This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 009051 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CENTCOM AND EUCOM: PLEASE PASS TO POLADS AND J-5 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON TU POLITICAL PARTIES
SUBJECT: TURKEY: AK PARTY SEES DENKTAS AS OBSTACLE TO 
CYPRUS SOLUTION 
 
 
REF: ANKARA 8976 
 
 
Classified by Acting DCM Scot Marciel.  Reason:1.5(b)(d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The political debate in Ankara regarding 
Turkey's EU candidacy and the future of Cyprus is revealing 
sharp differences between the ruling AK (Justice and 
Development) Party/Government and the Establishmentarian 
foreign policy class, including elements that predominate in 
the MFA.  The fulcrum of the debate is "TRNC President" 
Denktas.  Hailed by the Establishment as the one and only 
representative of Turkish Cyprus, Denktas is seen by AK as a 
major liability, complicating efforts to find a solution to 
the decades-old Cyprus dispute and threatening Turkey's own 
EU bid.  While the MFA continues to rally around Dentkas, AK 
is subtly trying to undermine him.  AK officials support 
Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot equities on the island, but 
calculate that the voting public is nevertheless increasingly 
weary of the stalemate and receptive to the notion that 
Establishmentarian intransigence is counterproductive.  End 
summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) The outcome of the Dec. 12-13 EU summit Copenhagen is 
regarded by Turks as a mixed blessing.  The EU admitted the 
Republic of Cyprus as a member while giving Turkey a 
conditional date of Dec. 2004 for the start of formal 
accession talks (reftel).  While they accept that the summit 
generated considerable progress in Turkish-EU relations 
(though not as much as Turkey would have liked), the 
cognoscenti recognize that the GOT's (and "TRNC President" 
Denktas') failure to ink a Cyprus deal in Copenhagen set back 
the Turkish cause on the island and in Brussels.  This has 
prompted the Turks to engage in the time-honored practice of 
shifting blame; it also is providing an opportunity for Turks 
to question some of the basic assumptions of the GOT's 
traditional policy toward Cyprus.  The noteworthy aspect of 
this reevaluation is that it is being generated primarily, 
albeit carefully, by AK in conjunction with some newfound 
provisional allies in the press. 
 
 
-- On Dec. 17, AK Leader Erdogan publicly noted that AK and 
the "TRNC" share the same views on Cyprus, but emphasized 
that there is "no overlap" at all between the AK position and 
the Turkish State's traditionalist approach.  Foreign 
Minister Yakis later observed publicly that if a solution is 
not found on Cyprus, the Turkish military would be regarded 
as "an occupying power" on EU territory. 
 
 
-- Yakis' statements prompted a rebuttal from Deniz Baykal, 
leader of the opposition CHP (Republican People's Party) and 
political standard-bearer of the Establishment.  Baykal 
called for Yakis' resignation, asserting that "of the six 
billion people on Earth, the Turkish Foreign Minister should 
be the last person to say such things.  I don't know how we 
can correct the damage." 
 
 
-- In a statement issued Dec. 18, the MFA supported ongoing 
negotiations on the Cyprus disupte but decried the admission 
of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU, charging that it was 
unacceptable legally or politically.  A GOT "Foreign Policy 
Summit" -- featuring Gen. Hilmi Ozkok, the TGS Chief, 
President Sezer, P.M. Gul, FOMIN Yakis, MFA u/s Ziyal, and 
Denktas -- endorsed the MFA statement and mutuality of views 
between the GOT and the "TRNC." 
 
 
¶3. (U) Reaction among opinion makers reflects the divide. 
The pro-CHP "Cumhuriyet" endorsed Baykal's call for Yakis' 
ouster and underscored the growing distance between AK and 
"TRNC President Denktas  Others, including "Milliyet's" Sami 
Kohen and "Radikal's" Ismet Berkan and Murat Yetkin, leaned 
the other way.  Kohen described Denktas as an obstacle to a 
Cyprus solution, and as a liability to Turkey.  "Hurriyet's" 
Cuneyt Ulsever on Dec. 18 also drew attention, for virtually 
the first time, to the pecuniary interests in Cyprus among 
Turkish Cyprus hard-liners, notably former foreign Ministers 
Sukru Sina Gurel and Mumtaz Soysal, who is currently a close 
Denktas confidant.  In the days before Copenhagen, Soysal, a 
dyed in-the-wool secularist formerly with CHP, accused 
Erdogan of being an "infidel" (gavur) for straying from the 
Establishment position on Cyprus. 
 
 
--------- 
AK's View 
--------- 
¶4. (C) In private meetings with us, AK officials dispense 
with diplomatic niceties regarding Denktas.  On Dec. 17, an 
AK Parliamentary Group Deputy Chief described to us how 
before AK came to power, the idea of publicly questioning 
Denktas was akin to the third rail of Turkish politics.  "We 
are the ones who opened the door to criticism of Denktas," 
not only for his handling of the Cyprus problem per se, but 
for helping to generate the economic morass on the island 
that has perpetuated poverty among Turkish Cypriots and 
Anatolian settlers in the north. On Dec. 18, Erdogan's former 
Chef de Cabinet, now an M.P., and several associates asserted 
to D/Polcouns that "Denktas is, and always has been, the 
biggest obstacle in the way of a solution on Cyprus and has 
to go."  Picking up on Ulsever's article, the AK officials 
asserted that part of what perpetuates the status quo in 
Cyprus, and in GOT Cyprus policy, is the personal financial 
and other stakes Denktas and many influential mainland Turks 
maintain in the "TRNC." 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Comment: "Government" vs. "State" Policy 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶5. (C) Undercutting Denktas is a tricky business that runs 
the risk of backfiring.  Over the decades, the "TRNC" leader 
has built up relations with the Turkish Establishment that 
have insulated him from public scrutiny here.  Moreover, 
there appears to be little obvious daylight between the MFA 
and the TGS on Cyprus-related issues.  Denktas and his allies 
have also been able to play the nationalist card effectively 
in Turkey, raising the specter of betrayal as a club to keep 
critics in line.  As Soysal once noted to us, "Istanbul 
capitalists might be willing to sell out on Cyprus, but 
fortunately Turkish policy is made in Ankara."  He was not 
referring to Erdogan. 
 
 
¶6. (C) The rise of AK, and a broader popular consensus in 
favor of EU accession, is beginning to shake some old 
assumptions.  Reflecting the Soysal approach, the MFA took 
the unusual step after the Nov. 3 elections that brought AK 
to power of publicly suggesting that governments come and go, 
while "State policy" -- on Cyprus and in other areas -- 
endures and is not subject to change.  At a minimum, Turks 
are now beginning to appreciate that there are major downside 
costs for Turkey to the business-as-usual approach to Cyprus 
issue. 
PEARSON