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Viewing cable 03ZAGREB1047, CROATIA/ICC: STILL TAKING A TOUGH LINE ON ARTICLE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ZAGREB1047 2003-05-12 17:02 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 001047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PGOV HR UNSC HRPREL UNSC NATO
SUBJECT: CROATIA/ICC: STILL TAKING A TOUGH LINE ON ARTICLE 
98 NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 92865 
     B. 02 STATE 253531 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POLOFF ROB SILBERSTEIN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ON MAY 12 PRESSED DEPUTY FOREIGN 
MINISTER IVAN SIMONOVIC TO CONCLUDE AN ARTICLE 98 OR OTHER 
NON-SURRENDER AGREEMENT.  SHOULD CROATIA FAIL TO DO SO BY 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  01047  01 OF 02  121715Z 
JULY 1 WHEN THE AMERICAN SERVICEMEMBERS PROTECTION ACT COMES 
INTO EFFECT, IT STANDS TO PUT AT RISK OVER USD 19 MILLION IN 
FMF AND IMET ASSISTANCE (FY00 TO FY03) KEY TO ITS NATO 
INTEGRATION ASPIRATIONS.  DFM SIMONOVIC SAID THAT ICTY 
LINKAGES DURING AN ELECTION YEAR -- PARTICULARLY WHEN NEW 
INDICTMENTS ARE EXPECTED -- AND THE GOC'S DESIRE NOT TO GET 
OUT IN FRONT OF THE EU MADE NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT ALMOST 
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GOC. 
 
2. (C) SIMONOVIC ASKED IF WASHINGTON MIGHT GRANT CROATIA AN 
ASPA WAIVER -- EVEN FOR SIX MONTHS -- PARTICULARLY, HE 
CLAIMED, SINCE THE GOC WAS SET TO UNDERTAKE A NUMBER OF 
PROMISING, BUT POLITICALLY DIFFICULT, REFUGEE RETURN 
INITIATIVES.  WHILE THE AMBASSADOR URGED SIMONOVIC TO 
IMPLEMENT THE GOC'S REFUGEE RETURN AGENDA (DESCRIBED SEPTEL), 
THERE COULD BE NO LINKAGE BETWEEN THOSE EFFORTS AND AN ASPA 
WAIVER.  THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT THE GOC HAD TO FIND A 
WAY TO BALANCE ITS INTERESTS AND TO MANAGE LINKAGES TO ICTY. 
RESPONDING TO SIMONOVIC, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE HAD NO 
INDICATION THAT THE EU WAS WORKING ON AN ARTICLE 98 
INITIATIVE FOR THESSALONIKI.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PRESSING THE GOC ON ARTICLE 98 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) THE AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM AND POLOFF, CALLED 
ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IVAN SIMONOVIC ON MAY 12 TO PRESS 
THE GOC TO CONCLUDE AN ARTICLE 98 OR NON-SURRENDER AGREEMENT. 
 THE AMBASSADOR BRIEFED THE DFM ON PROGRESS TO DATE -- 34 
AGREEMENTS SIGNED AND SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS UNDERWAY WITH SOME 
OF CROATIA'S NEIGHBORS.  TALKS WITH THE EU HAVE BEEN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  01047  01 OF 02  121715Z 
FRUITFUL, BUT SCOPE OF COVERAGE ISSUES HAVE PREVENTED THE 
U.S. FROM REACHING AN EU-MODEL AGREEMENT. 
 
4. (C) THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER RACAN AND 
OTHER GOC OFFICIALS TOLD HIM IN 2002 THAT THEY WISHED TO 
REACH AN ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT, BUT THAT CROATIA DID NOT WANT 
TO GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE EU AND, THEREFORE, PREFERRED TO 
WAIT FOR AN EU-MODEL AGREEMENT.  THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT 
WHAT WAS AN UNDERSTANDABLE POSITION LAST YEAR NOW MUST BE 
RECONSIDERED:  BECAUSE OF THE AMERICAN SERVICEMEMBERS 
PROTECTION ACT (ASPA), CROATIA PUTS AT RISK OVER USD 19 
MILLION IN FMF AND IMET ASSISTANCE FROM FY 00 THROUGH FY 03. 
CONSIDERING THE LIMITED SCOPE IN THE CROATIAN DEFENSE BUDGET 
FOR NEW ACQUISITIONS, THIS ASSISTANCE IS CRITICAL FOR KEEPING 
CROATIA'S NATO INTEGRATION ASPIRATIONS ON TRACK.  NOBODY ELSE 
WAS GIVING THAT NEEDED SUPPORT. 
 
5. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT THE GOC NEEDED TO REALIZE 
THAT THE COUNTRIES THAT CROATIA IS LOOKING TO PAVE THE WAY 
FOR IT WITHIN THE EU ARE UNAFFECTED BY ASPA.  MANY ARE EXEMPT 
OF THE EFFECTS OF ASPA BECAUSE OF THEIR NATO MEMBERSHIP OR, 
LIKE AUSTRIA, DO NOT RECEIVE FMF OR IMET ASSISTANCE.  THE DFM 
AGREED THAT CROATIA WAS IN A DIFFICULT AND ISOLATED POSITION. 
 IT WAS AN "UNPLEASANT FEELING" TO BE A PRIMARY "TARGET," 
ALBEIT INADVERTENTLY, OF THE ASPA.  UNFORTUNATELY, THE DFM 
SAID, THE GOC WAS HAMSTRUNG.  IN AN ELECTION YEAR, THE 
SPECTER OF NEW ICTY INDICTMENTS AND DOMESTIC LINKAGES BETWEEN 
THE ICC AND ICTY MAKE AN AGREEMENT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE.  THE 
TYPE OF AGREEMENT, BE IT THE STANDARD OR UNILATERAL ARTICLE 
98 AGREEMENT OR THE "GENERIC" NON-SURRENDER AGREEMENT, DID 
NOT MATTER. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  01047  01 OF 02  121715Z 
 
A SIX-MONTH WAIVER PLEASE 
------------------------- 
 
6. (C) SIMONOVIC LAUNCHED INTO A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF A 
NUMBER OF NEW INITIATIVES -- LARGELY FOCUSED ON REFUGEE 
RETURN -- THAT HE SAID THE GOC PLANNED TO UNDERTAKE IN COMING 
MONTHS (SEPTEL).  THESE INITIATIVES, HE ARGUED, WERE 
IMPORTANT FOR CROATIA'S EU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP ASPIRATIONS 
AND FOR REGIONAL STABILITY, BUT HAD THEIR OWN POLITICAL COST 
FOR THE GOC.  IN LIGHT OF THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS, WHICH ARE 
LIKELY TO BE SCHEDULED IN NOVEMBER, AND THE DIFFICULTY FOR 
THE GOC OF IMPLEMENTING THOSE NEW INITIATIVES, WOULD IT BE 
POSSIBLE FOR WASHINGTON TO CONSIDER ISSUING A SIX-MONTH 
WAIVER ASPA FOR CROATIA, SIMONOVIC ASKED.  ADDITIONALLY, 
SIMONOVIC ASKED IF WE HAD RECEIVED ANY INDICATION THAT THE EU 
LAUNCH AN INITIATIVE ON ARTICLE 98 AT THE UPCOMING EU SUMMIT 
IN THESSALONIKI. (HE DID NOT ELABORATE.) 
 
7. (C) THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT THERE COULD BE NO LINKAGE 
BETWEEN OTHER CROATIA FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES AND OUR NEED 
TO CONCLUDE A BILATERAL NON-SURRENDER AGREEMENT.  THERE WAS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0745 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  01047  02 OF 02  121715Z 
ACTION IO-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AMAD-00  ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00 
      PERC-00  DS-00    EUR-00   FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00 
      LAB-01   VCE-00   NSAE-00  OIC-02   PM-00    SP-00    IRM-00 
      PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00 
      SWCI-00    /004W 
                  ------------------63C145  121716Z /38 
P 121702Z MAY 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0167 
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ZAGREB 001047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PGOV HR UNSC HRPREL UNSC NATO
SUBJECT: CROATIA/ICC: STILL TAKING A TOUGH LINE ON ARTICLE 
98 NEGOTIATIONS 
 
LITTLE POINT IN DISCUSSING WHAT SHORT-TERM WAIVERS FOR 
ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE BECAUSE CROATIA HASN'T 
EVEN BEGUN TO NEGOTIATE.  IN ANY CASE, ALL INDICATIONS WERE 
THAT ASPA WAIVERS WOULD BE FEW, AND, IF ANY WERE TO BE 
ISSUED, NATO INVITEES WOULD HAVE PRIORITY BEFORE CROATIA. 
THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON 
WHO, IF ANYONE WOULD GET A WAIVER. 
 
8. (C) THE AMBASSADOR TOLD SIMONOVIC THAT WHILE WE BELIEVED 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  01047  02 OF 02  121715Z 
CROATIA'S EU AND ICTY CONCERNS WERE UNDERSTANDABLE, THEY ALSO 
HAD TO BE PUT  PERSPECTIVE.  OUR SENSE WAS THAT WE WOULD 
SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EU ON ARTICLE 98 
WELL BEFORE BRUSSELS WOULD CONSIDER CROATIA'S EU MEMBERSHIP. 
GOOD ARGUMENTS DIFFERENTIATED THE ICTY AND THE ICC; IT WOULD 
BE UP TO THE GOC TO CRAFT A MESSAGE THAT WOULD RESONATE WITH 
THE CROATIAN PUBLIC.   THE AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT HE HAD 
RECEIVED NO INFORMATION THAT THE EU WOULD ALTER ITS POSITION 
ON ARTICLE 98 IN THESSALONIKI. 
 
9. (C) THE AMBASSADOR AGAIN URGED DFM SIMONOVIC TO REVIEW THE 
VARIOUS AGREEMENT TEXTS WE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE GOC TO BEGIN 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH US ON AN AGREEMENT.  SIMONOVIC WAS NOT 
OPTIMISTIC, SAYING THAT, UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, HE COULD 
NOT SEE THE GOC AGREEING TO A NON-EXTRADITION AGREEMENT, 
IRRESPECTIVE OF THE COST. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (C) SIMONOVIC'S GAMBIT OF LINKING AN ASPA WAIVER TO GOC 
PROGRESS ON CORE REGIONAL STABILITY ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO 
US WAS A GOOD TRY FROM THE CROATIAN PERSPECTIVE.  THE GOC 
DOES NOT WANT TO EXPEND WHAT IT IMAGINES WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT 
POLITICAL CAPITAL -- BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND IN TERMS OF ITS 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU -- TO SIGN A NON-SURRENDER 
AGREEMENT. 
 
11. (C) NOW THAT WE DISPENSED WITH THE GOC'S MANEUVER, 
HOWEVER, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER OR NOT THE GOC STICKS 
TO THE NO-NEGOTIATIONS POLICY THAT SIMONOVIC DESCRIBED.  THE 
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GOC KNOWS WHAT THE STAKES ARE AND HOW LITTLE CHANCE CROATIA 
HAS FOR A WAIVER.  WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE GOC TO FIND 
A WAY TO BALANCE ITS INTERESTS AND BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE A 
NON-SURRENDER AGREEMENT WITH US.  PROSPECTS CANNOT BE 
CONSIDERED GOOD.  PM RACAN IS NEVER EAGER TO RISK DOMESTIC 
PROBLEMS OVER ICTY, AND SIMONOVIC INADVERTENTLY REITERATED 
THAT THE GOC'S EU BID COUNTS FOR MORE THAN NATO -- IN SPITE 
OF REPEATING LEADING REFERENCES BY THE AMBASSADOR, SIMONOVIC 
NEVER ONCE REFERRED TO CROATIA'S MAP PROCESS AS AN IMPORTANT 
GOC PRIORITY. 
ROSSIN 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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