This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001446 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PINR ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: MUGABE SUCCESSION ELUSIVE 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER KIMBERLY JEMISON FOR REASONS 1.5 B/D. 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary.  Over the past two months the domestic 
written press, both government and opposition, has churned 
out a stream of reporting on President Mugabe,s possible 
retirement.  The local rumor mill has kept pace.  Competing 
succession scenarios and successor lists have appeared, and 
different timelines have been presented.  In the final 
analysis, however, there appears to be no heir apparent that 
does not suffer some disqualifying flaw, and no clear-cut 
scenario for when, or under what terms, Mugabe might actually 
step aside.  As usual, and barring unforeseen actuarial 
developments, the decision on where Mugabe goes remains 
squarely with Mugabe himself.  His willingness to commit to a 
fixed timetable for succession is the key to moving beyond 
the status quo and bringing the possibility of meaningful 
change to Zimbabwe.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Mugabe,s April 18 Independence Day speech, in which 
he encouraged open discussion of the succession issue within 
ZANU-PF councils, opened the floodgates of speculation. 
Politburo members and ZANU-PF party members long known to 
harbor latent presidential ambitions suddenly stampeded to 
the fore.  Journalists have examined various individuals and 
scenarios, including interviews with some prominent ZANU-PF 
officials who have declared themselves ready to step forward 
when the time is ripe.  The unanswered question is when this 
might be.  The most optimistic observers are pushing a 
scenario in which Mugabe resigns as ZANU-PF President at the 
in 2003 and anoints a new party president, who will become 
his heir apparent for the national presidency.  Less 
exuberant commentators predict a longer-term scenario, and 
possibly one in which ZANU-PF engineers two-thirds a 
parliamentary majority (by hook or crook) in early 
parliamentary elections in 2004 and pushes through a 
constitutional amendment that allows Mugabe to serve out most 
or all of his current term as titular president while a newly 
created post of Prime Minister -- nominated by Mugabe, of 
course -- takes up the reins of power.  (Comment.  Whoever 
might take hold of the reins; it is difficult for even the 
most nave to imagine that a titular President Mugabe would 
relinquish the whip as well.  End comment.) 
 
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In the Starting Gate 
-------------------- 
¶3. (C) Free and fair elections or a transitional government 
of national unity do not figure into any scenario that 
ZANU-PF insiders or government-owned newspapers have conjured 
up.  In ZANU-PF logic, ZANU-PF succession is a given.  Recent 
Politburo discussions of the succession issue reportedly 
concluded that any successor to Mugabe must meet two basic 
requirements: enjoy significant acceptance in all provinces, 
and be acceptable to the Ndebele in the South.  The two names 
most frequently mentioned as presidential successors are 
Speaker of Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe,s clear 
favorite, and former Finance Minister Simba Makoni; but 
neither of them cleanly fit the bill.  Because of his 
involvement in the Matebeleland massacres of the 1980s, 
Mnangagwa cannot pass muster with the Ndebele.  In addition, 
he is feared and mistrusted by many ZANU-PF insiders, 
including his arch-rival (and former ZAN/ZANLA  Commander) 
Solomon Mujuru, for his ruthlessness.  For his part, Makoni 
is the darling of the donors, popular with the more 
liberal-minded, and acceptable to many in the MDC.  However, 
he comes from Manicaland and lacks a broad constituency base 
in Mashonaland rural areas and is anathema to pro-Mugabe 
hard-liners for his commitment to reform and his conciliatory 
political views. 
 
¶4. (C) Other potential successors worth mention include 
Defense Minister Sidney Sekeremayi, who has considerable 
Politburo support, and retired Army General Solomon Mujuru. 
The former suffers from a reputation for personal weakness, 
while the latter is widely considered too rough-edged and 
uneducated to handle the job.  In Mujuru,s case, he seems 
more interested in being kingmaker than the king.  The very 
ambitious Minister of Information Jonathan Moyo, an Ndebele, 
is widely disliked in party circles.  His dependence upon the 
patronage of Mugabe is such that he appears determined to 
block or delay any moves toward Mugabe,s departure, since 
Moyo himself is an unlikely dauphin.  Like Mugabe, Minister 
of Local Government Ignatius Chombo is from the Zezeru 
sub-clan of the Shona, and his nomination would spark fierce 
opposition from the competing Karanga and Manyica sub-clans. 
 
¶5. (C) Other candidates include Minister of Special Affairs 
in the President,s Office John Nkomo, whose Ndebele 
bloodlines and ZAPU origins might qualify him for a prime 
ministerial or custodial role, but certainly not a strong 
presidential one.  Lesser candidates include Minister of Home 
Affairs Kembo Mohadi, Minister of State for National Security 
Nicholas Goche, Minister of Social Welfare July Moyo, and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Stan Mudenge.  Most are not 
serious contenders for ethnic/clan reasons, or for a lack of 
political traction with the generation of ZANU-PF 
heavyweights from the liberation era who must ultimately 
second Mugabe,s choice.  Many of these old-timers in their 
70s and 80s, including the two Vice Presidents, Didymus 
Mutasa, and Nathan Shamuyarira can be expected to resist 
mightily any change from the effective one-party system they 
have known so long.  Less entrenched and ideological insiders 
would like to see reform, but only ZANU-PF reform, and fear 
that the party has not prepared for succession and would be 
extremely vulnerable in the post-Mugabe period.  For 
different reasons, many within the party would prefer to 
still the winds of change.  The fact that there are competing 
rivalries and factions with ZANU-PF has serves to slow 
change, whether these divisions are the critical factor, or a 
pretext for Mugabe to cling to power. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
ZANU-PF Extraordinary Congress - the Harbinger of Change? 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
¶6. (C) From the ZANU-PF perspective, the path to the 
Presidency of the Republic clearly goes through the ZANU-PF 
presidency.  Mugabe has held this position since 1987 and 
will continue to serve until next December at the earliest, 
when the ZANU-PF Extraordinary Congress will take place. 
Mugabe,s five-year term as ZANU-PF leader does not expire at 
that time, but there is widespread speculation that he will 
take this occasion to step aside, and thus open the way for a 
successor whom he can designate and who will presumably 
become the favorite to succeed Mugabe as President of the 
Republic.  According to well-informed ZANU-PF MP Edison 
Zvobgo, this is the scenario that has been painted to the 
South Africans.  This may also be a wishful scenario.  We 
note for the record that there was widespread speculation 
before ZANU-PF,s last two major get-togethers in 2000 and 
2002 that Mugabe would either name a successor or would be 
confronted by the party membership, neither of which 
transpired. 
 
¶7. (C) Should Mugabe choose to stand aside, however, the 
ZANU-PF party Constitution provides a clear framework for 
electing party leadership.  The National People,s Congress, 
which is held once every five years, elects the President, 
two vice-presidents, and the National Chairman of the party 
directly, upon nomination by at least six provincial 
executive councils of the party, meeting separately, in 
special session called for that purpose.  If more than one 
candidate is presented, then the candidate having the highest 
number of votes stands as the nominee.  In the event of a 
tie, the National Congress votes by secret ballot.  The 
ZANU-PF constitution does not address the case of a 
resignation in mid-term.  Whether Mugabe would respect the 
established rules in this case, and accept the caucus of the 
provincial executive councils, is known only to him.  There 
is ample proof that he is not prone to leaving political 
choices to electoral chance, and he would try to tip the 
contest to his preferred candidate. 
 
--------------------- 
Looking at Tea Leaves 
--------------------- 
¶8. (C) If Mugabe seeks re-election as ZANU-PF President in 
December, he will almost certainly prevail.  Despite the 
increased muttering of a growing number of party members 
adversely affected by Mugabe,s policies, there seems to be 
no individual or coalition within ZANU-PF willing to tackle 
him head on.  His retention of the ZANU-PF presidency would 
also indicate that his retirement from national office would 
not be imminent.  Mugabe,s decision to cede ZANU-PF to 
another, however, could signal willingness to pass 
Zimbabwe,s presidency to a hand-picked successor as well, 
probably well before the expiry of Mugabe,s current term in 
¶2008.  It would not necessarily signal a commitment to a 
government that includes the opposition or an early election 
in which Mugabe,s successor, and by extension ZANU-PF, would 
take their chances.  A scenario in which Mugabe stepped down 
as ZANU-PF chairman in December, then resigned as president 
in 2004 to start the constitutionally-mandated three-month 
electoral clock ticking, might not be a desirable outcome. 
In fact, it could well signify a replay of the violent, 
fatally flawed presidential election of 2002. 
 
¶9. (C) Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF leadership have been 
sending out ambiguous messages for most of a year about their 
willingness to embark on a genuine transition process.  Their 
willingness to contemplate such a transition has waxed and 
waned depending on the degree of pressure that the Government 
has been under, particularly from their African colleagues. 
When pressed, Mugabe and ZANU-PF hint of a transition 
possibly beginning with the December party congress and 
ending no later than the 2005 parliamentary elections.  Once 
the pressure is off -- as ZANU-PF leaders may now perceive it 
to be following the GOZ,s successful use of security forces 
to prevent the MDC-called June demonstrations, the conclusion 
of President Bush,s trip to Africa, and Mugabe,s rotation 
into the AU,s regional Vice President slot -- Mugabe and 
coterie may once again be ready to reject any change that 
occurs on terms other than their own.  ZANU,s Information 
Secretary Shamuyarira provided a graphic illustration of this 
 
SIPDIS 
last week, on Monday pleading with the Ambassador that the US 
should refrain from doing anything rash because Mugabe was 
open to change, but on the following Saturday telling the 
Ambassador that he and his colleagues flatly reject any 
compromises with the MDC, which is a puppet of the British 
and Uncle Sam.  In sum, probably only Robert Mugabe knows how 
sincere are his intimations that he is ready to contemplate a 
departure from power under circumstances other than a forced 
exit. 
 
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Comment 
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¶10. (C) Because Mugabe,s departure is necessary for any 
meaningful political change in Zimbabwe )- although his 
departure will not necessarily guarantee this -- Mugabe,s 
exit should remain our top priority.  We must seek to use all 
means at our disposal in our dealings with regional leaders 
such as Mbeki to seek to get Mugabe to publicly commit to a 
timetable for stepping down from party leadership and the 
Presidency, not later than December.  Barring such a 
commitment, and combined with Mugabe,s coyness on whether 
his talk about succession is merely that, we could otherwise 
end up facing a worst case scenario for Zimbabwe,s future ) 
a lingering status quo.  End comment. 
 
 
 
SULLIVAN