This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000746 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 22April2013 
TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM PREL NI US EU XA
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OVERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The Independent National Electoral 
Commission has declared the ruling PDP the major victor in 
the April 19 and April 12 elections.  However, echoing 
reports of several observers, President Obasanjo's 
political opponents allege massive irregularities.  The GON 
is striking back with criticism of some observers and the 
international media.  The battle over the legitimacy of the 
elections is thus engaged.  As part of this post-elections 
competition, Nigerians on both sides of the win/lose divide 
will selectively quote the verdicts of international and 
domestic observer missions, citing the passages supporting 
their varying contentions.  Four major international 
observer missions have published interim reports.  All cite 
serious flaws in the elections, with the IRI submission 
being the mildest and the EU the toughest of the bunch. 
Two domestic groups (TMG and JDPC) were sharply critical on 
some points but laudatory on others.  Many Nigerians await 
our response.  We must proceed with great caution, since 
what we say could tip the balance here toward acquiescence 
or confrontation. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary continued: While the elections transpired 
peacefully, the political climate remains tense; violence 
and unrest could still spring forth if care is not taken 
and responsible leadership is not exercised.  Any USG 
statement must be based on the understanding that 
democratization is a process requiring stability and that 
our interest in democratization extends beyond these two 
election dates.  We do not want to unwittingly precipitate 
instability that would undermine democracy, a very harsh 
statement intended to defend democracy could have the 
counter productive impact of undercutting democracy by 
encouraging unrest.  Thus, we should recognize both the 
positives and the negatives of the electoral process, 
drawing attention to the many material flaws and troubling 
irregularities that sullied the elections in many 
jurisdictions while complimenting the Nigerian people for 
their patience.  We should avoid a general conclusion 
whether the elections were or were not credible.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
---------------- 
WHAT IS AT STAKE 
---------------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) The key objectives of democratization and stability 
are at stake in Nigeria.  The April 12 and 19 elections 
were a historic moment for the country.  In the past, 
civilian-run elections had been the parent of instability. 
April's polls presented the chance to break the cycle of 
failed elections and successful military coups that have 
dogged Nigeria's civilian regimes.  Yet, no matter how much 
we wanted the elections to go well, we also realized the 
process would be more coarse than refined.  There would be 
blemishes because politics in Nigeria remained a 
tumultuous, often dirty, winner-take-all game, often 
involving livelihoods and even great wealth.  We all hoped 
that the conduct of this election would be a sufficient 
break from the past to allow Nigeria to leap this hurdle 
and begin to build a self-sustaining democracy.  The 
elections of the past two weeks have not dashed that hope, 
but they have made it more difficult. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
VIEW FROM THE POSITIVE SIDE 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶4. (C) Some positive developments have emerged from this 
series of elections.  First and foremost, the Nigerian 
public did its job. Voters came out in respectable numbers; 
they stood in line, sometimes waiting patiently for hours 
for INEC to get its act together.  They voted peacefully 
and went home orderly to await the results.  Registration 
of more political parties opened the political space 
reducing tension by letting more people and parties enter 
the political arena.  Creation of the computerized voters 
registers provide a base for an expected continuous 
registration process that will serve the nation well in 
2007 and future elections.  In many parts of the country, 
INEC's logistical preparations on April 19 were a cut 
better than its dismal April 12 performance.  Throughout, 
the Nigerian judiciary did a good job.  There was never a 
fear that the military would intervene in any way. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
UNFORTUNATELY, MISCONDUCT WAS NOT HARD TO FIND 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
¶5. (C) However, the elections also had an underbelly.  INEC 
failed to sufficiently break with Nigeria's history and 
business-as-usual in the areas that have traditionally been 
the weakest links in Nigerian elections -- the vote 
tabulation and collation processes. In many locations, 
tabulation sheets were doctored to produce false returns. 
In some areas, ballot boxes with valid ballots were removed 
and replaced with fake votes.  In other places, polling 
stations were moved to locations undisclosed to the general 
public so that an incumbent's partisans could have free 
rein at that location.  Some times, no polling stations 
were opened at all but returns were reported from these 
nonexistent stations.  Emboffs have repeatedly encountered 
PDP supporters who lament that the rigging was so excessive 
and obvious, it had tainted their electoral successes. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Many of these infidelities were material to the 
electoral outcome.  For both the April 12 and 19 elections 
in Edo state, Mission and other observers saw vote counts 
at numerous individual polling stations indicating 
significant support for the ANPP.  However, the incumbent 
PDP governor won handily in that state despite the fact 
that he is widely unpopular.  The high voter turnouts and 
margins of victory for Obasanjo and the incumbent PDP 
governors reported by INEC in perhaps half the states 
diverge significantly from the reports of our and other 
observers.  Their observations suggested much more 
competitive races involving lower voter turnouts. 
 
 
¶7. (C) In many states in the South, the PDP achieved 
grossly lopsided margins where the voting for the ANPP and 
other opposition parties was so low that the outcome defied 
reasonable explanation given our knowledge of the political 
terrain of those areas.  For example, the Igbo-dominated 
APGA made a very strong showing at the April 12 polls in 
the Southeastern region; at least, APGA's gubernatorial 
candidates should have provided very strong competition in 
Anambra and Enugu.  However, out of 56 National Assembly 
seats (House and Senate) in those five states, APGA gained 
just one House seat (plus another in Bayelsa), but no 
Senate seats or governorships.  Extrapolating from what we 
saw of APGA's strength at various polling areas, the party 
should have captured between 20-30 Assembly seats. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) In the North, manipulation was more subtle but 
still widespread.  For example, turning a few votes in 
selected wards resulted in a PDP sweep of the 12 Assembly 
seats in Bauchi in spite of Emboff's observed support for 
the ANPP in many districts.  Extrapolating from what we saw 
of ANPP's strength at the polling areas we observed, ANPP 
should have won one hundred or more of the northern 
Assembly seats instead of the 79 that they obtained.  PDP 
probably was not alone in its efforts to influence the 
elections' outcome.  Underage voting, while evident 
throughout the nation, was common in the North.  The ANPP 
likely took advantage of this practice to pad its already 
large margin.  Other malevolent actions by the opposition 
also no doubt took place; however, not on the scale of the 
observed PDP controlled areas. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
¶9. (C) Notwithstanding frequent invocations of God, none of 
Nigeria's political parties is staffed by angels or saints. 
All parties took advantage of the process where they could. 
However, the PDP was the dominant transgressor, simply 
because it controlled more states and the important INEC 
appointments in all jurisdictions.  In the South, the 
general result of the misconduct was to skew voting in many 
states to inflate probable PDP majorities or pluralities 
into gross landslides.  In this sense, the experience of 
the 1999 elections was repeated.  Some of the northern 
states experienced a more subtle chicanery, different from 
the military-administered 1999 elections.  In these states, 
the aim might not have been to manufacture PDP victories. 
Such victories in many northern jurisdictions would have 
been outlandish.  Instead, the tallies were likely massaged 
to assure Obasanjo gained 25 percent of the vote in as many 
places as possible. (NOTE: To win the election, a candidate 
needed at least a plurality as well as 25 per cent of the 
vote in 25 jurisdictions (36 states plus the FCT).  END 
NOTE.) 
 
 
¶10. (C) We believe that INEC's results for the presidential 
race are biased and skewed.  However, we cannot say with 
exactitude what the real outcome was.  Obasanjo might have 
actually won a first round victory, albeit by a decidedly 
slimmer margin.  However, given our observations of both 
the elections and the political scene over time, as well as 
analysis of the INEC results and observer mission reports, 
it is more likely that both Obasanjo and Buhari due to 
impuissance in the North and South, respectively, failed to 
clear the 25 per cent threshold in the requisite number of 
states.  If so, a run-off election, not an Obasanjo first 
round victory, should have been the accurate, just outcome 
of April 19. 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
AN OBSERVATION ABOUT THE OBSERVER MISSIONS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶11. (U) Because there were marked differences in numbers of 
observers and the geographic coverage of the missions, 
differences were expected in the statements made by the 
international observer groups.  However, there is also a 
common thread to all the statements thus far.  All the 
interim reports state that the elections were very bad in 
some states, needed sometimes significant improvement in 
others, and were relatively good in a few.  Two domestic 
observer groups (TMG and JDPC) were laudatory on some 
points and sharply critical on others. 
 
 
¶12. (C) In many states of the South-South and Southeast, as 
well as Katsina and Kaduna, the elections were tainted by 
flaws so serious that results from these areas are presumed 
to be grossly inaccurate.  Second, in some states, 
especially in the Northeast and North Central zones, there 
were significant irregularities that would call into 
question the voting percentages if not the actual victory. 
This is where the 25 percent threshold might be material. 
Third, in the FCT, the states in the Southwest and most of 
the Northwest, the process was relatively efficient and 
transparent, although some complaints about vote tampering 
in these areas have been made.  For example, in Lagos 
State, the PDP credibly accuses the AD of not permitting 
their agents to participate in the collation process. 
 
 
¶13. (C) In addition to the presidential poll, gubernatorial 
elections took place in all jurisdictions except the FCT. 
For many, the stakes involved in these contests were every 
bit as high as those of the presidential race.  Some of the 
regional variation in the quality of elections may have 
arisen from the efforts of embattled (primarily PDP) 
incumbent governors to assure their re-election by margins 
large enough to cow the opposition, a by-product of which 
were improbably large margins in the presidential race as 
well. 
 
 
---------------------- 
WHAT SHOULD WE NOT SAY 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶14.  (C) The vast differences in the integrity of the 
elections in the various states argue for a USG statement 
that avoids a blanket conclusion about the credibility of 
the elections.  A blanket statement could not do justice to 
the complexities of this vast electoral undertaking and 
could be susceptible to both purposeful and innocent 
misinterpretation.  A statement acknowledging the material 
differences in the conduct of the elections would be more 
accurate and less prone to encourage action inimical to the 
continued development, democracy, and domestic and regional 
stability. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
WHAT IS THE OPPOSITION DOING? 
----------------------------- 
 
 
¶15.  (C) The opposition parties most important to the post- 
election scenario are the ANPP, APGA and AD.  Each has its 
own axe to grind. The ANPP claims that its presidential 
candidate has been shafted by manipulated results.  They 
claim victory or at least a run-off is in order.  APGA 
believes it is the strongest party in the Southeast and 
that it should receive a commensurate number of National 
Assembly seats and governorships.  The Yoruba-based AD 
thinks it was betrayed by President Obasanjo, its leaders 
hoodwinked into believing the PDP would not mount a strong 
challenge to AD National Assembly and gubernatorial 
incumbents if AD would support Obasanjo for president. 
Accordingly, the AD did not contest the Presidency.  The 
PDP, however, routed the AD in most of the Southwest, with 
a brusque Obasanjo telling the incumbent AD governors to 
"pack their bags and go." 
 
 
¶16.  (C) Buhari is trying to gather the opposition parties 
into an alliance to contest the results of the elections. 
Already he has seized on the tough language in the EU 
statement to back his call that people should not recognize 
the government that gets inaugurated on May 29.  He is 
attempting to get the other parties to endorse his tack and 
to discuss other joint actions they can take to challenge 
the results.  As opposition discusses ways to form a common 
front against the surging PDP, the ruling party and the GON 
seek ways and means to drive a wedge between the groups. 
While many in the opposition can probably be sidelined with 
money, contracts or offices, it would not be in character 
for Buhari to budge. 
 
 
------------------- 
OUR PUBLIC POSITION 
------------------- 
 
 
¶17. (C) Our public position will be viewed against a 
backdrop of escalating tension, political dealing and 
rising anxiety regarding what we might say.  If our 
criticism is too blunt, we risk radicalizing those who want 
to upend the results.  This not only could undermine 
internal stability with attendant risks for a less-than- 
stable sub-region, it could also jeopardize the survival of 
the very democratization process that a harsh statement 
would be intended to champion.  On the other hand, we 
cannot call this election credible.  Intelligent, informed 
Nigerians know it was riddled with flaws, and increasingly 
they mock the outcome in certain areas.  While an unduly 
positive statement might discourage some from taking 
extreme action, it would be inaccurate and undermine our 
credibility in the long run.  It also would do nothing to 
encourage an open, transparent and fair elections- 
arbitration process, something the country desperately 
needs in order to vent the pressure building in the 
political boiler. 
 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Consequently, our statement should: 
 
 
 
 
-- acknowledge INEC's announcement, an ineluctable reality; 
 
 
-- applaud the efforts of the average Nigerian voter; 
 
 
-- point to the obvious and serious flaws and 
irregularities; 
 
 
-- acknowledge the differences in the quality of elections 
conducted among the various states; 
 
 
-- acknowledge the positive aspects of the election; 
 
 
-- commend leaders who have called on their supporters to 
channel their grievances through peaceful means; and 
 
 
--- call on those who are aggrieved to use the judicial 
process. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
THE NEED FOR POLITICAL REFORM; WE CAN RAISE IT LATER 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
 
¶19.  (C) What the system really needs is a political fix. 
The tribunals are intended to handle a few cases of 
scattered malfeasance and fraud.  This is a much larger, 
nigh systemic problem.  However, it would be neither 
appropriate nor effective for the USG to call for electoral 
reform.  That would just invite invidious comparisons 
(already spewing from the mouths of some GON flacks) with 
Florida in 2000.  For now, the EU is taking much of the 
heat.  We do not need to compete with the EU to prove our 
democratic credentials. 
JETER