This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002754 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR DRL, AID AND NEA (ACTING DAS ROMANOWSKI) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2010 
TAGS: PHUM PTER PREL EU YM ICC HUMAN RIGHTS DEMOCRATIC REFORM
SUBJECT: INVITATION FOR USG PARTICIPATION IN JANUARY 2004 
YEMENI-EU INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN SANAA: 
"WE WILL ACT ON PRESIDENT BUSH'S 11/6 NED SPEECH" 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary/Comment: In an 11/18 meeting with Charge, FM 
Qirbi delivered a verbal invitation for &high-level8 USG 
participation in an international conference to take place in 
Yemen 10-12 January 2004.  Shura Council Member Mohamed 
al-Tayeb, who will head ROYG preparations, provided 
background in separate meetings with Charge.  The conference 
will be jointly sponsored (and entirely paid for) by the EU, 
with its affiliated NGO, No Peace Without Justice, playing a 
central role.  Invitees will include: all OIC member states; 
all EU member states; the United States; Canada; Japan; and 
selected non-OIC African states including Chad, Ghana, 
Ethiopia, and Kenya.  Most invitations have been sent, with 
each country,s Foreign Minister, Justice Minister and heads 
of upper and lower houses of parliament invited by name. 
NGOs will constitute up to half the projected 350-400 
participants. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary/Comment Continued: The ROYG is willing to 
meet U.S. conditions -- e.g. downplaying ICC and playing up 
support for Iraq, Afghanistan and the 11/5 POTUS NED speech 
-- in order to draw a senior delegation from Washington. 
Even so, EU sponsorship and hostiles (Libya, Iran) on the 
guest list will likely constrain U.S. ability to 
influence/inform conference outcomes.  It is nevertheless 
important that the USG be present to highlight U.S. policy 
and achievements in the region.  We recommend a delegation 
headed at DAS level (perhaps NEA acting DAS Romanowski) and 
including DRL and AID.  U.S. delegation should also be able 
to address criticism on ICC and GTMO.  Post would welcome 
Department guidance on (a) Yemeni request on invitation for 
Iraq (para 7) and (b) our ongoing engagement with the ROYG on 
the agenda (para 8).  End summary/comment. 
 
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WHY A HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN YEMEN? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) On 11/16 Shura Council member Mohamed al-Tayeb, a 
former cabinet minister and current head of the SC,s human 
rights committee, approached Charge with a preliminary 
invitation for USG participation in the &Intergovernmental 
Regional Conference on Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule 
of Law.8  The conference will take place in Sanaa January 
10-12, 2004.  The event, which will be funded and 
co-sponsored by the EU will aim to increase awareness and 
&market8 democracy in the region.  In Tayeb,s words, &We 
will act on President Bush,s recent speech on democracy in 
the region.8 
 
¶4.  (C) The impetus for the conference began last summer, 
when Tayeb attended two human rights conferences in Rome 
sponsored by the EU-affiliated NGO &No Peace Without 
Justice.8  NPWJ members told him of plans to host a 
conference on the ICC in Jordan late in the year.  Tayeb 
persuaded them that the ICC was not a salient enough issue 
for a stand-alone conference in the Middle East, and the 
discussion led to broadening the agenda and shifting the 
venue to Yemen (where some NPWJ had favorable experience as 
observers for Yemen,s 4/03 parliamentary elections).  While 
the ICC will not/not be a focus of the conference, Tayeb 
confirmed that the ROYG intends to complete an Article 98 
agreement with the USG as soon as possible, and then proceed 
to ratify the Rome Statute prior to the conference. 
 
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AGENDA AND MODALITIES 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Following a plenary at Sanaa,s Republican Palace 
(typically used for large, formal state occasions), the 
conference will devolve into three sub-conferences -- 
promoting the rule of law; building democracy; and promoting 
human rights - in separate venues.  Along with national 
delegations expected from dozens of countries (ministers of 
foreign affairs and justice, along with heads of upper and 
lower parliamentary bodies, will be invited by name), NGO 
members could constitute 40-50 percent of participants. 
European diplomats tell us several EU states are considering 
delegations headed at the deputy FM level, but most have not 
yet decided.  NGO invitees will include former Secretary 
Albright, in her capacity as head of the National Democratic 
Institute. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Tayeb will head preparations on the ground, aided by 
staffers from NPWJ who arrived 11/18.  He expects a draft 
agenda to be ready within the coming week, and has offered to 
share it with Embassy Sanaa.  Invitees will include: all OIC 
member states; all EU member states; the United States; 
Canada; Japan; and selected non-OIC African states including 
Chad, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Kenya.  Most invitations have 
already gone out, and the ROYG plans a particularly warm 
reception for the new leadership of both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Tayeb told Charge 11/19 that the Iraqi Embassy in 
Sanaa has declined to accept the invitation on the grounds 
that it lacks the ability to forward it to authorities in 
Baghdad.  Tayeb thus asked if the USG could assist in 
forwarding the invitation to FM Zebari.  Charge urged him to 
explore other options (e.g. Yemen,s embassy in Baghdad, or 
the Arab League) but agreed to forward his request to 
Washington. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
U.S. PARTICIPATION: WILLING TO MEET U.S. &CONDITIONS8 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶8. (C) During a frank exchange 11/18, Charge advised Tayeb 
that the USG would not be able to decide on its level of 
participation without having a clearer idea of the agenda. 
Beyond that, ROYG assurance on certain points could also help 
elicit a favorable view from Washington.  For example: 
 
-- ICC: Assurance that the ICC will not emerge as a major 
conference focus, that the agenda will not be slanted to 
&slam8 the U.S. position on the ICC; that all agenda items 
relating to the ICC will be clearly disclosed and defined in 
advance, and that the ICC will not/not be mentioned my name 
in the final communiqu; 
 
-- Israel/Palestine: Assurance that issues of Israeli 
occupation and Palestinian aspiration will not be allowed to 
distort the positive focus of the conference; 
 
-- Iraq and Afghanistan: Assurance that Iraq and Afghanistan 
will be held up (including in the final communiqu) as 
positive examples of democratic transition, that the agenda 
will not be shaped to criticize intervention in those 
countries; that the final communiqu will exhort participants 
and the world community to assist the peoples of Iraq and 
Afghanistan in their transition to democracy; 
 
-- Women: Assurance that women,s issues will be highlighted, 
both in the agenda and the final communiqu, and that female 
participation (e.g. through NGOs) will be maximized. 
 
-- 11/5 POTUS NED Speech: Assurance that the speech will be 
appropriately integrated into the agenda and acknowledged, 
ideally in the final communiqu, as a positive statement of 
generally held values and aims. 
 
-- GTMO detainees: In a conversation on 11/19, Charge added 
this subject to the list of those that should not receive 
undue or negative attention at the conference. 
 
¶9. (C) Tayeb responded favorably on all counts, including 
GTMO.  He welcomed the input, and emphasized that the rough 
and informal list above were consistent with both his views 
and those of the ROYG, and could readily be worked with Arab, 
European and other participants.  He invited further U.S. 
input, including in drafting the final communiqu, and 
offered a &guarantee8 that U.S. concerns would be met. 
Tayeb reiterated his intent to structure the conference so as 
to: (a) draw the highest possible level of U.S. 
participation; and (b) ensure an upbeat and positive outcome 
for all/all participants (&no finger pointing8).  &We have 
no disagreements on this,8 he said. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶10. (C) Even with experienced staffers from &No Peace 
Without Justice,8 the ROYG faces a daunting task to organize 
a large international conference in less than two months. 
Although some invitations are already in the mail, organizers 
are just at the point of translating a broad vision into 
details -- so untold devils could still emerge. 
Nevertheless, with endorsement by Saleh and EU financing 
assured, the event is likely to proceed.  The Yemenis showed 
that they could host a large conference with the 1999 
Emerging Democracies Forum in Sanaa. 
¶11. (C) We take seriously Tayeb,s assurance that the agenda 
will not be slanted against U.S. interests, and we will 
remain engaged with him toward this end; but assessment of 
potential risks (e.g. undue emphasis on the ICC or GTMO), and 
benefits (e.g. opportunity to promote international support 
for Iraq and Afghanistan and highlight the 11/5 POTUS speech) 
cannot be completed until the agenda comes into clearer 
focus.  Moreover, with EU sponsorship and a long list of 
invitees -- including some critical of U.S. policy (e.g. 
Libya, Iran) -- our ability to influence/inform the outcome 
on key issues is likely to be constrained despite Tayeb,s 
best intentions.  Nevertheless, post deems it important that 
the USG be present in order to highlight U.S. aims and 
achievements in the region.  Based on what we know at this 
point, post recommends the Department consider a delegation 
headed at DAS level -- perhaps NEA acting DAS Romanowski, who 
has visited Yemen and can highlight MEPI -- and including AID 
and DRL.  U.S. delegation should also include member(s) able 
to address criticism on ICC and GTMO. 
 
¶12. (C) Finally, post would welcome Department guidance on 
engagement with Tayeb to ensure that U.S. priorities are 
appropriately reflected in the agenda. 
MISENHEIMER