Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 03ZAGREB489, AMBASSADOR REVIEWS PRIORITY ISSUES WITH NEW DEPUTY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03ZAGREB489.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ZAGREB489 2003-03-06 14:59 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 000489 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2008 
TAGS: PREL PINR PREF PINR PREF PINR PREF HR HRPREL NATO NATO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REVIEWS PRIORITY ISSUES WITH NEW DEPUTY 
FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: DCM PATRICK MOON FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) IN A MARCH 3 INTRODUCTORY CALL ON NEW DEPUTY FOREIGN 
MINISTER SIMONOVIC, THE AMBASSADOR REVIEWED THE U.S. APPROACH 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  00489  01 OF 03  061511Z 
ON IRAQ, STEPS TOWARD CROATIA,S CANDIDACY FOR NATO 
MEMBERSHIP, THE SFRY ASSETS SUCCESSION ISSUES, OUR REQUEST 
FOR AN ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT WITH CROATIA, ICTY COMPLIANCE, 
REFUGEE RETURNS AND THE UPCOMING UNCHR SESSION.  SIMONOVIC 
CONFIRMED THAT CROATIA DOES NOT SEE A MAJOR ROLE FOR ITSELF 
ON IRAQ, BUT STILL WANTED TO BE SUPPORTIVE.  CROATIA WOULD 
READILY PURSUE REGIONAL INITIATIVES (INCLUDING THE ADRIATIC 
CHARTER) BUT DID NOT WANT TO ENDANGER CLOSE TIES TO WESTERN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.  SIMONOVIC SAID CROATIA DID NOT WANT TO 
BE AN OBSTACLE TO THE UNFREEZING OF SFRY ASSETS AND WANTED A 
QUICK RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS WITH THE AGREEMENT ON 
SUCCESSION ISSUES.  HE SAID THAT THE GOC MUST DO A BETTER JOB 
ON ICTY AND REFUGEE RETURNS.  ACCORDING TO THE NEW DEPUTY 
FOREIGN MINISTER, CROATIA HAS A BRIEF WINDOW REMAINING FOR 
TOUGH DECISIONS; THE UPCOMING ELECTION SEASON WOULD SOON 
CLOSE THE DOOR ON UNPOPULAR ACTIONS BY THE GOC COALITION. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
2.  (C) IN HIS INTRODUCTORY CALL ON NEWLY ARRIVED DEPUTY 
FOREIGN MINISTER IVAN SIMONOVIC (UNTIL RECENTLY CROATIA,S UN 
PERMREP) ON MARCH 3, AMBASSADOR ROSSIN ASKED FOR CROATIA'S 
SUPPORT AT THE UN FOR U.S. OBJECTIVES ON IRAQ.  SIMONOVIC 
SAID HE DID NOT FORESEE A MAJOR ROLE FOR CROATIA AND 
INDICATED HIS BELIEF THAT THE UNSC WOULD APPROVE A SECOND 
RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS ALSO IMPORTANT FOR PRESERVING THE 
RELEVANCE AND CREDIBILITY OF THE UN.  HE SPECULATED THAT IT 
WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME TO INSTALL TRUE DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ 
GIVEN THE ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS.  THE AMBASSADOR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  00489  01 OF 03  061511Z 
THANKED CROATIA FOR ITS RECENT DECISION TO PERMIT FLOW 
THROUGH OF COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT CARRYING U.S. TROOPS TO THE 
REGION.  WHILE WE DID NOT NEED ADDITIONAL SUPPORT AT THIS 
TIME, IT WAS POSSIBLE THE U.S. WOULD SEEK ADDITIONAL 
COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE TO SUPPORT OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS. 
 THE U.S. SOUGHT A CLOSE DIALOGUE WITH THE GOC ON THE IRAQ 
SITUATION. 
 
NATO AND CROATIA 
---------------- 
 
3.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR NOTED PROGRESS ON THE ADRIATIC CHARTER 
TEXT AND RECONFIRMED HIS ATTENDANCE AT THE MEETING OF THE 
THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN DUBROVNIK ON MARCH 7.  HE PRESSED 
FOR A STRONG STATEMENT ON IRAQ IN THE PLANNED DUBROVNIK 
DECLARATION.  REFERRING TO THE CROATIAN LANGUAGE ON 
INDIVIDUAL TRACKS INSERTED INTO THE DRAFT CHARTER, SIMONOVIC 
ADMITTED THAT CROATIA HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO PURSUE REGIONAL 
COOPERATION FOR FEAR OF CUTTING INCREASINGLY CLOSE RELATIONS 
WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES.  HOWEVER, HE ASSURED THE 
AMBASSADOR, WITH UNSUAL ANIMATION, THAT CROATIA WAS FULLY 
COMMITTED TO CLOSE COOPERATION WITH REGIONAL PARTNERS AND 
WOULD SEEK TO PROMOTE THE CANDIDACIES OF OTHER MAP COUNTRIES. 
 CROATIA WOULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE AT THE EU SUMMIT IN 
THESSALONIKI. 
 
4.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT SINCE CROATIA HAD A 
REPUTATION FOR WANTING TO GO ITS OWN WAY, GOC REPRESENTATIVES 
MUST SAY EXPLICITLY AND OFTEN THAT CROATIA SUPPORTS REGIONAL 
COOPERATION.  A COMPETITIVE APPROACH DENIGRATING OTHER 
ASPIRANTS AND INVITEES DOES NOT HELP CROATIA.  THE AMBASSADOR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  00489  01 OF 03  061511Z 
STRESSED THAT THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTED CROATIA'S NATO 
ASPIRATIONS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE. 
HOWEVER, CROATIA NEEDED TO DO MORE ON DEFENSE REFORMS, ICTY 
COOPERATION, REFUGEE RETURNS, AND JUDICIAL REFORM.  CROATIA 
NEEDED TO PUT OUT A POSITIVE MESSAGE OF PROGRESS ON THESE 
ISSUES AND NOT BE SEEN AS COMBATIVE OR "WHINING" IN RESPONSE 
TO INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM. 
 
ICC ) ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT 
-------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR NOTED OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT CROATIA 
WAS WAITING FOR AN EU MEMBER STATE MODEL ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT 
BEFORE MOVING AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S. 
SIMONOVIC CONFIRMED THIS BUT ALSO ASKED THAT THE U.S. NOT 
PRESS TOO HARD FOR AN AGREEMENT, REFERRING TO THE SENSITIVITY 
OF AN ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT DUE TO PERCEIVED INEQUITIES IN THE 
PUBLIC,S MIND BETWEEN U.S. OBJECTIVES AND CROATIA,S ICTY 
OBLIGATIONS.  HOWEVER, HE CONFIRMED THAT CROATIA WOULD BE 
READY TO MOVE AHEAD ONCE THERE IS AN EU STATE MODEL 
AGREEMENT.  IN THAT REGARD, HE HOPED THE U.S. WOULD BE ABLE 
TO MAKE TIMELY PROGRESS ON SUCH A MODEL AGREEMENT.  THE 
AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER THE PROVISIONS 
AND DEADLINE  OF THE ASPA.  WE COULD NOT PREDICT HOW IT WOULD 
BE IMPLEMENTED BUT WAIVERS COULD NOT BE PRESUMED.  CROATIA 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ8005 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  00489  02 OF 03  061511Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DINT-00  DODE-00 
      DOTE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    FAAE-00  FBIE-00 
      VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   L-00     VCE-00 
      AC-01    NRRC-00  NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    IRM-00   SS-00    TRSE-00 
      T-00     USIE-00  EPAE-00  SSD-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00 
      DRL-01   G-00     SSR-00   NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /005W 
                  ------------------4028B8  061511Z /38 
R 061459Z MAR 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9610 
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ZAGREB 000489 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2008 
TAGS: PREL PINR PREF PINR PREF PINR PREF HR HRPREL NATO NATO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REVIEWS PRIORITY ISSUES WITH NEW DEPUTY 
FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
MIGHT NEED TO CONSIDER ITS OWN INTERESTS IN THE COMING 
MONTHS. 
 
ICTY ISSUES 
----------- 
 
6.  (C) SIMONOVIC ADMITTED THAT THE GOC HAD HANDLED THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  00489  02 OF 03  061511Z 
BOBETKO CASE BADLY, AT LEAST INITIALLY.  THE HAPHAZARDLY 
LAUNCED LEGAL APPROACH HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL, BUT LUCK (E.G., 
WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) HAD PLAYED TOO LARGE A ROLE. 
BUT THAT CASE WAS NOW "MORE OR LESS" RESOLVED.  IT WAS CLEAR 
THAT CROATIA NEEDED A "SUCCESSFUL CASE" TO DEMONSTRATE ITS 
FULL COMMITMENT TO ITS ICTY OBLIGATIONS.  HE ADDED THAT 
INDICTMENTS AND THE POTENTIAL TRANSFER OF CROATIAN OFFICERS 
FOR COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY CHARGES DO NOT SIT WELL WITH THE 
CROATIAN PUBLIC.  HE HAD HEARD THAT THERE MAY BE UP TO FIVE 
ADDITIONAL INDICTMENTS OF CROATIAN CITIZENS BEING STUDIED BY 
THE ICTY. 
 
7.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT THE BOBETKO CASE WAS NOW 
BEHIND US, BUT WARNED THAT BECAUSE OF GOC SHORTCOMINGS IN THE 
HANDLING OF THE BOBETKO INDICTMENT, THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY WOULD BE LOOKING VERY CLOSELY AT THE GOC,S 
PERFORMANCE ON ANY NEW INDICTMENTS.  THEY MUST BE HANDLED 
QUICKLY AND QUIETLY TO ENSURE SUCCESSFUL COMPLIANCE.  IN 
ADDITION, THE U.S. AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY ARE LOOKING FOR MORE ACTIVE AND VIGOROUS GOC 
ACTIONS TO LOCATE AND CAPTURE ICTY INDICTEE GOTOVINA.  WE 
KNEW SPECIFICALLY OF THINGS THE GOC CLAIMED IT WAS DOING TO 
FIND GOTOVINA THAT, IN FACT, IT WAS NOT DOING. 
 
8.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR ADVISED SIMONOVIC THAT THE U.S. WAS 
PREPARING TO RE-LAUNCH ITS INITIATIVE TO ASSIST THE GOC WITH 
LOCAL WAR CRIMES PROSECUTIONS.  HE ANTICIPATED A U.S. 
PROPOSAL SOON FOR A U.S. TEAM TO VISIT IN APRIL OR MAY. 
SIMONOVIC WELCOMED THIS, REFERRING TO PROPOSED REFORMS IN THE 
JUDICIAL SECTOR AND PLANS TO ESTABLISH FOUR REGIONAL COURTS 
TO TRY WAR CRIMES CASES. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  00489  02 OF 03  061511Z 
 
UNCHR SESSION 
------------- 
 
9  (C) THE AMBASSADOR REMINDED SIMONOVIC THAT THE LINE UP IN 
THIS YEAR,S UNCHR SESSION WAS BAD, STARTING WITH LIBYA,S 
INSTALLATION AS CHAIRMAN.  THE U.S. WANTED TO WORK CLOSELY 
WITH CROATIA TO PROMOTE A PRODUCTIVE SESSION.  SIMONOVIC 
FULLY AGREED WITH THE AMBASSADOR,S POINTS, NOTING CROATIA'S 
BOARD PARTICIPATION THIS YEAR.  HE LAMENTED EXCESSIVE 
POLITIZATION IN THE FORUM. 
 
SFRY -- SUCCESSION ASSETS 
------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE U.S. INTENTION TO UNBLOCK 
SFRY NBY ASSETS LOCATED IN THE U.S.  HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. 
WAS STILL SEEKING A HOLD HARMLESS STATEMENT FROM THE GOC AND 
HOPED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD REVERSE ITS OPPOSITION.  HE 
WOULD RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH FM PICULA IN AN UPCOMING MEETING. 
 SIMONOVIC RESPONDED THAT CROATIA DID NOT WANT TO BE AN 
OBSTACLE TO THE U.S. INITIATIVE AND URGED THAT BOTH SIDES 
SEEK A SOLUTION SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.  HE POINTED OUT 
THAT A GOC DECISION TO ACCEDE TO THE U.S. REQUEST ON THIS 
ISSUE ) LIKE A NUMBER OF OTHER DIFFICULT ISSUES BEFORE THE 
GOC ) WOULD NOT SIT WELL WITH THE PUBLIC.  WITH ELECTIONS 
EXPECTED EITHER THIS FALL OR PERHAPS EARLY NEXT YEAR, THE GOC 
WOULD WANT TO MAKE THE UNPLEASANT DECISIONS BEFORE THE 
PRE-ELECTION WINDOW CLOSED IN ABOUT TWO MONTHS.  THE 
AMBASSADOR AGREED AND ADDED HIS HOPE THAT A GOC DECISION TO 
FOREGO $50 MILLION PLUS FROM THE NBY DISTRIBUTION WOULD NOT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  00489  02 OF 03  061511Z 
BE USED IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COALITION. 
 
REFUGEE RETURNS 
--------------- 
 
11.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR NOTED OUR CONCERNS REGARDING REFUGEE 
RETURNS ARE ASSUMING STEADILY MORE PROMINENCE IN CROATIA'S 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.  SIMONOVIC SAID THAT CROATIA MUST BE 
MUCH MORE PROACTIVE ON THIS ISSUE, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE REAL 
PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY WITH ADDRESSING THE TENANCY RIGHTS 
ISSUE.  ON THE TENANCY RIGHTS ISSUE, THE AMBASSADOR URGED 
THAT THE GOC PRIORITIZE ITS ACTIONS AND PUT PRIMARY FOCUS ON 
CASES WHERE ACTUAL REFORMS HINGE ON PROVIDING FARMER TENANTS 
A HOUSING OPTION.  UNFORTUNATELY, THE U.S. AND EU STATES HAD 
NOT SEEN MUCH MOVEMENT ON THIS FROM THE GOC SIDE. 
RECONSTRUCTION MINISTER CACIC HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING BUT VAGUE 
ON AN ISSUE WHERE CONCRETE STEPS ARE HUGELY OVERDUE.  PM 
RACAN HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING ON THIS ISSUE. 
 
12.  (C) SIMONOVIC AGREED THAT THE GOC NEEDS TO ACT BUT THAT 
THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS WOULD LIMIT THE GOC'S MANEUVERING 
ROOM.  IN ANY EVENT, HE CLAIMED THAT CROATIAN PUBLIC OPINION 
IS NOW MUCH MORE FAVORABLE TOWARD THE RETURN OF CROATIAN 
SERBS.  IN FACT, HE ASSERTED, THE GOC HAS DONE FAR MORE THAN 
WAS THOUGHT POSSIBLE FIVE YEARS AGO. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ8006 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  00489  03 OF 03  061511Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DINT-00  DODE-00 
      DOTE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    FAAE-00  FBIE-00 
      VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   L-00     VCE-00 
      AC-01    NRRC-00  NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    IRM-00   SS-00    TRSE-00 
      T-00     USIE-00  EPAE-00  SSD-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00 
      DRL-01   G-00     SSR-00   NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /005W 
                  ------------------4028C2  061512Z /38 
R 061459Z MAR 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9611 
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ZAGREB 000489 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2008 
TAGS: PREL PINR PREF PINR PREF PINR PREF HR HRPREL NATO NATO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REVIEWS PRIORITY ISSUES WITH NEW DEPUTY 
FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
13.  (C) SIMONOVIC IMPRESSED US AS A BUSINESSLIKE 
PROFESSIONAL WITH WHOM WE CAN DO BUSINESS.  PRIOR BILLINGS 
FROM USUN OF A VERY LAWYERLIKE APPROACH WERE AMPLY BORNE OUT. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  00489  03 OF 03  061511Z 
 HE MAY WELL PROVE TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN FORCING THE LEADEN 
MFA BUREAUCRACY TOWARD TIMELY ACTION AND REASONABLE POSITIONS 
THAT RESPOND TO CONCERNS COMING FROM THE U.S. AND OTHERS IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. 
 
14.  (C) HOWEVER, WE ARE CONCIOUS THAT HIS BACKGROUND AND 
PAST USG INTERACTIONS HAVE SUGGESTED A STRONG NATIONALIST 
STREAK UNDER THE URBANE SURFACE.  CERTAINLY, IN THE MEETING 
SIMONOVIC PUT THE MOST FAVORABLE SPIN ON EACH RESPONSE, 
HIGHLIGHTING CROATIA'S HANDICAPS AND "NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING" 
WHILE SEEKING TO PORTRAY HIMSELF AS A SYMPATHETIC FRIEND TO 
THE U.S. IN A SOMETIMES UNFRIENDLY COURT.  HIS OBSERVATIONS 
ABOUT THE VERY SHORT WINDOW AVAILABLE FOR THE GOC TO TAKE 
UNPOPULAR DECISIONS RANG TRUE, ALTHOUGH THIS COALITION 
GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS LED BY A PRIME MINISTER WHO SEEKS 
CONSENSUS AT ALL COSTS, HAS SHOWN LITTLE INCLINATION TO TAKE 
UNPOPULAR (EVEN IF NECESSARY) DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF THE 
TIMING. 
 
ROSSIN 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
>