
     arranged for an all agency EAC for early 
     afternoon. 
 
     -The Ambassador held an embassy wide town meeting 
     in the afternoon. 
 
     -We drafted talking points for callers, with a 
     standard set of questions attached:  Who is 
     calling, who are you calling about, why are you 
     concerned (i.e. what makes you think your 
     friend/relative might have been in the train), 
     contact information for all parties, date and time 
     of the call and who took the call.  These talking 
     points were distributed throughout the embassy and 
     sent to OCS for them to send on to the US phone 
     information line.  We wanted to provide 
     information and obtain information efficiently and 
     to keep track of everything in a usable format. 
 
     -We turned the talking points into a Warden 
     message, had it cleared with the duty officer, and 
     included in the message the request that everyone 
     should call home to let family/friends know they 
     were ok. 
 
     -We continued to meet as a group in the consular 
     section every hour or so to update each other on 
     information and activities. 
 
     -We updated the talking points to address the most 
     frequently asked questions; and we sent a second, 
     updated Warden message in the afternoon.  We 
     provided the updated information to OCS so they 
     could give it to the OCS information contractor. 
 
     -We created a roster for after-hours work and 
     double-checked our home phone/cell phone telephone 
     tree list. 
 
     -We confirmed the instructions for sending Warden 
     messages so anyone could activate the warden email 
     and fax lists, not just the staff normally 
     assigned.  This meant the folks on the duty roster 
     had tools necessary if needed. 
 
     -We touched base with other consular operations in 
     country via email and phone (Consulate General 
     Barcelona and six consular agencies).  We felt the 
     email contact worked best to ensure everyone had 
     the same information, but follow-up phone calls 
     were effective in reassuring our colleagues we 
     were fine.  It also meant we had them on tap for 
     additional assistance if needed.  We also needed 
     to be sure they were not experiencing any 
     difficulties. 
     -We kept in touch with OCS regularly by phone and 
     email throughout the day.  A series of meetings 
     throughout the day were held with other embassy 
     sections.  Short, focused meetings worked best. 
 
     -Upon return from the hospitals and morgue, about 
     9:30 pm, the CG had a meeting with about ten 
     consular staff working late, called the Ambassador 
     and Consular Duty officer in the Department and 
     sent a short email to OCS. 
 
     -The day after the attacks in coordination with 
     OCS, we issued an updated CIS and a Public 
     Announcement on the acts of violence, addressing 
     travel concerns. 
 
     -The following Monday the CG went to Alcala de 
     Henares, where about 200 Americans are studying, 
     for a group meeting. This was the point of origin 
     of the trains, and the students were appreciative 
     of the personal outreach and reassurance. 
 
-------------------- 
Providing Assistance 
-------------------- 
 
  4.   We identified three American victims of the 
attack. Fortunately all three suffered relatively minor 
physical Injuries, and there were no reported deaths. 
Once the individuals were identified (using the 
Internet lists, PIERS, and personal contacts), we 
called them to make initial contact. 
 
     -We contacted possible victims and/or emergency 
     contacts using the information on passports / 
     registration lists and PIERS.  We were able to 
     eliminate some individuals with name match in this 
     way as they or their family confirmed they were 
     not in Madrid at the time. 
 
     -We asked the victims to come in.  The first 
     victim who came in actually arrived to apply for a 
     replacement passport.   One was hesitant to use 
     public transportation, but did come in on Monday 
     even though we offered to come to her.  The third 
     has been in contact by phone only and is still 
     hesitant to get on the public transportation. 
 
     -The Legat at post wanted to talk with American 
     victims.  We made those contact arrangements.  We 
     also identified another American who was in the 
     train but not physically injured. 
 
     -We requested expedited processing for family 
     members of affected people should they need 
     passports in the US.  The DAS/PPT sent a message 
     to all PPT agency directors to expedite emergency 
     issuance and waive the expedite fees. 
 
     -When it became clear that many victims were South 
     Americans, we asked VO to assist in getting a 
     message to all WHA posts to request expeditious 
     visa processing for family/friends if needed.  VO 
     sent an ALDAC to WHA posts. 
 
     -We continue to maintain contact and follow up 
     with the American victims. 
 
----------- 
Visa Issues 
----------- 
 
5.  As the Spanish law enforcement officials began to 
identify, arrest and pursue suspects, we worked with 
other agencies in the embassy to obtain specific 
identifying information so we could run name checks 
through the CCD and check our own issuance records 
We were disturbed to note that none of the names we 
ran resulted in hits based on prior Visas Viper 
Submissions.   We learned that one person had been 
issued a visa (not one of the principal 
suspects), and we pulled up the application and 
provided it to the VO duty officer, the RSO, DS duty 
officer, Legat and others requesting with a need to 
know.  We reviewed our issuance practices, management 
review of cases, and provided a context to those 
requesting the applications so they could better 
understand how we adjudicate cases and make our 
decisions.  For example, the issuance was to a non 
Spanish citizen, but in the six weeks preceding the 
bomb attacks, we had adjudicated applications from 90 
different nationalities.  This information was 
essential for non-consular/visa officials to 
understand why we might have 
issued this individual. 
 
-------------------- 
Organizing Ourselves 
-------------------- 
 
6.  One of the basic lessons learned for us, was 
reviewing how we organized ourselves to accomplish our 
goals. 
 
     -      Regular meetings:  We gathered regularly 
        with different groups, large and small.  The 
        meetings were short and specific goals were 
        important.  However, coming together as a 
        group helped us keep a feeling of teamwork as 
        we went about our individual tasks. 
 
     -     Clear specific tasking:  Each person needed 
        to be clear on his/her role.  This enabled us 
        to concentrate, bring specifics to the 
        meetings, and not get distracted with 
        peripheral things. 
 
     -     Created roster for after-hours work, 
        confirmed home and cell phone numbers.  The 
        people who could stay, did, those with family 
        commitments could leave. We knew who could be 
        called in for back up, those needing rest 
        could get it. 
 
     -     Email collectives - This was very important 
        for efficient communications especially when 
        you want to get information distributed but 
        phone lines are disrupted.  Very efficient for 
        getting clear information in brief format. 
 
     -      Wearing identifying tags: When we went to 
        the sites we used badge like tags to identify 
        ourselves. This way people could identify us 
        as US government officials/employees and could 
        approach us for assistance if needed.  We had 
        tags pre-made from when we went to the airport 
        after 9/11 
 
     -     Taking care of each other - We brought in 
        food to share.  The Ambassador brought us 
        dinner the first night from his own kitchen. 
        We sent tired people home.  We supported 
        people when they were in distress and let 
        ourselves cry if needed.  We tried to see when 
        someone needed a quiet supportive talk and to 
        pull individuals aside to talk it out a bit 
        when they looked in need. We still need this 
        as the stress and anxiety has been continuing 
        and we need to be sure renew our reserves 
        physically and psychically in the event 
        further events occur. 
 
--------------- 
Lessons Learned 
--------------- 
 
7.  Outreach and good contacts show their value in a 
crisis situation.  Regular communication is essential. 
Taking care of each other is vital.  Being in a country 
with a strong infrastructure makes your job a lot 
easier.  Let's hope no other post in the world needs 
this summary. 
 
Manzanares