This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ZAGREB 001887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KAWC HR NATO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES ON KEY BILATERAL ISSUES WITH 
FM, DEPUTY FM, AND CROATIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S. 
 
REF: ZAGREB 01797 
 
Classified By: Poloff Justin Friedman, reasons 1.5 (b) & (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C): With the political class returning from the Dalmatian 
coast, the Ambassador had separate tour d'horizon meetings 
this week with Foreign Minister Picula, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Simonovic, and Croatian Ambassador to the U.S. 
Grdesic to re-energize work on some key issues that have lain 
largely dormant over the summer vacation season.  FM Picula 
said he has given his staff a two week deadline to develop a 
serious proposal on an Article 98 agreement, as he 
understands a meeting at the Department around his UN UNGA 
visit will depend on real progress in this key area.  The 
Ambassador stressed that we needed to see concrete, positive 
steps on this issue to help steer the bilateral relationship 
back on track. 
 
¶2. (C) FM Picula said that the GoC wants to use the planned 
visit of a U.S. Navy ship to the BiH port of Neum in 
September to show that Croatia can work with the U.S.  The 
Ambassador stated bluntly that the real measure of Croatian 
cooperation with the ICTY will be General Ante Gotovina's 
transfer to The Hague.  On refugee returns, the GoC must work 
to harmonize its statistics with its neighbors' and the 
international community's so that we can have a clear 
understanding of what kind of progress has been achieved. 
Picula said that Croatia was trying to build more cooperative 
relations with BiH and Slovenia, but the GOC's initiatives 
were being spun the wrong way in the Slovenian and BiH press. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
ARTICLE 98 
---------- 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador met with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Simonovic on August 26 and with Foreign Minister Picula and 
Croatian Ambassador to the U.S. Grdesic (separately) on 
August 27.  The Ambassador's calls were simultaneous to a 
flurry of press reporting suggesting that Croatia had made a 
new offer to the U.S. on Article 98.  DFM Simonovic clarified 
that the GoC's approach was still the same.  Croatia could 
accept an agreement where the U.S. agrees to start some form 
of U.S. investigative or judicial proceeding against an 
accused person which would allow Croatia to halt extradition 
of that individual to the ICC.  Simonovic said further expert 
level discussions could work out what phase or what kind of 
U.S. process would be needed to satisfy Croatian legal 
concerns.  Subsequently, FM Picula told the Ambassador that 
he had charged his experts with coming up with a new, 
creative proposal in the next two weeks. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador commented to Picula that Croatia's 
position on the Article 98 issue and the Iraq war remained 
prominent in Washington's thinking about the U.S.-Croatia 
relationship.  The GoC would need to take a series of steps 
to change this thinking and get the bilateral relationship 
moving forward.  He cautioned Picula that U.S. views on 
Article 98 were clear and had not changed, and it would be 
important for the GoC to present to the U.S. a meaningful 
proposal. 
 
¶5. (C) Picula asked where discussions on Article 98 stood 
with the EU, as their position was key.  The GoC is under the 
impression that the UK and Italy are pushing the EU to bring 
forward a position that would permit members to conclude 
Article 98 agreements with the U.S.  Such a move would 
facilitate Croatia,s efforts to conclude an Article 98 
agreement.  The Ambassador commented that Croatia would have 
to come to its own decision on an Article 98 agreement in the 
context of its relationship with the EU, but noted that it 
was hard to believe that this single issue could decide 
Croatia's membership prospects, particularly when other 
countries seeking EU membership had signed Article 98 
agreements with the U.S. 
 
NEUM SHIP VISIT 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador stressed in all his meetings that by 
clearly demonstrating its support for the U.S. Navy ship 
visit to the BiH port of Neum, Croatia can help steer the 
U.S.-Croatia relationship back on track.  FM Picula said the 
GoC was ready to support the ship visit, and and asked that 
the U.S. request for specific GoC assistance to support the 
ship visit be conveyed in writing.  DFM Simonovic told the 
Ambassador that the GoC was satisfied with the BiH dipnote 
(generated by the GoBiH subsequent to reftel) requesting 
assistance for the U.S. ship visit.  (COMMENT: Given the lack 
of BiH maritime infrastructure or support services at Neum, 
Croatian support will be critical to the success of the ship 
 
 
visit.  END COMMENT). 
 
IRAQ TROOP CONTRIBUTION 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Picula said that the MFA was working with the MoD to 
prepare the appropriate documentation for the Sabor to begin 
consideration of a Croatian contribution to coalition forces 
in Iraq.  He said the decision document would be submitted to 
the Sabor for approval in the regular session beginning 
September 15.  He predicted approval prior to parliamentary 
elections expected on November 23.  Picula asked the 
Ambassador's assistance in lobbying for support of key Sabor 
deputies.  Picula observed that a new UNSC resolution thought 
to be under consideration that would go beyond UNSCR 1500 
would make the GoC political position easier. 
 
EU ACCESSION 
------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Simonovic noted that political conditionalities on EU 
membership will drive much of the next government's 
post-election actions, including cooperation with ICTY, 
refugee returns, and justice system improvements.  He noted 
that the UK was being very tough on Croatia, making its 
approval of the EU SAA contingent on the surrender of General 
Ante Gotovina to the ICTY.  Simonovic hoped that Prime 
Minister Racan's upcoming visit to London in September would 
help smooth out this problem and facilitate UK approval of 
the SAA. 
 
ICTY 
---- 
 
¶9. (C) DFM Simonovic commented that the timing of the next 
ICTY indictments could affect the political situation in 
Croatia, but observed that the GoC would be able to handle it 
even if the announcement came before the elections.  He asked 
if the international community's impression of GoC 
cooperation had changed.  The ambassador warned bluntly that 
the international community's perception is that the GoC is 
not doing enough to capture Gotovina and transfer him to The 
Hague.  That Gotovina could grant an interview with a leading 
Croatian weekly magazine and pose for photos for the cover 
made it hard for the international community to believe that 
Gotovina simply could not be found.  The message to Gotovina 
must be clear that his only choice is to appear in The Hague. 
 Anything else will hold up EU accession and just about 
everything else Croatia wants with the international 
community.  Simonovic responded that the international 
community's perception of Croatia on this issue was "worse 
than I thought." 
 
REFUGEE RETURNS 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (C) When asked about the international community's 
perception on refugee returns, the Ambassador observed that 
because of poor record keeping and a lack of agreement on 
definitions for categories of returnees made it imperative 
that the GoC get the basic issue of how to count returnees 
resolved with its neighbors and the international community. 
Until that happens, we would never be able to agree on what 
the remaining tasks are.  Simonovic hoped that President 
Mesic's upcoming trip to Belgrade will help Croatia's image 
on this issue.  The Ambassador responded that the 
international community is looking for measurable progress, 
and the consensus is that we are not there yet. 
 
RELATIONS WITH SLOVENIA 
----------------------- 
 
¶11. (C)  Simonovic complained that relations with Slovenia 
are burdened by Slovenia's emotional approach to key issues 
like the GoC plan to declare an exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ).  He noted that the Italians have the rational approach 
of wanting to preserve a sustainable fishery for their own 
fleet and are ready to talk about options, including an EEZ, 
to prevent non-European vessels from devastating the Adriatic 
fishery.  Working with Slovenia was much more difficult as 
the GoS will not say directly what it wants and keeps linking 
an EEZ with the issue of access to the high seas.  He 
admitted that poor GoC diplomacy had led to the initialed 
(but unratifiable) agreement on Piran Bay which, despite 
having no legal standing, had created political expectations 
in Slovenia and Croatia that were hard to overcome. 
Simonovic believes that arbitration may be the only long-run 
way to depoliticize and resolve the EEZ issue, as well as 
border delimitation and the Ljubljanska Banka issue. 
 
RELATIONS WITH BOSNIA 
--------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Simonovic observed that the GoC was finally finding 
 
 
the right level of engagement with BiH and now believes it 
can play a positive role in Bosnia.  However, he was unhappy 
how the corridor 5C roadway issue was developing.  Simonovic 
commented that some in BiH are using this issue to claim the 
GoC is back to its old ways of meddling in BiH internal 
affairs.  He feared the GoC response will be to become once 
again too "hands-off."  Croatia was on the "side of the 
angels" on the 5C corridor; the real issue is that BiH 
authorities are letting the whole tendering process smell of 
corruption. 
FRANK 
 
 
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