This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001074 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2014 
TAGS: BK MARR PREL EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: SOLANA ON BOSNIA: PARTNERSHIP REQUIRES TRUST, TOO 
 
REF: STATE 51534 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kyle Scott.  Reason: 1.5 (B 
)(D). 
 
¶1. (C) This is a joint USEU/USNATO message.  Policy 
recommendation in para 12. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary: In an animated discussion with Ambassadors 
Schnabel and Burns March 9 on planning for a post-SFOR EU 
mission in Bosnia, EU HiRep Javier Solana said, "If you want 
the EU to be your partner in Europe, the US must learn to 
trust us."  Solana argued that U.S. proposals (reftel) for a 
NATO HQ in Sarajevo led by a two-star officer, as well as 
views on Dayton authorities and continuing NATO 
responsibility for PIFWCs, "will not fly."  He stressed that 
clarity of command required that the EUFOR commander must be 
the final authority, legally and practically.  Ambassador 
Burns told Solana that the US wants the EU mission to 
succeed, and that we would continue to work practically with 
the EU to resolve misunderstandings and outstanding problems. 
 However, he reaffirmed that we continue to support an 
important role for a NATO HQ in defense reform, 
counter-terrorism, and PIFWCs.  Burns urged that we work 
pragmatically to iron out differences before the transition. 
 
¶3. (C) Solana's reaction to the US position reflects the EU 
concern that an EU-led mission in Bosnia be clearly perceived 
in Bosnia as the supreme authority, which we heard again from 
the EU at the March 10 NAC-PSC (see USNATO 242).  Ambassador 
Burns used the NAC-PSC to assuage these concerns, restating 
that the US wants the EU to succeed and fully accepts that 
the EU will have the lead role in post-SFOR Bosnia. He said 
the US would work to make sure that the Bosnians understand 
this fact.  USEU and USNATO recommend that the USG take a 
second look at the question of the hierarchy of ranks in 
Bosnia between the EU and NATO military leaders.  In order to 
avoid a senseless &bidding war8 over ranks between NATO and 
the EU, one solution would be for the NATO commander in 
Sarajevo to be a one-star officer, as opposed to a two-star. 
Not only would this be seen as a positive gesture by the EU, 
but it would remove the incentive for the EU to put a 
three-star officer in command of its operation, thereby 
ensuring that the AFSOUTH Deputy Commander in Naples would 
remain the higher ranking officer ) a key point in our favor 
as we seek to maintain a strict adherence to Berlin Plus 
principles.  End Summary. 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassadors Burns and Schnabel met March 9 with EU 
High Representative Javier Solana to review planning for a 
possible transition from SFOR to a EU-led mission in Bosnia. 
Ambassador Burns noted that a positive response to Solana's 
proposals on exchange of liaison offices at SHAPE and EU 
Military Staff would be forthcoming soon from NATO.  He 
stressed that the US wants an EU mission in Bosnia to 
succeed, and agrees that the EU must be seen to be in charge 
in Bosnia after SFOR shuts down.  We want to avoid the 
perception of competition between the EU and NATO, Ambassador 
Burns stressed.  He outlined reftel views on NATO's post-SFOR 
role in Bosnia, including continuing responsibilities for 
defense reform, counter-terrorism, and apprehension of PIFWCs. 
 
EU Accepts Any NATO Nominee in an "International Capacity" 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Solana said he was surprised that a NATO response to 
his proposals on liaison offices had been so long in coming, 
and confirmed that the EU would respect DSACEUR's decision to 
nominate any officer to fill the NATO liaison billets at EU 
Military Staff, regardless of nationality (a key point for 
non-EU allies Turkey, Norway and Canada).  Solana had 
delivered this message personally to the Turkish CHOD at the 
beginning of the week, emphasizing that the Turks were "more 
than welcome, they are super-welcome."  Ambassador Burns 
welcomed this statement, and encouraged Solana to repeat it 
at the March 10 NAC/PSC. 
 
BOSNIA: DO U.S. POSITIONS REFLECT LACK OF TRUST IN EU? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6. (C) Turning to Bosnia, Solana became highly animated.  He 
said the U.S. position on continuing roles for a NATO HQ 
seemed to contradict the basic message of "mission 
accomplished."  Instead, it appeared the US seeks a joint 
NATO/EU operation, rather than an EU-led mission using Berlin 
Plus.  The end result turned Berlin Plus on its head: instead 
of the EU having guaranteed access to NATO assets, it 
appeared the US wished to maintain NATO authority in Bosnia 
while using only EU assets on the ground. 
¶7. (C) He pointed to the US proposal for a NATO HQ led by a 
two-star general of equal rank to the EUFOR commander as one 
example.  This would blur lines of authority to the local 
population.  It must be clear that the EUFOR commander is the 
final authority.  NATO will have a small HQ of a couple 
hundred people, many not in uniform.  The EU will command 
several thousand troops.  Clarity of command requires that 
final authority in Bosnia be vested in the EUFOR commander. 
If the EU and NATO are to be partners, then NATO must be 
prepared to trust the EU, Solana stressed. 
 
¶8. (C) U.S. insistence on NATO HQ responsibility for 
apprehension of PIFWCs was another sign of "lack of trust." 
The NATO HQ in Sarajevo would be too small to have any 
operational capability.  Any operations against a PIFWC would 
require local forces to provide area support for a Special 
Forces operation mounted from outside Bosnia.  That is how it 
has been up until now under SFOR command, and that is how it 
should continue once EUFOR takes over.  But since EUFOR will 
provide the area support, the EUFOR commander must have the 
same authorities now vested in the SFOR commander.  Solana 
briefly reviewed the U.S. points in reftel and said flatly 
"these will not fly."  Instead, he suggested that NATO allies 
could continue to mount operations against PIFWCs, but that 
they must be under the ultimate direction of the EUFOR 
commander on the ground. 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador Burns stressed that the U.S. proposes 
vesting Dayton authorities in DSACEUR or an appropriate 
official in AFSOUTH, to be delegated to NATO or the EU as 
needed to complete their missions.  Solana was not swayed, 
saying the US needs to be ready to trust an EU general.  He 
pointed out that the circumstances for EUFOR could not be 
better for the US: our most trusted European ally, the UK, 
will occupy every key position all the way up the command 
ladder.  Lord Ashdown is still in place, a UK commander will 
lead EUFOR, report to a British officer as DCINC at AFSOUTH, 
who in turn will report to a Brit as DSACEUR. 
 
¶10.  (C) Solana concluded that the impression left by US 
positions was that Washington is still not ready to trust the 
EU to take on this mission.  The EU is ready to do the 
policing mission, provide the resources to assist the 
Bosnians and try to eventually bring them into Europe.  To be 
successful, it needs the visibility and authority to carry 
out those tasks.  If the U.S. has a political problem with 
this, it should say so outright.  Ambassador Burns assured 
Solana that the U.S. supports an EU-led mission, and want to 
help it be a success.  He promised to convey Solana's views 
to Washington.  In addition, he argued that the U.S. 
proposals for a residual NATO headquarters were limited, 
practical, and common-sensical.  There was full support for 
them in Washington. 
 
¶11. (C) Post-Script: At the NAC-PSC the next day, Ambassador 
Burns used his intervention to reiterate our basic message 
while allaying EU fears about US intentions vis--vis the 
SFOR transition.  Noting that Bosnia will become the template 
for Berlin Plus, Burns said that the US wants the EU to 
succeed.  He said that the US agrees that the EU will be in 
the lead in Bosnia, as it will have the preponderance of 
forces on the ground, and that we will do everything to make 
it abundantly clear to the Bosnians that the EU, not NATO, 
had the leading role.  The Ambassador assured the EU that 
NATO would work with the EU on PIFWCs and that CT operations 
are aimed at preventing foreign terrorists from gaining a 
foothold in Bosnia.  He said that Dayton was a complex issue 
that would have to be resolved, but that clearly the EU would 
need to be vested with its powers, as would NATO.  Burns 
suggested a possible model would be to vest the authorities 
in DSACEUR, as he would be in both NATO and EU chains of 
command.  After the meeting, Solana thanked Ambassador Burns 
for his remarks, which he said clearly articulated US 
positions in a way that had given the process positive 
momentum by showing the US commitment. 
 
COMMENT AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION: 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The intensity of Solana's reaction reflects the need 
to continue to work with the EU on the details of a hand-off. 
 To help keep the process on track, one area where compromise 
is possible without crossing our redlines is the rank of the 
U.S. general in charge of NATO HQ Sarajevo.  We understand 
that the EU has sent mixed signals in the past on whether 
their EUFOR commander would be a three-star general and leave 
it to the US military to assess whether the EU has a valid 
point about clarity of command.  We believe that the EU has a 
valid point about the need for political clarity in Bosnia. 
In particular, the Europeans have been adamant with us that 
their own history in Bosnia peacekeeping requires that the EU 
be seen as a credible guarantor of security.  We believe 
making the Senior Military Representative in Bosnia a 
one-star general makes sense as an area to show flexibility 
with the EU.  It would give nothing away on the continuing 
operational role for the U.S. and NATO and is consistent with 
current NATO practice in its headquarters in Tirana and 
Skopje (which was recently downgraded to a one star billet). 
Finally, by removing the incentive for the EU to send a 
three-star to lead its Bosnia force, we would ensure the 
seniority of the AFSOUTH Deputy Commander, thereby 
reinforcing the position of this NATO command in the EU,s 
chain of command. 
 
SCHNABEL