This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001707 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR FOLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL RS CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): RUSSIAN 
COMMENTARY ON ABERDEEN DOCUMENTS AND ITS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM 
 
This is CWC-71-03. 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. In Delegation's view, during these meetings it became 
clear that Russia does not intend, and perhaps never 
intended, to abide by the present terms of the CTR MOU dated 
14 March and signed by then-Director of the Russian Munitions 
Agency Zinovy Pak.  The Russian delegation expressed its view 
that the U.S. Aberdeen Chemical Destruction Facility 
documents under consideration by the Council were 
problematic, as written, because they identified a 
non-contiguous commercial chemical facility as a declared 
part of the Aberdeen destruction facility.  This was 
problematic in that it set a precedent Russia would be unable 
to follow.  Specifically, Russia could not declare the 
various commercial facilities it intended to use to destroy 
the "reaction mass" created by hydrolysis because it was 
limited by law to declaring six destruction facilities. 
Queried by the U.S. Delegation as to how this concern could 
be reconciled with Russia's commitment, as embodied in the 
March 14 MOU signed between the U.S. CTR program and t 
he Russian Munitions Agency, to perform the final destruction 
of such reaction mass as the CTR-funded Schuch'ye facility, 
the Russian delegation indicated that Russia would seek to 
avail itself of the clause in the MOU which permitted the 
parties to agree, in writing, to alternative arrangements. 
In making this point, the Russian delegation indicated that 
the MOU had been signed by Pak without the knowledge of other 
interested officials in the Russian government and, in fact, 
resulted directly in Pak fired. 
 
¶2.  The Russian Federation is clearly of the view that all of 
its CWPF conversions are "completed" except for buildings 352 
and 353 at Novocheboksarsk.  (These two buildings are 
necessary to house equipment and operations associated with 
the destruction of building 350).  All other conversion 
requests, in the view of the Russian Federation, are complete 
because the facilities are demilitarized.  The Russians, in 
sharp contrast to the CWC, TS, US and others, do not accept 
that a conversion is complete only when the agreed commercial 
process is installed and producing "widgets."  This 
difference will likely need to be aired at future EC's. 
 
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"Problems" with U.S. Aberdeen Documents 
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¶3.  On June 24, 2003, members of the U.S. delegation to the 
33rd session of the OPCW Executive Council met with their 
Russian counterparts to discuss a number of CWC-related U.S. 
and Russian documents under consideration by the Council. 
See wrap-up of EC-33, with final document outcomes, septel. 
 
¶4.  During the discussion, Russian representative Viacheslav 
Kulebyakin, State Secretary of the Russian Munitions Agency 
(RMA) indicated that the Russian Federation considers two of 
the U.S. documents - the Facility Agreement and the Agreed 
Detailed Plan for the Verification of Destruction of Chemical 
Weapons at the Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, 
Aberdeen, Maryland, to be problematic.  In particular, the 
fact that the U.S. had declared a secondary treatment, 
storage, and disposal facility at DuPont Chamber Works, as a 
non-contiguous part of the Aberdeen destruction facility, 
created a precedent that would cause Russia certain problems 
(Note: The Aberdeen chemical weapon (CW) destruction facility 
eliminates CW in a two-stage process.  In the first stage, CW 
agent is neutralized through hydrolysis with water and Sodium 
hydroxide at the Aberdeen Proving Ground facility in 
Maryland. The resultant hydrolysate is subsequently 
transported to the DuPont Chamber Works facility in 
Deepwater, New Jersey, where it is irreversibly disposed of 
through a biotreatment process.  In the interest of 
transparency, the U.S. declared the DuPont facility as part 
of the Aberdeen destruction facility, subject to verification 
under the terms of the CWC.  End Note.)  Russia could not, 
Kulebyakin concluded, join consensus on these two U.S. 
documents during this session of the Council. 
 
¶5.  Kulebyakin noted that, inasmuch as Russia intended to 
employ a similar process of hydrolysis for its nerve agent 
stockpile, it would face the same prospect of having to 
dispose of the hydrolysate, and intended to do so at 
commercial facilities.  Moreover, under its laws Russia could 
only maintain up to six CW destruction facilities.  It 
followed from this that Russia could not declare all of the 
commercial facilities it might use for final disposition to 
be destruction facilities under the terms of the CWC, as the 
U.S. had.  It was also not clear to Russia why the U.S. would 
even want to do such a thing, given the additional burdens 
(unelaborated) created by declaring a commercial facility to 
be part of the Aberdeen production facility. 
 
¶6.  After discussing the issue internally, the U.S. 
delegation pointed out that in a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) signed by former RMA Director Zinovy Pak, Russia had 
committed to conducting final disposition of all nerve agent 
at the U.S.-funded elimination facility at Schuch'ye, as a 
precondition for the release of $160M in CTR funds. 
Therefore, the question of disposing of hydrolysate at 
commercial facilities, over which Russia was expressing 
concern, is moot. 
 
¶7.  Kulebyakin responded that Mr. Pak was no longer Director 
of the RMA, and pointed to the clause in the MOU that allows 
the parties to reach some alternative agreement in writing. 
Ambassador Javits asked if he should report to Washingtonthat 
Russia did not intend to abide by the terms of the MOU, i.e. 
it did not/not intend to dispose of its nerve agent 
hydrolysate at Schuch'ye.  Kulebyakin responded that 
Ambassador Javits should not, but also stated that Russia 
intended to avail itself of the option to negotiate other 
arrangements.  In doing so Kulebyakin asserted that Pak had 
signed the MOU without the knowledge of anyone else, 
including himself (Kulebyakin).  He said that when he 
discovered what Pak had done, he was dismayed over the MOU's 
contents. 
 
¶8. Kulebyakin stated that to ship hydrolysate to Schuch'ye 
from the various neutralization locations , would require the 
expenditure of billions of dollars. The gas, electric and 
water supply infrastructure at Schuch'ye are inadequate for 
the large-scale facility that would be required to do adhere 
to the MOU.  Sizeable infrastructure upgrades would be needed 
as well as the additional industrial facility, specifically 
another destruction building.  Shipping hydrolysate across 
thousands of kilometers of Russia would also mean that new 
railroad track would have to be laid to avoid population 
centers, since Russian law prohibits transporting such 
material through population areas above a certain size. 
Adequate rolling stock would also be required and is 
extremely expensive to produce.  If the U.S. is willing to 
pay for all this, it could be done.  Short of that, Russia 
was simply not in a position to accommodate.  If the U.S. 
wants it this way, the U.S. will need to pay for it - and the 
price would be huge. 
 
¶9.  During bilateral consultations, Kulebyakin stated on 
several occasions that the RF was having great difficulty in 
attracting foreign investment to its converted facilities. 
Deloff asked for a list of facilities that were having 
difficulty in attracting foreign assistance.  RMA official 
Michailov responded that chloroether, aminomercaptan, and 
loading of sub-munitions into munitions at Novocheboksarsk 
along with sarin production and soman production at Volgograd 
do not have adequate foreign assistance.  The larger problem 
is at Novocheboksarsk according to Michailov. 
 
¶10.  In a separate conversation, Mr. Valery Semin of the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed U.S. delegation 
member David Weekman that Dr. Pak was fired by the Russian 
Prime Minister and President Putin as a direct result of his 
signing the 14 March CTR Amendment.  Semin claimed that this 
agreement was not coordinated in Moscow.  (Comment: In 
Delegation's view, during these meetings it became clear that 
Russia does not intend, and perhaps never intended, to abide 
by the present terms of the MOU.  The Russian Delegation's 
comments during the June 23 destruction informals and during 
the general debate at the EC (see septel) were consistent 
with the approach they took in private meetings.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶10.  Javits sends. 
SOBEL