This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006398 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013 
TAGS: PREL TU AM AJ
SUBJECT: TURKEY HITCHES ARMENIA POLICY TO NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 6198 
     ¶B. STATE 278584 
     ¶C. STATE 286070 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.5 
(b) and (d). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a October 8 discussion with poloff, MFA 
Caucasus and Central Asia Director Ertan Tezgor confirmed 
that the GOT clearly linked opening the Armenian border and 
resuming diplomatic relations to Armenian concessions on 
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK).  Tezgor brushed off concerns this 
would substantially delay bilateral progress, but predicted 
no breakthroughs in bilateral relations until 2004.  He was 
unconcerned about the effect of a potential Armenian genocide 
resolution by the U.S. Congress on bilateral relations and 
said the GOT would consider a proposal to allow diplomatic 
passport holders to cross the border freely.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
 
A Clear Link Between Bilateral Relations and NK 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Unlike previous statements by MFA officials that 
bilateral relations and NK were "separate but parallel" 
tracks (ref A), Tezgor confirmed what FM Oskanian reported to 
U/S Grossman on September 25 (ref B):  Turkey clearly linked 
opening the border and resumption of diplomatic relations to 
progress between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh 
(NK).  "Armenia cannot just approach Turkey," he said, it 
also had to deal with Azerbaijan.  Tezgor reiterated the GOT 
proposal for the GOAM to withdraw from four NK cantons, which 
he said would permit 350,000 IDPs to return, and to open rail 
links. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Tezgor brushed off the idea that linking bilateral 
relations to NK would substantially delay progress between 
Turkey and Armenia.  He said Turkey and Armenia were "on a 
good track."  Armenia would have no incentive to deal on NK 
if Turkey opened the border and resumed relations without any 
NK link.  He also worried about public criticism if Turkey 
opened the border without any NK concessions from Armenia. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Tezgor said Turkey also wanted Armenia to publicly 
renounce territorial claims inside Turkey, which he claimed 
were found in Art. 11 of Armenia's Declaration of 
Independence (referring to "Western Armenia") and Art 13 of 
the Constitution (referring to Mt. Ararat as one of Armenia's 
national symbols), although he conceded Armenia posed no real 
territorial threat to Turkey.  The GOAM was prepared to make 
such a pronouncement, but only upon the resumption of 
diplomatic relations. 
 
 
No Breakthrough Until Next Year 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Tezgor foresaw no breakthroughs in Turkish-Armenian 
relations until spring 2004.  He expected Ilham Aliyev would 
win Azerbaijan's October 15 elections and would need time to 
form a government before he could deal on NK.  Tezgor said FM 
Gul would next meet with FM Oskanian on the margins of the 
December OSCE meeting, and he predicted progress in further 
bilateral meetings in January and February.  In the meantime, 
the two countries would focus on expanded NGO contacts, joint 
restoration of historical monuments, and expanded airline 
service.  Tezgor ruled out any other significant movement, 
saying that it would have to come as part of a "package" that 
included NK. 
 
 
Not Concerned About Genocide Resolution 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Tezgor professed to be unconcerned about the prospect 
that lack of movement with Armenia would fuel another push 
for an Armenian genocide resolution in the U.S. Congress.  He 
was confident such a resolution would have no effect on 
government-to-government relations and that the GOT could 
manage Turkish public opinion.  He claimed that France's 
genocide resolution had no lasting effect and predicted a 
similar only-temporary reaction to a U.S. resolution. 
 
 
Diplomatic Passport Border Crossing Proposal 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Tezgor said the GOT would consider the proposal to 
allow diplomatic passport holders from both nations to cross 
the border (ref C).  He added that the two governments had 
not discussed including third-country diplomats in the 
proposal, but had discussed including official delegations. 
¶8.  (C) Comment:  We have observed a similar vacillation over 
the last year.  Speaking with the same officials we 
alternatively hear a stronger or weaker link between 
bilateral Armenian-Turkish relations and NK.  Given the 
transition in Azerbaijan, we are clearly in the swing to a 
stronger link.  Tezgor's seeming minimizing of the potential 
impact of any Armenian resolution is not credible.  Turkish 
officials always emphasize the impact "anti-Turkish" 
resolutions could have.  The Turks have just canceled a Swiss 
FM's visit because of the passage of a genocide resolution by 
one canton, and our French colleagues say they still feel the 
chill, particularly with the military, from their resolution 
several years later.  End Comment. 
EDELMAN