This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000818 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM YM DEMOCRATIC REFORM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: SETTING THE STAGE FOR YEMEN,S PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTION 
 
REF: SANAA 706 
 
¶1.  (U)  Summary:  The April 27 parliamentary elections 
should be the most competitive elections ever in Yemen.  This 
third parliamentary election in Yemen's emerging democracy 
presents a challenge and an opportunity for Yemen to move 
forward.  The potential for violence threatens to mar what 
observers believe will be a mostly free and fair election 
(ref).  Many issues will affect the election's outcome, 
including opposition party coordination or lack thereof, poor 
candidate selection, campaign issues, few women candidates 
and effective election observation.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Most Competitive Elections Ever, 
Higher Potential for Violence 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  Unlike in past elections, little evidence of 
"backroom" coordination between the GPC and Islah parties has 
emerged.  In 1997, the parties negotiated to create "safe" 
constituencies for each other, both because they were running 
in an informal coalition and because they wished to avoid 
violent clashes in high-tension areas.  The Yemeni Socialist 
Party (YSP), former ruling party of pre-unification People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, is running in this election, 
another major difference from 1997 when they boycotted. 
These two factors mean that the 2003 elections should be the 
most competitive in Yemen ever.  An informal count by 
knowledgeable observers indicates that approximately 120 of 
301 constituencies should be highly competitive "hot" races, 
primarily in Sanaa city and the Aden, Taiz and Hadramaut 
governorates. 
 
¶3.  (U)  The increased competition and resultant tension 
causes many observers to fear increased violence during this 
election period.  Past elections have seen flare-ups of 
violence in random constituencies between political parties 
and between tribes.  In some instances, this violence was the 
result of warring tribes using the elections as "an excuse" 
to continue fighting that has gone on for decades.  In other 
instances, the fighting has flared up because of disputes 
between partisans.  The ROYG, political parties and NGOs have 
made significant efforts in recent months to discuss how to 
combat the possibility of violence, including the signing by 
22 political parties of a Code of Conduct on April 8 
(septel).  Observers fear, however, that these efforts may 
not be entirely effective as election day approaches even 
with an increased security presence throughout Yemen. 
 
¶4.  (U)  Political observers are finding that the heavy 
competition makes predictions of election results difficult. 
A vast majority believe that the GPC will retain its majority 
with little difficulty, but many also see the likelihood of 
the Islah party significantly increasing its number of seats. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U)  The Islah party, YSP and most small opposition 
parties comprise the JMP, which was formed in early 2002 to 
more effectively challenge the ruling GPC.  At several points 
in the last several months, JMP cohesion was threatened.  For 
example, the assassination of YSP leader Jarallah Omar at the 
Islah party conference December 28, 2002 could have caused 
the JMP to break up.  However, in a development that 
surprised many observers, the JMP has managed to remain 
largely coordinated. 
 
¶6.  (U)  The JMP failed to negotiate which party,s 
candidates would run in which areas in all constituencies. 
Among the largest parties, the YSP gave way to Islah 
candidates in 130 constituencies while Islah gave way to YSP 
candidates in 30 constituencies.  Negotiations with the 
smaller parties in the coalition did not result in many 
agreements.  A majority of the JMP competitive constituencies 
are located in Aden, Hadramaut and Sanaa, areas where the YSP 
and Islah both believed themselves well able to win. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Sheikh al-Ahmar -- "Joint" GPC-Islah Candidate 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7.  (U)  Leader of the Islah party and recent Speaker of 
Parliament Sheikh al-Ahmar will run unofficially as a "joint" 
candidate for the GPC and Islah.  Negotiations between the 
GPC and Islah to orchestrate a switch in high positions 
between al-Ahmar and Shura Council Chairman Abdul Ghani 
failed.  These negotiations were fueled by the realization 
that if the GPC retained its majority, it would not make 
sense to re-elect an Islahi because the two parties no longer 
form an informal governing coalition.  At the same time, 
al-Ahmar,s profile and power necessitated a high position in 
the complicated balancing act that is Yemeni politics.  It 
appears that the ROYG and the GPC calculated that, in the 
absence of an agreement to switch, it was prudent to make the 
re-election of al-Ahmar politically feasible by announcing 
him as being supported by both parties.  Al-Ahmar is expected 
to win because the same token opposition candidate that runs 
against him regularly will be his only competition, setting 
the stage for al-Ahmar,s likely re-election as Speaker of 
Parliament. 
 
----------------- 
Candidate Choices 
----------------- 
 
¶8.  (U)  Approximately 1,500 candidates are running in the 
301 constituencies, including political party and independent 
candidates.  This number is significantly lower from past 
elections.  Some observers have blamed the war in Iraq for 
the decrease, alleging that it reduced the number of 
candidates, lowered citizen interest and created 
opportunities for opposition parties to gain votes through 
anti-U.S./ROYG campaigning.    However, the decrease is more 
likely a result of opposition parties coordinating candidates 
and complicated measures by which independent candidates can 
register that decreased their number significantly. 
 
¶9.  (U)  Political observers note that decentralization in 
candidate nomination by the GPC and Islah parties caused 
deterioration in "candidate quality" in some cases and 
lowered the chances for women being nominated.  Many 
candidates are believed to be illiterate and were nominated 
out of local or tribal power centers rather than from among 
the educated. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Presidential son Ahmed Saleh, head of the Yemeni 
Special Forces, did not run again.  A well-traveled joke from 
the last parliament was that its numbers of Members were "300 
  Ahmed," an indication of what many thought of his 
effectiveness as a Member.  In his constituency, the former 
Mayor of Sanaa is the GPC candidate, someone that many 
believe corrupt. 
 
----------------------- 
Active Campaign; Issues 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (U)  Halfway through the 19-day official campaign 
period, the election campaign is in full swing.  Campaign 
posters are everywhere, political party newspapers publish 
almost daily and coverage on television and in newspapers is 
widespread.  Political party platforms are published in their 
entirety in official and opposition papers alike.  Concerns 
that the war in Iraq would greatly affect the election -- 
including rumors for several months that the elections would 
be postponed should a war begin -- have dissipated with the 
fall of Saddam's regime. 
 
¶12.  (U)  Campaign issues vary, with the most prominent being 
the economy, law and order, and corruption.  In many cases, 
parties seem to run less on specific issues than on candidate 
or leadership personalities and whether they are government 
or opposition.  The issues of U.S.-ROYG counterterrorism 
cooperation and, in relation, the war in Iraq, do not appear 
to be the huge issues that the ROYG and ruling GPC feared. 
Nevertheless, political observers believe that these issues, 
with an attendant flavor of an "American fight against 
Islam," will increase the Islah party vote. 
 
-------------------- 
Few Women Candidates 
-------------------- 
 
¶13.  (U)  In what many consider the biggest disappointment of 
the run-up to the election, only 11 women are running for 
election.  They represent four political parties, including 
GPC and YSP, and include five independents.  Not only has 
Yemen allowed universal suffrage since 1993 (the first on the 
Arabian Peninsula), but both parliaments in 1993 and 1997 had 
women Members.  Some observers and political parties fear 
that no women will be elected this time and Yemen will 
backslide in its women,s representation. 
 
¶14.  (U)  Several domestic and international NGOs and some 
political parties had advocated for either a formal or 
informal "set-aside" for women candidates to ensure at least 
10 percent representation.  Ideas included parties informally 
agreeing to run only women in 30 selected constituencies and 
a formal last-minute change in the election law to mandate 
"women,s constituencies."  Several problems caused the low 
number of women candidates, including a decision by the Islah 
that they would lose a large part of their base should they 
run women, decentralization in candidate selection that left 
central party bodies without the ability to place women 
candidates, increased competition that caused parties to be 
reluctant to run women they thought might be weaker 
candidates than men and a traditional male-dominated society. 
 A formal resolution in the election law was not feasible 
before the election, and many are discussing the possibility 
of raising the issue after the election. 
 
-------------------- 
Election Observation 
-------------------- 
 
¶15.  (U)  The National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs (NDI) is fielding the only official international 
observation delegation.   30 delegates from 10 countries, 
including several in the Middle East, will observe.  More 
than 30,000 domestic election observers are registered as 
well, including between 6-10,000 NDI-trained observers.  The 
Embassy plans to informally observe the elections.  Details 
on observation septel. 
HULL