This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000647 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
CDR USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL BM ASSK NLD
SUBJECT: MFA BRIEFING ON NLD/GOVERNMENT CLASHES 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 640 
     ¶B. RANGOON 639 
     ¶C. RANGOON 636 
     ¶D. RANGOON 635 
     ¶E. RANGOON 634 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win's 
briefing for diplomats on the recent deadly clash between NLD 
and government supporters in Depeyin satisfied no one. While 
he provided a faithful rehash of government press reporting 
on the incident, he would not say where Aung San Suu Kyi or 
other members of the NLD leadership are being held or why NLD 
offices in Rangoon had been closed.  He could only assure 
diplomats that both measures were "temporary" and that 
neither Aung San Suu Kyi or any of the members of the NLD 
leadership had been charged with any crime.  On Razali, he 
said it was up to the Special Envoy to decide whether he came 
to Burma June 6 as planned, but noted that he could not 
guarantee that Razali would see Aung San Suu Kyi, if he came. 
 Razali may be willing to continue his mission on those 
terms, but we don't see the point. So long as she remains in 
detention and the NLD offices remain closed, Razali should 
stay away. In the meanwhile, we plan to send officers to 
Depeyin to see what we can determine regarding events there. 
It may be impossible to re-assemble any clear picture of 
events on May 31, but we believe it is essential to show our 
interest and concern.  End Summary. 
 
The Government's Briefing 
 
¶2. (U) At a briefing for diplomats on June 3, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Khin Maung Win provided a rehash of the government's 
side of the story regarding the recent riot in Depeyin. 
According to the Minister, the events in Depeyin were 
provoked by the youth wing of the NLD and militant Buddhist 
monks who had affiliated themselves with the NLD.  He said 
that there had been a variety of incidents leading up to the 
riot on May 31.  He asserted that a 21-year old girl had been 
run down in Shwebo and, in Indaw on May 26, NLD supporters 
had attacked villagers with "sticks, iron pipes and bicycle 
chains."  In Depeyin on May 31, the NLD convoy, consisting of 
nine cars and about 40 motorcycles, were stopped by a crowd 
of 5,000 local people about 2 miles outside the town, he 
said.  As the NLD tried to push its way through the crowd, 
fights broke which eventually left four dead and fifty 
hospitalized.  Initially, there were "no Burmese police or 
military forces" on the spot, according to the DepFonMin. 
Security forces from Mon Ywa only arrived about two hours 
after the altercation started.  They secured the situation, 
took Aung San Suu Kyi and her party into "protective 
custody", and took count of the casualties.  The government 
still has not identified all the dead, missing, or injured, 
but says categorically that neither Aung San Suu Kyi nor NLD 
Vice Chairman U Tin Oo were injured. The DepFonMin also 
denied that gunshots were fired during the course of the 
incident. 
 
¶3. (U) On Aung San Suu Kyi, the Minister said that the 
government had been obliged to  provide "temporary 
protection" for her and her party.  Similarly, the NLD had 
been asked to "temporarily" close their offices throughout 
the country.  The DepFonMin asserted that the government had 
"no animosity or hostility" towards Aung San Suu Kyi, and 
maintained that, for the government, the "greatest nightmare" 
is that some harm might come to her.  However, some of the 
NLD youth had acted "very rashly," and there was "growing 
resentment" against the NLD in Burma.  He also assured 
diplomats that the process of national reconciliation would 
continue and hoped "that the international community will 
understand the situation and not complicate it." 
 
Diplomats Reaction 
 
¶4. (U) Diplomats reacted to brief with incredulity and tough 
questions that focused on Aung San Suu Kyi's health and 
circumstances, the situation of the NLD's Central Committee 
members, and the government's reasons for closing NLD offices 
throughout Burma.  The DepFonMin would not say where Aung San 
Suu Kyi was being held, though he did say she was not in the 
notorious Insein prison.  He also said that neither she nor 
any of the other leaders of the NLD would be charged with any 
crime.  When pressed regarding access to ASSK and the other 
NLD detainees by the COM, the British Charge, and the French, 
German and Norwegian Ambassadors, however, he stated flatly 
that "for security reasons," it would not be possible for any 
diplomats to have access to either Aung San Suu Kyi or any of 
the other members of the NLD's leadership and gave no time 
frame for the "temporary" detention.  His answer regarding 
the NLD's offices was much the same; the offices had been 
closed down as a "temporary measure for security reasons." 
On SE Razali's upcoming visit, the DepFonMin said that he had 
been in touch with the Special Envoy on both June 2 and June 
3 but it was entirely up to Razali as to whether he came or 
not.  However, he emphasized that at "his level" (the 
DepFonMin's) he could not assure Razali that he could meet 
with Aung San Suu Kyi. 
 
¶5. (U)  The DepFonMin also ruled out any international 
investigation of the incident.  Burma, he said, was "very 
conscious of its independence" and would never allow 
foreigners to dictate to it.  When the COM informed the 
DepFonMin that officers form the Embassy were traveling to 
Depeyin on June 4, he was taken off guard, but did not 
indicate that the area would be off limits to travel. 
 
¶6. (U) The DepFonMin's answers satisfied no one.  The COM was 
emphatic in stating that the GOB's credibility on this matter 
was gone, and that the diplomatic community could not be sure 
whether Aung San Suu Kyi and the other NLD members were alive 
or dead.  Without access, no one could verify any part of the 
government's story. She also questioned the credibility of 
the government's account of the events in Depeyin and 
insisted that names of the dead should be released.  The 
British noted that, in large measure, the GOB's own 
credibility and reputation was at stake - if we could not 
verify the government's statements, others would undoubtedly 
question them.  The Italian Ambassador similarly expressed 
his concern and that of the EU regarding the situation and 
read a statement from the EU. 
 
Comment 
 
¶7. (C) This was a deservedly brutal session for Khin Maung 
Win.  His account convinced no one.  In fact, his 
presentation left behind the impression that the government 
have stage-managed recent events in order to end the latest 
tentative political liberalization episode in Burma, and to 
scuttle the UN-sponsored dialogue process.  It is hard 
otherwise to understand how Aung San Suu Kyi's party could 
have run into a mob of 5,000 anti-NLD agitators at night on a 
country road without any government security present.  The 
government's actions since then in closing all NLD offices 
and holding all senior NLD leadership incommunicado also 
suggest that the government has a broader agenda than simply 
assuring internal security.  Burmese government spokesmen 
will deny this, as the DepFonMin did in the briefing today, 
but the government's seeming indifference to the strong 
international reaction to the latest events, and to Razali's 
mission, suggests that neither political transition nor 
international opinion carries any weight with them at the 
moment.  Internal security and keeping the junta's power 
intact comes first, even if that means political repression 
and international condemnation. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT:  For the United States and other countries 
which have focused their policy on the goal of a transition 
to democracy and increased respect for human rights and the 
rule of law, these latest developments are powerfully 
negative.  The GOB may restore ASSK's liberty and may allow 
the NLD to re-open its offices, but there is little doubt 
that it will do so only on terms that make explicit that 
political liberty will always be subordinate to the internal 
security concerns of the regime in Burma.  Razali may be 
willing to continue his mission on those terms, but we don't 
see the point, unless there is some clarification of the 
government's intention regarding the teatment and liberties 
of the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi.  So long as she remains in 
detention and the NLD offices remain closed, Razali should 
stay away.  End Comment. 
¶9. (U) We are sending two officers and an FSN employee to 
Depeyin to see what we can determine on the ground regarding 
events there.  It may be impossible to re-assemble any clear 
picture of events on May 31, but we believe it is essential 
to show our interest and concern. 
Martinez