This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 004214 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR DELAURENTIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KJUS PTER ELAB PROP MOPS CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA'S DEBATE OVER MASS DETENTIONS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Some human rights NGOs oppose the GOC's policy of 
large-scale detentions.  The GOC, however, insists that such 
detentions are consistent with legal norms and points out 
that between 60 and 70 percent of persons arrested in such 
operations remain in custody based on judicially-sanctioned 
orders for investigative detention.  The government's Office 
of the Inspector General ("Procuraduria") has identified 
irregularities in some mass detentions, but claims it has 
successfully intervened to solve these problems without 
opposition from other GOC entities.  Partly because the GOC 
has shown that the state can effectively police itself in 
these cases, a senior ICRC official in Colombia (strictly 
protect) told the Embassy he believes the GOC's use of 
large-scale detentions are not arbitrary.  Several case 
studies reveal that despite the legal complexities of 
detentions, their imperfect results, and the adverse 
publicity they often generate, they are one of the most 
effective tools the GOC has to isolate and incapacitate 
paramilitary and guerrilla terrorists.  End Summary. 
 
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The Debate over Mass Detentions 
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¶2. (U) The GOC's "Democratic Security Policy" and its use of 
large-scale detentions to ferret out terrorists operating 
clandestinely among the civilian population have come under 
heavy criticism from political opponents and human rights 
groups.  President Alvaro Uribe has stood by the practice, 
stating during his recent trip to Europe that large-scale 
detentions are a key component of the GOC's "strategy for 
isolating terrorists, with the aim of condemning them to live 
in woodland hideouts, feeding on roots." 
 
¶3. (U) Some Colombian NGOs have linked the practice to other 
GOC security initiatives such as the hometown soldier program 
("soldados campesinos") and the informants network that they 
allege improperly involve civilians in the internal armed 
conflict.  They also accuse the Government of using mass 
detentions to punish the political opposition, and claim that 
detainees subsequently face higher risks of violence for 
allegedly being terrorist -- or government -- collaborators. 
On February 18, a group of Colombian NGOs issued a report 
that claimed that 90 percent of mass detentions were 
arbitrary.  According to the Committee in Solidarity with 
Political Prisoners (CSPP), which focuses on the rights and 
treatment of persons detained for politically motivated 
crimes, particularly rebellion and subversion, 4,846 people 
accused of collaborating with guerrillas were detained in 
large-scale detentions in 2003.  The CSPP characterized 3,939 
of these detentions as "arbitrary" and claimed that 3,750 of 
these detainees were released for lack of evidence.  The NGO 
report also criticized the use of information received from 
confidential informants to justify the detentions. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶4. (U) GOC numbers for large-scale detentions are 
significantly lower than CSPP estimates, largely because of 
the time differences (hours vs. days for example) in how a 
"detention" is defined.  However, GOC numbers' themselves 
confirm NGO claims that many persons arrested in mass 
detentions were soon released.  According to the Prosecutor 
General's Office ("Fiscalia"), of 1,264 persons arrested in 
31 mass detentions, 414 have been released.  NGOs cite this 
fact as additional evidence that the detentions were 
arbitrary.  However, according to the Fiscalia, the arrests 
were the result of careful planning that targeted specific 
individuals.  The Fiscalia continues to gather evidence 
against the 850 persons arrested in these detentions who 
remain in custody, but only 53 of whom have been formally 
indicted. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Mass Detentions and the Colombian Judicial System 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶5. (U) According to a 1994 Constitutional Court ruling, 
non-judicial authorities are permitted to "materially 
apprehend a person under certain circumstances and with 
certain formalities, without first obtaining a judicial 
order."  The ruling states that such detentions must be based 
on reasonable evidence, warranted by exigent circumstances, 
limited in time and scope, consistent with principles of 
fairness and equality, and subject to habeas corpus.  The 
recently approved anti-terrorism statute, which has yet to 
face Constitutional Court scrutiny, permits members of the 
security forces to make provisional arrests, with or without 
prior judicial approval, in cases related to terrorism. 
 
¶6. (U) In Colombia, anyone detained by government authorities 
must be brought before a senior prosecutor within 36 hours of 
his or her detention.  The hearing must take place in the 
presence of the detainee's attorney or a court-appointed 
public defender.  The senior prosecutor is required to rule 
on the legality of the detention within an additional 36 
hours and decide whether the case merits formal 
investigation.  If an investigation is warranted, the case is 
assigned to a different prosecutor and a formal investigation 
begins.  Otherwise, the detainee is released. 
 
¶7. (U) Colombia's legal system divides judicial proceedings 
into various stages, each of which should be completed within 
a limited period of time, which varies according to the 
alleged crime and the number of persons under investigation. 
If a formal investigation is not completed within the 
prescribed time limit, a suspect must be released.  Upon 
completion of the investigative stage, in which prosecutors, 
police, the Inspector General's Office ("Procuraduria"), and 
the defense all have a say, the prosecutor assigned to the 
case decides whether it should go to trial.  Trial consists 
of two phases: 1) presentation of evidence by all parties; 
and 2) verdict and sentencing.  Both of these phases must 
also be completed within prescribed time limits. 
 
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ICRC: GOC Complying with Human Rights Norms 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) According to Max Furrer (strictly protect), Protection 
Coordinator for the Colombia office of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), although arrests have 
occurred on a large scale, the ICRC does not consider them 
arbitrary.  According the ICRC's understanding of 
international humanitarian law (IHL), an arbitrary detention 
occurs when there is no arrest warrant or right to habeas 
corpus.  However, Furrer said, most persons arrested during 
these detentions had outstanding arrest warrants, while 
others were held based on evidence gathered at the scene or 
shortly thereafter.  Persons against whom credible evidence 
could not be found were released within a reasonable time. 
Furrer recognized that targeted groups operate clandestinely 
within the civilian population in areas where the government 
is trying to re-assert state control. 
 
¶9. (C) Furrer said government authorities in any country have 
a right to ask for a person's identification and even detain 
persons temporarily if they suspect they are involved in 
criminal activities.  If innocent detainees are released 
within a reasonable period of time, due process has been 
respected and detentions should not be considered arbitrary. 
 
¶10. (C) From Furrer's perspective, mistreatment of detainees 
has not increased as a result of mass detentions.  Furrer 
said that mistreatment of prisoners and detainees in Colombia 
was not systemic or gross, but rather the result of 
occasional heavy-handedness by police, soldiers, and prison 
guards.  Furrer also said the GOC does not carry out 
large-scale detentions to target organizations or individuals 
for political reasons. 
 
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Inspector General Remedying Irregularities 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (U) Colombian Inspector General ("Procurador General") 
Edgardo Maya acknowledged in a public report that the 
security forces have made mistakes during large-scale 
detentions, primarily related to an absence of arrest 
warrants and other violations of judicial guarantees.  For 
example, following Operation "Cafe," conducted in October 
2003 in the towns of Anserma and Riosucio, Caldas department, 
the Inspector General's Office requested and obtained the 
release of 51 of 95 detainees because no arrest warrants had 
been prepared against them.  According to the Inspector 
General's Office, 754 of 1,957 persons detained for the 
crimes of rebellion, conspiracy, and/or narcotics trafficking 
between January 2003 and February 2004, or 38 percent of all 
detainees, were released because of procedural 
irregularities.  The Inspector General said, however, that 
his office has successfully intervened to protect citizens' 
rights in all cases in which such irregularities have arisen, 
without opposition from other government entities. 
 
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Case Studies 
------------ 
 
¶12. (U) Several examples can help clarify the nature of mass 
detentions and the circumstances under which they occur. 
 
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Cartagena del Chaira, Caqueta Department 
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¶13. (U) On September 6, 2003, soldiers and police surrounded 
the town of Cartagena del Chaira, Caqueta department, and 
"rounded up" nearly 600 people.  Residents complained that 
the operation was indiscriminate and that police arrived with 
incomplete search and arrest warrants that they filled in 
during the day based on evidence from unidentified 
confidential informants.  However, according to the Fiscalia, 
 
SIPDIS 
prosecutors had 95 completed arrest warrants, 74 of which 
were successfully executed against alleged members of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  Edelberto 
Diaz, former director of the Department of Administrative 
Security (DAS) in Caqueta department and current assistant 
director of investigations in Bogota defended the detentions, 
emphasizing that all detainees were formally processed at the 
prosecutors' office and all those ultimately arrested had 
outstanding warrants.  He said the town's residents were 
temporarily detained both for security reasons and to verify 
their identities. 
 
¶14. (U)  On September 29, the Fiscalia issued investigative 
detention orders ("medidas de aseguramiento") against 67 
detainees for the crime of rebellion and released seven 
others.  On December 23, the Fiscalia issued investigative 
detention orders against 12 other town residents with 
outstanding arrest warrants who were not detained during the 
September 6 operation.  Outstanding arrest warrants against 
another nine suspects not found that day were rescinded.  On 
January 11, twelve detainees were released based on 
exculpatory evidence.  As of March 15, the rest of the 
original detainees remained in the custody of the Fiscalia. 
 
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Saravena, Arauca Department 
--------------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) On November 12, 2002, GOC authorities, including 
representatives of the local human rights unit of the 
Fiscalia and members of the Colombian National Police (CNP), 
Colombian Army Special Forces, and the Colombian Army's Third 
Mobile Brigade, detained 85 persons in a series of 
coordinated raids in the town of Saravena, Arauca department. 
 Detainees were temporarily held in a soccer stadium while 
authorities confirmed their identities.  The Fiscalia says 
detainees were held in the stadium because officials could 
not process them safely on city streets.  Saravena, one of 
Colombia's most violent cities, is home to many FARC and 
National Liberation Army (ELN) sympathizers and clandestine 
operatives.  Civilian prosecutors throughout Arauca, 
including Saravena, live and work on military bases for their 
own protection and do not leave them without protective 
details.  Ten detainees were confirmed to have outstanding 
arrest warrants for alleged membership in the FARC's 10th 
Front and 33 others were linked to ELN urban units.  The 
following week, 43 detainees were transferred to Bogota for 
investigation by the Fiscalia's Anti-Terrorism Unit.  All 
other detainees were released. 
 
¶16. (U) Prosecutors indicted 37 detainees, but because all 
were charged with rebellion -- a crime normally heard in a 
lower court (cases such as terrorism and narcotics 
trafficking are heard in higher courts located in department 
capitals and Bogota) -- the cases were assigned to a local 
judge in Saravena.  In November 2003, the Fiscalia convinced 
the Colombian Supreme Court to return the case to Bogota 
because the presiding judge in Saravena could face undue 
pressure from local guerrillas.  However, delays caused by 
Arauca judicial authorities forced the newly-assigned 
presiding judge in Bogota to order the release of all 37 
prisoners in early February because the prescribed time limit 
for that stage of the judicial process had elapsed.  Although 
the case continues, all the accused have disappeared and it 
is unlikely authorities will re-arrest many of these 
fugitives in the foreseeable future.  The Inspector General's 
Office is investigating events that led to the prisoners' 
release. 
 
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Cucuta, Norte de Santander Department 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (U)  From December 9-13, 2003, prosecutors from the 
Fiscalia's national Human Rights Unit in Bogota, supported by 
elements of the CNP and the Fiscalia's Corps of Technical 
Investigators (CTI), executed 30 arrest warrants against 
paramilitaries in Cucuta, Norte de Santander department, 
suspected of scores of murders and other human rights 
violations, including the May 2003 disappearance of a CTI 
investigator and the October 2003 murder of the husband of 
the Fiscalia's departmental director.  The Fiscalia ordered 
the investigative detention of 25 of the detainees after 
releasing five others for lack of evidence.  Seven other 
presumed paramilitaries were subsequently arrested based on 
testimony from cooperative detainees.  All 32 suspects remain 
in custody pending completion of investigations against them. 
 
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Comment: Detentions Large-Scale, but not Arbitrary 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶18. (C) The GOC's policy of so-called "mass detentions," 
although controversial and imperfect, has captured hundreds 
of FARC, ELN and paramilitary terrorists and support 
personnel.  Although irregularities have occurred during 
large-scale judicial operations, the government, through the 
Office of the Inspector General, has worked to police itself. 
 But far too many prisoners remain in custody without 
adequate, timely resolution of their cases.  We will continue 
to urge the GOC to better target arrests on the one hand, and 
to move them more rapidly through the judicial process on the 
other. 
WOOD