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Viewing cable 03THEHAGUE2685, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03THEHAGUE2685 2003-10-22 15:22 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002685 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2013 
TAGS: PARM PREL UK KS CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  WRAP-UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING 17 OCTOBER 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.5 b) and d). 
 
This is CWC-110-03. 
 
----------- 
2004 BUDGET 
----------- 
 
1.  (U)  Informal budget discussions on Oct. 16 broke little 
new ground, and the stage is set for last-minute negotiations 
during CSP-8.  DG Pfirter was in attendance and reiterated 
his call for a 7.36% increase.  France stated that it had 
sent the DG's proposals and his calculations on the impact of 
smaller budget increases to Paris for consideration, but 
still had no instructions.  Japan had the same message, 
noting that Tokyo was still considering the matter.  The only 
new vote of support for the DG came from Iran, which said it 
backed the DG's proposal, but conspicuously tied it to a 
strong pitch for a robust amount of ICA.  And while India did 
not explicitly express support for the DG, it did state that 
the scenarios set forth by the DG as a result of smaller 
budget increases were a reason for concern, as they indicated 
an impact on core activities. 
 
------------------ 
STABILIZATION FUND 
------------------ 
 
2.  (U)  The new facilitator for Article IV/V (Johan 
Verboom/Netherlands) chaired his first meeting, which 
focused, of course, on the new draft decision on late receipt 
of Article IV/V income.  Delegations were generally 
supportive of the overall concept -- once it was explained 
adequately -- but there were many questions, and it is not 
clear whether there is sufficient support and understanding 
to push this through next week. 
 
3.  (U)  The Mexican delegation in particular complained 
about being hit with such a significant proposal only days 
before the CSP, a sentiment which was shared by other 
delegations.  Germany had some questions and concerns, which 
appeared to focus mainly on the cashflow side of the 
equation.  In particular, they asked why the Working Capital 
Fund could not be used for the same purpose, asserting that 
EC-31 had provided a dispensation that would allow 
"additional" or "late" funds accumulated in 2003 and 2004 to 
be put into the WCF.  Administrative Director Herb Schulz and 
Ali Asghar noted the limitations on the WCF and stressed that 
it is not flexible enough to meet the needs of the 
organization.  They also argued that the WCF is not large 
enough on its own to cover the initial shortfalls at the 
start of the year, before many States Parties make their 
initial assessed contributions. 
 
4.  (U)  Canada and others had questions about the 
significance of specific wording in the operative paragraphs, 
but nothing which indicated solid opposition to the proposal. 
 Interestingly, Russia did not object to proposals to delete 
a reference to consulting with the EC before tapping the 
program stabilization fund.  As AC/CB is aware, this 
provision had been included at the request of the Russian IO 
deputy director. 
 
5.  (SBU)  In short, while no delegation made a serious 
objection to the proposal, they will require a lot of 
convincing.  There is general agreement on the idea of 
ensuring that late Article IV/V funds should be put to use by 
the organization, and not simply become a windfall surplus to 
be redistributed back to the member states.  The 
administrative and financial points made by Schulz and Asghar 
were usually helpful, but occasionally confused the 
delegates.  As long as the focus remains on the overriding 
goal of the draft decision document, there is a chance of 
having it passed.  But in view of the short time involved in 
reaching this decision, and the requirement for capitals to 
consider this matter, it will take a lot of work from the TS 
during CSP-8, probably with a lot of help from the U.S. 
 
------------------ 
EXTENSION REQUESTS 
------------------ 
 
6.  (SBU)  UK delegation informed del that the idea of visits 
to U.S. demil sites could become a very important element of 
their calculus regarding our extension request.  The U.S. had 
satisfied the UK with our language proposed bilaterally to 
them regarding our 45% deadline exceeding the 100% deadline, 
but the UK was keen to maintain pressure on Russia to be open 
about its demil program.  Part of that was to maintain the 
tool of visits to Russian demil sites which, in turn, 
suggested visits to U.S. sites, under the guise of equitable 
treatment, though the UK was/is not remotely concerned about 
our demil program or our extension request. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Del indicated that while it was encouraging that 
the UK and other States Parties recognized the differences 
between the U.S. and Russian demil programs and extension 
requests, such recognition did not mean much if, at the end 
of the day, we were treated no differently than the Russians. 
 Del added that we understand the sensitivity, particularly 
with the Russians, of being perceived as being treated 
differently or held to a different standard, but emphasized 
that, if anything, we were being held to a higher standard of 
conduct than the Russians.  Nevertheless we would take the 
UK's concerns into account. 
 
8.  (SBU) The UK delegation also asked what, if anything, we 
thought needed to be done in terms of extending Albania's 
deadlines for destruction of its recently-declared stockpile 
of CW.  Del said we did not have an immediate answer and 
would respond upon receiving information from Washington. 
 
9.  (U)  Del was also asked if we were aware of the fact that 
Moldova had recently stated that it had approximately 1712.26 
tons of "unused and forbidden" chemical products and 
pesticides stored in military sites.  Del responded that we 
were unaware of this issue, but would raise the question with 
Washington.  The matter has apparently been put before the 
NATO Political-Military Steering Committee and a fund has 
been established to collect the estimated 20,000 Euros needed 
to develop a detailed proposal for how to verify and develop 
destruction procedures for this material. 
 
-------------------------- 
ACTION PLAN ON ARTICLE VII 
-------------------------- 
 
10.  (U)  (Note: the action plan was adopted on Oct. 21 at 
the Special EC.  The following is a record of some of the 
discussions in the run-up to that decision.  End Note.)  One 
consultation was held on Friday, 17 October, to attempt to 
reach consensus.  Despite the efforts of facilitator Mark 
Matthews/UK, the group was unable to achieve consensus due to 
Indian and Iranian intransigence.  At issue are Operational 
Paragraphs (OP) 10 and 19.  Delegations agreed to take back 
to their capitals the following proposals: 
 
--OP10:  Without prejudice to the timelines set by the 
Convention, strongly stress (vice require) those States 
Parties that have yet to do so take the necessary steps and 
set realistic deadlines for these steps leading to the 
enactment of the necessary legislation (remainder unchanged). 
 
--OP18/9: Review at its ninth session the progress made and 
decide on any further action needed; and further review at 
its tenth session the status of implementation of Article 
VII, and consider and decide on any measures to be taken, if 
necessary, in order to ensure compliance by all States 
Parties with their obligations under Article VII. 
 
11.  (U)  India, Iran and the U.S. were asked to meet on Oct. 
20 to determine whether consensus could be reached before the 
Executive Council meeting the afternoon of Tuesday 21 October 
2003. 
 
---------- 
ARTICLE XI 
---------- 
 
12.  (U)  Norma Suarez/Mexico chaired one informal 
consultation Friday 17 October, announcing that she hoped to 
achieve consensus on her draft decision document before the 
CSP and called for general views one by one from attending 
delegations.  Generally, delegations supported the draft as a 
good starting point, and requested specifics on the origin of 
specific text paragraphs in order to focus our work. 
 
13.  (U)  Pakistan stated that because Article XI is one of 
the pillars of the Convention, the TS needs to do more than 
merely sponsor seminars and workshops.  Pakistan slammed the 
continued maintenance by some delegations of discriminatory 
export controls and asked that delegations focus on sharing 
rather than excluding.  Iran demanded that the coordinator 
include its proposal for the establishment of an 
International Cooperation Committee, and again made a fifteen 
minute intervention on the damage done by the Australia Group 
restrictions in particular and noted that the EU had 
reconfirmed its support of these controls.  Germany noted 
that progress would not be possible if the draft decision 
included a call for an International Cooperation Committee. 
France noted that it was important to avoid theological 
debates if progress was to be made on the Article XI draft 
decision document. 
 
14.  (U)  Delegations agreed that there was no possibility of 
consensus before the Eighth CSP, and the facilitator 
tentatively set a date of mid-November for her next 
consultation and noted that delegations should bring concrete 
text proposals at that point. 
 
----------------------- 
RESULTS BASED BUDGETING 
----------------------- 
 
15.  (U)  Consultant Robert Smith, together with DDG Brian 
Hawtin and Administrative Director Herb Schultz provided a 
briefing and summary paper (faxed to AC/CB) to interested 
delegations on October 15.  Keying his presentation to the 
distributed paper, Smith summarized the postulated six core 
objectives of the OPCW.  (These are drawn from the draft 
Medium Term Plan and have not changed since they were 
proposed in July, but have not been vetted by Policy Making 
Organs.)  These six core, or overarching, objectives address 
universality, national implementation, destruction 
verification, industry inspections, international assistance, 
and operation of the Secretariat.  These objectives are 
intended to capture every activity carried out by the OPCW. 
 
16.  (U)  Underlying these core objectives are 105 lesser 
objectives, which have not been released.  Organizationally, 
Smith identified 18 OPCW "units" contributing to these 
objectives.  Some units are Divisions, and others Branches. 
This, he explained at length, was the result of careful study 
which found that some Divisions (like Verification) are 
thoroughly "integrated" with respect to the objectives they 
pursue, while others (such as Administration) have clearly 
delineated Branches pursuing different objectives.  The 
Office of Special Projects is not included at all, because it 
sets its own objectives from year to year.  Nor are the 
Policy Making Organs addressed in any way by RBB (because the 
Technical Secretariat is not in a position to direct the 
PMOs). 
 
17.  (U)  Although the purpose of RBB is focused on 
budgeting, Smith emphasized that it is a tool, not an 
automatic mechanism.  It is intended to measure progress 
against clearly defined goals to answer the question "how did 
we do?"  The next questions are "why?" and "what next?" - 
allowing for course changes and a flexible budgetary response. 
 
--------------------- 
ROK EXTENSION REQUEST 
--------------------- 
 
18.  (C)  (Note: the ROK extension request was approved at 
the Oct. 21 Special EC.  The following is a record of some of 
the discussions in the run-up to that decision.  End Note.) 
At an Oct. 16 lunch, we asked PRC Counselor Kang Yong about 
the South Korean request for an extension of its destruction 
deadline.  At EC-34, the PRC has requested that action be 
deferred on this item.  Kang declined to even state if 
Beijing had made a decision, simply informing us that the ROK 
request was made more difficult by the fact that the South 
Koreans had classified the background information regarding 
their request.  However, in a separate conversation with the 
Korean delegation, Mr. Lee indicated that the Chinese MoD had 
reviewed Korea's extension request and, through the Chinese 
delegation, had indicated that it would support it.  The UK 
delegation privately questioned why the Koreans needed a 
three-year extension for a four-month delay in operations and 
indicated that it would be consulting bilaterally with Korea 
during the CSP on this question. 
 
19.  (U)  Javits sends. 
 
 
SOBEL