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Diana T Fritz  03/20/2007 11:35:46 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                        December 15, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 5295 - UNKNOWN)         

TAGS:     PREL, PGOV, PARM, MOPS                                 

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  SCENESETTER FOR CSAF VISIT TO THE UAE, DECEMBER 17-21, 
          2003                                                   

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 05295

SIPDIS
Laser1:
    INFO:   FCS 
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   DAO USLO ECON RSO AMB DCM P/M 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: DAO:BKERINS USLO:KMASSENGIL

VZCZCADI668
OO RUEAHQA RUEOBBA RUEKJCS RUEHC RUCAACC RUCNRAQ
RHEFDIA
DE RUEHAD #5295/01 3491342
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 151342Z DEC 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEOBBA/USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC IMMEDIATE
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//CSAF/SECAF IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2694
RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 005295 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
CSAF FOR GENERAL JUMPER 
NSC FOR THEROUX 
DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA AND PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/13 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MOPS GCC IZ TC
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER FOR CSAF VISIT TO THE UAE, DECEMBER 
17-21, 2003 
 
Ref: A) Abu Dhabi 5003, B) Abu Dhabi 4613 
 
¶1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba, reasons 
1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
¶2. (C) General Jumper: I would like to welcome you back to 
the UAE.  The highlight of December in the UAE has been the 
2003 Dubai Air Show, the third largest air show in the 
world and the premier aviation and air industry show in the 
Gulf region.  The Dec. 7-11 Air Show was preceded by a UAE 
Air Force-hosted Middle East Air Chiefs' Conference held in 
Dubai.  The UAEG regards both events as huge successes, and 
so do we, particularly since they relied heavily on USAF 
participation and cooperation.  I want to thank you for 
supporting the Air Show and for making our robust USG 
presence an important message to the UAE and the region. 
U.S. military aircraft on display included AH-64D Longbow, 
E-8A JStar, F-14, E-2C, EA-6B, C-2A, P-3AIP, C-130J, F-117, 
A-10, F-16, and C-17.  During the Dubai Air Show Secretary 
Roche met with Defense Minister General Shaykh Mohammed bin 
Rashid (MbR), Crown Prince of Dubai, as well as with Deputy 
Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Chief of Staff of UAE Armed 
Forces, Lieutenant General Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ). 
 
¶3. (C) MbZ was appointed Deputy Crown Prince on Nov. 30. 
General Moseley also met with MbZ during the Air Show. 
MbZ's promotion clears up any doubts about who will assume 
the position of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince after Shaykh Zayed 
departs the scene and current Crown Prince Shaykh Khalifa 
assumes the presidency.  We have requested meetings for you 
with MbZ and Major General Khalid bin Abdullah Al Buainnan, 
the Commander of the United Arab Emirates Air force and Air 
Defense. 
 
---------------- 
SUGGESTED THEMES 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (C) We propose that you touch on the following key 
bilateral military issues, in addition to the more general 
themes outlined below: 
 
-- Congratulate your hosts on the Dubai Air Show, and 
underscore that it advances the U.S. security and 
commercial interests, directly supports USCENTCOM war 
fighting and engagement goals and objectives, furthers 
military-to-military relations, and improves regional 
access. 
 
-- Focus the UAE military leadership on the need, as part 
of our commitment to building and solidifying our strong 
military ties, to begin the process of negotiating a 
Defense Cooperation Agreement to succeed the unratified 
agreement which expires in 2006. 
 
-- Express our enthusiasm about the validation course at 
the Gulf Air Warfare Center, Al Dhafra Air Base, scheduled 
for January 2004.  The Center will be a model for 
multilateral training in the region. 
 
¶5.  (S) More broadly, you may also wish to: 
 
-- Congratulate MbZ on his promotion to Deputy Crown Prince 
of Abu Dhabi. 
 
-- Express thanks for the UAE's exemplary support for U.S. 
and coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, namely 
access to bases and logistical support, including air and 
sealift of Bulgarian troops to Iraq, the UAE SOC deployment 
at Bagram, as well as extensive intelligence coordination. 
Thank MbZ for his offer to use a squadron of the UAE's 
newly acquired South African Seeker II UAV's. 
 
-- Pass on our gratitude for the UAE's generous 
humanitarian assistance, especially the UAE Armed Force's 
establishment of the very successful Shaykh Zayed hospital 
in Baghdad and the UAE's efforts to re-supply with 
equipment and medicine other Iraqi hospitals and the 
provision of basic foodstuffs to the Iraqi people. 
 
------------------------- 
BILATERAL MILITARY ISSUES 
------------------------- 
 
Defense Cooperation Agreement 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) We need to start the process of discussing a 
successor agreement to the Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(DCA), which comes up for renewal in 2006.  The existing 
agreement was never ratified by the UAE's Federal National 
Council.  We have been getting by on ad hoc arrangements. 
With the growing presence here (Jebel Ali Port in Dubai is 
the busiest USN port-of-call outside the United States; and 
there are 1,100 USAF personnel and civilian contractors at 
Al Dhafra Air Base supporting Operation Enduring Freedom, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operations in the Horn of 
Africa), we need to put our relationship on a more solid 
footing.  Following a meeting with the Ambassador in late 
October during which she noted the need to start addressing 
the DCA issue, MbZ directed his staff to begin discussions 
with us on the way ahead for a re-negotiated DCA.  This 
will require heavy lifting on both sides and the sooner we 
agree on a strategy and define our "non-negotiable" items, 
the easier it will be to proceed with the Emiratis. 
Embassy representatives met with GHQ lawyers in mid- 
November to hear their views.  The Emiratis continue to 
have reservations about criminal jurisdiction provisions, 
as well as concerns over perceived ambiguities regarding 
the status of US personnel in the UAE.  The Embassy will 
make a formal recommendation on the way ahead for the DCA 
after the first of the year. 
 
Air Warfare Center 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) The Gulf Air Warfare Center (GAWC) at al-Dhafra Air 
Base has tremendous potential to become a resource for 
multilateral training, defense cooperation, and 
compatibility.  The GAWC will provide an excellent 
opportunity for CENTCOM pilots to hone their skills in 
theater.  It comes with the added benefit of offering the 
perfect setting for our officers to build long-term 
relationships with their Arab and European counterparts. 
The GAWC represents the UAE leadership's commitment to 
increasing inter-operability with U.S. and coalition 
forces. 
 
Predator 
-------- 
 
¶8. (S) Over the past year, MbZ raised his desire to procure 
the armed Predator B with just about every interlocutor in 
Washington, and Deputy Prime Minister and de facto Foreign 
Minister Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan raised the 
Predator issue his meetings in late October in Washington, 
including with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State. 
We believe he will raise it with you.  Both MbZ and HbZ 
believe this system will provide the UAE the much-needed 
capability to survey and defend its long, porous coasts and 
inland borders.  We know that you are actively involved in 
the current policy review regarding the release of this 
MTCR Category I weapon system to the UAE.  CENTCOM in 
September forwarded an assessment to OSD supporting sale of 
an unarmed Predator B to the UAE.  The Emiratis will find 
it difficult to understand that we can sell them F-16s 
while denying them an armed Predator B. 
 
ATACMs 
------ 
 
¶9. (S) We are moving forward with the ATACMs 1A deal.  The 
Emiratis have agreed to the principles outlined in what 
will be a regional Memorandum of Understanding governing 
the use of this system.  We have forwarded the MOU to GHQ 
for UAE approval.  Once we have their approval, the next 
step in the process is for GHQ to submit an LOR for Pricing 
and Availability, after which we can begin the LOA process. 
We are awaiting the provision of a revised Pricing and 
Availability and Acquisition, following an Emirati visit to 
the US last July to discuss their forecast system 
requirements. 
 
Remote sensing (If Raised) 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S) The Emiratis continue to request new, long-term 
access to satellite imagery of Iran and the UAE region, as 
part of its strategic relationship with the United States. 
A USG interagency team visited the UAE in November to 
discuss a government-to-government agreement that the USG 
had provided to the UAE last May.  In an unexpected move, 
the Emiratis presented alternative text to the agreement, 
requesting an option to lease a US satellite.  The USG team 
must now review the proposal and respond to the Emiratis 
when a review is complete. 
 
-------------- 
BROADER ISSUES 
-------------- 
 
Afghanistan and Iraq: Support for Coalition Efforts 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶11. (S) The UAE Armed Forces has deployed a 35-man Emirati 
Special Operations contingent to Bagram Air Base.  As you 
know, the UAE continues to play a very helpful role in 
Afghanistan, particularly in the provision of humanitarian 
and reconstruction assistance.  The UAE Armed Forces 
provided the Afghan National Army with approximately $50 
million in assistance in kind in 2002 and overall 
humanitarian assistance has crossed the $50 million mark. 
The UAEG also continues to provide substantial personal 
financial support to President Karzai.  In Iraq, the UAEG 
provided a "lift" in support of Iraqi stabilization 
efforts. 
 
¶12. (S) Regarding MbZ's offer to us to use a squadron of 
the UAE's newly acquired South African Seeker II UAV's, 
CENTCOM/J5, CJTF-180, and CJSOTF-A are coordinating with 
the Emiratis to deploy this capability in Afghanistan in 
January 2004.  A joint US team traveled to the UAE in early 
November to discuss operational UAV experience in 
Afghanistan, command relationships, integration and fusion, 
intel support, strategic lift, beddown location, force 
protection, logistics, and third country contractor 
support.  We are working the details for implementation. 
 
Iraq:  UAE Humanitarian/Medical Assistance 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶13. (SBU) As you know, the Emiratis were among the first in 
the Arab world to step up to the plate in providing much- 
needed humanitarian assistance and medical relief to the 
Iraqi people.  The Embassy, the HOC in Kuwait and CENTCOM 
worked closely with the UAE Red Crescent Authority to move 
supplies into Iraq and transport Iraqi patients to the UAE 
for treatment.  This cooperation continues.  Thanks to the 
system put in place by CENTCOM and the HOC, the Emiratis 
are now moving assistance into Iraq on a routine basis 
using their own C-130s.  The Shaykh Zayed hospital in 
Baghdad continues to receive hundreds of patients a day. 
 
Iraq: Timely Public Statements 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) When U.S. officials confirmed Saddam Hussein's 
capture on Dec. 14, HbZ told the Ambassador that he thought 
it was a good outcome that Saddam was captured alive 
because the Iraqis will have a chance to try him.  He said 
he hoped to hear similar news about Al Qaida leaders UBL 
and Zawahiri.  Since Saddam's fall last April, the Emiratis 
have strongly supported Iraqi delegations at official 
meetings in the region or when they visited the UAE.  The 
UAEG also issued strong public condemnation for the attacks 
against the UN's Baghdad headquarters and against Ayatollah 
Baqir al-Hakim and his followers in Najaf.  Privately, the 
senior leadership has told us that they applaud the U.S. 
decision to accelerate the transfer of authority to the 
Iraqis (see ref A). 
 
Iran: Worries Persist 
-------------------- 
 
¶15. (S) All of our senior Emirati interlocutors worry about 
Iran's intentions in Iraq and in the Arabian Gulf region as 
a whole.  Iran is one of the major reasons the UAEG is 
actively pursuing acquisition of ATACMS, remote sensing 
technology, and is so keen to get Predator.  The Emiratis 
have urged us to help prevent Iran from meddling in Iraq's 
domestic affairs.  They view Iran's nuclear program with 
deep suspicion and have consistently supported a tough 
approach by the IAEA. 
 
WAHBA