This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001684 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, SA/RA 
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2013 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: FORMER PRESIDENT OF FINLAND AHTISAARI 
BROUGHT IN FOR CONSULTATIONS ON GON-MAOIST DIALOGUE 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 1677 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Former President of Finland Marti Ahtisaari 
paid a three-day visit to Nepal August 28-30 at the request 
of British aid agency DFID to provide assistance to the 
facilitators of the GON-Maoist peace talks.  During a meeting 
with Ambassador Malinowski, Ahtisaari expressed optimism 
that, despite resumed violence, a negotiated political 
settlement between the government and the insurgents 
eventually could be reached.  He questioned, however, the 
viability of holding elections with the Maoists as a 
legitimate political party until the insurgents have laid 
down their arms.  Ahtisaari's visit planned by DFID, although 
well-intentioned, did nothing to further the peace process 
and caused some consternation within the GON and the Indian 
Embassy.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On August 29, Ambassador Malinowski met with former 
President of Finland Marti Ahtisaari to discuss the prospects 
for peace in Nepal.  Ahtisaari said he had been approached 
two weeks prior, with the support and assistance of British 
aid agency DFID, by the four facilitators to the 
Maoist-Government of Nepal dialogue asking Ahtisaari to 
travel to Nepal to make an assessment and offer advice on how 
to move the peace process forward.  Ahtisaari agreed to the 
visit, which he made from August 28 - 30. 
 
¶3. (C) During his visit, Ahtisaari spent over three hours 
with the facilitators and the Government of Nepal's lead 
negotiator and Minister of Finance, Dr. Prakash Chandra 
Lohani.  (Note.  The facilitators have been disbanded as a 
result of the break in the cease-fire. (Reftel) End Note.) 
After these discussions, Ahtisaari observed that the only way 
to resolve the conflict would be to provide conditions under 
which the Maoists could play a role in government through 
national elections.  However, any election would require 
international supervision, he said.  Ahtisaari questioned the 
need for a constituent assembly and suggested that both sides 
first agree on a constitutional framework, such as 
constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy, that would 
provide the basis from which to proceed.  He concluded that 
the Maoist insurgency and political crisis in Nepal are not 
as bad as that with the LTTE in Sri Lanka. 
 
¶4. (C) Ahtisaari asked the Ambassador for his assessment of 
Maoist intentions and the possibility of renewed peace talks. 
 The Ambassador replied that the main problem centers around 
what the Maoists expect to get from negotiations with the 
government, namely that the insurgents want control over 
elections and, ultimately, over the government.  However, the 
Ambassador opined, the Maoists may be miscalculating the 
impact of their terror campaign on GON thinking.  Maoist 
threats to bomb the capital and attempts to assassinate 
political and military leaders will not cause the GON to 
capitulate to Maoist demands, he said. 
 
¶5. (C) Ahtisaari expressed concern that the Royal Nepal Army 
(RNA) had not used the seven-month long cease-fire to improve 
and expand the counter-insurgency effort.  Ambassador 
Malinowksi pointed out, however, that the RNA had used the 
cease-fire to fortify its bases around the country so that 
mass attacks by the Maoists will be less likely to succeed. 
The Ambassador suggested that there are four components to 
the peace effort.  First, Nepal's constitutional forces -- 
the King and political parties -- must come together and 
present a unified front against the insurgents.  Second, the 
GON must begin to address the root causes of the conflict by 
distributing resources more fairly and including 
disenfranchised groups, such as women and members of the 
low-castes, into the political system.  Third, the GON must 
improve the ability of its security forces to protect the 
Nepali people.  Fourth, the international community must 
support the GON against the Maoists, assist the GON's 
development effort, and build the GON's capacity to negotiate 
with the insurgents. 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Malinowski warned, however, that the 
Government of India is very sensitive to third-party 
involvement in resolving the Maoist conflict in Nepal and 
recommended strongly that Ahtisaari pay a visit to Indian 
Ambassador Shyam Saran during his stay in Kathmandu. 
Ahtisaari agreed to see Ambassador Saran as well as the 
British Ambassador before leaving the country.  Ahtisaari 
said that because the Maoist leadership is now in hiding, he 
would not have the chance to meet with them.  He intended 
perhaps to hold a separate meeting with talks facilitator 
Padma Ratna Tuladhar and journalist Shyam Shrestha, both 
known to be surrogate Maoists with close ties to political 
leader Baburam Bhattarai.  Ahtisaari did not expect to return 
to Nepal for a second visit. 
 
¶7. (U) Biographic Note:  Marti Ahtisaari was elected 
President of the Republic of Finland in 1994 and held office 
until 2000.  Shortly after leaving office, Ahtisaari assumed 
the Co-Chairmanship of the East-West Institute based in New 
York and Chairmanship of the International Crisis Group based 
in Brussels.  In June 2003, U.N. General Secretary Kofi Annan 
appointed Ahtisaari as a U.N. Special Envoy for the 
Humanitarian Crisis in the Horn of Africa.   He has also done 
a significant amount of work furthering peace in the Balkans. 
 End  Biographic Note. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment.  Although Marti Ahtisaari's visit was 
well-intentioned, it did not appear to have a significant 
impact on the peace process (especially since the 
facilitators for the peace talks were relieved of their 
duties).  Moreover, DFID provided the GON with little prior 
notice, and the Indian Embassy no advance notice, of this 
high-profile visit.  DFID, which has advocated direct donor 
contact with the Maoists, has been criticized by Palace 
officials who are suspicious of DFID's activities and feel 
that the development agency is ignoring political and 
security sensitivities surrounding the Maoist insurgency. 
When finally informed, the Indian Ambassador privately 
expressed ire over DFID's actions in this regard.  Although 
Post does not necessarily agree with the Indian position on 
the possible value of outside mediation, we do not advise 
antagonizing the Indians over this issue at a time when the 
Indians are increasing the level of their cooperation with 
Nepal and other countries on the Maoist insurgency.  Post 
believes it is important that the U.S., UK and India maintain 
a common message toward the Maoists and fear that DFID may be 
countermanding this effort.  End Comment. 
MALINOWSKI