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Diana T Fritz  03/20/2007 04:07:14 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                         October 27, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 4764 - ROUTINE)         

TAGS:     PREL, PGOV, PINR                                       

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  UAE, OMAN FORMALIZE BORDER PACT                        

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L        ABU DHABI 04764

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   DAO PAO RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON 
Laser1:
    INFO:   PAO 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:RAALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: NONE

VZCZCADI104
RR RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHDE RUCJACC RHEHNSC RHEFDIA
RUEAIIA
DE RUEHAD #4764/01 3001153
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271153Z OCT 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2210
INFO RUEHZM/GCC COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 3498
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004764 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR, NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/13 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR QA SA IR MU TC
SUBJECT:  UAE, OMAN FORMALIZE BORDER PACT 
 
Ref:  A) 02 Abu Dhabi 3079, B) 02 Abu Dhabi 2778 
 
(U) Classified by Richard A. Albright, Charge 
d'Affaires, a.i., Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: The historical dispute between the 
UAE and Oman over their common international border 
appears to be over.  On October 11, the two 
neighbors exchanged authenticated documents on the 
agreement reached on the common border from east of 
Al Aqeedat to Al Daar in the north on the Arabian 
Gulf coast.  The agreement had been signed on June 
22 last year by UAE MinState for Foreign Affairs 
Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan (HbZ) and Omani 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi bin 
Abdullah (see ref A).  HbZ is expected to turn his 
attention next to other disputes with Iran and 
Saudi Arabia.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On October 11, the UAE and Oman exchanged 
authenticated documents on the agreement signed in 
June 2002 delineating the common border between the 
two countries.  That signing took place in the 
presence of UAE President Shaykh Zayed and Sultan 
Qaboos bin Said of Oman.  According to newspaper 
reports, the border agreed upon lies between the 
northern Emirate of Ras Al Khaymah and Oman's 
northern Musandam peninsula, specifically between 
the Emirati fishing village of Al Daar on the 
Arabian Gulf and the inland town of Al Aqeedat.  We 
had been told last year that the border pact 
includes a swap involving the Omani enclave of Al 
Madhah in Sharjah-controlled Khor Fakkan.  (Note: 
On October 25, a reliable source at the Ministry of 
Information and Culture told Polchief that the 
intent of the border pact was to include the Al 
Madhah enclave.  He said details of the pact are 
closely held by the UAEG and are not being revealed 
to the press.  He said he would try to confirm the 
information with his government sources in Sharjah 
and Fujairah during the month of Ramadan.  End 
note.)  Under the terms of the pact, UAE citizens 
within what is now Omani territory have been given 
the option to remain Emirati and the same is true 
for Omanis in what is now UAE territory.  HBZ told 
the press that the agreement was a model of a 
peaceful settlement of a border dispute and would 
open "unlimited avenues of cooperation and 
integration in various fields between the two 
countries." 
 
¶3. (C) As we reported in ref A, Shaykh Hamdan's 
task from his father, UAE President Zayed, was to 
strike a compromise in which both sides were 
required to give a little.  Zayed's approach with 
this conflict, as well as with the UAE's historical 
border dispute with Saudi Arabia, and the UAE's 
quarrel with Iran over three islands Iran seized in 
the Arabian Gulf, has been to peacefully resolve 
these disputes. 
 
¶4. (C) Prior to the formation of the UAE federation 
in 1971, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had some 
competing territorial claims.  The contested areas 
included the Abu Dhabi oasis of Al Ain, the Omani 
oasis of Al Buraimi, the coastal strip between Abu 
Dhabi and Qatar, and the Zarrara-Shaybah oil fields 
near the border between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
The Saudis declined initially to recognize the UAE, 
pending a resolution of the territorial issue. 
Shaykh Zayed made resolution of the dispute with 
the Al Saud a top priority and in 1974 initialed an 
agreement allowing for cession by Abu Dhabi of some 
territory in the west of the country to Saudi 
Arabia in exchange for the establishment of 
diplomatic relations (ref A).  Due to the highly 
sensitive nature of the issue, details are 
difficult to confirm.  A source of ours in the oil 
business told us that most of the Saudi-UAE border 
remains unresolved, while the CIA World Factbook 
states that the treaties have not been made public. 
The exact alignment of the boundary with Saudi 
Arabia remains unpublished and is labeled 
approximate. 
 
¶5. (C) The border dispute with Oman carried 
significant baggage as the Omanis -- who view the 
UAE as part and parcel of historical Oman -- also 
refused initially to recognize the UAE.  With the 
Omani border disagreement finally behind them, the 
Emiratis can now focus on the remaining border 
disputes.  HbZ told the Ambassador October 19 that 
the Saudis wanted to discuss maritime borders with 
Qatar, and that they had also asked to hold border 
consultations with the UAE.  HbZ referred to some 
of the territory near Shaybah as Emirati land.  HbZ 
stated that the border issue need to be resolved 
and was planning to stop in Riyadh Oct. 20.   This 
timing did not work out so the visit most likely 
will have to wait until after Ramadan. 
ALBRIGHT