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Viewing cable 03KATHMANDU2470, A/S ROCCA AND NEPAL'S ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03KATHMANDU2470 2003-12-19 07:09 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kathmandu
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 002470 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF ETRD BH CH NP
SUBJECT: A/S ROCCA AND NEPAL'S ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER 
DISCUSS ROAD MAP FOR THE FUTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
REF: (A) KATHMANDU 1805 (B) KATHMANDU 2432 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C)  On December 16, Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary 
of State for South Asia met with Ambassador-at-large and de 
facto Foreign Minister Bekh Bahadur Thapa and Foreign 
Secretary Madhu Raman Acharya to discuss the Government of 
 
SIPDIS 
Nepal's plans for political reconciliation and elections, 
human rights, and Bhutanese and Tibetan refugees.  The 
meeting also touched upon SAARC and prospects for a U.S. 
garment bill.  Nepal's possible contribution towards 
peacekeeping in Iraq will be covered septel.  Ambassador 
Malinowski accompanied the Assistant Secretary to the 
meeting.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
GON Road Map on Political Reconciliation and Counter 
Insurgency 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
2. (C) Nepal's Ambassador-at-large and de facto Foreign 
Minister Bekh Bahadur Thapa opened his meeting with Assistant 
Secretary of State for South Asia, Christina Rocca, with a 
 
SIPDIS 
briefing on the Government of Nepal's road map for the 
future.  The government's objectives and challenges, he said, 
are three fold: political reconciliation, improved governance 
and countering the insurgency.  To attain these objectives, 
the government will seek to bring the political parties into 
the government, hold elections, pursue social and economic 
development programs and support Nepal's security forces to 
defeat the Maoists. 
 
3. (C) Bekh Thapa noted Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa's 
patience in dealing with the political parties' persistent 
refusal to join the government.  The Prime Minister continues 
to "leave his door open" for the parties to form an all-party 
government under his leadership.  (Comment.  The political 
parties, on the other hand, argue that they will join a 
government only under a prime minister of their choice or 
under a restored Parliament.  End Comment.)  Thapa stressed 
the need for the parties to join the government in order to 
isolate the Maoists.  He suggested that the parties would 
join the current government if they sincerely were committed 
to democracy. 
 
4. (C) Despite the political parties' unwillingness to 
participate, the government plans to bring the country back 
onto a "constitutional track," he said.  To do this, the 
government plans on holding local elections in three phases 
beginning with municipalities and then moving on to village- 
and district-level elections and finally to national 
elections.  The GON's road map postulated that within 14 
months all phases of elections would be complete and there 
would be a sitting parliament.  He noted that the 
international community would be welcome to assist and 
monitor the process to ensure elections are transparent and 
fair.  While security at the ballot box will certainly be 
important, "the government can guarantee only a minimum level 
of risk," he said.  Once elections are conducted, the 
government can move full swing into development and social 
programs. 
 
5. (C) According to Thapa, the government has shared its 
plans with the political parties.  He indicated that the 
political parties have questioned the government's capacity 
to hold elections in the current environment of insecurity 
and political disunity.  Thapa noted, however, that elections 
have occurred in other places on the sub-continent under 
similar conditions.  He asked for the international community 
to understand that the current government is trying to 
protect democracy and safeguard the constitution.  A/S Rocca 
replied that the U.S. continues to support democracy, the 
inclusion of the political parties in the current government 
and elections. 
 
6. (C) Compared with the outlook one year ago, Thapa averred 
that the current forecast regarding the insurgency is much 
more optimistic.  The perception now, versus then, is that 
the Maoists are not in a position to "take over" the 
government.  Thapa claimed that the Maoists' strongholds have 
been scattered and they are "on the run."  The next dialogue 
with the Maoists will have to be driven by a sincere desire 
for peace, he said.  However, Thapa criticized former Prime 
Minister Chand's government for releasing from prison nearly 
1,800 "hard-core combatants."  These combatants are now the 
primary threat to GON security forces.  They are using their 
knowledge about individuals within the security forces to 
inflict damage, Thapa said. (Note. Thapa could be referring 
to the assassination attempts, one of which succeeded, on two 
army Colonels on August 27.  One was the chief interrogator 
for Maoist prisoners.  End Note.) 
 
7. (C) Thapa indirectly complained of India's unwillingness 
or inability to crack down on Maoist leaders, who allegedly 
are residing in India.  "It is difficult enough to fight them 
within our borders, much less outside them," Thapa said.  He 
requested U.S. assistance in urging the Indians to act on 
this issue.  Thapa regards the U.S. as one of the main 
pillars of support to Nepal on both the security and 
political fronts.  He mentioned the GON's need for increased 
mobility within the army and improved border security. 
 
------------- 
Human Rights 
------------- 
 
8. (C) Thapa admitted that human rights abuses occur, but 
affirmed the GON's commitment to investigating these cases 
and upholding human rights.  The GON is aware of its 
responsibility to the people and has no intention of being 
"high-handed," he said.  Thapa suggested, however, that the 
security forces are "new at handling insurgencies, 
particularly one this ruthless."  Thapa thanked the U.S. for 
providing training, which he believed has helped educate GON 
security forces on human rights.  The National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) has also assisted in bringing human rights 
issues to the surface.  The government has made the RNA aware 
of the problem and asked them to be "more careful," he said. 
Thapa intimated that the government is seeking to become more 
transparent and accountable. 
 
9. (C) Thapa suggested that the army and the insurgents 
should not be compared with one another.  By comparing the 
army with the Maoists, who are regarded as terrorists, only 
confusion and misunderstanding arise, he said.  Thapa added 
that the security forces should be seen as protectors, not 
violators.  Thapa believed that some incidents have become 
magnified beyond all proportion and suggested that some NGOs 
appear willing to accept Maoist brutality while exaggerating 
government abuses.  These NGOs, he said, pre-judge incidents 
without waiting for a complete investigation. 
 
10. (C) A/S Rocca assured Thapa that the U.S. does not equate 
the RNA with the Maoists, but that, as the RNA represents the 
government, it "must be cleaner than clean" and held to a 
higher standard, she said.  A/S Rocca argued that human 
rights abuses will undermine GON objectives.  On the other 
hand, if people perceive that the government fairly 
investigates human rights abuses and upholds human rights 
principles, the GON will further its political and social 
objectives.  A/S Rocca stressed the importance to U.S. 
military assistance programs of upholding human rights.  A/S 
Rocca cited specifically the need to hold those accountable 
in the Ramechhap incident (reported ref A).  Thapa replied 
that it was wrong that the National Human Rights Commission 
issued a statement before its investigation was complete. 
Thapa noted that the government wants to avoid demoralizing 
the security forces while at the same time remain 
accountable.  "Please bear with us during this difficult 
period," he concluded. 
 
------------------- 
Bhutanese Refugees 
------------------- 
 
11. (C) Prior to meeting Ambassador Bekh Thapa, Foreign 
Secretary Acharya briefed A/S Rocca on the Bhutanese refugee 
 
SIPDIS 
issue.  Acharya noted that the Royal Government of Bhutan 
(RGOB) has agreed to accept nearly 10,000 of the residents in 
Khudunabari Camp for repatriation in February 2004.  The RGOB 
has already printed residency cards and papers for the 
returnees, he said.  Acharya admitted, however, that 
conditions for return are "far from ideal" and that the first 
group of returnees will be a "test case." 
12. (C) Rocca asked about GON preparations for local 
resettlement.  Acharya replied that the government will have 
to "do something" for Category III (non-Bhutanese) people who 
are the only group not permitted to repatriate to Bhutan. 
However, he noted that there are no provisions to keep 
third-country citizens in Nepal since, effectively, they are 
not refugees.  Acharya explained that the GON continues to 
claim that Category III refugees came from Bhutan, but merely 
lacked the documentation to prove their residency status. 
After the camps are consolidated and repatriation is 
complete, the government will then look at the possibility of 
resettlement, he said.  Acharya also noted problems with 
security in the camps now that there is no police presence. 
 
13. (C) Ambassador Thapa later added that the RGOB continues 
"to be stubborn" about third-party monitoring, but that "this 
is as far as Nepal can go bilaterally."  He believed that 
pressure from the international community over the past 
several months caused the RGOB to take a "closer look" at the 
refugee issue.  Bhutan's King, Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister, Thapa said, have all become more open-minded. 
Thapa reiterated his earlier statement that a joint 
Bhutan-Nepal team will look after the refugees' welfare.  He 
indicated that the recent visit of foreign diplomats to 
Thimpu had resulted in more positive indications from the 
RGOB (reported Ref B).  But Thapa believes that this dialogue 
needs to continue.  Thapa did not believe that Bhutan's 
current crack-down on rebel movements in southern Bhutan will 
impact the refugees. 
 
---------------- 
Tibetan Refugees 
---------------- 
 
14. (C)  Pointing to progress on the handling of Tibetan 
refugees in Nepal, Secretary Acharya noted that there are no 
Tibetans currently in prison in Nepal.  Ambassador Thapa 
suggested that the Tibetan issue was very sensitive and the 
"less noise we make publicly, the easier" it will be to 
process Tibetan refugees transiting Nepal for India.  During 
the last official visit from Beijing, he said, Chinese 
rhetoric on the Tibetan issue was "extremely strong."  Thapa 
added that the GON cannot ignore its northern neighbor, who 
claims that the Tibetans are illegal immigrants, not 
refugees. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
15. (C) Ambassador Thapa looked forward to the upcoming SAARC 
Summit in Islamabad, noting that things have been going 
smoothly since a meeting between the Indian and Pakistani 
foreign ministers in New York during the U.N. General 
Assembly.  Rocca noted that she has high hopes for the future 
of SAARC and attributed the shift to several factors, 
including the Indian Prime Minister's willingness since April 
to take the high road, the latest round of Indian elections, 
Musharraf's call for a cease-fire, and the realization by 
both sides that peace, not war, pays dividends.  However, 
impediments to progress remain, and a major terrorist attack 
could undermine the progress, she said.  Ambassador 
Malinowski noted that India's approval to allow overflight 
rights to flights between Nepal and Pakistan was a result of 
the recent progress so far achieved between India and 
Pakistan. 
 
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U.S. Garment Bill 
----------------- 
 
16. (C) Secretary Acharya raised the need for the U.S. 
Administration's support for a proposed garment bill.  Noting 
that textile concessions are always a contentious issue in 
the United States, A/S Rocca admitted it could be difficult. 
She told them that the Administration has not yet taken a 
position on the bill. 
 
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Comment 
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17. (C)  The GON's road map points the country in the right 
direction, but lacks implementation details.  The commitment 
to holding elections over the next 12 months is commendable, 
but it remains unclear how the government expects to foster a 
proper environment for elections, free of Maoist intimidation 
and with the full support and participation of the estranged 
political parties.  Likewise, the Prime Minister's attempts 
to include the political parties in the government are 
laudable, but seem to lack the impetus that only the King 
could provide.  On the social agenda, the government has made 
positive steps, such as proposed changes for the inclusion of 
women and dalits in public service.  By addressing some of 
the issues important to the Maoist platform, the government 
may further undermine whatever support remains for the 
insurgents' cause.  On human rights, Ambassador Thapa said 
that the government will be transparent and will hold 
security forces accountable for abuses.  We certainly expect 
so.  So far, none of the RNA's investigations into alleged 
abuses (about 17 to date) have been released to the Nepali 
public.  Resource constraints and the recent, rapid expansion 
of the army notwithstanding, the GON and Royal Nepal Army 
must demonstrate a truly even-handed approach to punish 
transgressions or they risk squandering the progress Thapa 
claims the RNA has achieved in countering the insurgency. 
 
18. (C) On the Bhutanese refugees, Acharya's assertion that 
the RGOB has prepared residency permits for Khudunabari Camp 
refugees is the first indication we have received that 
logistic preparations to receive returnees are underway. 
However, it was discouraging to hear that the GON will begin 
discussions on local integration only after repatriation of 
all six camps occurs.  Post will continue to press the GON on 
the need to plan for at least a smaller portion of the 
refugees to stay in Nepal.  End Comment. 
 
19. (C) A/S Rocca has cleared this cable. 
MALINOWSKI