This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000532 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM VE
SUBJECT: CARTER CENTER BRIEFING ALARMS WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
AMBASSADORS 
 
Classified By: Mark A. Wells, A/PolCouns, for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) The Carter Center held a briefing on February 10 at 
the Ambassador's residence for Western Hemisphere ambassadors 
on the status of the signature verification process at the 
National Electoral Commission (CNE).  Carter Center 
representatives described the numerous administrative 
problems (inconsistent guidelines, lack of transparency and 
clear information, poor decision-making) and the urgent need 
for decisions to be made by the CNE if there is to be any 
hope of announcing the results by March 16.  Critical to the 
referendum's survival is the CNE's treatment of the "plana" 
signature forms filled out (but not signed) in the same 
handwriting.  The ambassadors attending the meeting were 
alarmed at the prospect that the CNE could toss out enough 
signatures on a technicality to kill the referendum.  End 
summary. 
 
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Carter Center Lays Out Challenges 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Carter Center (TCC), in its role as process 
analyst of the signature collection for the revocatory 
referendums, in conjunction with the Organization of American 
States (OAS) gave a short presentation regarding the current 
situation on February 10. TCC representatives Marcel Guzman 
and Francisco Diez headed the presentation attended by OAS 
observer chief Edgardo Reis, OAS country representative 
Patricio Carbacho, UNDP country representative Antonio 
Molpeceres, and the Ambassadors from Chile, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, and Colombia, plus the 
Charge from Peru. 
 
¶3. (C) During the presentation, Guzman stated that the role 
of the TCC is to evaluate and verify the legality, 
transparency and the results of the revocatory process. The 
main strategies to do so consist of procedural analysis, 
observation of the process, and three different samplings. 
 
¶4. (C) The TCC concluded that before February 13, the 
National Electoral Commission (CNE) will make a decision 
regarding the "planillas planas," forms filled out in the 
same handwriting. The government alleges that these planillas 
are proof of mega fraud and should be annulled according to 
Article 22, which states that this process is intensely 
personal and the individual should fill out all the 
information, including biographical information. OAS 
representative Reis consulted with three independent legal 
experts who unanimously stated that they could see nothing in 
the law to invalidate these signatures; however, both the CC 
and OAS representatives agree that in the end this will be a 
political decision.   Since all three signature drives have 
large quantities of these "planillas planas," the decision is 
potentially explosive. Invalidating these planillas will 
nullify an estimated 650,000 signatures from the presidential 
drive alone according to Diez. OAS representative Reis 
confirmed that if these planillas were rejected, there would 
be no referendum of any sort, not for president or any of the 
deputies.  (Comment:  Diez later told Ambassador he was not 
sure of the exact number of "planas," intimating it could be 
a much lower number.  End comment.) 
 
¶5. (C) The CC also observed that inconsistencies exist in the 
rules being used to do the physical verification of the 
signatures. Those verifying the signatures use methods that 
are passed out on handouts printed by unknown authors to 
determine if quality of the fingerprints are acceptable or 
not. There is no clearly defined leadership and poor 
communication in the CNE, so erroneous perceptions that are 
not corrected are leading to bad decisions made by those 
working on the verifications. 
 
¶6. (C) The standards used also change as the process 
 
 
continues. For example, the signatures from each drive are 
verified in alphabetical order according to state names. 
Halfway through the second drive (the presidential), CNE 
workers employed new criteria without proper written 
authorization.  Referral rates to the Superior Technical 
Committee (CTS) skyrocketed from around 3 percent to 70 
percent.  OAS rep Carbacho pointed out that during the 
physical verification process of the presidential planillas, 
the change in criteria came suspiciously after the count 
surpassed 2.5 million just over the minimum threshold to 
convene the referendum.  When complaints arose of the CNE's 
disparate treatment, the board agreed to re-submit the 
planillas against opposition deputies to the same rigorous 
examination (Note:  On February 11, the CNE board decided to 
re-submit the presidential planillas that were originally 
approved back to the physical inspection using the new rules. 
 This will likely result in up to half of the 388,000 
presidential planillas being subjected to further scrutiny. 
End note.) 
 
¶7. (C) Diez noted that the CNE took a sample of 8,600 planas 
(3,700 from the presidential) for a handwriting analysis. 
The OAS estimated that there are not 40 handwriting experts 
in Venezuela. Even if the signatures under discussion were to 
be corrected during the five-day complaint period, the 
process would drag on for months. 
 
¶8. (C) The Chilean ambassador then suggested that the TCC or 
the OAS issue an official statement regarding the current 
situation. The Brazilian Ambassador adamantly seconded this 
request alluding to the fact that the situation was urgent 
and the governments of other Latin American countries should 
have information if they were to take action. 
 
¶9. (C) Diez backed off, noting that TCC was not suggesting 
that any government take action; this meeting was called 
solely to impart information. This included an "optimistic" 
timeline that shows a potential announcement of the results 
on March 17, if the CNE continues at its current pace. He 
made clear that the CC was not implying fraud on behalf of 
the CNE. The delays to the process until now have not been 
intentional, rather, they have been caused by administrative 
inefficiency, lack of planning and guidance, and no clear 
chain of command or communication. Reis also pointed out that 
the CC and OAS, as observers, have agreements with the CNE 
not to issue statements without clearance from the CNE. 
 
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Ambassador's Comment 
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¶10. (C) What was planned as a routine briefing was a wake up 
call for these group of ambassadors.  The message from the 
TCC and OAS observers was clear:  the decision on the 
planillas planas will decide whether or not there will be a 
recall referendum.  There is no legal basis for rejecting 
them.  The decision is political.  President Chavez cynically 
told Brazilian foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Gomez on 
February 11 that he would love to have a recall because he 
would win it, but that he cannot influence the decision of 
the CNE since it is an independent branch of government. 
President Carter told the press when he was here in January 
that the will of the people signing the petitions should not 
be thwarted by legalisms.  My assessment is that is exactly 
what the pro-Chavez CNE majority intends to do. 
 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
NOTE:  POSSIBLE MISSING ADM AID OR AIDAC CAPTION. 
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      2004CARACA00532 - CONFIDENTIAL