This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005449 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR NP AND EUR/SE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2013 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC IR TU IAEA
SUBJECT: IRAN SOLICITING TURKEY'S SUPPORT FOR THE IAEA BOG 
MEETING 
 
REF: STATE 245961 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, reasons 1.5, b/d. 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: MFA DG for International Security Affairs 
Morali gave DCM August 26 a detailed readout of the visit of 
Iranian National Security Council Deputy SYG Hussein Mousavin 
(spelled Museviyan in the Turkish press) August 25. 
According to Morali, Mousavin told his Turkish interlocutors 
that the Iranian NSC had fought a difficult, internal battle 
over the last two months to legitimize Iran's nuclear program 
through increased transparency and cooperation with the IAEA. 
 In addition, Iran stated its readiness to sign the 
Additional Protocol.  Mousavin came to Ankara to solicit 
Turkey's support at the Sept. 8 IAEA Board of Governors 
meeting, claiming that a finding of noncompliance would 
bolster hard-liners in Iran who believed cooperation and 
transparency were pointless.  Morali said the GOT delivered 
to Mousavin an "unequivocal" message that Iran must 
completely disavow its pursuit of self-sufficient nuclear 
capability in order to regain international confidence if it 
hoped to access to nuclear technology in the future.  DCM 
delivered reftel points to Morali, emphasizing that Iran's 
recent cooperation with IAEA was due primarily to its having 
been caught trying to deceive the IAEA and international 
community.  Morali noted that Turkey's position at the BOG 
would likely follow that of the EU, and he asked what 
Russia's position was, speculating that a finding of 
noncompliance would spell the end of a huge market for 
Russia.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) MFA DG for International Security Affairs Morali met 
August 26 with the DCM to provide a detailed readout of the 
previous day's visit of Iranian National Security Council 
Deputy SYG Hussein Mousavin.  Morali said Mousavin, who was a 
US- and UK-trained engineer as well as former Iranian 
ambassador to Germany, had met with Deputy U/S Sensoy 
followed by a short call on FM Gul.  Morali found it 
interesting that Mousavin had come from Iran alone, "without 
watchdogs," although the Iranian charge accompanied him to 
meetings.  Mousavin had explained that the Iranian NSC had 
worked a "miracle" in the last two months pursuing a policy 
of transparency and full cooperation with the IAEA on the 
basis of NPT obligations and had disavowed any intent to 
divert its nuclear program for military purposes.  The NSC 
had decided that the military nuclear option had no place in 
Iranian defense policy, and Mousavin reminded the GOT that a 
"fatwa" had been declared against WMD several years ago. 
However, a balance must be struck between rights and 
obligations -- Iran should not only abide by its NPT 
obligations but should also have the right to enjoy nuclear 
technology for peaceful uses.  Mousavin complained that, 
while full compliance was expected from NPT signatories, 
there was no reciprocity in allowing NPT signatories full 
access to nuclear technologies for peaceful uses.  Many in 
Iran believed this "one-way street" was discriminatory and 
worried that the implementation of the Additional Protocol 
would also be discriminatory.  Mousavin said if, despite its 
recent transparency and cooperation, Iran was found 
noncompliant at the Sept. 8 BOG meeting, Iranian hard-liners 
would argue that Iran's isolation was inevitable, and Iran 
should pursue its own national security goals.  In this 
environment, Iran's new policy of transparency and 
cooperation was a true accomplishment, which Mousavin hoped 
would be bolstered by acknowledgment and encouragement from 
friends like Turkey at the BOG meeting.  Mousavin expressed 
concern that the BOG meeting would be politicized by the US, 
saying any compromise of the "dignity and security" would be 
counterproductive and lead to "all other options being 
considered" by Tehran (e.g. withdrawal from the NPT). 
 
 
¶3. (C) Mousavin told the Turks the August 10-13 IAEA 
inspection team had been extended cooperation beyond that 
required by the NPT.  He said the Kalaye Electric site had 
been inspected, as well as Hashef (NFI).  The three sites 
identified by the MEK: the "farm," the chocolate factory and 
one other site had all been inspected without notice.  The 
Natanz plant had been fully inspected three times, and spare 
parts were allowed to be taken away for testing.  According 
to Mousavin, the radiation levels at Natanz were 
"insignificant" and far from enrichment process levels.  He 
claimed this radiation was merely contamination from foreign 
sources.  The Kalaye site had no imported materials that 
could be contaminated, but Mousavin was confident the tests 
from there would come back negative.  He noted that the 
chronology of Iran's nuclear program and the acquisition of 
centrifuge spare parts had been fully explained to the 
inspectors.  After the inspection visit, the GOI wrote a 
letter to IAEA DG El Baradei informing him of Iran's 
readiness to begin official negotiations for signing the 
Additional Protocol. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Mousavin noted that Iran was prepared to begin with 
bilateral confidence building that could be broadened 
regionally.  He reiterated that because of Iran's internal 
difficulties, adopting a negative position on Iran at the 
Sept. 8 BOG meeting would be counterproductive, and 
everything the moderates had been able to achieve would be 
jeopardized.  If the BOG took a positive stance, the NSC's 
strategy would not be questioned.  Morali said Mousavin 
seemed to be looking forward to the BOG meeting and was 
optimistic that the August 27 report would cast Iran's recent 
activities in a very good light.  Mousavin added that signing 
the Additional Protocol would be easier if there were some 
assurances that after signing, ratifying and implementing the 
agreement, there would be no discrimination.  Furthermore, 
joining a regime of intrusive inspections created a "secrecy 
problem."  These were not preconditions nor delaying tactics, 
as Iran was serious in its determination sign the Additional 
Protocol, but merely concerns.  Mousavin also expressed 
concern about US and German indications that 
signing/ratifying/implementing the Protocol would not be 
enough.  He wondered what would be enough.  Iran would have 
to hold out in negotiations to find out what ALL of the US 
expectations were before signing. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Morali said Dep U/S Sensoy was "unequivocal" that Iran 
needed to cooperate fully with the IAEA, emphasizing that 
Iran needed to take concrete steps to overcome the lack of 
confidence in Iran's intentions.  He welcomed the NSC's 
recommendations, but noted that, even if Iran continues on 
the road of NPT compliance, Iran should not expect access to 
nuclear technologies until trust in Tehran is reestablished. 
Sensoy cautioned against withdrawing from the NPT, as such 
action would destroy all chances of cooperation and ensure 
Iran's isolation.  Iran should sign the Additional Protocol 
without conditions and ratify and implement it without delay. 
 Sensoy cited a need for the region to use this transition 
period to create an area of stability based on respect for 
obligations under international instruments.  He noted that 
Turkey's policy was not singling out Iran; it had asked 
Israel, Pakistan and India many times to accede to the NPT, 
noting that even as non-signatories they would not be granted 
nuclear state status. 
 
 
¶6. (C)  Morali encouraged Iran to do something "concrete and 
dramatic" to regain international confidence.  He said there 
was a perception that Iran had a secret program and was 
pursuing a policy of self-sufficiency in nuclear technology 
(i.e. exploiting and enriching its own uranium resources). 
Morali recommended that Iran declare the suspension of all 
enrichment programs and arrange with Russian for the supply 
of fuel as well as the return of spent fuel for Iran's energy 
programs.  Self-sufficiency was an irreversible situation 
that would ensure unending pressure on Iran.  He told the 
Iranian that Iran needed to help Turkey help Iran.  Mousavin 
responded that Iran needed strategic nuclear depth because of 
the danger that Busher might be "taken out." (sic) 
 
 
¶7. (C) The DCM delivered reftel points, noting that our 
perception of Iranian cooperation and transparency differed 
drastically than Mousavin had described.  He noted that in 
addition to signing the Additional Protocol, Iran needed to 
explain many of the questions that had arisen as its nuclear 
program became apparent.  DCM added that Iran should be party 
to the NPT not because it ensure access to technology but 
because we all benefit from the security rendered by the 
treaty; there was no inherent guarantee of access to 
technology.  When asked if Turkey had begun formulating a 
position for the BOG in anticipation of the IAEA report due 
out August 27 Morali said that Turkey's EU aspirations would 
likely compel it to follow the EU lead.  But he wondered 
aloud what Russia's plans were given the large market it 
would likely lose if a finding of noncompliance were reported 
to the UNSC. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Morali, who also served as Turkey's 
ambassador to Iran, seemed encouraged by Iran's recent 
cooperation and transparency efforts.  Morali argued that 
Iran's MFA and Min. of Interior were often more enlightened 
than other GOI elements, implying that they should thus be 
supported.  The GOT is awaiting the report before it decides 
on its stance for the BOG meeting. 
EDELMAN