This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S DISAFFECTED YOUTH VOTE: CAN IT BE COOPTED? 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Protest voting is an old tradition in Turkey 
but showed a new twist in Nov. 3 national elections. 
Motorola deadbeat and Berlusconi wannabe Cem Uzan -- 
emphasizing a xenophobic, nihilistic message and playing on 
resentment of America -- parlayed the anger of disaffected 
urban youths into a notable percentage of votes for his Genc 
(Youth) Party.  Whether this bloc of protest voters can be 
coopted by governing AK Party or will remain to be 
manipulated again at the next elections will depend on the 
government's ability to address unemployment, sharply lower 
standards of living, and a deep-rooted mistrust of governing 
parties.  End summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) Turks have long used the ballot box to show their 
dissatisfaction with endemic corruption and feckless 
leadership of politicians.  In 1999, for example, the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) capitalized on an angry 
electorate to capture 18% of the national vote.  Although the 
concept of the "protest vote" is therefore nothing new in 
Turkey, the Nov. 3 national election was noteworthy for the 
strong showing of Cem Uzan's Genc (Youth) Party.  Uzan's 
xenophobic, nihilistic, and often anti-American rhetoric 
attracted people of all ages, including many from among the 
the nearly 4 million young Turks who voted for the first 
time.  The questions are: 1) whether these poorly educated, 
unemployed youths searching for a political voice will be 
coopted by the ruling AK (Justice and Development) Party, 
itself embodying an anti-Establishment message, as it 
wrestles with Turkey's pressing economic issues; or 2) 
whether they remain a floating group that could be 
manipulated, once again, by Cem Uzan or someone else playing 
on similar themes. 
 
 
------------------- 
Who voted for Genc? 
------------------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) During the campaign, as Uzan's media-savvy and 
manipulative campaign gathered force, many observers feared 
that Uzan would get up to 15% of the vote, well beyond the 
10% threshold for representation in Parliament.  Uzan's poll 
numbers tailed off at the close of the campaign and in the 
end, mainly since AK Party had captured the aspirations of a 
significant portion of voters in the greater urban sprawls, 
he could not garner more than 7% of the vote.  Nevertheless, 
his provocative rhetoric -- supported by a massive media 
campaign on the multiple Uzan-owned TV channels -- played 
well with certain segments of the Turkish electorate 
disgusted with the status quo. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Local Ankara contacts explained to us recently that 
Genc appealed to disaffected nationalist youths across the 
political spectrum.  One AK Party official in Ankara's Mamak 
sub-province claimed that half of Genc's vote total came from 
those who voted for MHP in the 1999 national election.  Besir 
Atalay -- founder of ANAR polling firm and now a State 
Minister and close partisan of P.M. Abdullah Gul -- told us 
Nov. 15 that a significant portion of Genc votes came from 
former P.M. Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP) and 
his coalition partner Motherland Party (ANAP).  In addition, 
a local AK Party boss claimed that Genc had made inroads 
among stay-at-home women voters because of its intense 
television ad campaign in the run-up to Nov. 3. 
 
 
¶5. (C) There was also a strong anti-American undercurrent to 
many of Genc's campaign themes.  Indeed, many of our contacts 
across Turkey have noted that Genc supporters were attracted 
by the fact that Uzan had defrauded Motorola, thus the U.S., 
of more than $2 billion: "If he could cheat the U.S. to such 
an extent, he must be clever enough to run Turkey" is a 
refrain quoted over and over to us. 
 
 
¶6. (C) In left-leaning Izmir, where Genc drew some 18% of 
votes, both a local political observer and a candidate from 
center-right DYP have told us the party attracted voters from 
all age groups.  People who were fed up with years of 
corruption and with Establishment parties in general, 
including CHP, or who were fearful of losing their jobs in a 
deepening of the economic downturn which had already ravaged 
Izmir, were looking for a way to register their 
dissatisfaction.  In "infidel" Izmir -- so called because of 
its staunchly secular voting tendencies -- this disaffected 
group did not choose AK.  Genc voters saw the party as the 
only viable, secular protest party and cared very little 
about the party platform, according to our contacts in the 
region. 
 
 
----------------- 
Can Genc Survive? 
----------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) Based on our discussions with local and national 
politicians, whether Genc survives as an important factor 
depends on: 1) the party's resources and ability to create an 
infrastructure; and 2) the AK government's ability to deal 
effectively with Turkey's pressing economic problems. 
¶8. (C) Building a party largely from scratch requires more 
than the deep pockets Uzan could dip into for a brief if 
intense election campaign (free concerts, food, and even 
handing out cash).  AK's party boss in Ankara's Yenimahalle 
district explained that Genc has not as yet put into place an 
effective grassroots machine or invested significantly in its 
own infrastructure.  Genc's future, therefore, will depend in 
part on how well Uzan can build a credible nation-wide party 
structure. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Genc's prospects also depends greatly on how the AK 
government performs.  The Mayor of Kecioren, a conservative 
Ankara sub-province, explained that if AK eliminates the 
underlying conditions -- perceived fecklessness of 
politicians in general and a failing economy -- that gave 
rise to Genc, Uzan stands little chance of surviving as a 
political figure.  Otherwise, with Turkey continuing to 
urbanize and to need job creation at a pace to absorb its 
overwhelmingly young population, the disaffected youth vote 
will remain a manipulable and potentially decisive bloc the 
next time around. 
PEARSON