This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001455 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR BURNS/SATTERFIELD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2009 
TAGS: ECON PREL KWBG IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: VIOLENT WEEKEND IN GAZA - IS THIS THE STORM BEFORE 
THE QUIET? 
 
Classified By: Economic Counselor Ted Mann, Reasons 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
This cable has been cleared by ConGen Jerusalem. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On Saturday, March 6, four suicide bombers 
who were apparently en route to Erez crossing detonated 
prematurely, killing themselves and two PA security officers. 
 Eighteen persons were injured as a result of the explosion 
and/or return fire from the IDF.  On Sunday March 7, the IDF 
staged a large-scale incursion into the adjacent Bureij and 
Nuseirat refugee camps and met with significant resistance 
from armed militiamen and other camp residents.  As a result 
of the fighting, 14 Palestinians died, including nine Hamas 
members and three youth civilians, all under age 15.  No 
Israeli injuries resulted from the incursion.  Gaza contacts 
expressed dismay that militants continue to target Erez 
crossing, noting that it only increases the hardships for 
laborers.  However, public criticism of acts of "resistance" 
remains taboo.  Regarding the camp incursion, many saw 
inconsistencies between what they view as "heavy-handed" IDF 
tactics, and the GOI's announced withdrawal plans.  Contacts 
predicted that both Palestinian militants and the GOI would 
continue to "hit one another" in order to ensure that neither 
was able to "claim the victory" post-withdrawal.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Erez - Public Unhappy About Target, But Taboo to Criticize 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) On March 6, militants attempted a sophisticated 
attack, driving two explosive-laden jeeps, disguised to look 
like IDF vehicles, towards Erez crossing.  According to 
UNRWA,  the first jeep approached an IDF position and 
militants opened fire on the soldiers.  The soldiers returned 
fire, killing the militants.  The second jeep exploded 
(apparently prematurely) near the Palestinian checkpoint, 
killing the two militants inside and two members of the 
Palestinian National Security Forces (NSF).  The IDF 
responded by directing heavy fire towards the Palestinian 
position.  A total of eighteen persons were injured, 
including twelve security officials and a five-year-old boy 
as a result of the explosion and/or return fire from the IDF. 
 Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Al-Aqsa brigades 
claimed responsibility for this coordinated attack.  The GOI 
closed Erez crossing after the attack. 
 
¶3.  (C) Gaza contacts reported that most ordinary Gazans were 
dissatisfied with the militants' apparent decision to target 
Erez crossing over the past few months.  Everyone knows, they 
said, that these actions will have a negative impact on the 
workers and any other Palestinian needing to use that 
crossing.  Journalist contacts Tagrid El-Khoudary (N.Y. 
Times) and Saud Abu Ramadan (Reuters) said that there was 
lots of grumbling on the street, in grocery stores, and 
throughout the community as people predicted bitterly that 
workers would again lose several days worth of wages.  When 
pressed, however, El-Khoudary said that all shied from 
criticizing the militants directly and placed blame squarely 
upon Israel for the occupation.  Salah Sakka, a member of the 
Gaza municipal council, said, "Even though we all disagree 
with that target, no one would dare to complain.  We are all 
afraid of the militants and, in addition, we do not want to 
be viewed as traitors." 
 
¶4.  (C) Asked whether such attacks, which have such a direct 
and clear negative impact on ordinary Palestinians, were 
likely to weaken support for the militant groups, contacts 
replied, "no."  El-Khoudary noted that the militant groups 
did attempt to ward off any potential backlash from the 
public by noting that they "deliberately" chose a day 
(Saturday), on which no workers would be present, in order to 
avoid accidentally harming them in the explosion. 
 
¶5.  (C) PLC member Ziad Abu Amr, speculated that militants 
have switched to attacking Erez, as opposed to settlements 
for example, merely because it is easier.  Gaining access to 
Erez is much more feasible than attempting to penetrate 
settlement security.  A successful attack at Erez is also 
likely to result in higher Israeli casualties, he opined. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
IDF Incursion - 14 Palestinians Killed; Hamas Vows Revenge 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) On Sunday, March 7, the IDF staged an incursion into 
El-Bureij and Nuseirat refugee camps.  According to DAO 
sources, the purpose of the operation was to strike at an 
area known for launching mortar and anti-tank fire.  DAO 
sources said that Palestinians responded aggressively with 
numerous armed men moving to engage IDF forces with anti-tank 
rocket fire and grenades.  Since the first of March, there 
have been fourteen mortar attacks from Gaza, but no injuries 
or significant damage. 
 
¶7.  (C) As a result of the fighting, fourteen Palestinians 
were killed -- nine Hamas members, one Palestinian Resistance 
member, and four civilians, including three children.  Dozens 
of others, mostly youth, were injured.  The Israeli press 
reported widely that the incursion, which began in the early 
morning hours, was meant to be brief.  The IDF was compelled, 
however, to stay longer than anticipated when a tank became 
temporarily disabled, according to these reports.  The fact 
that the IDF was still present in the area when the 
work/school day began likely contributed to increased 
casualties, particularly among the youth.  The nine-year-old 
boy who was killed, for example, dressed in his school 
uniform and told his mother that he was going to school. 
Instead of going to classes, however, he went to the scene of 
the still on-going clashes where he was killed.  DAO sources 
did not report a disabled tank, however analysts said the 
scenario reported in the press seemed "plausible." 
 
¶8.  (C) El-Khoudary interviewed a family whose home the IDF 
used for sniper positions.  El-Khodary reported that the 
incursion was unexpected.  The IDF allegedly "invaded" the 
home and locked 20 members of the family into one room.  Once 
released, the family purportedly found their home 
"ransacked", their garden "mangled", and several items of 
jewelry and cash missing. 
 
¶9.  (U) Contacts reported that there was "a lot of anger" in 
the streets as funerals concluded on March 8.  Many 
questioned why Israel would attempt such a large-scale 
operation at a time when PM Sharon has announced his 
intention to withdraw from the Gaza Strip.  In their public 
statements, both Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades promised 
to exact a "painful" revenge, for the operation and both 
linked the U.S. and Israel in their vituperation.  Hamas went 
so for as to allege that the U.S. "approved" Israel's 
incursion. 
 
------------------- 
And Where's the PA? 
------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Gaza contacts universally dismissed the role of the 
PA in responding to the incursions.  One contact said, "The 
PA does not exist in Gaza."  Palestinian national television 
covered the incursions extensively but broadcast only 
interviews from low-ranking PA officials, according to 
contacts.  Salah Sakka said that listening to the PA after 
these incursions is akin to pressing the "play" button on a 
tape recorder:  The PA condemns the "massacre;" then urges 
citizens to keep the faith and uphold the resistance. 
Although the top Hamas leaders did not grant interviews due 
to concerns for their personal security, Hamas did stage a 
large rally in the camps. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Israel and Palestinians - Scoring Points Before Withdrawal? 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶11.  (U) Both Israeli and Palestinian media are replete with 
speculation that the GOI is attempting to "hit Gaza hard" 
before withdrawal so that it is not seen as "leaving with its 
tail between its legs."  Outgoing IDF commander Brigadier 
General Gadi Shamni was circumspect in a March 8 interview 
carried by the left-leaning daily, Ha'aretz.  Shamni 
emphasized that withdrawal decisions were up to the political 
echelon and the IDF would continue carrying out its mission 
until those decisions were finalized.  Shamni, however, 
emphasized that the IDF was "winning and had no problem 
continuing to fight."  Shamni added that "IDF pressure would 
continue to increase," the extent of military pressure being 
an important element in "dealing with terror." 
 
¶12.  (C) PLC member Abu Amr averred that both Israel and the 
militants may be "trying to score points" with each, 
determined that the other not walk away in triumph following 
the withdrawal.  Abu Amr said that militants are trying to 
send a message to both Israel and the PA.  He said to Israel, 
the message is that the withdrawal must be more than a 
security arrangement.  It must be part of a broader political 
agenda; otherwise attacks will continue.  To the PA, the 
attacks represent a jockeying for power.  The attacks say 
that we (the militants) will not be ignored and we must be 
brought into national political arrangements following the 
withdrawal. 
 
¶13.  (C) Abu Amr questioned the motivations behind the 
incursion and other recent Israeli actions which he viewed as 
"heavy handed."  There was no "ticking bomb", he said.  This 
incursion was not "necessary" at this time.  If Israel 
intends to withdraw from Gaza and "wash her hands" of 
negotiations with the PA, then these sorts of actions "make 
sense", he said.  They represent one last show of force. 
However, if the withdrawal is meant to set the stage for 
broader negotiations, then they are absolutely the wrong 
tactic, he stressed.  There is no doubt that at the first 
available opportunity, Hamas will respond; and then Israel 
will counter-attack.  This is the wrong environment to foster 
if our goal is to begin negotiating with one another again, 
he concluded. 
 
 
 
 
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