This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 TEGUCIGALPA 003365 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN 
STATE FOR PM, INL, EB, AND CA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2012 
TAGS: OVIP MARR MASS MOPS PREL PGOV SNAR ECON HO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL HILL'S VISIT TO HONDURAS 
DECEMBER 18-19 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Roger Pierce; 
Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Honduran President Ricardo Maduro, in 
office since January, faces numerous challenges in one of the 
poorest and most corrupt countries in the Western Hemisphere. 
 His Administration has been stalled on its domestic agenda 
since June as it tries to reconcile its ambitious goals to 
its straitjacketed financial situation.  Bilateral relations 
between the U.S. and Honduras are excellent; Honduras was the 
first country in Central America (and the second in Latin 
America) to sign an ICC Article 98 Agreement with the U.S. 
and its support for the international counterterrorism effort 
is steadfast.  The United States and Honduras have maintained 
a long-standing close relationship framed by such events as 
the establishment of the banana plantations in the late 
1800s, the Contra wars of the 1980s, and reconstruction 
efforts in the wake of the October 1998 fury of Hurricane 
Mitch.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Key Issues in Bilateral Relationship 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The central themes in our bilateral diplomatic 
efforts in Honduras are combating international crime by 
strengthening governance and attacking corruption, assisting 
American citizens, fostering economic development, promoting 
regional stability, promoting trade and investment, and 
combating terrorism.  However, the underlying difficulty to 
realizing USG objectives is improving the administration of 
justice and rule of law.  President Ricardo Maduro's 
government is fully engaged on all of these issues, supports 
judicial and political reform, and is seeking to transform 
Honduras so that law and order can be restored and economic 
growth ignited.  He faces formidable challenges from 
entrenched economic and political interests in moving his 
agenda forward. 
 
------------------------------- 
Status of the Maduro Government 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) President Maduro is facing increasing criticism 
from the political opposition over his government's policies 
and continued dissatisfaction from his own party's Members of 
Congress because of his Administration's technocratic style. 
The Honduran Congress is a focal point of political 
opposition to his policies.  It is a corrupt institution 
riddled with avaricious politicians, and Maduro's National 
Party does not control a majority of the unicameral body. 
The ongoing problems within his own party are serious and 
threaten his broader political agenda, which will require 
legislation to advance.  Continuing political negotiations 
will be needed to manage this situation.  Maduro's personal 
life also intruded into the political sphere.  His October 
wedding to a Spaniard was criticized by many Hondurans who 
viewed the President as distracted by his personal life. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The President's standing has remained stalled at a 
low point since June.  Faced with slow progress in his 
efforts to promote regional economic integration, Maduro's 
team is pinning its hopes that a U.S.-Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) can serve as a catalyst to regional 
economic cooperation.  Maduro is also beginning to hear wider 
disillusionment among the Honduran public as violent crime 
levels are increasing once again despite his successful 
initial "zero tolerance" law and order campaign. 
Notwithstanding his crackdown on street crime, actual ongoing 
criminal investigations, in particular homicides, remain 
stalled. 
 
---------------------------- 
Counterterrorism Cooperation 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Maduro is a good and reliable friend of the U.S. on 
counterterrorism.  His government hosted a major U.S. 
military counterterrorism exercise in March and has quickly 
responded with freeze orders to all U.S. requests regarding 
suspect terrorist bank accounts.  No terrorist assets have 
been found in Honduran financial institutions, to date.  The 
GOH still needs to take the following concrete steps: 
designate a national coordinator for counterterrorism, file 
its national report in accordance with United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373, and most of all, 
sign and/or ratify the five outstanding international 
conventions/protocols and two OAS conventions (1971 and 2002) 
against terrorism.  It is also of vital importance for 
Honduras to improve security at its maritime ports, 
particularly Puerto Cortes. 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶6.  (C) While the GOH is in general supportive of key USG 
foreign policy goals, the Ministry of Foreign Relations 
appears hesitant to be out front supporting the USG position 
on Iraq.  Securing a UNSC Resolution on Iraq has helped 
mollify MFA officials concerns about the need for 
multilateral support via the United Nations.  Lacking Rio 
Group consensus the GOH is not yet willing to make a public 
statement backing U.S. policy on Iraq.  However the U.S. 
should be able to count on Honduras' support when a final 
decision is taken. 
 
-------------- 
Anticorruption 
-------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The new U.S. policy against corruption struck a 
nerve in Honduras, especially any mention of our new visa 
revocation authorities.  Politicians in Congress and certain 
business elements feel the U.S. is attacking them.  Maduro is 
committed to addressing corruption, even if it will cost him 
political support within his party.  The Supreme Court 
President is also on board.  Given the scope of the problem, 
any public discussion about the country's pervasive 
corruption is a positive development. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Supreme Court and Judicial Reform 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Supreme Court is developing into an independent 
branch of power, unlike all of its predecessor courts since 
democracy was restored in 1982.  It is pro-reform in 
orientation and fighting for its prerogatives.  In some 
respects, the development of the court in Honduras' restored 
democracy is approaching its "Marbury v. Madison" moment. 
The emerging issue is whether it can become a fully 
independent and co-equal branch of political power, 
consistent with the separation of powers provision in the 
Honduran Constitution.  The established political order is 
fighting that prospect with all its might.  In fact, the 
Congress recently seized the political opportunity to 
introduce legislation that would give itself the power to 
interpret the constitutionality of the laws its passes. 
 
---------------------------- 
Public Security/Human Rights 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Upon taking office on January 27 President Maduro's 
first act was to fulfill his main campaign promise -- a zero 
tolerance campaign against the country's out-of-control crime 
situation.  He deployed more than 5,000 soldiers to the 
streets to support the police.  The public responded 
enthusiastically.  However, despite the initial success of 
establishing a visible police presence, violent crime, 
particularly homicides and kidnappings, has only fallen 
marginally.  Public support is fading and the campaign needs 
some visible victories to restore confidence in the 
government's program.  We are helping the Maduro government 
establish an anti-kidnapping unit, increase intake/training 
of police recruits, create a model tourist police force, 
boost its counternarcotics efforts, and expand the frontier 
police.  The country's geographic position makes it an 
obvious strategic transit point for narcotics trafficking, 
alien smuggling operations and other organized crime 
activities. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Extrajudicial killings, especially of 
children/young adults between 1998-2001, have been a source 
of serious concern and only recently has the GOH begun to 
take steps to investigate the hundreds of unsolved cases. 
There has been some discussion of the establishment of a 
Truth Commission to look into unresolved alleged human rights 
abuses from the 1980s.  There are serious problems with child 
labor in several industries, particularly melon, coffee, and 
shrimp (but not the maquila) sectors, and trafficking in 
persons of women/children for prostitution in the U.S. and 
children for commercial sexual exploitation in Central 
America.  USAID and Peace Corps have both been involved in 
HIV/AIDS prevention. 
 
------------- 
Consular Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Some 500,000 Hondurans, both legal and illegal, 
live in the U.S., a fact that places immigration issues high 
on the bilateral agenda.  (The population of Honduras is 6.5 
million.)  There is deep appreciation for the 
Administration's extension of Temporary Protected Status 
(TPS) in the U.S. and interest in possible congressional 
action on the pending Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central 
American Relief Act (NACARA), which would give immigration 
parity for Hondurans.  With fourteen thousand American 
citizens residing in Honduras and many thousands visiting 
Honduras annually for tourism and business American Citizen 
Services are a key part of the Embassy's work.  Until 
recently, there was little progress in most of the now more 
than 30 American citizen murder cases; however, there have 
been three convictions in these cases in recent weeks.  In 
the last year the GOH has increased cooperation with the 
Embassy on these cases, including establishing two 
prosecutors.  However, little progress has been made on 
extradition cases involving American Citizens wanted for 
felonies in the U.S. 
 
-------------- 
Border Relations 
---------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Honduras has border disputes with its three 
Central American land neighbors and its seven maritime 
neighbors.  Maduro is personally engaged with his 
Presidential counterparts to address these issues.  Its land 
and maritime disputes with El Salvador and Nicaragua are the 
most heated.  The Gulf of Fonseca on the Pacific coast is a 
particularly difficult point.  A 1992 International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) ruling laid out shared areas of control in the 
Gulf of Fonseca and established the land border between 
Honduras and El Salvador, although El Salvador has been slow 
to implement the ruling.  In September of this year El 
Salvador requested a revision of the 1992 ICJ ruling. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) On the Caribbean coast, Honduras and Nicaragua 
have a long-standing maritime border dispute over the 15th 
parallel.   Honduras provoked Nicaraguan retaliation when it 
signed a maritime treaty with Colombia recognizing the 15th 
parallel as its maritime border in 1999.  Nicaragua filed an 
ICJ case over the maritime border and more importantly in 
1999 slapped a punitive 35 per cent tariff on Honduran goods 
that remains in place despite a Central American Court of 
Justice ruling that it is illegal.  With former Nicaraguan 
President Arnoldo Aleman deposed as President of the National 
Assembly, GOH officials have expressed renewed optimism that 
Nicaraguan President Enrique Bolanos will make good on 
private assurances to lift the tariff and thereby take an 
important step forward toward regional economic integration, 
especially given the fact that the ICJ recently ruled in 
favor of the GOH's petition against the tariff.  You may wish 
to compliment Maduro on the GOH,s restraint and note that 
the regional integration benefits of a CAFTA with the U.S. 
(as well as other integration efforts) will be undermined by 
a trade war. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Troubled Economy Endangers IMF Program and HIPC Debt Relief 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) President Maduro inherited a stagnating economy 
and seriously deteriorated government finances from the 
previous government.  The GOH missed all key International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) targets in 2001.  Even after the Maduro 
economic team won passage of austerity and tax measures in 
May of this year, the government's budget deficit is still 
expected to be a high 5.9 percent of GDP.  It is important 
for the GOH to undertake the meaningful and long overdue 
reforms needed to work out a new IMF program. 
 
¶15.  (C) During its November visit the IMF team did not reach 
agreement with the GOH on draft terms of a three-year Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility Program (PRGF).  In 
consultations with the IMF mission, the GOH developed a plan 
to improve the fiscal situation in the next few months.  If 
all goes well, the team will return to Honduras in March or 
April to begin negotiations on a program.  The delay of a 
program jeopardizes $240 million in debt relief, concessional 
loans and grants from some donors.  The IMF maintains that 
the situation is unsustainable, unless donors want to 
continue to fund public sector salaries, and watch investment 
in poverty reduction programs continue to dwindle.  The 
Maduro administration has asked the U.S. to push the IMF for 
flexibility, but the Embassy favors supporting the IMF on its 
push for real fiscal and economic reform in Honduras. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) International Financial Institution (IFI) and 
bilateral donor disbursements will be held up until the new 
IMF program is in place.  There could also be pressure on GOH 
Paris Club debt service payments (USD 100 million per year). 
In the meantime, the completion point for Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) debt reduction (worth USD 900 million) 
continues to slip back further.  Ultimately, this fiscal 
situation could impact Honduras' eligibility for Millennium 
Challenge Account grants. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) The Honduran economy is growing slowly (estimated 
real GDP growth of 1.8 percent this year).  Low world coffee 
prices continue to hurt the economy in rural areas. 
Inflation continues to decrease slowly, estimated at 8-9 
percent in 2002.  The currency is depreciating at a rate of 
about five percent per year.  The economy is dominated by 
agriculture - particularly the production of coffee, bananas 
and cultivated shrimp - although the in-bond apparel assembly 
industry has grown dramatically over the past decade and 
remittances, from Hondurans living overseas, continues to 
grow rapidly (up 38 percent in the first six months of this 
year) and have become the most important source of foreign 
exchange.  The U.S. is Honduras' largest trading partner; 
roughly 150 U.S. companies do business here.  While many 
social indicators are improving, two-thirds of all Hondurans 
live in poverty and average educational levels are very low. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Maduro has personally identified himself with a 
CAFTA as his government's principal trade objective.  The 
Minister of Industry and Trade is reorganizing the Ministry 
(historically fairly weak) and adding staff in a belated 
effort to get ready for the negotiations.  The Maduro 
administration has also been more cooperative with the U.S. 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva.  Honduras 
(along with other Central American countries) has been 
supportive in the FTAA ministerials but to date has not taken 
an active role in the negotiating groups. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Latent protectionism exists in the private sector, 
especially agriculture, but the general attitude toward a 
free trade agreement in Honduras is guardedly positive.  The 
textile and apparel industry in particular believes an FTA is 
the only way that the Honduran apparel sector can survive the 
elimination of quotas in 2005 and compete with Asian 
manufacturers.  As such, it is the strongest supporter of 
CAFTA. 
 
------------------------------ 
U.S. Investment Faces Problems 
------------------------------ 
 
¶20.  (SBU) The Maduro government understands that Honduras 
needs foreign (and domestic) investment to spur economic 
growth but has placed emphasis on the more immediate problems 
of political and judicial reforms, the fiscal deficit, and 
needed improvements in security, education and health. 
Maduro will tout a new law on simplification of 
administrative procedures and formation of a national 
competitiveness council, headed by Vice President Vicente 
Williams, to enhance the investment climate at all levels of 
society.  The government has identified tourism, 
agribusiness, and forestry as important sectors that could 
create much-needed jobs. 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Much more needs to be done to declare Honduras 
"open for business."  Maduro needs to find a way to get his 
cabinet (and the prickly legislative and judicial branches) 
to make meaningful changes that will resolve the key 
problems: poor and expensive infrastructure; weak legal 
system; personal security, education and health conditions; 
land tenure problems; and opposition to large foreign 
investments by well-connected vested interests. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) The Honduran government has stalled in its past 
efforts to liberalize and privatize the electricity and 
telecommunications markets.  On November 15, the National 
Electric Energy Company (ENEE) announced that Honduran 
company Lufussa was winner of the 210 mega-watts electricity 
tender, ignoring Lufussa's failure to comply with bid 
requirements and serious allegations of impropriety.  This 
was a heavy blow for U.S. company AES, which seeks to build a 
$600 million combined cycle plant in Puerto Cortes.  On 
November 26, AES challenged the award to ENEE's decision, 
citing a failure to disqualify Lufussa for the omissions in 
its bid (e.g., insufficient transmission facilities and 
failure to specify the type of fuel to be used) and other 
irregularities.  The Honduran Attorney General and the Office 
of the Inspector General have announced that they are 
investigating the matter.  The GOH telecom regulatory agency 
is also bidding out a second cellular phone license this 
year; one U.S. company has been pre-qualified.  The GOH has 
requested USG policy support for liberalization of the 
telecom (through the Trade and Development Agency) and power 
(through USAID) sectors.  However, in order to make these 
long overdue structural reforms a reality, the Maduro 
government must follow through on its commitments. 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Land tenure problems (combined with a weak 
judicial system) are endemic in Honduras, and undermine 
efforts to develop the tourism, agriculture and forestry 
sectors.  They also deter new investments in a variety of 
other sectors.  The Embassy has files on 112 property dispute 
cases (generally squatter/land reform cases and title 
disputes), of which 32 are active.  There are an additional 
68 commercial disputes, of which 14 are currently active. 
The GOH is adopting a law allowing some of the land cases to 
be submitted to arbitration and is working on an improved 
property registry system.  In recent weeks, we have seen 
notable progress in handling by the judicial system of 
commercial and investment disputes involving U.S. citizens. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Money Laundering and Bank Failures 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶24.  (SBU) Strengthened money laundering legislation, with an 
antiterrorist financing clause, was the first law to be 
adopted by the new Congress in late February of this year. 
The GOH has followed up rapidly with creation of a Financial 
Information Unit.  Currently, 70 potential cases are under 
investigation.  Weakness of the financial system remains a 
key concern.  The GOH took over the two most troubled banks 
in May 2002, arranged for the absorption of a third 
undercapitalized bank and is actively promoting mergers among 
the remaining 20 private banks. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Bilateral Political/Military Issues 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶25.  (C) In January of 1999, the constitution was amended to 
abolish the position of military commander in chief of the 
Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF), thus codifying civilian 
authority over the military.  Honduras now has a civilian 
Minister of Defense (MOD) and a Chief of the Joint Staff who 
heads the HOAF.  Civilian control is well accepted by the 
HOAF, and the transition to civilian control has resulted in 
greater transparency and fiscal accountability.  The current 
MOD, Fred Breve, enjoys a good relationship with the HOAF 
military leadership, but the Office of the Minister of 
Defense still lacks a staff that could provide institutional 
memory and continuity between the change in political 
administrations. 
¶26.  (U) There are a number of bilateral political/military 
issues with which Post routinely deals - brief summaries of 
recent issues follow. 
 
Cerro La Mole Radar 
------------------- 
 
¶27.  (C) In 1993, the U.S. entered into an agreement with the 
GOH regarding the maintenance of the radar located at Cerro 
La Mole, under which it agreed to pay 75 percent of 
maintenance costs up to $400,000 per year.  The U.S. has paid 
nothing under the agreement, and the issue affects relations 
between the U.S. and Honduran militaries.  Post has sought 
guidance from DOD and State on how to resolve our 
obligations, and recommended that the U.S. either replace the 
radar with a solid state version (TPS-78) or with another 
TPS-70 transferred from counterdrug programs.  Alternatively, 
the U.S. could repair the radar to operational status.  When 
operational, the radar provides a view of the 
Honduras-Nicaragua-El Salvador border areas and the Gulf of 
Fonseca on the Pacific Ocean.  If operational, the radar 
could be helpful in the fight against narcotrafficking. 
 
Naco 
---- 
 
¶28.  (C) The small town of Naco hosts the 4th Logistical Base 
(CALE) and a large cache of weapons and artillery.  In 1985, 
Longlac Enterprises, a Panamanian-registered arms importer, 
sent weapons to Honduras on deposit for use by the HOAF. 
After years of poor storage and neglect, the cache became a 
serious hazard, and in 1993 an explosion killed two people. 
In 2001 the GOH destroyed the unstable weapons, and moved the 
remaining weapons to a more secure storage facility -- 
supposedly eliminating the threat to the nearby population. 
 
¶29.  (C) Meanwhile, Longlac sold the cache of arms to 
Miami-based Samco Global Arms.  For several years, there has 
been a complicated legal battle over the ownership of the 
weapons and who is responsible for removing them.  Currently, 
the Honduran courts control the storage facility and the 
inventories.  The legal battles become even more complicated 
when Samco sued the GOH in Miami and the GOH counter-claimed. 
 Post is concerned that the weapons might fall into the hands 
of arms traffickers or terrorists, and we have advised the 
GOH of the USG willingness to assist in the destruction or 
disposal of the remaining cache once ownership is established. 
 
¶30.  (C) On July 31, the prosecutor from the Task Force 
against Organized Crime conducted a spot check, accompanied 
by a Court Clerk from the Fourth Circuit of the Honduran 
Criminal Court, a DAO military attache, and a team of arms 
experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency.  The prosecutor 
conducted the spot check using an inventory attested to by 
affidavit of the Chief Judge of the Fourth Criminal Court of 
San Pedro Sula and the Commander of the CALE dated July 31, 
¶2001.  Among other arms and ammunition, the inventory 
included 790 AKMS assault rifles that are Chinese-made AKMS 
type 56-1 -- copies of the Soviet folding stock AKMS.  The 
recent spot check revealed that 230 of the AKMS are missing, 
presumably stolen.  On August 28, the high command of the 
HOAF designated an Army Auditor to investigate the alleged 
theft of the arms. 
 
Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) Account Freeze 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶31.  (C) This spring, an automobile accident occurred 
involving a USG vehicle from JTF-Bravo, causing injuries to 
four Hondurans, as well as vehicle damage.  A civil lawsuit 
was filed against two JTF-B personnel, and ultimately, a 
court issued an order freezing the local JTF-B bank account. 
 
¶32.  (C) The 1954 Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement 
(BMAA) expressly provides that the USG funds are not subject 
to this sort of legal process.  Eventually, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) persuaded the Supreme Court to order 
that the account be freed from the inappropriate legal 
actions of the lower court. 
 
Bay Islands Vetting 
------------------- 
¶33.  (C) In 2002, U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships began port 
calls/liberty visits in the Bay Islands after a period of 
many years without any ship visits.  We suspect that a number 
of businesses in the Bay Islands are owned, in whole or in 
part, by individuals who are suspected of being involved in 
narcotrafficking and other illegal activities, or who are 
convicted felons.  Post formed a committee to gather 
information about Roatan hotels and their owners in order to 
formulate a policy regarding the patronization of such 
businesses -- particularly in instances where U.S. government 
monies are used. 
 
Recent Military Promotions 
-------------------------- 
 
¶34.  (C) On December 6, 18 HOAF officers (two generals, 15 
colonels and one lieutenant colonel) who are members of the 
twelfth promotion group unexpectedly retired.  These 
honorable retirements came in the wake of a scandal involving 
General Mario Raul Hung Pacheco (also of the twelfth 
promotion group), who allegedly stole money from the Honduran 
Military Retirement Fund.  Some of the retiring officers 
emphasized that they served their country honorably, and that 
the HOAF should not be judged solely by those officers who 
were involved in corruption.  Another promotion ceremony took 
place on December 11 -- amongst the ranks of those officers 
were General Jose Isaias Barahona (the current Chief of the 
Joint Staff), Jorge Andino, Luis Maldonado and Rodolfo 
Interiano.  Interiano's promotion was unexpected because of 
his previous problems with the Maduro Administration.  He is 
expected to stay in Washington, DC as the Honduran Defense 
Attache. 
 
--------------- 
A Great Tragedy 
--------------- 
 
¶35.  (U) At approximately 8:55 p.m. on December 11, a U.S. 
Army Black Hawk helicopter from Joint Task Force Bravo 
crashed while engaged in a night training exercise -- killing 
five (5) U.S. soldiers who belonged to the 1st Battalion, 
228th Aviation Regiment.  The helicopter flew from Soto Cano 
Air Base to La Mesa international airport in San Pedro Sula 
to participate in a night landing exercise.  After refueling 
the helicopter headed back to Soto Cano, and 40 minutes later 
crashed into the mountains near Santa Cruz de Yojoa, which is 
85 miles north of Tegucigalpa. 
 
------------------- 
Embassy Tegucigalpa 
------------------- 
 
¶36.  (SBU) Embassy Tegucigalpa is a medium-sized post, 
employing 140 U.S. citizens and 300 Hondurans among 20 USG 
agencies.  Our Peace Corps program, with more than 220 
volunteers, is one of the world's largest, and the USAID 
mission had a FY02 budget of USD 34.5 million.  The Mission 
maintains a Consular Agent in Honduras' second city and 
industrial center, San Pedro Sula.  Five-hundred and fifty 
U.S. service men and women are stationed at Honduras' Soto 
Cano Air Base under the auspices of SOUTHCOM as Joint Task 
Force Bravo.  In 1954, the USG and GOH signed a Bilateral 
Military Assistance Agreement that set forth their intention 
to work closely together to foster peace and security in the 
Western Hemisphere.  The ICC Article 98 Agreement with 
Honduras is therefore a particularly important 
accomplishment, and will enable our military forces to 
continue to work together in such areas as disaster recovery, 
joint training exercises, and counternarcotics missions. 
PIERCE