This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001792 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI MDC
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI ON MDC'S OVERSEAS OUTREACH, TALKS, 
TRIAL 
 
REF: HARARE 1711 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Political officer Win Dayton; reason -- Section 1.5 (B) 
(D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a September 10 meeting with Ambassador 
Sullivan, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai voiced continued 
frustration with ZANU-PF's lack of urgency on resuming talks 
and recounted efforts by MDC principals to engage with 
regional SADC leaders in that regard.  He sought USG support 
for the opening of an MDC office in Washington and reported 
that he and MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube planned to 
testify at Tsvangirai's treason trial due to get underway 
September 15.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) On his own initiative, Tsvangirai came to the 
Residence to review recent developments with the Ambassador. 
At the outset, he described ongoing approaches by MDC 
principals with SADC heads of state.  Malawian President 
Muluzi had been especially receptive in welcoming a 
delegation that included Secretary General Welshman Ncube and 
Chairman Isaac Matongo.  Muluzi also had arranged a call by 
the delegation on Tanzanian President Mkapa and offered to 
facilitate other meetings.  The delegation was to visit 
Mozambique after meeting with Mkapa on September 9. 
Tsvangirai identified Botswana, Angola, and Namibia as other 
 
SIPDIS 
possible MDC diplomatic whistle stops.  (NOTE: We understand 
that a meeting in Mozambique is being rescheduled for the 
coming weeks and that the Angolans, while aware of MDC 
interest in a meeting, were waiting for further word from the 
MDC. END NOTE) 
 
¶3.  (C) According to Tsvangirai, Muluzi was skeptical of 
South African reassurances that "things were moving forward" 
in Zimbabwe.  Muluzi had reported that Mugabe's 45 minute 
ramble on land reform and neocolonialism at the SADC summit 
had left other leaders frustrated and sensing that he lacked 
a meaningful plan to address Zimbabwe's multi-dimensional 
crisis.  Tsvangirai observed that the South African High 
Commissioner was becoming especially frustrated over GOZ 
inaction.  At the same time, he voiced doubt about the 
intensity of South African pressure on Zimbabwe, and noted 
that the MDC delegation had heard "nothing new" from the ANC 
Secretary General when they passed through South Africa on 
 
SIPDIS 
their way home from Malawi. 
 
¶4.  (C) Tsvangirai advised that very discreet interparty 
discussions on the constitution had gone well, suggesting to 
him that Justice Minister Chinamasa recognized the 
inevitability of a framework to support new elections.  He 
took recently announced internal ZANU-PF provincial elections 
as an indication that the party was preparing for a 
transition, although whether they had implications beyond an 
internal transition remained unclear.  He concluded that the 
bishops' initiative had "fallen through" and claimed that 
there were no other interparty channels in use.  Publicly 
reported channels involving ZANU-PF Chairman John Nkomo and 
party spokesman Nathan Shamuyarira were only associated with 
the defunct church initiative.  Curiously, intermediaries for 
the Italian order Santo Egidio had approached him the day 
before to inquire if MDC would object to the order playing a 
role in mediation/reconciliation efforts.  Tsvangirai said he 
told them that he had no formal objection but that the 
multiplicity of potential channels and mediation efforts only 
contributed to confusion and unhelpful delays.  He said he 
did not believe that ZANU-PF had given Santo Egidio any green 
light to facilitate talks. 
 
¶5.  (C) Tsvangirai expressed concern about the potential 
impact of speculation within the  government-controlled press 
on divisions within the MDC leadership, particularly between 
himself and Ncube.  His own rank and file were likely to know 
better but diplomats might believe the reports.  He confirmed 
our own analysis that there were no rifts within the MDC 
leadership and said that he felt "completely unchallenged." 
In addition, unlike ZANU-PF, which was rife with potential 
ethnic, sub-ethnic, geographic and historical divisions, MDC 
was unified across ethnic and geographic lines.  The 
Ambassador assured him that we had not given any credence to 
the reports, and had shared this assessment with diplomats 
who sought our opinion on the matter. 
 
¶6.  (C) Referencing local media reports on A/S Boucher's 
September 2 statement on Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai sought 
clarification of Washington's assessment of the August 30-31 
elections.  He voiced concern that positive appraisals of the 
elections could play into the government's hands.  The 
Ambassador explained that the statement had recognized some 
degree of improvement over past elections but highlighted 
continuing concerns about levels of violence and 
intimidation, economic duress on voters, and non-transparency 
associated with voter rolls.  Tsvangirai conceded he had not 
seen the full statement and agreed that objectivity and a 
balanced assessment were important to USG credibility with 
public. 
 
¶7.  (C) Tsvangirai reported that the MDC was interested in 
opening an office in Washington and sought USG support in 
that regard.  Beyond Washington, he asserted that the MDC 
already had adequate coverage of the EU but would pursue 
additional offices in Nairobi and West Africa.  The party was 
in the process of getting higher level coverage of South 
Africa, perhaps on a rotating, part-time basis.  The 
Ambassador explained that the USG was prohibited from 
supporting lobbying operations in Washington but that the 
Department could be helpful in facilitating access and in 
other ways. 
 
¶8.  (C) Turning to his treason trial, which is due to get 
underway on September 15, Tsvangirai reported that he was 
planning to testify in his own defense.  Former co-defendants 
Party Secretary General Welshman Ncube and Shadow Agriculture 
Minister Ransen Gasela also would testify in person. 
Tsvangirai predicted that the trial would stretch out at 
 
SIPDIS 
least until the end of the year. 
 
¶9. (C) COMMENT:  The MDC leadership's efforts to stimulate 
regional pressure on the GOZ reflect frustration over the 
GOZ's continuing lack of urgency to come to the table. 
SADC's public inaction on Zimbabwe at the recent summit in 
Dar Es Salaam and MDC suspicions about SAG ambivalence 
further impel the leadership's foreign relations initiative. 
Although it is unclear the extent to which SADC member 
leaders would be willing to engage the GOZ constructively at 
the MDC's behest, for now the MDC leadership appears 
encouraged by the recognition they have received.  Our own 
feedback from SADC diplomats here is that they are 
encouraging meetings between MDC and their governments as a 
means to press ZANU-PF to resolve Zimbabwe's political 
crisis.  (The Mozambican High Commissioner -- who comes from 
a military background -- expressed frustration to us that 
Zimbabwe expected African solidarity with Zimbabwe vis-a-vis 
relations with the EU, while the absence of interaction was 
hurting all of Africa.)  Beyond the party's overseas 
outreach, Tsvangirai's preoccupation with media 
misinformation, treason trials and the like suggests that 
ZANU-PF harassment continues to absorb MDC leadership 
attention, with attendant opportunity cost to organizational 
and substantive concerns. 
SULLIVAN