This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 RANGOON 000890 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2013 
TAGS: KPAO PREL ABLD ASEC BM
SUBJECT: MANDALAY OUTREACH CENTER: NOW MORE THAN EVER 
 
REF: A) RANGOON 00183 B) 02 RANGOON 1493 C) 02 
 
     RANGOON 1624 D) WEGMANN-GLAZEROFF E-MAIL 
     2/12/03 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5 (D) 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  See para 2. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Summary:  In order to expand its democracy training 
and outreach, Embassy proposes to establish an American 
Center Teaching Annex in Mandalay (see reftels), Burma's 
second largest city and its geographic and cultural center. 
The American Center Teaching Annex would enable post to 
include significantly larger numbers of those supporting 
political change in these regions in public diplomacy 
outreach programs fostering democracy and civil society, a 
core MPP goal.  The most recent GOB crackdown on opposition 
parties throws into stark relief the need and utility of 
another outreach channel to those organizations and 
individuals. 
 
An OIG team visiting post in February applauded post,s plans 
to expand outreach beyond the capital.  Among its draft key 
judgments:  "The (Public Diplomacy) section continues to make 
significant strides in its outreach efforts and conducts a 
highly successful educational program in Rangoon."  The OIG 
recommended that Post provide for the Department an analysis 
of alternatives for establishing an outreach center in 
Mandalay. 
 
Post herein offers an assessment of three possible options 
for the establishment of the Mandalay outreach center: 
 
A) Opening an American Center Teaching Annex in USG-owned 
property: Utilize former Mandalay Consulate property for the 
Center and begin the program with four FSNs and two AmCit 
grantees; 
 
B) Leasing the USG property to an Educational NGO to perform 
outreach programs under a grant agreement: Have an American 
educational NGO provide program activities similar to Public 
Diplomacy programs at the USG-owned property; and 
 
C) Opening an American Center Teaching Annex as a Tenant in 
Commercial Space: Rent commercial space in Mandalay, sell the 
USG-owned property, and begin the program with four FSNs and 
two AmCit grantees. 
 
Funding would need to come from a variety of sources, but 
could include ESF from the "Burma Earmark" for democracy 
programs.  In making this assessment, site visits to Mandalay 
were conducted by the COM, DCM, PAO, GSO, and RSO, as well as 
by two DS Regional Security Engineers, an OBO architect, and 
the OIG team. 
 
ACTION REQUEST:  that the Department review the options and 
select which, if any, it deems most appropriate and name a 
point of contact to work with Post to implement the proposal. 
 End Summary. 
 
THE NEED FOR AN AMERICAN CENTER TEACHING ANNEX, MANDALAY 
 
¶3. (SBU) Even before the May 30 ambush on Aung San Suu Kyi's 
motorcade and the subsequent arrests of hundreds of democracy 
supporters, Burma was a country subject to Orwellian 
censorship and control by the military dictatorship.  There 
is no free press, free speech, or right of assembly.  The 
universities, historically a source of political activism, 
have been virtually dismantled by the regime.  Graduating 
high school students must wait more than a year before space 
opens for them in a university "distance learning" program. 
Thus, at precisely the time they are making life decisions 
and are perhaps most open to influence, thousands of young 
adults are turning to the American Center in Rangoon each 
month to use the Library/Information Resource Center (IRC), 
attend films or lectures, or join English language classes. 
These English language classes have a high content of civil 
society training, such as critical thinking, expressing 
opinions and persuading others, mediating disputes and 
conflicts, etc.  A number of the students in the English 
language classes are former political prisoners, or 
representatives of opposition political parties or minority 
ethnic groups, who have been granted tuition waivers for the 
classes. 
 
¶4. (C) For the past year, through an ESF Burma Earmark grant, 
post has been providing governance training and English 
classes (eight hours a week) for seven to twelve opposition 
leaders.  The program was begun at the request of opposition 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the participants are her 
hand-picked representatives -- predominantly MP's elected in 
1990, but never seated -- her shadow Ministers and successors 
to the aging party leadership.  Because of the importance of 
this program to ASSK, she asked that the training be 
continued for a second year.  During the first year of the 
program, ASSK also sought to include party leaders and MP's 
from other provinces.  A group of three Mandalay MP's moved 
to Rangoon for two six week sessions, but were unable to keep 
up with the main cohort because they could not be away for 
long from party responsibilities in Mandalay.  Another group 
including a Shan, a Mon, and a Karen party member were able 
to come for just one session.  A clear benefit to 
establishing a public diplomacy facility in Mandalay would be 
to extend activities like this high priority (but stealth) 
training program to NLD leadership in Mandalay and 
neighboring states and divisions.  This is one reason ASSK 
herself has endorsed establishing an American Center Teaching 
Annex in Mandalay. 
 
¶5. (C) The enthusiastic reception ASSK received in Mandalay 
and neighboring divisions, which led directly to the SPDC's 
dastardly May 30 ambush and crackdown on the National League 
for Democracy party leadership, demonstrates that there is a 
groundswell of popular support for political change in these 
regions.  All offices of the NLD (the only place party 
members can legally assemble) have been closed.  If the GOB 
experimentation with a longer leash for the opposition 
parties is indeed over, and the NLD's freedom of activity is 
curtailed, their ability to operate in the Mandalay region 
and beyond will be severely restrained.  Post can best aid 
democratization efforts, and our core MPP goal of a return to 
democracy, by increasing the capacity (widening the pipeline) 
to deliver training and information about the outside world 
to these supporters of political change. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The American Center Teaching Annex in Mandalay need 
not be an open-ended commitment.  In the period before 
democracy returns to Burma, and in the transition period, it 
would be in a unique position to provide valuable training 
for civil society organizations, particularly the democratic 
opposition.  Once democracy returns, the USG could 
investigate deeding the facility and its apparatus to a local 
institution as a democracy think tank or an American Studies 
Institute, as was done with many USIS libraries during the 
1990's. 
 
OPTION A  OPENING AN AMERICAN CENTER ANNEX IN USG-OWNED 
PROPERTY (FORMER MANDALAY CONSULATE) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Reftel A provided post,s rationale for opening an 
American Center Annex at the former consulate building 
Mandalay.  Reftels B and C, reported on the RSO,s security 
survey of the site and on probable costs associated with 
opening an American Center Annex there. 
 
¶8. (SBU) To recap, under Option A, the Teaching Annex would 
be staffed by a combination of LES (4) in the 
Library/Information Resource Center, and English 
teachers/trainers (2) hired through a grant agreement, with 
supervision from the PAO in Rangoon.  The former Consulate 
building offers approximately 3700 square feet well 
configured to function as a small American Center.  It could 
include two teaching classrooms and a language/computer lab 
in the upstairs rooms, and a Library reading room, reference 
section, and office space in the downstairs rooms.  An OBO 
architect, concluding a site visit in May, reported: "The 
property is in excellent condition and would be well-suited 
for use as an American Center," citing the building's 
excellent location, accessibility, and setback. 
 
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
¶9. (SBU) The RSO determined (see Ref B) that the building is 
&in good to excellent condition8 has &excellent setback 
and reasonably effective safe area/office complex.8  &Basic 
structures are fundamentally sound and could be made 
operational with appropriate upgrades and DS exceptions to 
specific standards.8 
 
¶10. (SBU) According to 12 FAH-6, H-020, Definition of Terms 
the Annex would be a Public Office Facility. ("Facility, 
which exists for public use or functions, such as libraries 
and cultural centers.  It is located in a commercial or 
residential building not collocated with the chancery or 
consulate.  No classified material is maintained.  U.S. 
Government may or may not be sole occupant.")  Thus it would 
be governed by the physical security standards for "Public 
Office Facilities" as provided by regulation 12 FAH-6, 
H-111.8, Physical Security (Public Office Facilities - Such 
as Libraries and Commercial Offices). 
 
¶11. (SBU) The current property was acquired prior to 1991 and 
therefore falls in the category of an Existing Office 
Building, 12 FAH-5, H-111, Differentiation Between Existing 
and New Buildings; 12FAH-5, H-112, Existing Office Building 
(EOB).  Thus, no waiver for collocation or setback is 
required, according to SECCA, 1999, A.1, 00 State 82682.  ("A 
quick reference checklist for waiver requirements involving 
building collocation and setback follows: A. No waiver 
required: 1) Existing U.S. diplomatic facilities as of 29 
November 1999....") 
 
¶12. (SBU) If this option is chosen, RSO is ready to prepare a 
formal Site Survey and Security Upgrade Plan for the facility 
utilizing 12 FAH-5 and 12 FAH-6 as specific guidelines. 
These reports would provide DS the exact site layout, 
recommended security upgrades, and define those physical 
security standards that are not feasible as defined per 
regulation.  This would satisfy the requirement of 12 FAH-5, 
H-121.2, Exceptions to Standards, and serve as the 
documentation to support a funding request for security 
upgrades, 12 FAH-5, H-121.1, Applicability. 
 
FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS 
¶13. (SBU) Reftel C discussed post,s estimates of funding 
needs for this option.  Post estimated approximately $200,000 
in non-recurring expenses and about $95,000 in recurring 
costs, including salaries for locally engaged staff.  English 
teachers/trainers would be recruited through a grant to an 
educational NGO, at additional cost.  (A similar grant 
arrangement using Burma Earmark ESF is under consideration 
this fiscal year to assist the Rangoon American Center's 
English Teaching Program.) 
¶14. (SBU) In Ref D, AID indicated to State Desk Officer its 
estimation, after consultation with its Legal office, that of 
the $295,000 post estimated would be needed for year one, 
most could be covered by ESF.  (This may include costs for 
furnishings, computers and telecommunications, generator, 
electrical upgrade and maintenance costs, program materials, 
books, janitorial, grounds keeping, utilities, and fuel.) 
 
¶15. (SBU) AID advised that non-project costs, such as raising 
the perimeter fence and providing security guards, could not 
be allocated to ESF.  Funds for this, which post estimated at 
$45,000, will need to be found elsewhere.  Some recurring 
costs such as LES salaries ($37,000) should come from PD 
allotment.  PAO would request an increase in PD allotment 
from EAP/PD to meet this new cost. 
 
OPTION B: LEASING THE USG PROPERTY TO AN EDUCATIONAL NGO TO 
PERFORM OUTREACH PROGRAMS UNDER A GRANT AGREEMENT 
 
¶16. (SBU) The USG property (former Consulate Building) could 
be leased to an international NGO active in Education 
programs to run programs similar to Public Diplomacy 
programs, but not under the direction of the country PAO. 
Funds from the Burma earmark, with appropriate notification 
to Congress, could be used in a multiyear grant to pay for 
most startup and recurring costs associated with the project. 
 Security upgrades would not be required by law. 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POST AND GRANTEE 
¶17. (SBU) The grantee NGO would administer a program with 
aims similar to the country public diplomacy program, but 
would not be under the supervision of the country PAO.   In 
accordance with grants policy, the PAO could function as a 
program officer to the grant, ensuring that the program is 
being run in good faith, but could not provide day-to-day 
direction.  PAS Rangoon could cooperate on programs and could 
provide some materials and assistance to the grantee, as it 
does to other local organizations 
 
¶18. (SBU) As part of the grant agreement, the USG could lease 
the former consulate building to the NGO for a nominal fee of 
$1 per year.  The facility would not be a diplomatic 
installation, but may have a status equivalent to the British 
Council, which has quietly operated a small reading room in 
Mandalay for two years.  Post hopes that the grantee would 
enjoy protection from GOB harassment because of its 
affiliation with a diplomatic entity.  The NGO would have to 
register with the Government of Burma. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The grantee could recruit and provide 
teacher/trainers for the English language programs, and could 
locally recruit a reference librarian and other clerical 
support staff.  The grantee,s program could host speaker and 
cultural presentations from PAS Rangoon on a quarterly basis. 
 The grantee could network with other civil society 
organizations in Mandalay and help the PAO to identify 
exchange participants from Mandalay and northern Burma.  The 
grantee,s library staff could help disseminate PAS 
Rangoon,s publications and products. 
¶20. (SBU) The grantee could not be expected to perform the 
policy advocacy role of a State Department public diplomacy 
program. 
 
¶21. (C) In addition, without the diplomatic cover of the USG, 
it is unclear whether the grantee could effectively run the 
stealth governance program described in paragraph 4 above. 
 
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
¶22. (SBU) By leasing the property to the NGO, the USG is no 
longer obligated by regulation to bring the property up to 
security standards mandated for USG diplomatic installations. 
 However, because the site has strong association with the 
United States, and because American citizens may be among the 
grantee,s staff, the place may run some risks of being a 
target of terrorism, as do many American NGO's around the 
world.  The Department will have to decide whether it has a 
perceived obligation to provide the same security upgrades it 
would to an American Center. 
FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS 
¶23. (SBU) By AID,s estimation, in consultation with its 
Legal office, costs for furnishings, computers and 
telecommunications, generator, electrical upgrade and 
maintenance costs, program materials, books, annual staffing 
costs, janitorial, grounds keeping, utilities, and fuel could 
be covered by ESF.  Although most of the above will be 
provided by the grantee, it might be expedient for post 
(still using ESF) to provide procurement and importation of 
furniture, computers, and other aspects of the facilities 
upgrade. 
 
¶24. (SBU) AID advises that non-project costs, such as raising 
the perimeter fence and providing security guards, could not 
be allocated to ESF.  If these are deemed necessary, funds 
will need to be found. 
FINDING THE RIGHT GRANTEE 
¶25.  (SBU) In preliminary discussions, post has not found a 
grantee willing to take on such a novel arrangement.  The 
representative of one large Educational NGO with extensive 
worldwide experience, already in grant relationships with 
both AID and State, has told PAO they would be willing to 
provide English teachers to a USG operated facility in 
Mandalay (as per Option A or C).  But the representative said 
they would not be interested in taking on a challenge like 
Option B &on our own.8  The well-known difficulties of 
establishing a relationship with the GOB, together with the 
controversy inherent in teaching English with a democracy 
bent, apparently makes the risks outweigh the benefits for 
this organization.  While there may be more zealous or less 
experienced organizations willing to take up the challenge, 
post would need to weigh the judiciousness of entering into a 
close programming association with them. 
 
OPTION C OPENING AN AMERICAN CENTER ANNEX AS A TENANT IN 
COMMERCIAL SPACE 
 
¶26. (SBU) In May, GSO, PAO, and RSO, accompanied by regional 
Security Engineers, visited several commercial properties 
available for rent in Mandalay.  GSO and PAO identified two 
as best meeting requirements for the proposed program in 
acceptable downtown mixed retail/residential areas. 
Available commercial space affords no setback from road or 
neighbors, and is often adjacent to open sewers or other 
eyesores.  While rents are not high, there would be costs 
associated with security upgrades and other modifications. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Property One is a new, four-story, reinforced 
concrete structure, currently configured as living space, 
sharing one half of the ground floor with a fast food retail 
shop.  The ground floor hall has ample room to install a PAC. 
 With some modifications, the upper three floors could be 
configured to serve as classrooms, office space, library 
reading room, and event space.  Rent was quoted at 
$1,000/month for 5880 square feet. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Property Two is a three-story space in a row of 
similar shops in a new, reinforced concrete structure.  Most 
are not yet occupied but are designed for street-level 
retail, and mixed retail/residential above.  The first floor 
could accommodate a PAC and office space, and the upper two 
floors could accommodate a 1500 square foot library reading 
room and two English teaching classrooms. Rent was quoted at 
$2000/month for 4536 square feet.  There are many similar 
rental spaces available in this newly redeveloped quarter of 
Mandalay, which is a joint venture of the local government 
and some (Chinese) businessmen. 
 
¶29. (SBU) In the interests of thoroughness, GSO and PAO also 
investigated commercial space in Mandalay,s centrally 
located hotels, but found nothing appropriate.  The Sedona 
Hotel offered space configured as serviced apartments and 
space designed for their own administrative offices 
accessible only through a service stairway.  Access and space 
configurations were problematic in both.  The Mandalay Swan 
Hotel offered four adjoining shops spaces adjacent to the 
hotel with a very pleasant entrance off quiet 68 th street. 
The total space, under 1500 square feet, could accommodate 
the teaching classrooms but the associated 
library/information resource center program. 
 
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
¶30. (SBU) As with every commercial property examined, there 
is no setback from the street, or from neighboring buildings, 
which are as near as six inches away.  Because of the high 
price of land in central Mandalay, new structures are built 
on their entire allowable footprint (and possibly beyond it). 
 The facility would be governed by the physical security 
standards of 12 FAH-6, H-111.7 - Physical Security Tenant of 
Commercial Office Space.  Collocation and setback waivers 
would have to be sought. 
 
FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS 
¶31. (SBU) Startup and recurring costs and possible sources of 
funding would be similar to Option A, with the addition of 
annual rent of $12,000 to $24,000.  Also, security upgrades 
will be at least as expensive as for Option A, and possibly 
higher. 
THREE OPTIONS: PRO'S AND CON'S WEIGHED 
 
¶32. (SBU) Option A Pro,s and Con,s: 
Pro,s: 
 
--  The attractive USG-owned facility is in good to excellent 
repair, requiring little upgrading (other than security) and 
reconfiguration. 
 
--  On a large parcel of land, it has excellent setback and 
could be brought up to security standards with some outlay. 
 
--  USG-owned means no delay or harassment from local 
authorities, also no additional recurring costs from rent 
($12,000 ) $24,000/year). 
 
--  American Center Teaching Annex (vs. grant agreement with 
NGO) means mission has control over all program content. 
 
--  Prime location for reaching target groups 
 
Con,s: 
 
--  Post will have large initial outlays for start-up and 
security upgrade (but not necessarily larger than with other 
options). 
 
¶33. (SBU) Option B Pro,s and Con,s 
Pro's: 
 
--  No legal requirement for security upgrade. 
 
--  NGO programming would share most Country PD goals. 
 
--  More recurring costs, such as salaries, could be covered 
by ESF through the grant agreement. 
 
Con's: 
 
--  Mission would not have supervisory role or control over 
all program content. 
 
--  NGO could not play Policy Advocate role of PD. 
 
--  Without diplomatic or USG employee status, NGO, program, 
and participants may be subject to more harassment by GOB and 
local authorities. 
 
¶34. (SBU) Option C Pro,s and Con,s 
Pro,s: 
 
--  The commercial space identified, though in some ways 
inferior to the USG owned property in Mandalay, could be made 
as serviceable. 
 
--  Locations are as good as the USG owned property. 
 
Con,s: 
 
--  Being a "tenant in commercial space" is meant to lower 
the facility's desirability as a terrorism target because it 
would entail too much collateral damage to other tenants. 
But crowded urban locations afford more chances for 
terrorists to hide.  With no setback from neighbors or the 
street, these locations may be less secure than the USG owned 
property set apart on a large parcel of land. 
 
--  Post will have to spend the same amount of dollars, if 
not more, for necessary security upgrades on the rental 
properties as on USG-owned property. 
 
--  Post will have to secure a setback waiver and other 
waivers for the rental properties. 
 
--  With a rental property, post gives GOB and local 
authorities an entry point for harassment.  The authorities 
may use threats or pressure on the landlord to cause delays 
or interference with services to the PD program.  The 
landlord of the current American Center in Rangoon was jailed 
before the Center opened in 1991.  And Mandalay authorities 
used threats to hotel employees to disrupt a PD cultural 
program in January 2003 (Rangoon 00134).  Post may even spend 
funds on security upgrades only to find the landlord renege 
on the contract because of pressure from authorities. 
 
--  Implicit in this option is post's disposal of the USG 
property, i.e., sell it back to the despotic Burmese regime 
for what was paid for it (now worth $75), leading to a huge 
windfall for the Generals, and a public affairs embarrassment 
for the Department. 
 
¶35. (U) Post POC for this project is PAO Mary Ellen 
Countryman, countrymanme@state.gov. 
Martinez