This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 000154 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2013 
TAGS: PREL PREF XF IZ JO
SUBJECT: IRAQIS IN JORDAN: WHO THEY ARE AND WHAT TO EXPECT 
IN THE EVENT OF WAR 
 
REF: AMMAN 16 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (S) Most political observers in Jordan predict that the 
great majority of the large Iraqi expat community in the 
Kingdom (estimated by the GOJ to number approximately 
300,000) will stay quiet should military action against 
Saddam commence, and will then exercise caution before 
deciding to return to Iraq following regime change.  Although 
difficult to gauge fully, this appears to be the prevailing 
attitude of most Iraqis here, whether they are part of the 
large mass of Iraqi economic migrants who have come to Jordan 
seeking work; artists, musicians and academics contributing 
to the active Iraqi cultural scene in Jordan; or members of 
the small, wealthy and well-established business elite 
(perhaps 2-3 percent of the total) who have prospered here. 
While the vast majority of Iraqis in Jordan pose no threat to 
political stability or Hashemite rule, GOJ security forces 
are actively searching for Iraqi agents who have infiltrated 
the Kingdom.  These agents or operatives might seek to 
destabilize the country by means of armed actions such as 
assassinations, ambushes or attacks on U.S., Jordanian or 
exile Iraqi targets in the Kingdom in the event of U.S.-led 
military action.  End Summary. 
 
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The Iraqis Here: Who They Are 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Gaining a comprehensive picture of the Iraqi 
population in Jordan is not easy.  With the exception of the 
General Intelligence Directorate (GID), no organization that 
we are aware of (either official or NGO) looks at the Iraqi 
expat population as a whole.  Iraqi businesspeople deal with 
Jordanian counterparts on mutually beneficial deals while 
Iraqi laborers interact with their Jordanian employers; Iraqi 
artists, writers, musicians and academics are involved with 
Jordanian individuals, organizations and universities on 
specific projects or performances; and even UNHCR and the 
other humanitarian NGOs in Jordan that provide assistance to 
Iraqis in need see only a small self-selected percentage of 
the total (reftel).  The Iraqi community in Jordan is not a 
cohesive whole, but rather a series of distinct subgroupings 
without a unified leadership or structure.  Relief agencies 
that work with Iraqis believe that the GOJ would actively 
discourage a unified leadership for the Iraqi community and, 
as a result, have shied away from any activity that would be 
construed as political organization.  Many of the Iraqi 
business elite in Jordan, for example, have far more 
interaction with the Jordanian captains of industry than with 
Iraqi laborers not of their social class. 
 
¶3. (C) Those constraints notwithstanding, there is a 
consensus among our Embassy contacts and diplomatic 
colleagues on the general outline of the Iraqi population 
here.  The vast majority of expat Iraqis in Jordan are 
economic migrants who have arrived during the past decade as 
job prospects in Iraq for those not tied to the regime have 
deteriorated.  Many were formerly members of the Iraqi middle 
class and saw their salaries and purchasing power destroyed 
in the years following the Gulf War.  They often have been 
willing to accept positions below their qualifications for 
the simple reason that they can earn more in Jordan doing 
relatively unskilled labor than they can in Iraq engaged in 
the work for which they were trained.  We hear from refugee 
relief organizations that most of these economic emigrants -- 
like the Iraqi population as a whole -- are Shi'a.  While 
working class Iraqis make up the biggest segment of the expat 
population, smaller numbers in the arts and industry/trade 
play significant roles in their respective sectors of 
society.  Our Consular Section notes that all of these 
segments of Iraqi society are represented among the several 
hundred Iraqi immigrant visa applications that are in process 
at any one time.  In this limited grouping, however, 
Christians are more heavily represented than in the Iraqi 
population as a whole. 
 
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The Working Class and Below 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) By far the largest segment of Iraqis in Jordan are 
those who come to work in the industrial sector.  A common 
snapshot of such a worker would be a man in his mid-20s to 
mid-30s, previously an engineer but now working as a 
custodian in an industrial factory in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, or 
(to a lesser extent) Aqaba.  He is probably paid less than 
Jordan's minimum wage of USD 112/month and may live with 5-10 
compatriots in a small apartment close to the industrial zone 
where he works.  Although he may complain to his compatriots 
of mistreatment from his employer, he does not report this to 
the Ministry of Labor lest he risk deportation for being out 
of legal status. 
 
¶5. (C) Politically, the average Iraqi worker in Jordan 
appears to have little sympathy for Saddam, and has a more 
sophisticated view of the scope of Saddam's misrule than his 
Jordanian counterparts would.  He may harbor anger at Saddam 
for destroying his job prospects at home as well as 
resentment toward Jordanians whom he sees as exploiting his 
vulnerabilities (paying him too little and charging him too 
much for rent or other necessities).  That said, he is, for 
the most part, apolitical, less concerned about the plight of 
Palestinians in Jordan, and more focused on earning a living 
than regime change. 
 
¶6. (C) Below the class of Iraqis engaged as unskilled or 
semi-skilled labor in the industrial estates are untold 
numbers who scrounge out uncertain subsistence incomes as day 
laborers, street-corner peddlers and beggars.  No statistics 
on this population are available and the limited information 
we have is based on our own observations and those of NGOs 
(such as Caritas) (reftel) that assist Iraqis who seek out 
their services. 
 
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Artists, Musicians and Academics 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In addition to the large number of Iraqi laborers in 
Jordan there is a smaller, but still significant, population 
of Iraqi artists, musicians and academics -- some of whom can 
be categorized as middle income.  Many in this group also 
complain that they are inadequately paid, underappreciated, 
and subject to discrimination due to their temporary 
residence status.  That said, these Iraqis have had a 
tremendous impact on the Jordanian cultural scene and have 
established in Jordan what many art critics acknowledge is 
something of an Iraqi "cultural renaissance." 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Art centers, such as Darat al Fanun have employed 
Iraqi artists to conduct training workshops for Jordanian 
artists.  More than 20 art centers have opened in Amman alone 
in recent years, with most of the credit going to these Iraqi 
artists. Jordan's music and theater scene has also prospered 
from the influx of Iraqis in recent years.  The National 
Music Conservatory instructors are 80 percent Iraqi, and 
Iraqi musicians comprise at least half of Jordan's National 
Symphony Orchestra.  The Noor al Hussein Foundation Theater 
is the home of many young Iraqi actors. Additionally, 
Jordan's academic institutions are staffed with many Iraqis, 
especially in the arts.  Jordan University's new Faculty of 
the Arts largely depends on part-time Iraqi instructors for 
its program.  In the past, Yarmouk University's Music 
Department, the only such university-level department in the 
country, has drawn more than 80 percent of its professors 
from among the Iraqi expat community.  However, in the 
mid-1990s a large number of Iraqi artists, musicians and 
graphic artists emigrated to Canada and Europe, and at 
Yarmouk University only one of five Ph.D. holders is now 
Iraqi.  That said, many Iraqi commercial artists remain and a 
considerable number of private schools still use Iraqi 
teachers to support their music and drama programs. 
 
¶9. (C) Such work opportunities notwithstanding, most Iraqi 
artists in Jordan are not happy with their status quo, and 
their economic situation -- while better than if they were in 
Iraq -- is still precarious.  Few Iraqi artists engage in 
overtly political work -- both because such themes do not 
sell as well and out of fear that to do so could cause 
problems for their relatives still in Iraq.  If asked, many 
express strong interest to follow in the footsteps of those 
who have already emigrated either to Europe or North America, 
places where they believe their talents would be more fully 
appreciated. 
 
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The Business Elite 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Far removed from the hardships of those Iraqis eking 
out a living at the lower levels of Jordan's economic food 
chain is a relatively small group of wealthy and 
well-established Iraqi industrialists and traders who have 
lived and worked in Jordan for decades and who dominate some 
local industries, notably prepared foods.  Like their poorer 
countrymen, this business elite is, for the most part, 
apolitical.  They have built successful, diverse interests in 
Jordan and the region and have little interest in taking a 
forward-leaning political stand on one side or the other of 
the Iraq question.  As Iraqis -- and as sound businessmen -- 
they would have an interest in investing down the road in a 
post-Saddam Iraq.  However, any decision to do so would be 
based on hard-nosed commercial realities, notably their 
perception of the stability of any new political order in 
Iraq.  This small group is unlikely to move their operations 
back to Iraq post-Saddam but would rather seek to expand 
their current operations into that market once it is clear 
that the political risk factors are manageable. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Saddam's Agents: 
Relatively Few, but Capable of Causing Trouble 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶11. (S) While the vast majority of Iraqis in Jordan will 
almost certainly remain quiet in the event of military action 
against Saddam, there is an expectation (both in official 
Jordanian circles and among the public at large) that an 
unknown number of Iraqi agents are already here, have mixed 
into the broader community, and will seek to sow instability 
in the Kingdom, possibly before hostilities begin.   Armed 
actions may include assassinations/ambushes of Jordanian, 
U.S. and Iraqi opposition targets as well as attacks on other 
facilities in Jordan.  How many Iraqi agents are already 
present is difficult to quantify, but assuming that they 
number only in the low hundreds (i.e. a fraction of one 
percent of the total Iraqi community here), the potential for 
trouble is not insignificant.  Former Iraqi Oil Minister 
Issam Chalabi (a long time Iraqi exile in Amman who is 
currently an oil industry consultant) told poloff recently 
that he believes Iraqi agents will seek to carry out acts of 
violence in Jordan, including against anti-regime Iraqis. 
Because of that fear, he and his family intend to depart 
Amman for London if military action begins and remain there 
until the regional situation stabilizes. 
 
¶12. (S) Jordanian security forces are well aware of this 
potential and are aggressively seeking to root out those 
elements from the population.  Actions implemented have 
included increased scrutiny at the border (refusing entry to 
military age males, for example), security sweeps in 
neighborhoods where Iraqis live, and other activities.  The 
GOJ is under no illusion that these efforts will be 100 
percent effective but are doing all they can to minimize the 
potential for destabilization. 
 
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Comment 
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¶13. (C) If/when military action against Saddam begins, Jordan 
will confront myriad security, political and economic 
challenges -- the gravity of which will depend on many 
unpredictable factors (a contemporaneous spike in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a prolonged cutoff of oil 
supplies, the duration and character of the war, etc.).  In 
all probability, however, the behavior of the bulk of the 
large Iraqi expat community in the Kingdom should constitute 
one of the government's lesser concerns.  More problems can 
be expected to originate in the Palestinian refugee camps and 
poorer East Bank towns than in neighborhoods with large 
numbers of Iraqis.  Most Iraqis here will lie low and hope 
that their loved ones in Iraq escape any conflict unharmed. 
The GOJ, nevertheless, will keep a close eye on them, seeking 
to differentiate the small number of agents provocateurs from 
the larger peaceful population. 
 
¶14. (C)  How quickly many Iraqis will seek to return to a 
post-Saddam Iraq is open to speculation.  For most, Jordan 
has offered them a tolerable but not prosperous existence. 
If the security situation after Saddam is stable and jobs 
tied to the country's reconstruction are plentiful, many -- 
especially among the professional and working class -- can be 
expected to return to reunite with their families.  If the 
situation is less clear, and the reports from back home less 
glowing, the number of those choosing to return will, 
inevitably, be much more modest.  Whatever the scenario, 
given all that most Iraqis have been through in their lives, 
they will likely show considerable caution in making key 
decisions for themselves and their families. 
 
GNEHM