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Viewing cable 03AMMAN3420, ZARQA ELECTION PRIMER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03AMMAN3420 2003-06-10 07:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Amman
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 003420 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI JO INRB
SUBJECT: ZARQA ELECTION PRIMER 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Greg Berry, reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (c)  Summary:  Mohammed Arsalan, a long-time Embassy 
contact and candidate for the "Chechen" seat representing 
Zarqa in the new parliament, spoke with econoff at some 
length about the election process (Byzantine), his chances 
(good), and the primary concerns of the Zarqa constituency 
(surprising).  He also shared his views on the sources of 
strength for the Islamic Action Front/Muslim Brotherhood, and 
on the factors limiting their political influence.  Should 
Arsalan win his seat, he will be a strong advocate for 
continued economic reform and openness, and may have some 
success bringing other MP's into the fold.  End summary. 
 
NUMBERS, PREDICTIONS 
 
2.  (sbu)  Mohammed Arsalan is the 45-year old former 
Secretary General of the Zarqa Chamber of Industry and a long 
 
SIPDIS 
time Embassy contact.  He is currently a candidate for the 
"Chechen" seat in Zarqa governorate for the June 17 
parliamentary elections.  Arsalan recently described to 
econoff his campaign experiences, as well as the overall mood 
of Zarqans toward the election process and other issues of 
the day. 
 
3.  (sbu)  The seat Arsalan is contesting is one of 10 in the 
governorate, and one of four in the district containing the 
city of Zarqa.  Of the other three seats in the district, two 
are "reserved" for Arab Muslims, and the other is reserved 
for a Christian candidate.  For this election, a total of 37 
candidates have registered to contest the 10 seats in the 
governorate.  Of those, four are contesting the Chechen seat, 
including an IAF candidate, an independent woman, and a 
"wealthy" male doctor with support in the Palestinian 
community.  The total pool of potential voters in the 
governorate is around 151,000.  Seats for the Zarqa district 
are allocated to the top two Arab Muslim vote getters, the 
top Christian candidate (regardless of overall popular vote), 
and the top Chechen candidate.  Thus Arsalan will likely 
finish somewhere in the top third of the pack of the 37 
candidates, but expects to finish first among Chechen 
candidates. 
 
4.  (sbu)  Arsalan said voter turnout is expected to be low - 
he estimated no more than 25-30 percent of registered voters 
would cast votes.  Because of his own dogged campaigning, 
though, he expects to garner some 3,000 votes for himself, 
which he expects will easily outdistance his nearest 
competitor.  Arsalan predicted that the IAF candidate 
opposing him would gather no more than 250 votes.  For the 
governorate, Arsalan predicted the IAF would control no more 
than 3 or 4 seats, with the balance going to independent 
candidates who will secure votes based on tribal/family 
affiliations, ethnic/religious ties, or exceptional financial 
resources used to paper the governorate with campaign 
posters.  He added that few of these candidates were long on 
substance, and he expected to be able to lead the 
independents as a bloc of 6-7 MP's. 
 
ANATOMY OF A CAMPAIGN 
 
5.  (sbu)  Arsalan's campaign, like that of almost all 
independent candidates, is almost completely self-financed. 
Arsalan said that to run a campaign or create a party, heavy 
self-financing was critical, since voters had a very poor 
record of supporting candidates financially.  Ironically, 
Arsalan said he could not even secure an endorsement from his 
previous employer, the Zarqa Chamber of Industry, due to 
personal disagreements between himself and the Chairman of 
the Board.  This despite the fact that Arsalan is widely 
known to support exactly the kinds of policies the Chamber 
advocates. 
 
6.  (sbu)  Arsalan has instead relied on his contacts in the 
Chechen community as the main base of his support.  In what 
he termed a real revolution, he convinced the traditionally 
conservative, anti-liberalization community to back him over 
more conservative candidates.  He credits his ability to win 
the support of the community to the skills he learned while 
participating in a series of USAID-funded public speaking and 
management seminars over the past year.  He said this 
training, and his ability to speak on substantive (read: 
economic) issues has set him well apart from the rest of the 
field of candidates. 
 
7.  (sbu)  Arsalan has maintained a grueling campaign 
schedule, spending every day speaking with walk-ins to his 
campaign headquarters and every night (often until 3:00 a.m.) 
speaking to small groups (10-30) of constituents, both to 
gauge their interests and to elicit their support.  He noted 
with surprise the large number of students from local 
universities who have visited him in his offices, an 
illustration, he says, of a visibly higher level of awareness 
of issues among the constituency.  Arsalan expressed 
particular joy at speaking with students:  "I don't have to 
walk them through the ABC's of every issue - I can start at 
K."  By contrast, he said his opponents have steered clear of 
discussions, relying instead on aggressive "paper the town" 
approaches in an effort to get name recognition on the ballot 
through the use of campaign posters. 
 
8.  (sbu)  Arsalan said the IAF initially launched strong 
attacks against him, accusing him of being a tool of the 
Americans and a Free Mason (a less inflammatory substitute 
for "Zionist"), and of selling visas to the U.S. in return 
for votes.  He said they stopped perpetuating these rumors, 
though, after a few months when they saw the rumors were not 
gaining any traction among voters.  He said the IAF probably 
also decided to focus its energies on winning the two Arab 
Muslim seats in the Zarqa city district, and as a result 
could not sustain negative campaigning against him. 
 
ISSUES AND VIEWS FROM ZARQA'S VOTING PUBLIC 
 
9.  (sbu)  Arsalan said there was a great deal of voter 
apathy to overcome in this election.  He said that, as a 
result of perceived voting irregularities in the last 
parliamentary election, and a long-standing belief that 
districts were "Gerrymandered" to limit the power of the IAF, 
voters simply distrusted the system.  With little confidence 
in the system, many voters were reluctant to go to the polls. 
 Arsalan said his message to these voters was that a low 
turn-out only favors extremism and backwardness, and that a 
decision to "get out the vote" would help moderates and those 
who championed growth.  He said the approach had resonated 
somewhat, but he did not expect that he alone would be able 
to significantly affect turnout. 
 
10.  (sbu)  He said that most voters (somewhat surprisingly) 
are hungry for a candidate who can talk about "pocketbook" 
issues, one who knows something about the economy and can 
translate pronouncements from the cabinet into programs for 
Zarqans, jobs, and food on the table.  He added that many 
voters are just plain tired of listening to political 
rhetoric, either on Peace process issues, Iraq, or terrorism. 
 They are equally tired of constant announcements of new 
programs by the cabinet that don't result in noticeable 
improvements to their standard of living.  Related to this, 
Arsalan said many voters talk of wanting "equality and 
justice," i.e. equal opportunities for all Jordanians to 
benefit from programs, foreign aid, new business, and the 
like.  The inability of the cabinet to deliver has, Arsalan 
said, hurt prospects for Abul Ragheb and the cabinet to 
retain their positions after the elections - especially now 
that new appointments would have to be confirmed by MP's. 
Arsalan said he has been pounding the accountability in 
government theme to Zarqa voters, with good response.  (Note: 
 other Embassy contacts recently gave Abul Ragheb a 50-50 
chance of retaining office after the elections.  End note.) 
 
11.  (sbu)  On Iraq, Arsalan said he is hearing nothing.  He 
said Zarqans are bitterly angry at Saddam and, by extension, 
at Iraq and Iraqis, for being "all talk, no action."  He said 
voters were stunned by the total and rapid collapse of Iraq's 
armed forces, and that the Iraq debacle further shook their 
willingness to believe posturing by political leaders, both 
in the government and in the IAF and local community.  On the 
U.S., he said almost everyone is schizophrenic - of course 
they agree with the ideals America stands for, but almost 
everyone is strongly opposed to current American policies in 
the region and America's treatment of Arabs in the region and 
in the U.S.  He added it was too soon to see any measurable 
difference in opinion as a result of the Aqaba summit, but 
acknowledged that the issue of Palestine is closely and 
continuously watched by Zarqa voters. 
 
PILLARS AND RESTRAINTS ON THE IAF 
 
12.  (sbu)  Arsalan said the strength of the IAF in general 
was modest - they probably could count on no more than 10% of 
votes in Zarqa, and probably similar figures elsewhere in 
Jordan.  The votes they control, though, he said they control 
completely.  The IAF, he continued, draws its strength from 
two main areas:  first, they are exceptionally well organized 
in a system in which there are no other well organized 
parties to speak of, only masses of independent candidates. 
Not only can they mobilize voters, but they can mobilize 
services and support for communities in which they are 
prominent.  From mosque building to emergency food relief to 
other charity work (often financed from outside Jordan), the 
IAF can deliver to communities in need - thus gaining 
legitimacy and improving their following.  Second, they can 
claim to speak for God - who, Arsalan pointed out, 
consistently enjoys good approval ratings.  Not only does 
this give the IAF moral authority in some sectors, it also 
dismisses them from the burden of developing an issue-based 
platform.  Instead, they simply point to the Koran and tell 
voters that Islam has the answer - whatever the question. 
 
13.  (sbu)  While these mechanisms make for a tightly-knit 
organization, Arsalan said the influence of the IAF has been 
slipping for years, due mainly to their self-imposed exile 
from political dialogue in Jordan for the past several years. 
 This decision, Arsalan said, probably cost them 30% of their 
support base, since "now two generations have grown up not 
knowing about the IAF."  Also, in recent months, the IAF was 
delivered a black eye when it rallied support for Saddam 
Hussein and Iraq, gleefully repeating Saddam's propaganda, 
only to find itself standing firmly on the losing side and 
lacking all credibility.  These two trends have left a sour 
taste in the mouths of many voters who would traditionally 
have been sympathetic to IAF positions, but now see the IAF 
in the same light as any other political animal - long on 
slogans, short on substance. 
 
COMMENT 
 
14.  (c)  Arsalan is a practical, capable, affable, and above 
all active member of the Zarqa community.  He is not afraid 
to take risks - he is the only liberal running in the 
governorate, and the only candidate to feature the Jordanian 
flag in his campaign materials - a nod to the King's "Jordan 
First" campaign and a slap in the face to Islamists and 
Palestinian hard-liners alike.  Arsalan has long been a 
supporter of the QIZ's, the FTA, and any other program that 
can help improve the lives of average Jordanians.  He will 
seek membership in Parliament's economic and foreign 
relations committees, where he could prove an opinion leader 
among moderate MP's. 
BERRY