This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: 07/01/2013 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV MASS MOPS LI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA -- PRESIDENT OBASANJO CONFIRMS 
TAYLOR'S ASYLUM OFFER AND NIGERIA'S COMMITMENT TO 
DEPLOY 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.  REASONS: 
1.5 (B & D) 
 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a July 5 afternoon meeting 
with Ambassador Jeter, President Obasanjo stated that, 
despite the concerns of his security staff, he was 
committed to travelling to Monrovia to confer with 
Charles Taylor. He saw Taylor's extraction from 
Monrovia as an essential cog in the evolving peace 
machinery. However, Obasanjo noted that the situation 
was extremely complex and that Taylor's military 
machine, the LURD's and MODEL's, also needed to be 
dismantled for peace to stand a chance. Obasanjo 
claimed he would face domestic criticism for his 
active involvement in Liberia but that he could 
withstand the flak. He would move forward with 
offering Taylor asylum and with planning to deploy two 
battalions to Liberia if sufficient logistical 
assistance was provided by the international 
community. Discussion of the fuel price strike and 
other domestic political issues will be reported 
septel. END SUMMARY 
 
 
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OBASANJO ON HIS WAY TO MONROVIA 
------------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. 2. (C) During a lengthy July 5 conversation with 
Ambassador Jeter, President Obasanjo revealed his 
plans to visit Liberia to confer with Charles Taylor 
at Robertsfield. Relaxed and unusually affable, 
Obasanjo said he had overridden his security officer's 
concerns that Taylor could not guarantee his security 
or that Taylor might somehow manufacture an incident 
for which he would blame the LURD. Ambassador Jeter 
told Obasanjo Embassy Monrovia had reported that 
Monrovia had been peaceful the past few days and that 
commercial flights were landing at Robertsfield. With 
that information, Obasanjo reconfirmed that he would 
proceed to Monrovia. (NOTE: Ambassador Jeter 
subsequently called the Department again to ask that 
Embassy Monrovia approach the GOL on the need for 
beefed up security to cover the Obasanjo-Taylor 
meeting.  END NOTE) 
 
 
¶3. (C) The purpose of the visit to Monrovia was 
two-fold, Obasanjo said. First he would renew his 
offer of exile to the Liberian leader.  Obasanjo 
elaborated that he was willing to give Taylor an exit 
in order to stave off catastrophe in Monrovia.  If 
Taylor were left without any option save the War Crime 
Tribunal, Obasanjo feared Taylor would prolong the 
fighting, dragging the country further down the path 
toward chaos.  However, Obasanjo was emphatic that a 
mechanism should be found to render the Tribunal's 
indictment "inactive."  He did not want to offer 
Taylor exile, only to find himself hounded by the 
international community to relinquish the Liberian 
President. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Second, he was going to Liberia because he 
wanted to know exactly what Taylor wanted. Through 
Taylor's emissaries who had visited Abuja and his 
previous conversations with Taylor, Obasanjo noted 
that Taylor's position had been that departure prior 
to deployment of an international force would be 
premature and dangerous. It would create a power 
vacuum. Also, Taylor envisioned leaving Liberia with 
more than his immediate family.  He apparently wanted 
to take much of his inner circle as well. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
WHAT OF TAYLOR'S INNER CIRCLE? 
------------------------------ 
 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Jeter emphasized the importance of 
not solely focusing on Taylor's exit as the solution 
to Liberia's violent conundrum.  Taylor's removal was 
essential but did not constitute the entire machinery 
of peace. Prior to Taylor's departure, there must be 
an agreement on disarmament and demobilization; 
moreover, Taylor must lend his active imprimatur for 
his men to yield their weapons. Second, consideration 
must be given to the problem of Taylor insiders and 
notorious henchmen Benjamin Yeaten, J.T. Richardson 
and the like. These men have been with Taylor for 
years; they bear his mark and many have committed 
atrocities in his and in their own names; they too 
could be brought before the Special Court. 
 
 
¶6. (C) To extract Taylor, yet leave them behind could 
simply invite continued fighting. The situation could 
become even more chaotic because of the possibility of 
Taylor's machine dividing into smaller, even rival 
groups, each controlled by one of Taylor's lieutenants 
who would have assumed the status of an independent 
petty warlord. 
 
 
¶7. (C) In addition to providing for Taylor's exit, any 
tenable peace arrangement had to ensure that his chief 
lieutenants did not remain negative factors in the 
Liberia equation. For instance, if Nigeria choose to 
grant asylum to a larger number of people, they would 
have to actively push their forces to begin 
disarmament and demobilization before they would be 
granted exile along with Taylor. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
LURD AND MODEL - BAD OLD WINE IN BAD NEW BOTTLES 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador Jeter continued that LURD and MODEL 
disarmament required as much attention as the GOL's. 
Disarming them would have to be simultaneous, since it 
was unlikely that Taylor partisans would disarm if 
their enemies still retained their weapons. Both the 
LURD and MODEL were headed by known miscreants, who 
wanted power, preferably by the force of arms.  Their 
hope remained that they could sneak through the back 
door of the presidential mansion while everyone's 
attention was focused on escorting Taylor out the 
front. The LURD need to be pressured to disarm and its 
benefactors needed to turn off their support.  Both 
rebel forces should be converted into political 
parties if their officials want to hold office. Any 
peace plan should avoid their inclusion in an interim 
or transitional government if at all possible, Jeter 
posited. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
THOUGHTS ON THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶9. (C) Regarding a transitional government, Obasanjo 
felt that Liberia should follow a constitutionally- 
scripted succession, leaving Vice President Moses Blah 
as the transitional Head of State. Ambassador Jeter 
agreed but cautioned that Blah's appointment must be 
worked delicately, given the ethnic dynamics of 
Liberia. He explained that Blah was an ethnic Gio for 
Nimba Country, the bedrock of Taylor's political and 
military support. Krahn personalities in LURD and 
MODEL, and to a certain extent, Mandingos in LURD, 
would be wary of Blah.  With a Gio as Head of State, 
no Krahn and few Mandingos would be eager to disarm 
unless they were given adequate assurances regarding 
their personal security. Additionally, this could 
exacerbate tension along the common border between 
Nimba (Gio/Mano) and Grand Gedeh (Krahn) countries, 
possible spilling over to Cote d' Ivoire. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Last, Blah has the reputation of a cipher.  An 
interim government under his leadership would not 
command much respect or confidence; despite the uneasy 
relationship between Taylor and Blah, many Liberians 
would suspect that Taylor still would be pulling the 
strings, albeit from a distance. Obasanjo said that he 
appreciated the advice and would consider these 
admonitions. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
NIGERIA: COMMITTED TO DEPLOY 
---------------------------- 
 
 
¶11. (C) Obasanjo confirmed that he was prepared to 
send two Nigerian battalions to Liberia.  He also made 
a strong pitch for American boots on the ground, 
stating that this would be of tremendous military and 
psychological value in making all armed groups behave. 
Obasanjo added, however, that Nigeria would only 
deploy if provided the needed logistical support. 
 
 
¶12. (C) Obasanjo added that Libyan leader Quadhafi had 
written him, asking that Nigeria oppose deployment of 
U.S. troops in Liberia.  Obasanjo sardonically 
remarked that he told the Libyan to communicate 
directly with President Bush and not use him as an 
intermediary.  In a more serious vein, Obasanjo 
observed that Taylor had been talking with Tripoli. 
Obasanjo thought Quadhafi would provide some financial 
support to help smooth Taylor's asylum but that 
Tripoli would not assist in prolonging Taylor in 
power. 
 
 
---------------- 
ASYLUM REVISITED 
---------------- 
 
 
¶13. (C) Returning to the issue of Taylor's exile, 
Obasanjo said he had spent a lot of time thinking 
where to situate Taylor in Nigeria.  At one point, he 
considered Katsina but thought the Moslem North would 
be too uncomfortable for Taylor and his cabal. 
Obasanjo finally decided on Calabar, Cross Rivers 
State.  There was sufficient land for Taylor to pursue 
his farming and the climate and culture would be more 
akin to Liberia than any place in Northern Nigeria. 
Whatever location was selected, Nigeria had to make 
sure Taylor was safe but also sufficiently isolated 
and contained so that he could not interfere in 
Liberia, Jeter stressed.  Obasanjo responded that 
Lagos was not an option because of this fear. 
Obasanjo added that Cross Rivers Governor Donald Duke 
was sufficiently adept to keep Taylor within 
acceptable bounds of behavior. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶14. (C) While many Nigerians do not favor active re- 
engagement in Liberia, President Obasanjo sees the 
need and clearly recognizes that Nigeria is an 
essential actor to ending the slide in Liberia.  He 
has taken a forward leaning stance on troop 
contributions.  Moreover, beyond the establishment of 
a peacekeeping force, Obasanjo's exile offer to Taylor 
may be the most important single step in injecting the 
peace process with some momentum and giving the 
Liberian people some hope that change is imminent. 
While the War Crimes Tribunal indictment is 
unassailable and should not be ignored or dismissed, 
Obasanjo's asylum offer may be helpful to reaching a 
solution in Liberia.  We should do all that we can to 
encourage Obasanjo to continue the leading role he 
seems willing to play. 
 
 
JETER