This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 002416 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO PASS USAID/W 
STATE PLEASE REPEAT TO IO COLLECTIVE 
STATE FOR PRM/ANE, EUR/SE, NEA/NGA, IO AND SA/PAB 
NSC FOR EABRAMS, SMCCORMICK, STAHIR-KHELI, JDWORKEN 
USAID FOR USAID/A, DCHA/AA, DCHA/RMT, DCHA/FFP 
USAID FOR DCHA/OTI, DCHA/DG, ANE/AA 
USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA:WGARVELINK, BMCCONNELL, KFARNSWORTH 
USAID FOR ANE/AA:WCHAMBERLIN 
ROME FOR FODAG 
GENEVA FOR RMA AND NKYLOH 
ANKARA FOR AMB WRPEARSON, ECON AJSIROTIC AND DART 
AMMAN FOR USAID AND DART 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF IZ WFP
SUBJECT: PUBLIC FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND THE HARVEST IN 
NORTHERN IRAQ 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  WFP international staff will soon establish a full-time 
presence in Mosul, with responsibility also for At Tamim and 
Salah ad Din governorates.  WFP, working with the MOT, is 
providing food to hospitals and social institutions in 
Mosul.  WFP/Kirkuk reports that insecurity, salaries, and 
the need for MOT office equipment are the biggest obstacles 
limiting the quick revival of a successful PDS in At Tamim 
governorate.  PUK officials in As Sulaymaniyah have 
expressed concern to WFP about the backlog of distributions 
and the need for retroactive distributions.  Discussion is 
ongoing in the three northern governorates whether it is 
best for WFP to procure the wheat harvest as whole grain or 
wheat flour.  End Summary. 
 
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MOSUL 
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¶2.  The U.N. Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) conducted a 
security assessment on 7 May of Mosul.  U.N. World Food 
Program (WFP) program and logistics staff are now traveling 
daily to Mosul and Kirkuk.  WFP is providing some support to 
Ministry of Trade (MOT) food offices in Mosul and Kirkuk 
(for example, two computers in each location) and minor 
repairs to grain storage structures.  The WFP northern 
deputy responsible for Mosul and Kirkuk has arrived in Arbil 
and will likely move to Mosul this coming week.  She will 
head up the team focusing on Ninawa and At Tamim 
governorates. 
 
¶3. The DART traveled to Mosul on 5 May and met with WFP 
national staff, who reported that there is no shortage of 
food in the city of Mosul.  WFP also noted that when 
security allows, they will conduct an assessment to look at 
pockets of vulnerability. 
 
¶4. 
The Ministry of Trade (MOT) in Mosul on 12 May began to 
distribute non-WFP commodities to the 30 percent of the 
population who had not received March distributions (for 
August), which were interrupted by the war.  The MOT in 
Kirkuk will similarly distribute wheat flour to the 
approximately 30 percent there who did not receive the 
August distribution in Ninawa.  While cash is much more 
important right now than food, with the current absence of 
salaries, WFP believes that MOT distributions are 
appropriate.  Food is available in the markets, but at 
approximately double pre-war prices.  WFP and the MOT are 
distributing to hospitals and social institutions because 
there was concern that stocks were running dry. 
 
¶5.  WFP/Mosul reports that its relationship with Coalition 
Forces has been helpful.  The Coalition has posted 35 
soldiers to guard the WFP stores every night, and has 
recently provided WFP an additional 15,000 metric ton (MT) 
capacity warehousing complex since WFP's own 13,000 MT 
stores are now full.  It contains 13,000 MT of wheat flour, 
together with 640 MT lentils, 91 MT weaning cereal, and 600 
MT vegetable oil.  The wheat flour is a little less than 
half that necessary for a normal monthly distribution in 
Ninawa.  The second warehouse is being guarded by "local 
security."  The Coalition Forces have also provided some 
fuel to WFP. 
 
¶6.  WFP national staff believe the public distribution 
system (PDS) has been the best mechanism for distribution - 
in terms of fairness, dignity, organization and timeliness - 
and should certainly be continued instead of setting up a 
new system.  Despite extensive looting of the MOT offices, 
its staff members saved disks with food/flour agent and 
beneficiary data, and the MOT local contract transporter 
(from main warehouses to each food/flour agent) is still 
available.  This information, however, needs to be confirmed 
with the MOT. 
 
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KIRKUK 
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¶7.  The DART traveled to Kirkuk on 8 May and met with WFP 
local staff.  WFP/Kirkuk believes the silos and mills in the 
governorate are generally in good condition, and the Civil 
Military Operation Center (CMOC) personnel believe there is 
approximately 130,000 MT in governorate silos.  A 300,000 MT 
harvest is due in the area next month.  Coalition forces in 
Kirkuk arranged an initial meeting with the MOT heads of 
department on 6 May, an important step in reviving the 
entire MOT structure. 
 
¶8.  WFP raised concern regarding the shortage of fuel to 
enable farmers to bring their grain to market next month. 
CMOC personnel noted that the Bayji refinery should soon be 
repaired, allowing for sufficient fuel on the market in 
approximately two weeks time. 
 
¶9.  WFP/Kirkuk raised the following as the greatest 
constraints to quickly reviving the PDS: 1) Security of its 
warehouses, currently guarded by local security;  2) 
Replacement of MOT furniture and equipment that had been 
looted; and 3) Salaries of MOT staff. The nationwide $20 
emergency payments for each government employee are being 
provided in Kirkuk, but employees remain concerned about 
when they will receive their salaries and how much they will 
be paid. 
 
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AS SULAYMANIYAH 
--------------- 
 
¶10.  Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) government officials 
have expressed concern to WFP about the backlog of 
distributions and the need for retroactive distributions. 
(Note:  While the rest of the country received double 
rations since last fall, the northern three governorates 
received wheat flour in single ration allotments, rather 
than double.  End Note.) 
 
¶11.  WFP agrees this could be an extremely sensitive issue, 
given that the north has strongly supported the Coalition. 
At the same time, DART and WFP recognize it does not make 
sense to provide four-month flour rations (May through 
August) to northern populations, especially when the 
northern harvest looks promising. 
 
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MAKHMUR SILO IN ARBIL 
---------------------- 
 
¶12.  The DART visited Makhmur silo in Arbil on 15 May.  It 
has a capacity of 100,000 MT in addition to 60,000 to 70,000 
MT of open storage (similar to large swimming pool-sized 
bins).  The silo has been assessed by WFP and the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), and 
requires some minor repairs to become functional, and larger 
repairs to be fully operational.  The open storage, however, 
is usable immediately.  WFP believes that with minimal input 
(approximately USD 25,000) the silo could handle 
approximately 40,000 MT.  A much larger investment would be 
required to make it fully functioning (approximately USD 
500,000).  The surrounding fields of wheat and barley appear 
very good, and barley has just begun to be harvested. 
 
¶13.  The DART met with Coalition Forces, based at the silo, 
who are in charge of operations in Makhmur, a traditionally 
Kurdish farming area that had been "Arabized" over the last 
12 years.  In the past few weeks, many Kurds have returned 
to this part of Arbil district (which before the war was 
under GOI administration in Mosul) and have displaced a 
number of the Arab farmers who had settled there. 
 
¶14.  Coalition forces have been charged with enforcing an 
agreement made some days ago between the Arbil Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA), Mosul authorities, and Makhmur leaders 
(and facilitated by the Coalition) that the previous Kurdish 
landowners and the Arabs who planted the current crop would 
share the harvest equally. 
 
¶15.  The Coalition has tasked helicopters to patrol the huge 
farming district and to arrest farmers who are currently 
harvesting barley.  The Coalition forces are also 
confiscating machinery, until the farmer (primarily Kurdish 
now) can prove he owns the land, and agrees to share the 
harvest with any Arab who also has ownership documents.  The 
process requires a visit to the agriculture office, where 
the "harvest authorization" clearance process is conducted. 
It is reportedly straightforward and takes a short time, 
allowing the farmer to quickly return to harvesting. 
¶16.  Coalition forces hope that this campaign will persuade 
farmers to proactively seek clearance before harvesting. 
While acknowledging that this is a short-term solution, and 
there are a number of issues in the details (who pays for 
the harvesting, how is the 50 percent split effected, etc.), 
the Coalition views this as the best way to stave off 
violence and ensure that the current crop is harvested 
successfully.  Thus far, it appears to be a successful 
campaign, although farmers have only begun to harvest 
barley; the real test will come in early June when the 
substantial wheat crop matures. 
 
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LOCAL PURCHASE 
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¶17.  Between 1994 and 1995 WFP procured, through CARE, 
approximately 10,000 MT of wheat in the north.  For the much 
larger quantities expected this year, WFP believes that it 
would be much easier to buy wheat flour in the north rather 
than wheat grain, to obviate the need for WFP to conduct pre- 
milling quality checks and undertake the milling itself. 
WFP indicates that its procedures require a tender, rather 
than working directly through the MOA.  WFP is sending a 
procurement officer to the north in the coming days to 
explore the options. 
 
¶18.  By contrast, PUK ministry officials have suggested to 
WFP/Sulaymaniyah that wheat grain could be distributed 
rather than wheat flour from the harvest in the north.  WFP 
says it has previously had bad experiences with private 
tenders for other goods when attempting to make a local 
purchase (as businessmen tend to pool and inflate rates). 
Consequently, WFP/Sulaymaniyah would prefer that the MOT's 
Grain Board procure wheat nationwide.  WFP could then 
purchase from the Grain Board at a fixed rate. 
 
¶19.  According to WFP/Mosul, there may be some 250,000 MT of 
wheat grain in government silos within Ninawa governorate 
and 130,000 MT wheat in At Tamim governorate.  These amounts 
need to be confirmed.  This wheat is part of the National 
Strategic Reserve and falls under the jurisdiction of the 
MOT.  If the MOT chose to do so, the wheat could be fed into 
the PDS. 
 
JONES