This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001781 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL'S KING SAYS NOT YET TIME TO INTERVENE 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1772 
 
     ¶B. (B) KATHMANDU 1762 
     ¶C. (C) 120813Z SEP 02 
     ¶D. (D) STATE 175352 
 
Classified By: POL PMAHONEY.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) In a September 12 meeting, King Gyanendra assured the 
Ambassador that he would not use his constitutional authority 
to intervene in the government unless he gains public 
national consensus on the move from all mainstream political 
parties and unless all other constitutional remedies were 
exhausted.  That time has not yet arrived.  He emphasized 
that he would take such action only to preserve, rather than 
undermine, democracy.  Given the fractiousness and 
self-interest that motivates many political leaders, the 
King's refusal to act unless he has full public national 
consensus is wise.  End summary. 
 
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NOT YET TIME FOR ACTION 
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¶2. (U)  On the evening of September 12, at the Palace's 
request the Ambassador called on King Gyanendra.  Ambassador 
opened the meeting by giving the King the text of President 
Bush's message of thanks for Government of Nepal (GON) 
support in the global campaign against terrorism (Ref C). 
The King was quite pleased by the letter and asked the 
Ambassador to convey his thanks to the White House. 
 
¶3.  (C) The King asked for the Ambassador's assessment of the 
state of affairs in Nepal.  The Ambassador described the 
situation as dire and expressed sympathy for the victims of 
recent Maoist attacks.  He noted that during his meeting with 
Prime Minister Deuba earlier in the day (Ref A) the PM had 
seemed worried for several reasons, including recent Maoist 
successes in the field, ongoing intra-party strife, rumors of 
corruption surrounding his closest advisors, and fear that he 
may have lost the confidence of the King.  The King 
acknowledged that Deuba is under significant pressure, adding 
that he had met the PM just the day before. 
 
¶4.  (C) Many people are claiming that "I'll do something" to 
intervene, the King acknowledged, adding that numerous 
individuals across the political spectrum had come to see him 
recently to ask him to act.  He emphasized that any action he 
would take would be to preserve democracy, not to undermine 
it.  He plans to do nothing, however, until all existing 
constitutional remedies are exhausted.  That point has not 
yet been reached.  Despite the obvious problems that are 
making elections appear less and less feasible, the King 
assured the Ambassador that he will not act unless he obtains 
public consensus from all the major political parties to 
support such action.  So far, no one has been willing to say 
anything in public, he noted.  "They want me to act on my 
own" so that they criticize the move later if it suits their 
political aims. 
 
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CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT ENVISIONED 
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¶5.  (C) Should the King obtain such national consensus and 
invoke his constitutional authority to intervene, the 
Ambassador asked, what might an interim government look like? 
    The King replied that he envisions a national consensus 
government, with representation from all political parties. 
With the support of such national consensus, even the Maoists 
might be invited to participate, provided they laid down 
their arms first.  Contrary to current rumors--and the PM's 
own fears (Ref A)--the King said he had no particular person 
in mind to head such a government.  Instead, the person 
should be chosen by the leaders of all the political parties 
to ensure national consensus. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ambassador delivered Ref D talking points, 
emphasizing that elections should be pursued if at all 
possible, and stressing that any action taken by the King 
should be done in strict accord with constitutional 
provisions and supported by broad political consensus.  The 
King agreed that he should first seek advice from the Supreme 
Court before taking any action.  (Note:  According to the 
British Ambassador, who met the King one hour earlier, the 
King disagreed when the UK Ambassador made the same point, 
reportedly arguing that he had no need to consult the Court. 
The British Ambassador's talking points for his meeting with 
the King were virtually identical to ours.  End note.)  He 
noted again that he did not contemplate action soon, but said 
that people should not be surprised if they wake up one 
morning and read about it in the newspapers. 
 
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PM SHOULD CLEAN HOUSE FIRST 
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¶7.  (C) The King described the Prime Minister as "overly 
concerned."  The only words of caution he has given Deuba so 
far is that "he should be clean."  The Ambassador pointed out 
that many of the most powerful and influential members of the 
PM's cabinet are also those tainted by corruption, and 
suggested that Deuba may be reluctant to alienate them.  The 
King said he had assured Deuba if he cleans up his Cabinet, 
he could guarantee that the (ostensibly autonomous) 
anti-corruption commission would defer investigating the 
ousted ministers for a year.  The Prime Minister is a good 
man, the King reflected, but he seems to be poorly advised. 
He needs to plan more ahead.  Instead, he is too narrowly 
focused on intra-party power struggles.  He has not thought 
ahead, for example, on what he will do if the Election 
Commission decides not to award his faction use of the Nepali 
Congress Party symbol during elections.  The PM's wife, Arzu 
Deuba, could be a source of good advice for him, the King 
concluded. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8.  (C)  The King is clearly considering taking action, but 
is wisely waiting for broad-based and public cover before 
doing so.  A tacit consensus seems to be mounting that the 
elections cannot be held for security reasons, and royal 
intervention could provide a face-saving way out for 
politicos unwilling to risk life and limb on the campaign 
trail.  But if the leaders of various political parties have 
decided among themselves that elections are not feasible and 
are hoping for the King to give them a way, they will have to 
come together publicly to ask him to do so.  If elections 
indeed cannot be held, a national consensus government, 
headed by a person chosen by all mainstream political 
parties, may be the best interim option available. 
 
 
MALINOWSKI