This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002991 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: 10/28/12 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: FORMER HEAD OF STATE ABUBAKAR THINKS 
OBASANJO SHOULD GO! 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5 (D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to former Head of State 
Abdulsalami Abubakar, the October 10 dinner meeting 
with Obasanjo, Babangida, VP Atiku, NSA Mohammed and 
himself did not bridge differences between Obasanjo 
and the others. Since no consensus on the way forward 
was reached, Abubakar felt the best solution for 
Nigeria's current electoral imbroglio was Obasanjo's 
withdrawal from the Presidential contest.  Obasanjo's 
cardinal failing has been his lack of pragmatism in 
attempting to govern a vast, complex and diverse 
Nigeria as if he were on a one-man crusade, alienating 
important political interests and the National 
Assembly in his drive for reform.  To Abubakar, 
Obasanjo tried to change things too much, too quickly, 
forgetting that an essential ingredient in Nigerian 
politics was patronage. Abubakar considered VP Atiku a 
strong possibility for the PDP Presidential 
nomination.  However, he disavowed any insider 
knowledge on the inscrutable Babangida and his next 
moves.  End Summary. 
 
 
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OBASANJO, BABANGIDA AND OTHERS DINE BUT FAIL TO BREAK 
BREAD 
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----- 
 
 
¶2. (C) During an October 18 afternoon with Ambassador 
Jeter at the Ambassador's residence, former Head of 
State Abubakar confirmed that Babangida, VP Atiku, NSA 
Aliyu Mohammed and he dined with Obasanjo on October 
¶10.  Contrary to press reports that the meeting helped 
reconcile the quintet, Abubakar described the session 
as inconclusive.  The meeting provided a chance to air 
grievances and concerns, but the five men did not 
agree on a way forward.  (Note: Abubakar also 
confirmed South African President Mbeki's apparently 
unsuccessful efforts in late September and in October 
to reconcile Obasanjo with Babangida and the others. 
End Note.) 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Given the high anxiety and political tension 
caused by the approaching elections, Abubakar thought 
Obasanjo's exit from the Presidential sweepstakes was 
the key to alleviating stress in the political system. 
Due to his lack of political skills, Obasanjo had 
alienated his friends and deepened the enmity of his 
foes.  The former military Head of State worried that 
protracted squabbling over Obasanjo's succession bid 
might cause further regional divisions pitting North 
against South.  Because he now was the lighting rod in 
Nigerian politics, the best way forward was for 
Obasanjo to stand aside, Abubakar declared. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
OBASANJO, THE IMPOLITIC REFORMER 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Giving credit to Obasanjo for integrity, good 
intentions, and a tireless work ethic, Abubakar 
nonetheless blamed Obasanjo's decline on the 
President's lack of political savvy and his impatient, 
sometimes erratic push for reform. Obasanjo tried to 
change too much, too quickly, without consulting and 
trying to persuade others to embrace his actions. 
Moreover, Abubakar said that Obasanjo presided over 
government as his personal fiefdom where only his 
opinions mattered. The President tried to control 
everything, and no important decisions could be made 
without him. By trying to do everything at once and by 
not prioritizing, he had accomplished precious little, 
Abubakar contended. Instead of turning the system on 
its head, Obasanjo should have concentrated on three 
or four key objectives.  By trying to do everything, 
he achieved nothing and had not major accomplishments 
to show for all of his efforts. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
PATRONAGE, THE KEY TO REELECTION 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Abubakar said that Obasanjo seriously 
jeopardized his political future by alienating people 
who had worked hard for his election.  Obasanjo the 
reformer had little sense of political reciprocity; 
his refusal to return political favors was perceived 
by many as rank ingratitude not principled reform 
especially when some of Obasanjo's men, such as Works 
and Housing Minister Tony Anenih, were involved in 
corruption. Obasanjo should have realized that 
Nigeria's political culture could not change 
overnight. The people who helped Obasanjo expected 
"some patronage." Patronage was an unavoidable fact of 
life Nigerian politics. Obasanjo's dismissive remarks 
that those who backed him in anticipation of favors 
had made a "bad investment" had angered many political 
investors. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Now that Obasanjo was coming back to ask their 
help in reelection drive, they were turning away from 
him.  Since their first investment in him was "bad," 
Abubakar said that Obasanjo's former supporters saw no 
reason to support him again.  Abubakar offered that 
Obasanjo's drive for reform, coupled with an 
exaggerated self-worth, blinded him to this crucial 
political reality. In short, Obasanjo was not 
pragmatic enough to be a good President, Abubakar 
believed. (Comment: Abubakar was speaking from 
personal experience. We have been told by one insider 
of an occasion where Abubakar went to Obasanjo for 
help -- we do not know if it was financial patronage. 
However, we were told that Obasanjo abruptly showed 
the former Head of State the door.  End Comment.) 
------------------------------ 
NOT TO IMPEACH BUT TO SIDELINE 
------------------------------ 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Because of Obasanjo, the PDP was tearing 
itself apart, observed Abubakar.  Obasanjo had set 
himself against the National Assembly early in his 
Administration.  He had undermined its leadership and 
belittled its role in governance.  To a substantial 
degree, the tables were now turned.  In response to 
the Ambassador's direct question, Abubakar thought the 
impeachment threat was not intended to remove Obasanjo 
from office but to deny him the PDPD renomination. 
Again, this was a struggle in the realm of practical 
politics, noted Abubakar. Assembly Members need to 
bring some money and projects to their constituents to 
help secure reelection; local voters only think a 
politician is good if he can give them money or has 
finagled a project or two for their community. 
 
 
¶8. (C) By initially refusing to fund capital and other 
constituency projects, Obasanjo was undermining 
Assembly Members' reelection chances.  When he finally 
realized the political implications of the impeachment 
threat, Obasanjo moved to fund many of these projects. 
By then, however, so much bad blood had developed that 
Obasanjo's corrective measures did not engender 
goodwill. They caused bewilderment. People wondered 
why it took Obasanjo so long to do the politically 
obvious, Abubakar declared. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Pointing out the numerous meetings that have 
taken place in the past few weeks without yet 
resolving the conflict between the President and his 
antagonists within the PDP, Abubakar said party 
officials were finding it difficult to identify common 
ground between the two sides.  Obasanjo created this 
strong adversarial relationship because he disdained 
the Assembly; now its members feel that either he or 
they must go. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Abubakar further commented that the schism 
between Obasanjo and his Vice President was real. 
While professing non-involvement in party politics, 
Abubakar believed that a bid for the PDP nomination by 
VP Atiku was a strong possibility.  However, Abubakar 
professed no knowledge of Babangida's next moves, even 
though the two are neighbors and reportedly best 
friends. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶11.  (C) The fence-mending dinner with Babangida, 
Abubakar and others seems to have fallen short of 
Obasanjo's expectations. If Abubakar is an accurate 
barometer, the meeting may have brought home to 
Obasanjo some of his past missteps, but it did not 
bring the expressions of current and future support 
Obasanjo wanted from the "big four."  We concur with 
Abubakar's assessment of Obasanjo's political 
troubles: It is not so much Obasanjo's gruff exterior 
but his miserliness. His weakness has been that he did 
not, or could not, play "the game" according to local 
rules. 
 
 
¶12. (C) Abubakar's identification of patronage as the 
fulcrum also helps place what may be at stake in the 
coming election. In one corner, there is Obasanjo, the 
often-inconsistent reformer who lacks political savvy. 
In the other, there is a steady stream of people who 
might be much better politicians than Obasanjo but 
whose bonds to "politics as usual" are decidedly 
stronger than their or Obasanjo's commitment to 
reform. 
JETER