This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000485 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT, SA/PD; NSC FOR 
¶E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL: 03-24-13 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS KPAO CE NO JA CH LTTE
SUBJECT:  Sixth round of talks proves constructive; 
Tigers reportedly sink Chinese fishing boat 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo-SA/INS 03/21/03 e-mail 
-      (B) Colombo 475, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The sixth round of GSL-LTTE talks 
wrapped up on March 21, with the two sides issuing a 
comprehensive press statement.  Minister Moragoda, a key 
GSL negotiator, told the Ambassador he was encouraged by 
the talks -- the Tigers seemed committed to the peace 
track for now and badly wanted U.S. recognition.  As the 
talks wrapped up, reports came in that the Tigers had 
apparently sunk a Chinese fishing boat on March 20.  The 
fact that the talks went as well as they did provided a 
solid boost for the peace process.  Suggested press 
guidance is contained in Para 8.  Mission plans to issue 
this guidance on March 25 unless otherwise directed. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
=================== 
Moragoda's Comments 
=================== 
 
¶2.  (C) The sixth round of Norwegian-facilitated talks 
between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) wrapped up on a largely 
positive note on March 21.  (Note:  The talks took place 
in Hakone, Japan, from March 18-21.)  In a March 22 
conversation with the Ambassador, Milinda Moragoda 
(Amcit -- pls protect), the Minister of Economic Reform 
and a key GSL negotiator, said he was encouraged by the 
talks and stated that, in his estimation, three 
headlines emerged from them.  First, the Tigers had 
clearly shown in Hakone that they did not want the talks 
to fall apart, at least not now.  Second, the Tigers 
want to be perceived not as terrorists, but as "freedom 
fighters" -- international recognition, especially by 
the United States, is key for them.  Third, the Tigers 
want and need money for development of  "their" part of 
Sri Lanka (i.e., the sections of the north and east 
under their control). 
 
¶3.  (C) Moragoda went on to make the following specific 
remarks re the talks: 
 
-- LTTE senior negotiator Anton Balasingham is "very, 
very" worried about the Tiger navy (the "Sea Tigers"). 
The Sea Tigers "feel caged," are bristling with 
resentment, and ready to go back to war if they could. 
(Note:  See Paras 5-6 regarding reports that the Sea 
Tigers were involved in the March 20 sinking of a 
Chinese fishing boat.) 
 
-- During the talks, LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran called 
Balasingham at least twice a day. 
 
-- The LTTE said it wanted an expansion of the Sub- 
Committee on Immediate Humanitarian Rehabilitation Needs 
(SIHRN) so that the body can consider mid- and long- 
range projects for the north/east.  Moragoda said the 
GSL would only agree to this if the LTTE agreed to talk 
about political structures and milestones to be reached 
prior to a final settlement. 
 
-- Moragoda said he was very worried about chain-of- 
command issues within the Sri Lankan military.  He 
expressed concerns, "for example," about a March 10 
incident in which the navy attacked and sunk a LTTE ship 
off the northeast coast without what he considered a 
clear political go-ahead from GSL leaders.  (Note:  Due 
to this incident, which resulted in the deaths of 11 
LTTE cadre, the Tigers almost boycotted the Hakone 
talks.  The navy asserts that the LTTE ship was carrying 
arms.)  Overall, he felt that civilian control over the 
military was "too loose" and that Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe was not exerting enough control. 
 
-- Moragoda said he felt that the Japanese hosts of the 
Hakone talks were "out of their depth" on political 
issues.  He added that he noticed tension between the 
Japanese and the Norwegian facilitators throughout the 
negotiations. 
 
-- At the end of the conversation about the talks, 
Moragoda reflected and said that it had been important 
that the two sides had reached an understanding in 
Hakone that the ceasefire needed to be consolidated. 
The security situation needed to be managed very 
carefully, and he was pleased in this regard that there 
would be a meeting between the Sri Lankan navy and Sea 
Tiger commanders in the next several weeks (see Para 4). 
 
===================== 
Joint Press Statement 
===================== 
 
¶4.  (C) At the close of the talks on March 21, the two 
sides issued a joint press statement through the offices 
of the Norwegian facilitators.  (Note:  The text of this 
statement was passed to SA/INS in Ref A.)  Per the 
statement, key topics addressed at the talks included 
the following: 
 
-- Ceasefire Modalities:  As noted by Moragoda, the two 
sides discussed ways to avoid a repetition of recent sea 
confrontations, such as the March 10 incident.  The two 
sides agreed to meet within three weeks in order to 
review the February 2002 ceasefire agreement and find 
ways to improve on it in regard to sea-related issues. 
The two sides also agreed to establish clear modalities 
for handling GSL soldiers and LTTE cadre captured by the 
other party.  (Note:  There have a number of incidents 
in which the LTTE has detained GSL troops and police, 
and refused to release them for days and weeks at a 
time.) 
 
-- Strengthening the Monitors:  As part of the general 
effort to improve the implementation of the ceasefire 
agreement, the two sides agreed "to strengthen the 
mandate and capacity" of the Norwegian-run SLMM.  The 
two sides also agreed to "guarantee the security" of 
SLMM personnel.  (Note:  The security of SLMM personnel 
became a major issue after monitors were forced to jump 
for their lives from a burning LTTE boat in February.) 
 
-- Federalism:  Reconfirming their commitment to 
"develop a federal system based on internal self- 
determination within a united Sri Lanka," the two sides 
discussed "essential elements" of federalism, including 
fiscal issues.  (Note:  Per Ref B, in a March 20 meeting 
with the Ambassador, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe 
stated that the GSL had proposed an outline regarding 
long-term political issues to the Tigers.  The PM was 
not clear on the exact nature of the GSL's proposal.  He 
said the LTTE did not respond immediately, but promised 
to review the proposal.  In an interesting aside, 
Moragoda told the Ambassador that Balasingham had told 
him the following:  "You know, Milinda, we can't have a 
final settlement until Ranil is president."  In making 
this comment, Balasingham was clearly hitting out at 
President Kumaratunga and others who have taken a 
critical stance toward the peace process.  End Note.) 
 
-- North/East Local Elections:  The LTTE indicated that 
it would "favorably consider" allowing the government to 
call new local elections in the north and east.  (Note: 
Local elections in these two regions have been postponed 
for some time.  In his conversation with the Ambassador, 
Moragoda said Balasingham had confirmed the LTTE's 
intention to consider seriously allowing these elections 
to go forward.) 
 
-- Human Rights:  The press statement also reviewed a 
human rights "road map" put forward by Ian Martin, a 
former Amnesty International official.  The road map, 
among other matters, proposes that the two sides agree 
to a "declaration" on human rights, and allow human 
rights training for LTTE cadre and government personnel. 
Per Ref B, the LTTE apparently did not sign on to the 
road map at the talks, stating that it needed further 
time to review it.  (Note:  Moragoda said Martin's 
presentation at the talks provoked yawns from both 
delegations.) 
 
-- Meeting Schedule:  The two sides agreed to the 
following schedule of meetings: 
 
- April 29 to May 2 in Thailand 
- June 12-15 in Japan 
- July 15-18 in Europe (venue to be determined) 
(Note:  The April/May and June dates are not new, but 
the July date is.) 
 
============================= 
Chinese Fishing Boat Attacked 
============================= 
 
¶5.  (SBU) As the talks wrapped up on March 21, reports 
came in that the Tigers had apparently sunk a Chinese 
fishing boat off the northeast coast in the early 
morning hours of March 20.  Details are still sketchy, 
but it seems that small boats with armed personnel 
attacked the Chinese boat about 20 or so miles off the 
LTTE-controlled coastal town of Mullaitivu.  According 
to reports, up to 17 crew on the Chinese boat are 
missing and feared dead (three bodies have been found, 
so far).  (Note:  Most of those missing are Chinese 
nationals, but some may be Sri Lankan.)  The Sri Lankan 
navy, which is conducting a search and rescue operation, 
claims that the Sea Tigers carried out the attack.  For 
their part, the Tigers have vigorously denied 
involvement.  The SLMM is still investigating the 
incident.  The Chinese Embassy in Colombo has lodged a 
complaint with the Sri Lankan MFA and demanded a full- 
and-complete investigation. 
 
¶6.  (C) When asked about the mysterious incident, most 
observers told us that they believed, per the available 
evidence, that the LTTE almost certainly sank the boat. 
They were not clear exactly why the Tigers may have done 
so, however.  Some speculated that the LTTE may have 
felt that the Chinese fishing boat had gotten too close 
to sensitive LTTE military outposts near Mullaitivu and 
decided to sink the boat without checking its identity. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶7.  (C) The fact that the talks went as well as they did 
provided a solid boost for the peace process.  There had 
been real fears after the March 10 incident that the 
Tigers might boycott the talks or choose to use them as 
a platform to criticize the government.  Except for the 
first day of talks when the Tigers discussed the 
incident in a non-rancorous way, the LTTE did not dwell 
on the incident and seemed to go out of its way to make 
clear that it wanted to move forward with the peace 
process.  Moragoda, for one, came away with increased 
confidence that the Tigers want to make the process 
work, at least for now.  By taking a softer tack, the 
Tigers certainly made things much easier for the 
government.  The GSL had been taking a lot of flak from 
the Opposition re the peace process and will, no doubt, 
continue to do so.  Nonetheless, the fact that the 
Tigers were cooperative in Hakone will make it harder 
for the Opposition to score political points.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
======================== 
Suggested Press Guidance 
======================== 
 
¶8.  (U) Suggested press guidance follows below.  Mission 
plans to issue guidance along these lines on March 25 
unless otherwise directed. 
 
Begin text: 
 
The U.S. has taken note of the talks between the 
Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) held in Hakone, Japan, from March 18-21. 
We are encouraged by the substantive and comprehensive 
nature of the talks, which focused on such issues as 
federalism and human rights.  Most importantly, we 
welcome the discussions on ways to improve ceasefire 
modalities.  We hope these discussions will lead to a 
cessation of efforts by the LTTE to smuggle arms into 
Sri Lanka and prevent confrontations such as the one 
which took place off the northeast coast on March 10. 
It is positive that the two sides have agreed to meet 
again in April/May, in June, and in July.  We salute the 
Norwegian government for facilitating the talks and the 
Japanese government for hosting them. 
 
Regarding the March 20 incident in which the LTTE 
reportedly attacked and sank a Chinese fishing boat, we 
note that information is still very sketchy.  We support 
a complete and immediate investigation into what took 
place.  We, of course, deplore the loss of life and hope 
those missing will be found soon. 
 
End text. 
 
¶9. (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS