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Viewing cable 03ROME2299, PDAS RIES CONSULTATIONS WITH GOI ON PRESIDENCY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ROME2299 2003-05-23 11:05 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 002299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2013 
TAGS: PREL EU EU EU IT NATO ITPREL NATO ITPREL NATO
SUBJECT: PDAS RIES CONSULTATIONS WITH GOI ON PRESIDENCY 
PRIORITIES 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  02299  01 OF 03  231111Z 
 
REF: STATE 131918 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: CHARGE EMIL SKODON.  REASON: 1.5 (B)(D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: ON MAY 20, EUR PDAS RIES DISCUSSED A BROAD 
RANGE OF US-EU AND ITALIAN EU PRESIDENCY ISSUES DURING 
SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH MFA SYG GIUSEPPE BALDOCCI AND DIRECTOR 
FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ROCCO CANGELOSI.  BOTH BALDOCCI AND 
CANGELOSI STRESSED THAT THE GOI'S TOP PRIORITY FOR THE 
ITALIAN SEMESTER WAS PUTTING US-EU RELATIONS BACK ON A SOUND 
FOOTING.  PDAS RIES SUGGESTED THAT THE JUNE 25 US-EU SUMMIT 
IN WASHINGTON WAS AN APPROPRIATE VENUE TO START THAT PROCESS 
AND SET THE STAGE FOR PRODUCTIVE AND POSITIVE USG RELATIONS 
WITH THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY.  POTENTIAL AREAS OF COOPERATION 
INCLUDED THE MEPP, IRAQ, NON-PROLIFERATION (DPRK AND IRAN), 
AND THE TRANSATLANTIC BUSINESS DIALOGUE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  RIES WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE DCM, POLMIN, AND POLOFF 
(NOTETAKER) TO BOTH THE OFFICE CALL ON BALDOCCI AND 
SUBSEQUENT WORKING LUNCH HOSTED BY CANGELOSI.  ECMIN JOINED 
THE GROUP FOR THE LUNCH.  BALDOCI HAD WITH HIM A NOTETAKER 
(READOUT OF DINNER WITH GOI TRADE/ECON OFFICIALS FOLLOWS 
SEPTEL; ESDP/EU STRATEGIC CONCEPT DISCUSSION ALSO REPORTED 
SEPTEL).  WITH CANGELOSI WERE CLAUDIO BISOGNIERO (DEPUTY TO 
POLDIR ARAGONA), EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS OFFICE DIRECTOR 
MASSIMO GAIANI, AND WTO COORDINATOR FABIO FABRI.  RIES BEGAN 
BY NOTING THAT DURING THIS PHASE OF HIS EU NEW-MEMBER "ROAD 
SHOW" WHICH PRECEDED HIS STOP IN ROME, HE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO 
DISCOVER THAT HIS INTERLOCUTORS WERE FAMILIAR WITH EU 
PROCEDURES AND THE COMPLEXITIES AND SUBTLETIES OF THE US-EU 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  02299  01 OF 03  231111Z 
RELATIONSHIP.  IN RESPONSE TO BALDOCCI'S REQUEST FOR HIS 
VIEWS ON "NEW AND OLD" EUROPE, RIES SAID THAT THE DIVIDE WAS 
RATHER BETWEEN THOSE COUNTRIES WITH MINIMAL GROWTH AND THOSE 
WITH RELATIVELY HEALTHIER ECONOMIES AND PROSPECTS.  FOR 
EXAMPLE, GERMANY AND FRANCE WERE UNDERSTANDABLY MORE 
PREOCCUPIED ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE US IN THE BROADER GLOBAL 
COMMUNITY THAN ITALY AND THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL EUROPE 
WHICH HAVE MORE ROBUST ECONOMIES AND MORE CONFIDENCE THAT THE 
EU CAN SUCCESSFULLY COMPETE WITH THE US. 
 
3.  (C) RIES AVERRED THAT THE US AND EU HAD "PASSED THE LOW 
WATER MARK" IN THEIR RELATIONS.  BALDOCCI AGREED, AND SAID 
THAT THE BEST WAY TO IMPROVE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS WAS TO 
FOCUS ON AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST; THE BALKANS, MIDDLE EAST 
AND TERRORISM, FOR EXAMPLE, REPRESENT COMMON GROUND. 
BALDOCCI CITED THE CASABLANCA BOMBINGS AS A NEW DEVELOPMENT 
IN TERROR AND ANOTHER CLEAR REASON WHY EUROPE AND THE US MUST 
WORK TOGETHER ON COMMON GOALS. 
 
MIDDLE EAST 
 
4  (C)  RIES ASKED BALDOCCI ABOUT THE EU VIEW THAT 
SENIOR-LEVEL DELEGATIONS SHOULD CALL ON BOTH ARAFAT AND PM 
ABU MAZEN EQUALLY.  BALDOCCI RESPONDED THAT DURING A RECENT 
MEETING IN CAIRO, EGYPTIAN FM MAHER SAID THAT ARAFAT RETAINS 
SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL AND MORAL AUTHORITY AMONG PALESTINIANS, 
AND THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO SHUNT HIM ASIDE.  ABU MAZEN 
NEEDS THE PRESENCE OF ARAFAT AND HIS INFLUENCE.  IT WOULD BE 
POSSIBLE, BALDOCCI AGREED, TO INTERACT ONLY WITH THE NEW PM 
AND FORGET ARAFAT, WHO REPRESENTS THE POLITICAL PAST.  BUT 
BALDOCCI WONDERED IF THAT LOGIC, WHICH WORKS IN THE WEST 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  02299  01 OF 03  231111Z 
(WHERE A FORMER PM OR PRESIDENT IS OUT OF POWER ABSOLUTELY), 
IS APPLICABLE TO THE MID EAST'S POLITICAL REALITY AND 
CULTURE.  POLMIN OBSERVED THAT ABU MAZEN'S OFFICIAL POSITION 
WOULD ALWAYS BE THAT SENIOR OFFICIALS SHOULD MEET WITH 
ARAFAT, BUT THAT IS NOT NECESSARILY WHAT BEST SERVES OUR 
COMMON INTEREST IN PEACE. 
 
UNSC RESOLUTION ON IRAQ 
 
5.  (C)  RIES SAID THAT HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT MODIFICATIONS TO 
THE UNSC RESOLUTION ON IRAQ, (REFTEL; SHARED WITH THE GOI 
LATER THAT DAY) WOULD HELP ENSURE SWIFT PASSAGE THROUGH THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL.   KEY CHANGES INCLUDED A MORE ROBUST ROLE 
FOR THE UN IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
IRAQ DEVELOPMENT FUND.  THE DOCUMENT REPRESENTED AN EFFORT BY 
THE US TO REACH CONSENSUS ON A RESOLUTION.  RIES HOPED FOR A 
SUCCESSFUL VOTE SOON, FOR POLITICAL (PRIOR TO THE EVIAN G-8) 
AND PRACTICAL (STORAGE FACILITIES AND REFINERIES WERE 
DROWNING IN THE HEAVY FUEL OIL BYPRODUCT OF GASOLINE REFINED 
FOR DOMESTIC IRAQI CONSUMPTION) REASONS.  IF WE HAVE A 
RESOLUTION ON IRAQ, AND INCREASED STABILITY IN THE REGION, 
SAID RIES, THE JUNE US-EU SUMMIT CAN FOCUS ON OUR OTHER AREAS 
OF COMMON INTEREST, INTER ALIA: BALKANS, NON PROLIFERATION, 
AFGHANISTAN, NEGOTIATION OF OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT, HYDROGEN 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ5759 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  02299  02 OF 03  231111Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00 
      PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EAP-00   VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00 
      IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    DCP-01   NRRC-00  NSAE-00 
      OIC-02   DHS-00   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00 
      SCT-00   SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00 
      EPAE-00  SSD-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00 
      SSR-00   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------6A02D4  231111Z /38 
O 231105Z MAY 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0072 
INFO EU CANDIDATE STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE 
AMCONSUL MILAN 
AMCONSUL NAPLES 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ROME 002299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2013 
TAGS: PREL EU EU EU IT NATO ITPREL NATO ITPREL NATO
SUBJECT: PDAS RIES CONSULTATIONS WITH GOI ON PRESIDENCY 
PRIORITIES 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  02299  02 OF 03  231111Z 
 
ENERGY, COUNTERTERRORISM/MLAT NEGOTIATIONS, DATA PRIVACY.  ON 
GALILEO, WE ARE GETTING CLOSE; NOT YET ON TECHNICAL DETAILS 
BUT ON A MORE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON SPECTRUM SEPARATION. 
 
6. (C)  RIES SAID AT BOTH MEETINGS THAT A NATO ROLE FOR IRAQ 
WAS NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION, BUT WHAT IS IMPORTANT NOW IS FOR 
THE RIGHT TYPE AND NUMBER OF FORCES TO BE IN PLACE AS THE IC 
RESTORES STABILITY.  BISOGNIERO CONFIRMED THAT THE ITALIAN 
DEPLOYMENT TO THE UK ZONE IN SOUTHERN IRAQ  WILL BEGIN IN 
JUNE, AND THAT THE MOD HAS HAD GOOD COMMUNICATION AND 
COORDINATION WITH BRITISH MILITARY OFFICIALS AND CENTCOM. 
RIES EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR THE CONTRIBUTION, NOTING THAT 
ITALIAN MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES HAVE EARNED THE RESPECT 
OF US AND ALLIED NATIONS. 
 
BALKANS 
 
7.  (C) RIES TOLD BALDOCCI THAT THE USG APPRECIATES THE GOI'S 
DESIRE TO REFOCUS EU ATTENTION ON THE BALKANS.  REGARDING THE 
REPLACEMENT FOR UNMIK HEAD STEINER, WE WOULD LIKE A CANDIDATE 
FROM A NATO COUNTRY - HAD THE GOI CONSIDERED ITALY'S CURRENT 
AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS, LAURA MIRACHIAN?   BALDOCCI SAID THAT 
BEFORE EVEN CONSIDERING HER NOMINATION HE WOULD NEED TO 
CONSULT WITH HER SINCE SHE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN BALKANS 
ISSUES FOR A SIGNIFICANT PART OF HER CAREER, AND WANTED SOME 
DIVERSITY.  ANOTHER COMPLICATION WAS THAT SHE WAS ALSO THE 
ITALIAN CANDIDATE TO BE THE EU'S MIDDLE EAST ENVOY.  HE 
AGREED THOUGH THAT WE NEED TO THINK CAREFULLY, AND QUICKLY, 
ABOUT AN APPROPRIATE REPLACEMENT FOR STEINER. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  02299  02 OF 03  231111Z 
8.  (C)  RIES SAID THE USG SHARES ITALY'S CONCERNS ON 
ORGANIZED CRIME, TRAFFICKING IN HUMANS - PARTICULARLY WOMEN 
AND CHILDREN, AND  PIFWCS.  THE DCM NOTED THAT LAW 
ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES, FOR EXAMPLE IN ALBANIA, WERE RIPE 
FOR EU-US COOPERATION, AND THAT WE COULD BUILD ON ONGOING 
PROGRAMS.  RIES UNDERLINED THE USG CONCERN THAT IC ECONOMIC 
ASSISTANCE WAS DECLINING AT A TIME CRITICAL FOR BALKAN 
STABILITY DUE TO CROATIAN ASPIRATIONS TO REFORM AND JOIN 
TRANSATLANTIC INSTITUTIONS, REFUGEE RETURNS, AND SERBIA AND 
MONTENEGRO'S NEED FOR CONTINUED IC ASSISTANCE.  BALDOCCI SAID 
HE AND FM FRATTINI AGREED THAT THE IC MUST KEEP FOCUSED ON 
THE BALKANS, AND WOULD USE THE PRESIDENCY'S PLATFORM TO 
HIGHLIGHT CRITICAL ISSUES.  CANGELOSI LATER SAID OVER LUNCH 
THAT THE GOI WILL URGE THE COMMISSION TO AUGMENT DOWNSIZED 
BALKAN RESOURCES BY ALLOWING THE WESTERN BALKAN 5 TO UTILIZE 
"PRE-ACCESSION" FUNDS. 
 
DPRK 
 
9.  (C)  IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM BALDOCCI ON PROGRESS 
WITH NORTH KOREA, RIES SAID THE USG'S OBJECTIVE IS TO GET 
REGIONAL POWERS INVOLVED IN KEEPING PRESSURE ON NORTH KOREA 
TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION AGREEMENTS. 
POLMIN POINTED OUT THAT A KEY FACTOR WAS RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT 
AND INFLUENCE.  FRATTINI AND RUSSIAN FM IVANOV HAD DISCUSSED 
DPRK EARLIER THIS MONTH; WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE RUSSIA MORE 
INVOLVED. 
 
IRAN 
 
10.  (C)  RIES RAISED USG CONCERN OVER IRAN'S ATTEMPTS TO 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  02299  02 OF 03  231111Z 
AUGMENT ITS NUCLEAR FUEL ENRICHMENT FACILITIES.  THE EU MUST 
USE ITS LEVERAGE TO PUT PRESSURE ON IRAN TO SIGN THE IAEA 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL.  BALDOCCI SAID THAT FRATTINI HAD URGED 
KHARAZI TO SIGN, AND THAT BALDOCCI HIMSELF HAD IMPRESSED UPON 
THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR IN ROME RECENTLY THE NECESSITY OF 
IRAN'S SIGNING THE AGREEMENT.  THE AMBASSADOR TOLD BALDOCCI 
HE WAS AWARE OF THE IC'S VIEWS, BUT DOES NOT WANT IRAN TO BE 
DISCRIMINATED AGAINST ON CIVILIAN USE OF NUCLEAR POWER.  RIES 
SUGGESTED THAT -- AT THE LEAST -- THE US AND EU OUGHT TO 
REQUIRE THAT ANY COUNTRY DESIRING COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR 
FACILITY DEVELOPMENT MUST AGREE TO AND SIGN THE IAEA 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL. 
 
EU-RUSSIA 
 
11.  (C)  CANGELOSI WORRIED THAT RUSSIA MIGHT HAVE 
UNACHIEVABLE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE ST. PETERSBURG SUMMIT AND 
THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY, SUCH AS A VISA FREE REGIME, 
COMPENSATION FOR ENLARGEMENT, AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION.  HE PREDICTED THAT THE MOST 
LIKELY OUTCOME FROM THE MAY 31 SUMMIT WOULD BE A "NAME 
CHANGE" OF PRESENT MECHANISMS TO A "PERMANENT PARTNERSHIP." 
THE EU IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF 25 1 MEETINGS ON 
SELECTED ISSUES, AND PM BERLUSCONI AND FM FRATTINI ARE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ5761 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  02299  03 OF 03  231112Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00 
      PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EAP-00   VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00 
      IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    DCP-01   NRRC-00  NSAE-00 
      OIC-02   DHS-00   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00 
      SCT-00   SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00 
      EPAE-00  SSD-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00 
      SSR-00   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------6A02E5  231112Z /38 
O 231105Z MAY 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0073 
INFO EU CANDIDATE STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE 
AMCONSUL MILAN 
AMCONSUL NAPLES 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ROME 002299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2013 
TAGS: PREL EU EU EU IT NATO ITPREL NATO ITPREL NATO
SUBJECT: PDAS RIES CONSULTATIONS WITH GOI ON PRESIDENCY 
PRIORITIES 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  02299  03 OF 03  231112Z 
 
DETERMINED THAT THE ROME EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT WILL FORGE CLOSER 
LINKS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND BRUSSELS. 
 
TABD 
 
12.  (C)  CANGELOSI SAID THE GOI WAS GIVING THOUGHT TO USING 
THE TRANSATLANTIC BUSINESS DIALOGUE AS A VEHICLE FOR HELPING 
PUT TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS BACK ON TRACK.  WHAT DID RIES 
THINK?  THE TABD IS STILL VALUABLE, BUT NEEDS REFORM, RIES 
RESPONDED.  THE MAIN PROBLEM IS THAT IT HAS GROWN TOO LARGE; 
THERE ARE TOO MANY INITIATIVES AND TOPICS; TOO MANY SMALL 
COMPANY OWNERS USING IT TO DRUM UP BUSINESS.  THE USG'S 
PREFERENCE IS FOR A SMALLER TABD FOCUSED ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, 
WITH PARTICIPATION BY MAJOR CEOS.  IT WOULD MEET ONLY IN 
CAPITALS TO ENSURE HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION.  THE 
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE WILL HOST A DINNER FOR SUCH BUSINESS 
 
SIPDIS 
LEADERS ON JUNE 24.  RIES INVITED CANGELOSI TO NOMINATE 
APPROPRIATE ITALIAN BUSINESS LEADERS TO PARTICIPATE. 
 
EU INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
 
13.  (C)  CANGELOSI SAID THAT MODALITIES AND LOGISTICS FOR 
THE EU AT 25 WOULD BE A CHALLENGE FOR THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY. 
 ITALY WOULD WORK TO CONTROL THE NUMBER AND DURATION OF 
INTERVENTIONS; HE LAMENTED THE COUNCIL'S LOSS OF "INTIMACY" 
AT 25.  CANGELOSI HOPED THAT THE IGC COULD START BY THE 
BEGINNING OF OCTOBER, AND THAT IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE TO 
COMPLETE DELIBERATIONS BY THE END OF THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY. 
THIS WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF THE IGC LIMITED DISCUSSIONS TO 
"OPEN ITEMS" UNRESOLVED BY THE CONVENTION.  THE PLAN THEN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  02299  03 OF 03  231112Z 
WOULD BE TO FINALIZE THE DOCUMENT DURING THE IRISH 
PRESIDENCY, AND SIGN THE AGREEMENT IN ROME AFTER THE FORMAL 
ACCESSION OF NEW MEMBERS IN MAY; THE GOI ALSO WANTS ROMANIA, 
BULGARIA AND TURKEY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESS AS 
OBSERVERS. 
14.  (C)  CANGELOSI PREDICTED THAT THE STRUCTURE OF THE EU 
COUNCIL PRESIDENCY WILL BE A COMPROMISE AGREED TO AT THE LAST 
MINUTE.  IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE A SPECIFIC JOB 
DESCRIPTION FOR THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT SO AS NOT TO INTERFERE 
WITH COMMISSION FUNCTIONS.   A BALANCE ACCEPTABLE TO LARGE 
AND SMALL MEMBER STATES COULD BE A COUNCIL PRESIDENT TERM OF 
2 1/2 YEARS, WITH A REDUCED NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL COUNCILS 
THAT WOULD ROTATE LEADERSHIP FROM WITHIN  CONSTITUENCIES 
(NORDIC, SOUTHERN, ETC.) DURING THE PRESIDENCY TERM. 
 
15.  (C)  RIES NOTED THE INHERENT COMPLEXITIES OF SUCH A 
SYSTEM, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS. 
EVERY TIME THE EU STREAMLINES, RIES NOTED, THERE ARE MORE 
EUROPEANS ACROSS THE TABLE FROM AMERICANS.  CANGELOSI 
PROMISED THAT THE NEW STRUCTURE WOULD SIMPLIFY TRANSATLANTIC 
RELATIONS BECAUSE THE MAIN COUNCIL PRESIDENCY BUREAUCRACY 
WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE FOR 2 1/2 YEARS.  RIES SAID THAT THE US 
WOULD, OF COURSE, WORK WITH THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE THE 
EU CHOSE FOR ITSELF.  HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF US-EU 
COORDINATION "UPSTREAM," BEFORE POSITIONS HAD BEEN FORGED IN 
BRUSSELS AND BECOME VIRTUALLY UNCHANGEABLE. 
 
16.  (SBU)  RIES PROMISED TO GET BACK TO CANGELOSI ON THE 
FOLLOWING PROPOSED MEETING DATES: 
 
- 19 SEPTEMBER -  CANGELOSI AND POLDIR ARAGONA IN WASHINGTON 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  02299  03 OF 03  231112Z 
FOR SLG; 
 
- 17/18 JULY -  US/EU TASK FORCE - ROME (CONTACT - SANDRO 
DEBERNADIN) 
 
- 21 OCTOBER, 9TH NOVEMBER - VIDEO TASK FORCE.  CANGELOSI 
ACCEPTED THE DCM'S OFFER TO MAKE USE OF THE EMBASSY'S VIDEO 
FACILITIES, IF REQUIRED. 
 
- 18 NOVEMBER - SLG VIDEO CONFERENCE; 
 
ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A MINISTERIAL 25 NOVEMBER, RIES POINTED 
OUT THAT DATE WAS DURING THANKSGIVING WEEK.  THE SECRETARY 
WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ALTERNATIVE DATES TO CONSIDER, WHICH 
CANGELOSI PROMISED TO FORWARD. 
 
17. (U)  PDAS RIES DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THIS 
CABLE BEFORE DEPARTING ROME. 
 
SKODON 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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 2003ROME02299 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL