This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001373 
 
SIPDIS 
 
RIYADH PLEASE PASS U/S BOLTON PARTY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2013 
TAGS: PARM PREL OTRA OVIP YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON'S VISIT TO 
YEMEN 
 
 
Classified By: CHARGE ALAN G. MISENHEIMER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) You are the most senior State Department official to 
visit Yemen since Secretary Baker came in late 1990.  The 
ROYG thus recognizes your visit as an important opportunity 
to continue building the positive bilateral relations that 
have evolved in the aftermath of the Cole and 9/11 attacks, 
so your brief stay in Yemen should be productive.  Our 
post-9/11 CT cooperation with Yemen has achieved important 
successes, and President Saleh has shown resolve; but your 
visit forces the Yemenis to focus on areas of the 
relationship that are difficult for them, particularly SCUDs 
and cooperation with North Korea.  Your discussions with 
Defense Minister Aliwa and, especially, FM Qirbi will advance 
the U.S. agenda on those issues, and on Article 98.  This 
cable follows up your discussion with AMB Hull in Washington 
early this month. 
 
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Yemen and North Korea 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Yemenis have no ideological affinity for the DPRK, 
but like to buy cheap.  Of course the question of why a 
country like Yemen -- among the world's 25 poorest, with 
annual per capita income around $400 -- would buy a useless 
weapons system like the SCUD (or Russian MIGs for that 
matter) at any price is often posed by international donors, 
and Yemen has no convincing answer.  The 11/02 interdiction 
of the So San with its cargo of SCUD-Bs underscored such 
questions and prompted several donors (particularly the 
Japanese) to suspend aid until the ROYG offered assurance 
that those SCUDs would be the last. 
 
¶3. (C) Those assurances, conveyed in similar terms to both 
Japan and the USG, fall short of the simple and categoric 
language we sought to elicit.  The most recent Yemeni 
statement on this -- a 3/5/03 letter from Aliwa -- stated 
that existing contracts with the DPRK for spares/ 
maintenance, as well as construction of a naval port near 
Hodeidah, would be implemented.  We have seen no recent 
indication of movement on either, and have strongly urged the 
Yemenis to refrain from both. 
 
¶4. (C) The ROYG has invited the USG to propose an affordable 
alternative to the DPRK.  We have urged the Rumanians (the 
best established of the East Europeans in Yemen) to use their 
extensive port-building experience to undercut the DPRK. 
They are interested, but have bad memories of unpaid bills 
for construction here in the early 90's.  AMB Hull has 
discussed with you the possibility of dangling expected 
supplemental FMF as assistance toward responsible military 
procurement. 
 
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Article 98 
---------- 
 
¶5. (C) U.S. military assistance is vital for Yemen, so our 
leverage on the ICC/Article 98 issue is considerable.  The 
fact that other Arab states have taken the plunge on Article 
98 is also an important consideration for the Yemenis, who 
are hesitant to step ahead of their Gulf neighbors on any 
potentially sensitive issue.  The ROYG has signed, but not 
ratified, the Rome Statute; and we have ensured that the 
Yemeni leadership is aware that ratification without an 
Article 98 agreement in place would precipitate a cut-off of 
FMF. 
 
¶6. (C) The ROYG put off consideration of an Article 98 
agreement for many months in the run-up to the April 27 
parliamentary elections.  Since then we have worked the issue 
hard with the MFA, which has been responsive.  FM Qirbi is 
interested in pursuing an exchange of diplomatic notes based 
on the Egyptian precedent, and we have encouraged this. 
President Saleh's approval is required, and we believe Qirbi 
is hoping for presidential authorization to proceed in time 
for your visit. 
 
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Humanitarian Demining 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) You will pay a brief visit to Yemen,s National Mine 
Action Committee.  With U.S. guidance, the ROYG began a 
humanitarian demining program in 1998.  Sixty percent of all 
marked areas have been cleared of mines and UXO, including 10 
out of 14 "high impact" areas.  Despite Yemen's poverty, the 
program is widely recognized as one of the best managed and 
most successful in the world. 
 
¶8. (C) There is an issue here.  The USG has been the largest 
contributor to the program, but FY03 NADR funds -- $750,000 
-- have not yet been released as the June 30 deadline looms. 
The program provides humanitarian benefit to the rural poor, 
and has helped anchor bilateral CT cooperation. 
 
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Security of Radioactive Materials 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Yemen's National Atomic Energy Commission -- led by 
U.S.-educated Moustafa Bahran -- is surprisingly active and 
supportive of U.S. positions in international fora.  Bahran's 
main initiative is a proposal to enhance the physical 
security of radiological materials.  The Republic of Yemen, 
in cooperation with the United States and the EU, co-drafted 
and co-sponsored the final resolution in the 2002 IAEA 
conference on preventing the use of radioactive materials for 
terror.  Bahran looks forward to meeting you. 
 
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¶10. (C) Foreign Minister Qirbi 
------------------------------ 
 
In his second term as Foreign Minister, Dr. Abu Bakr al-Qirbi 
(a physician by background) has worked to advance Yemen's 
return to a responsible foreign policy, although he is not 
inclined to take bold steps that might alienate Arab or 
Muslim opinion.  Both he and Saleh were cautious in public 
expressions of opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and 
Qirbi privately told us many times he welcomed the removal of 
Saddam Hussein.  Qirbi has strongly endorsed the 
Israeli-Palestinian Road Map and publicly praised President 
Bush for launching the initiative.  He is UK-educated and 
speaks fluent English. 
 
------------------------------ 
¶11. (C) Defense Minister Aliwa 
------------------------------ 
 
Major General Abdullah Ali Aliwa has served both as a soldier 
and as the civilian governor of a poor province.  He is 
anxious to strengthen military cooperation with the U.S.  He 
does not take the lead on international policy issues, 
however, and will defer to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 
Article 98 and, to a lesser degree, cooperation with North 
Korea.  He may raise the ROYG's program to buy back MANPADS 
as in indicator of Yemen's CT commitment.  He speaks limited 
English and will prefer to converse in Arabic. 
MISENHEIMER