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AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
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PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

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Viewing cable 02HANOI2272, WIN US OVER"

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02HANOI2272 2002-09-18 10:49 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

181049Z Sep 02

2002HANOI02272 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ6872

PAGE 01        HANOI  02272  01 OF 02  181057Z 
ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   AIT-03   ACQ-00   CEA-01   CIAE-00  
      COME-00  CTME-00  DOEE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    
      EXIM-01  E-00     FBIE-00  VC-00    FRB-00   H-01     TEDE-00  
      INR-00   ITC-01   L-00     VCE-00   MED-07   AC-01    NSAE-00  
      NSCE-00  OES-01   OMB-01   OPIC-01  CAEX-01  PA-00    PM-00    
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   STR-00   TRSE-00  
      USIE-00  EPAE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   G-00     
      NFAT-00  SAS-00     /021W
                  ------------------E909DE  181058Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7583
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AIT TAIPEI 0702
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/12 
TAGS: PREL EAID ETRD MARR VM CVR
SUBJECT: "WIN US OVER" 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02272  01 OF 02  181057Z 
 
REF:  A. HANOI 2202 (NOTAL)  B.  HANOI 2259 
-     C. HANOI 2260          C.  HANOI 2261 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RAYMOND BURGHARDT, 
REASON: 1.5 (D) 
 
2. (C)  AMBASSADOR'S SCHEDULED SEPTEMBER 17 MEETING TO 
DISCUSS CHINA (REF A) WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LE VAN 
BANG (FORMERLY AMBASSADOR TO U.S., AND NOW RESPONSIBLE 
FOR NORTHEAST ASIA) WAS UNAVOIDABLY DIVERTED INTO A 
DISCUSSION OF PRESSING BILATERAL ISSUES (REFS C-D). 
 
3.  (C)  BANG CAME PREPARED WITH SOME THOUGHTS ON THE 
US-VIETNAM BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.  READING FROM THREE 
PAGES OF PRINTED NOTES, HE URGED THAT THE U.S. DO MORE 
TO "BUILD TRUST," OFFERING THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS: 
--  MORE HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS, HOWEVER SHORT, SUCH AS 
THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RECENT CALL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY 
ARMITAGE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UPCOMING TALK (EVEN 
TEN MINUTES) BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 
PHAN VAN KHAI AT APEC; 
--  CONTINUE DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL 
ISSUES, AREAS OF ONGOING DISAGREEMENTS; 
--  ESTABLISH A DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT (AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT 
THE EXISTING BTA-RELATED MECHANISM ALREADY PROVIDES A 
GOOD FORUM FOR THIS); 
--  AVOID LETTING CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES SUCH AS ETHNIC 
MINORITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM BE 
"PROMINENT" IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT INSTEAD SEEK 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02272  01 OF 02  181057Z 
WAYS TO SOLVE DISAGREEMENTS "CONSTRUCTIVELY, NOT AT THE 
EXPENSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP." 
 
4.  (C)  VFM BANG EMPHASIZED THAT "FRANKLY, YOU MUST 
HAVE A WAY TO WIN OVER VIETNAM" IN A MANNER THAT WOULD 
BE "CONDUCIVE TO US POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA."  (HE 
USED THE SAME PHRASEOLOGY IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE 
DCM AT POST'S 9/11 CEREMONY, WHERE HE ALSO SAID THAT 
VIETNAM WANTS TO BE "WITH" THE U.S.)  HE WELCOMED US 
INTEREST IN A "STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN THE U.S. 
AND VIETNAM, AND REITERATED A NEED TO SOLVE SENSITIVE 
ISSUES "QUIETLY."  HE OFFERED THANKS FOR US AID 
PROGRAMS, ESPECIALLY RELATED TO LEGAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, AND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN 
VIETNAM'S INCLUSION IN THE MILLENIUM CHALLENGE FUND. 
AMBASSADOR NOTED OTHER US HUMANITARIAN AID PROGRAMS AS 
WELL, AND DESCRIBED US FRUSTRATION AT DIFFICULTIES IN 
INCREASING AID IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.  VFM BANG 
RETORTED THAT "SOMETIMES NOT TO HELP IS TO HELP." 
 
5.  (C)  VFM BANG DESCRIBED BURGEONING RELATIONS 
ELSEWHERE, POINTING TO COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL 
SECRETARY NONG DUC MANH'S OCTOBER TRIP TO JAPAN, A 
 
SIPDIS 
"GOOD VISIT" BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN TAN DUNG 
TO SOUTH KOREA RECENTLY, "GOOD RELATIONS" WITH TAIWAN 
(NOW INCLUDING "65,000 SONS-IN-LAW"), "FRIENDLY" 
RELATIONS WITH CHINA, AND EXPANDED TIES WITHIN ASEAN 
AND IN ASEM.  HE STRESSED THAT VIETNAM ALSO "VERY MUCH 
WANTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS" WITH THE U.S. TO A "HIGHER 
LEVEL," AND ASKED FOR AMBASSADOR'S PERSONAL HELP IN 
ACHIEVING THIS.  HE URGED THAT VIETNAM AND THE U.S. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02272  01 OF 02  181057Z 
WORK TOGETHER TOWARD IMPROVING THE STABILITY OF THE 
WHOLE REGION, EVEN FARTHER AFIELD SUCH AS THE KOREAN 
PENINSULA AND CHINA. 
 
6. (C)  AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THIS GOAL, 
NOTING EFFORTS TO ARRANGE HIGH LEVEL TRIPS IN BOTH 
DIRECTIONS, AND TO UTILIZE THESE MEETINGS TO RAISE THE 
LEVEL OF DISCUSSION.  VFM BANG NOTED THAT, WHILE THE 
STATE DEPARTMENT AND MFA WERE OF SIMILAR MINDS ON THIS 
GOAL, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONVINCE OTHER DEPARTMENTS -- 
NOTABLY THE PENTAGON AND THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL 
DEFENSE (MND) -- OF THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH TIES.  HE 
SUGGESTED THAT THE "ENVIRONMENT WAS NOT CONDUCIVE" FOR 
FALL 2002 VISIT TO THE U.S. BY DEFENSE MINISTER TRA, 
URGING THE U.S. INSTEAD TO "BUILD UP" MILITARY-TO- 
MILITARY TIES FIRST.  AMBASSADOR RECOUNTED EXISTING 
FORMS OF MILITARY COOPERATION SUCH AS IN MEDICAL 
RESEARCH, AS WELL AS ONGOING TALKS ON FUTURE SHIP 
VISITS.  (NOTE:  THE LAST CONVERSATION BETWEEN DATT AND 
MND REGARDING MINISTER TRA'S TRIP INDICATED THAT HE WAS 
STILL HOPING TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. IN THE LATE 
NOVEMBER/EARLY DECEMBER TIMEFRAME.  END NOTE) 
 
7.  (C)  COMMENT:  VFM BANG RETAINS A PROPRIETARY 
INTEREST IN US-VIETNAM RELATIONS, GIVEN HIS PERSONAL 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ6873 
 
PAGE 01        HANOI  02272  02 OF 02  181058Z 
ACTION EAP-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   AIT-03   ACQ-00   CEA-01   CIAE-00 
      COME-00  CTME-00  DOEE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    EXIM-01 
      E-00     FBIE-00  VC-00    FRB-00   H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00 
      IO-00    ITC-01   L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00 
      OES-01   OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00 
      P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   STR-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00  PMB-00 
      DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /013W 
                  ------------------E909EB  181058Z /38 
R 181049Z SEP 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7584 
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AIT TAIPEI 0703 
SECDEF WASHDC 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HANOI 002272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
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PAGE 02        HANOI  02272  02 OF 02  181058Z 
ROLE OVER THE PAST DECADE IN SHEPHERDING THIS 
RELATIONSHIP.  HE IS LIKELY DISTURBED AT THE 
POSSIBILITY THAT US-VIETNAM TIES ARE FAILING TO KEEP 
PACE WITH THE SOMETIMES OVERWHELMING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS 
OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STATES, AS WELL AS THE LARGER 
ECONOMIC AND ASSISTANCE ROLES JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND 
TAIWAN PLAY HERE.  WE AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT THAT IT 
IS IMPORTANT FOR THE USG NOT ONLY TO DO MORE 
BILATERALLY, BUT ALSO TO BE SEEN AS DOING MORE HERE. 
THIS IS A TOUGH TASK IN A COUNTRY WHERE THE MEDIA IS SO 
CONTROLLED, OFTEN INDEED BY ELEMENTS OF THE CPV AND GVN 
NOT ESPECIALLY INCLINED TO BE FAVORABLE TOWARD THE US. 
DAS DALEY'S VISIT, THE PROBABLE OCTOBER POLITICAL 
DIALOGUE, HOPEFULLY A PRESIDENTIAL PHOTO OP AT APEC 
WITH THE PM, AND THE POSSIBLE DECEMBER VISIT HERE BY 
THE MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT OFFER SOME SHORT-TERM 
BOOSTS TO THE VISIBILITY OF OUR BILATERAL TIES.  BUT, 
AS BANG ACKNOWLEDGED, PROGRESS WILL CONTINUE TO BE 
SLOWED BY LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS WHO ARE LESS ENTHUSIASTIC 
ABOUT US-VIETNAM TIES THAN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.  SOME 
OF THESE PEOPLE -- IN THE MILITARY, PUBLIC SECURITY, 
AND PROPAGANDA FIELDS, FOR EXAMPLE -- MAY ALSO BE MORE 
RECEPTIVE TO BEIJING THAN BANG (REF A). 
BURGHARDT 
 
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