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Diana T Fritz  03/21/2007 05:31:34 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                            June 23, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 2988 - UNKNOWN)         

TAGS:     PREL, PGOV, PARM, ETTC                                 

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  U/S BOLTON DISCUSSES NORTH KOREAN AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR  
          THREAT WITH MFA MINSTATE HAMDAN BIN ZAYID              

Ref:      None                                                   
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S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 02988

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   RSO P/M ECON AMB DCM 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:STWILLIAMS
CLEARED: A/DCM:TEWILLIAMS

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OO RUEHC RUCNIRA RUEKJCS RUCAACC RHEHNSC RUEAIIA
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DE RUEHAD #2988/01 1741226
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231226Z JUN 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0562
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA//
RUCAACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD/CCJ2/CCJ5//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002988 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, PM/B, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA AND EAP/K 
 
NSC FOR THEROUX 
 
DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/13 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM ETTC IR NK TC
SUBJECT:  U/S BOLTON DISCUSSES NORTH KOREAN AND 
IRANIAN NUCLEAR THREAT WITH MFA 
MINSTATE HAMDAN BIN ZAYID 
 
¶1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba 
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
¶2. (S) SUMMARY:  Conveying a message from President 
Bush, U/S Bolton laid out USG concerns on the 
nuclear weapons programs of both North Korea and 
Iran in a June 18 meeting with MFA Minstate Hamdan 
bin Zayid.  In the case of North Korea, U/S Bolton 
asked for the UAE's support in denying hard 
currency to the regime by helping us curtail DPRK 
weapons sales which could fund their nuclear 
program.  Hamdan expressed his deep appreciation 
for U/S Bolton's visit, noting that the U.S. and 
the UAE have a "special" relationship which has 
been significantly strengthened in the post-9/11 
period.  Hamdan pledged the UAE's complete 
cooperation in deterring the North Korean and 
Iranian threats as these countries' programs 
endangered not only the Middle East region but the 
world.  He cited UAE intelligence reports that the 
Iranians have recently redoubled their efforts and 
are "working more actively" on a nuclear program, 
particularly following U.S. and European 
expressions of concern.  The UAE had raised its 
concerns about Iranian-Russian cooperation with the 
GOR directly but did not buy Moscow's argument that 
the Iranians are not pursuing this technology for 
military purposes.   Hamdan also promised his 
personal engagement in obtaining an early signing 
of a bilateral ICC Article 98 agreement (see 
septel). END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (S) Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
International Security Assistance John R. Bolton 
met with UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayid Al-Nahyan June 18 in Abu 
Dhabi.  Bolton was joined by the Ambassador, 
Special Assistant Mark Groombridge, Foreign Affairs 
Officer Jodi Greene and Polchief (notetaker). 
Hamdan was joined by office assistant Abdulrahman 
Al-Romaithi and Presidential translator Zaki 
Nusseibeh. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
U/S BOLTON ON NORTH KOREA:  TIME IS NOT ON OUR SIDE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4. (S) U/S Bolton began with North Korea, laying 
out USG concerns about its dramatically increasing 
nuclear weapons capability.  President Bush had 
instructed the State Department to find a peaceful 
solution to the crisis, using multilateral 
conferences, the UNSC and North Korea's neighbors. 
However, Bolton explained, diplomacy is a complex 
process and "time is not on our side."  The 
President has decided that we must examine other 
"influences" in order to slow down the North Korean 
program.  The USG's judgment is that the North is 
supporting its hard currency earnings via sales of 
WMD material and equipment, as well as drugs and 
gambling enterprises.  U/S Bolton explained that 
his unpublicized trip to the ME region, with stops 
in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Kuwait, provided 
an opportunity to discuss our concerns with friends 
and to work together to cut off North Korea's 
external earnings.  We wished to create a 
"partnership" so that countries in the ME region 
would look elsewhere than North Korea to fulfill 
their legitimate weapons needs.  U/S Bolton made 
clear that we were not attempting to revisit the 
issue of past transactions and that we appreciated 
the UAE's termination of their military cooperation 
with the DPRK in 2000. 
 
¶5. (S) Bolton sought UAE engagement with Iran and 
Libya where the U.S. does not have formal relations 
and with Syria, with whom we do have diplomatic 
ties, but where we have not been able to exercise 
much influence.  The U/S offered to share 
intelligence as part of our counter-terrorism 
cooperation on transshipments, noting that the 
North Koreans typically sell components via 
clandestine means, including smuggling.  Bolton 
briefed Hamdan on the President's Proliferation 
Security Initiative, unveiled in Krakow in late 
May, in which the U.S. seeks to use existing and 
new authorities to go beyond traditional export 
control mechanisms to interdict shipments of WMD on 
sea, air and land.  The U.S. wants to make it 
harder for the North Koreans and others to complete 
these transactions by dramatically increasing the 
costs of doing business. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
HAMDAN: NORTH KOREA AN EXAMPLE TO ROGUE ACTORS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6. (S) Hamdan began by noting that the UAE does not 
have a diplomatic relationship with North Korea and 
is fully committed to cooperation with the U.S. 
with regard to the nuclear threat.  Any weapons 
proliferation in Asia poses a "direct threat to the 
national security of the UAE," the MFA Minstate 
continued.  In his view, how we deal with North 
Korea will determine whether other rogue actors 
will seek to develop dangerous weapons programs. 
Noting U/S Bolton's earlier meeting with Dubai 
Ports and Customs Authority Executive Director 
Sultan bin Sulayem (septel), Hamdan asked if the 
U.S. had particular concerns about Dubai as a 
transshipment point.  He noted that the UAE federal 
government would raise such issues with Dubai Crown 
Prince Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum if necessary. 
U/S Bolton believed that Dubai was "doing the right 
thing" by seeking training for their customs 
officials in order to alert them to possible WMD 
shipments.  The U.S. looked forward to sharing more 
information with Dubai, the U/S continued, 
particularly as those who traffic in WMD are 
getting increasingly sophisticated. 
 
¶7. (S) Hamdan doubted whether the UAE alone could 
exert much influence on the Libyans, Syrians and 
Iranians, given their recalcitrant and secretive 
nature.  He did not believe these governments would 
be responsive to any approaches regarding their 
dealings with North Korea.  Bolton suggested that 
the UAE use its leadership in multilateral forums, 
such as the OIC, GCC and Arab League to express 
these concerns. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
IRAN:  MULTILATERAL EFFORTS KEY TO STOPPING PROGRAM 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶8. (S) U/S Bolton contrasted the close consultation 
between the U.S., the UK and France on the threat 
posed by Iran with that on Iraq.  Pointing to the 
last G-8 statement, he noted there is some evidence 
that the Europeans are equally concerned.  Bolton 
explained the U.S. desire to keep Russia and France 
"close to us" on Iran.  Tehran's story that it is 
developing a civilian nuclear energy program is not 
consistent with its behavior.  The U.S. believed 
that if Iran continues at the present rate, it will 
be able to produce nuclear weapons by the end of 
the decade.  The U.S., he continued, has worked 
hard with Russia to stop the supply of fuel to the 
Bushehr facility.  We've made some progress with 
the GOR, but not with regard to the private Russian 
scientists working with the Iranians.  Putin had 
pledged to the President that the GOR would not 
supply fuel to Bushehr until questions regarding 
Iran's intentions are resolved. 
 
¶9. (S) U/S Bolton noted the "devastating" IAEA 
report which was important as it represented an 
international, not just a U.S., assessment and laid 
out a range of unanswered questions that the 
Iranians are refusing to answer, including why Iran 
is developing a heavy-water production facility. 
Bolton said the U.S. hoped the upcoming IAEA Board 
of Governors' meeting to be chaired by Kuwait will 
reflect consensus and call on Iran to open up to 
inspections.  It is the U.S. view that Iran will 
not be able to answer the IAEA's questions which 
may result in the U.S. referring the matter to the 
UNSC in September.  Hamdan noted that he had 
discussed the UAE's concerns with IAEA DG Al- 
Baradei, urging a clear international message. 
Bolton said he had encourged Al-Baradei to just 
"report the facts and refrain from political spin," 
can send the wrong message to Iran. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
UAE BELIEVES IRAN IS STEPPING UP NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶10. (S) Hamdan said the UAE was deeply concerned 
about Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile 
programs.  According to UAE intelligence, the 
Iranians have recently redoubled their efforts and 
are "working more actively" on a nuclear program, 
particularly following U.S. and European 
expressions of concern.  Hamdan pleaded "don't let 
Iran have this capability as this will be a 
disaster for the region."  The UAE welcomed broader 
cooperation on Iran, particularly with the Russians 
and Europeans, who in Hamdan's words "need to be 
with us."  The UAE had raised its concerns about 
Iranian-Russian cooperation with the GOR directly. 
The UAE did not buy Moscow's argument that the 
Iranians are not pursuing this technology for 
military purposes.  Hamdan estimated there was "no 
way for Russia to control the Iranians."  He noted 
that the GCC Foreign Ministers' meeting held 
earlier in the week in Jeddah issued for the first 
time a clear statement -- aimed directly at Iran -- 
calling for a Gulf/Middle East region free of WMD. 
The GCC was worried about the internal situation in 
Iran; Saudi FM Saud Al-Faisal had shared his view 
that Khatami and Rafsanjani, who usually differ 
widely on issues, have come together and are now 
singing the "same tune." 
 
¶11. (S) U/S Bolton said there was "no doubt" about 
the Iranian/Russian linkage.  While it was clear 
Putin doesn't want to see a nuclear-equipped Iran, 
his desires don't seem to be penetrating down 
through the GOR bureaucracy.  Bolton noted the 
inherent conflict of interest in the Russian Atomic 
Energy Agency which on the one hand fully 
understands the Iranian threat but on the other 
desires to sell reactors and fuel for profit.  As 
for the North Koreans, who were subject to a 
ballistic missile test moratorium, the U.S. 
believes they have an agreement with Iran to share 
data on Iran's ballistic missile tests.  Bolton 
hoped that the GCC would convey its concerns to 
Russia and the Europeans. 
 
¶12. (U) This cable has been cleared by U/S Bolton. 
 
WAHBA