This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002577 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR FOLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): ARTICLE VI 
BILATS WRAP-UP 
 
REF: A. A. L/VER/ODV/73619/03 
     ¶B. 11 JULY 2003 
     ¶C. B. NACS# 140630 
     ¶D. 7 AUGUST 2003 
     ¶E. C. NACS# 139498 
     ¶F. 30 JUNE 2003 
     ¶G. D. NACS# 129617 
     ¶H. 14 AUGUST 2002 
     ¶I. E. STATE 250474 
 
This is CWC-102-03. 
 
------------ 
Background 
----------- 
 
¶1.  US Del met with Per Runn (Deputy Director, Verification 
Division), Faiza Patel-King (Verification Division), 
Alexandru Dolea (Officer, Industry Verification Branch), and 
Cinthia Echavarria (Senior Policy Officer, Policy Review 
Branch) of the OPCW on 1 Oct 03 to discuss a variety of 
Article VI issues.  The Del consisted of: Rick D'Andrea 
(State), Larry Denyer (Commerce-TCD), Gary Mallard 
(Commerce-NIST), and Brandon Williams (Commerce Rep - Del). 
Ref A proposed a meeting between the US and Technical 
Secretariat (TS) to discuss Article VI issues.  Ref B 
 
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provided US agreement to the meetings.  The following topics 
were discussed: 
 
---------------------------- 
Sampling and Analysis Policy 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  The Del inquired on the status of TS policy development 
regarding the use of sampling and analysis during industry 
inspections.  Runn expressed that the TS's sampling and 
analysis is viewed as just one of the many inspection team 
tools available for successfully executing industry 
inspections and that there are no preset conditions that 
would mandate sampling and analysis.  He indicated that this 
tool, however, is much more expensive and logistically 
difficult to use than other such tools.  Therefore, the TS is 
seeking to maximize limited resources.  In particular, the TS 
is investigating how to more regularly deploy, at a minimum, 
sample collection and preparation equipment with teams to 
allow this tool to be available to them.  On balance, 
however, the TS is formulating directives to TS Inspection 
Team Leaders which allow for flexibility with respect to 
sampling and analysis and which take into account operational 
considerations and alternative methods of demonstrating 
compliance which achieve the same degree of confidence and 
validity as sampling and analysis, but may be less intrusive 
to the inspected site.  The TS made clear to Del that 
sampling and analysis will not be conducted on a presumption 
of use, or 'blank check' basis, during industry inspections. 
The TS agreed to provide regular updates to Del regarding 
development of their sampling and analysis policy. 
 
---------------------------- 
Schedule 1 Chemical Activity 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  At the outset of discussions, the U.S. and TS agreed to 
disagree on the CWC requirements for declaring Schedule 1 
facilities.  The TS view is that 1) once declared, Schedule 1 
facilities remain inspectable unless a State Party formally 
removes the plant site from the list of inspectable 
facilities, and 2) annual declarations are required for 
activities such as storage and consumption of Schedule 1 
chemicals even if there is no annual production above 100 
grams.  The U.S. position is that no declarations are 
required from facilities that produce Schedule 1 chemicals 
below the 100-gram threshold in a given year.  The TS had 
questions for Del concerning declaration requirements in the 
US CWC Regulations (CWCR) for facilities that fall under 
paras 11 and 12 of Part VI of the Verification Annex.  The TS 
perceives these facilities as "jumping on and off" the 
inspectable list because the CWCR requires declarations only 
for facilities that exceed applicable declaration thresholds. 
 The TS presented a number of potential solutions to the 
"problem."  Only one TS idea, however, seemed to be a 
workable solution in light of CWCR requirements and the 
180-day advance notification issue:  a "nil" declaration 
provided by the USG for such facilities that produce under 
the 100 g threshold and, as such, do not make an annual 
declaration to the USG.   The TS will pursue further 
discussions on the 180-day issue..  The TS still feels, 
however, that the question of inspectability is open 
regardless of the below-threshold activity. 
 
---------------------- 
Sequential Inspections 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  The TS presented the results of several surveys it 
carried out in 1998, 2000, and 2003 of States Parties 
concerning support for sequential industry inspections.  As a 
result of the TS's optimization and efficiency initiative, 
the TS is now requesting other dissenting States Parties to 
reconsider their opposition to sequential inspections in the 
hopes of maximizing available resources.  To allay State 
Party concerns that sequential inspections could drive the 
selection of sites for inspections, the TS outlined the 
two-tier process of site selection.  First, the TS draws 
plant sites for inspection, followed by ordering inspections 
in consideration of sequential inspections, where possible. 
The TS assured the Del that the confidentiality problems 
experienced during the only sequential industry inspections 
held in the U.S. were isolated incidents.  To address U.S. 
confidentiality concerns, the TS offered to develop formal 
 
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agreements with States Parties to address particular 
confidentiality, administrative or logistical concerns.  For 
 
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example, the TS offered to craft an agreement that limits 
sequential inspections to a one-week time period, 
accommodates technical equipment or additional 
point-of-entry/exit procedures, and restricts sequential 
inspections to only intra-state inspections.  The TS also 
committed to provide a copy of their confidentiality 
procedures to the U.S. for review.  The TS closed the meeting 
by asking the Del what our ideas were on conducting 
sequential inspections at plant sites located on the same 
industrial complex.  Del noted that such an approach would 
appear to end-run the selection predictability process and 
appears intended to short-cut the plant/plant site 
delineation issue to essentially conduct one inspection at an 
industrial complex (not necessarily one plant site).  Del 
also noted problems associated with 'bleeding' of information 
and issues between plant sites. 
 
------------------- 
Facility Agreements 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  Del and TS briefly discussed the scheduled facilitation 
on the need for and format of Schedule 2 facility agreements. 
 The TS indicated their preference for a facilitation focused 
on format rather than the establishment of criteria for a 
State Party to opt-out of negotiating facility agreements. 
Del signaled our support for such a format-oriented 
facilitation.  The TS also mentioned that they are 
considering the use of a form to collect risk data rather 
than wrestle with what they called the "big format."  Del 
reserves judgment on the utility of such an approach until 
the form is seen and reviewed. 
 
----------------- 
Original Records 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  There was general discussion about requirements for the 
provision of "original records" during industry inspections. 
The TS acknowledged that with more and more companies moving 
to purely electronic recordkeeping systems, the idea of 
original paper batch tickets and documents are no longer a 
guarantee.  The TS echoed the Del's observation that the real 
issue is providing the inspection team with records that can 
adequately be authenticated, regardless of their format.  The 
Del and TS agreed that, in cases where the actual, "original" 
records are not on-hand and copies or other authentic records 
as identified in the CWCR are provided, that authentic 
records are acceptable. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Absence of Schedule 1 Methodology 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  The Del questioned the TS on its progress on developing 
internal guidelines on verifying the absence of Schedule 1 
chemicals during industry inspections.  Runn noted that the 
TS is currently formulating directives to TS Inspection Team 
 
SIPDIS 
Leaders which allow for flexibility in pursuing specific and 
technical questions where necessary and related to verifying 
the absence of Schedule 1 chemicals and for teams to 'cease 
and desist' when there are not specific questions, technical 
issues or ambiguities.  Similar to sampling and analysis, 
there was a shared desire to avoid a 'blank check' approach 
in which teams would pursue unnecessary lines of questions. 
There was also a shared desire to balance against a checklist 
that might provide a roadmap to States Parties to evade 
detection of clandestine activities.  Del indicated, however, 
that specific documentation or guidelines would need to be 
reviewed to ensure progress is being made in this area and 
reminded the TS that if progress is not made, the U.S. is 
contempla 
ting moving, based on the requirements articulated in the 
Report of the First Review Conference, to remand the issue 
for decision by the industry cluster group. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶8.  The TS expressed its appreciation for these consultations 
and their desire for further talks.  Topics for future 
consultations include the 90-day window prior to receipt of 
annual declarations of past activities during which other 
chemical production facilities are not inspectable, and 
access to records based on declarations of anticipated 
activities.  Del agreed in principle to further 
consultations, but there was no discussion of when these 
talks would be held. 
 
¶9.  Javits sends. 
 
SOBEL