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Viewing cable 02ROME3313, GOI VIEWS ON FUTURE OF EU; PREPARATIONS FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02ROME3313 2002-07-05 16:05 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 003313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2007 
TAGS: PREL EU EU IT ITPREL EUN
SUBJECT: GOI VIEWS ON FUTURE OF EU; PREPARATIONS FOR 
PRESIDENCY 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: A/DCM MARGARET DEAN.  REASON:1.5 (B)(D) 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  03313  01 OF 02  051553Z 
 1.  (C)  SUMMARY: ON JULY 3, THE CHIEF OF THE MFA'S OFFICE 
FOR EU INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, GUISEPPE BUCCINO, EXPRESSED TO 
POLOFF HIS CONCERNS ABOUT PROGRESS, OR THE LACK THEREOF, ON 
CRITICAL EU INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS.  HE IS STILL HOPEFUL THAT 
THE CONVENTION DOCUMENT CAN BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE 
ITALIAN PRESIDENCY IN DECEMBER 2003.  THE GOI WILL ESTABLISH 
TWO NEW OFFICES IN THE MFA TO DEAL WITH ITS PRESIDENCY 
ISSUES.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  BUCCINO BEGAN WITH THE ISSUE THAT, IN HIS VIEW, 
COULD DERAIL ENLARGEMENT AND EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN EU 
INSTITUTIONS; THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POSITION (CAP), 
SPECIFICALLY DIRECT FARM SUBSIDIES TO FARMERS FROM NEWLY 
ADMITTED STATES.  THE SEVILLE COUNCIL AND JUNE 10 GAC HAD 
FAILED TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THIS ISSUE, A "HEADS IN THE 
SAND" ATTITUDE AMONG EU LEADERS THAT WORRIES BUCCINO. 
WAITING UNTIL AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTIONS TO DEAL WITH CAP IS 
"CUTTING IT TOO CLOSE" TO THE END OF THE DANISH PRESIDENCY, 
AND RISKS PUSHING OFF A SOLUTION UNTIL THE GREEK PRESIDENCY 
IN 2004, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH BUCCINO FEELS COULD JEOPARDIZE 
THE SCHEDULES FOR ENLARGEMENT AND THE CONVENTION. 
 
3.  (C)  ASIDE FROM SPECIFIC PAYMENT SCHEDULES, THERE WERE 
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES TO DEAL WITH.  GERMANY WOULD BE UNLIKELY 
TO ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION THAT REQUIRED ADDITIONAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS, WHILE THE FRENCH VIEW DIRECT PAYMENTS AS PART 
OF THE ACQUI.   BUCCINO HOPED THAT A COMPROMISE COULD BE 
REACHED WHICH WOULD START PAYMENTS TO FARMERS FROM NEW MEMBER 
STATES AT 10-20 PERCENT OF THOSE IN CURRENT MEMBERS, RISING 
TO 100 PERCENT IN 2013.  THIS SCHEDULE WOULD BE CONCOMITANT 
WITH GENERAL CAP REFORM AND REDUCTION OF PAYMENTS THROUGHOUT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  03313  01 OF 02  051553Z 
THE EU.  IN ANY CASE, BUCCINO SAID THE EU NEEDS TO START 
TALKING ABOUT THE DETAILS RIGHT AFTER THE SUMMER BREAK, NOT 
WAIT UNTIL NOVEMBER. 
 
4.  (C)  DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE SECOND ATTEMPT AT A 
SUCCESSFUL IRISH REFERENDUM ON THE NICE TREATY THIS AUTUMN 
WERE ALSO TROUBLING BUCCINO.   HE SAID THAT IRISH AND OTHER 
EU LEADERS WERE TOO CONFIDENT IN A POSITIVE OUTCOME, AND HE 
IS "ASTONISHED" BY THE LACK OF ORGANIZATION BY THE GOVERNMENT 
OF IRELAND TO EDUCATE AND GET THE WORD OUT ON THE IMPORTANCE 
OF NICE TO THE FUTURE OF EUROPE.  IF THERE WERE ANOTHER "NO" 
VOTE IN IRELAND, IT WOULD SEND A "POLITICAL SHOCK" THROUGHOUT 
THE EU FROM WHICH THE ORGANIZATION MAY NEVER RECOVER.  THE 
IRISH GOVERNMENT MUST EXPLAIN TO ITS PEOPLE THAT THERE IS 
MORE AT STAKE IN NICE THAN ECONOMIC ISSUES.  THE FUTURE OF A 
"NEW EUROPE," WORKING AS AN EQUAL WITH THE U.S. TO INFLUENCE 
GLOBAL EVENTS AND DECISIONS, WAS ON THE LINE. 
 
5.  (C) GETTING THE EU MEMBER STATES TO AGREE ON THE LIST OF 
REFORMS IN THE NICE TREATY WAS A "PAINFUL" PROCESS, CONTINUED 
BUCCINO.  REOPENING NICE, OR ATTEMPTING TO INCORPORATE ITS 
KEY ELEMENTS IN THE CONVENTION DOCUMENT, WOULD REQUIRE A MUCH 
LONGER TIMEFRAME THAN ORIGINALLY PROJECTED FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM.  CERTAINLY, REOPENING NICE WOULD MEAN THAT THE 
CONVENTION DOCUMENT COULD NOT BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE 
ITALIAN PRESIDENCY ON 2003. 
 
6.  (C)  BUCCINO WAS A BIT MORE OPTIMISTIC THAT A COMPROMISE 
COULD BE FOUND ON GREEK/TURKISH DISAGREEMENTS REGARDING ESDP 
AND CYPRUS.  HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH A 
COMPROMISE WHERE THE GREEK PORTION OF CYPRUS WAS ADMITTED IN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  03313  01 OF 02  051553Z 
THE NEXT ROUND OF ENLARGEMENT, BUT THE EU WILL HAVE TO "THINK 
CREATIVELY, AND QUICKLY" ABOUT CONCESSIONS TO TURKEY.  THE 
COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ENHANCED AID AND FINANCIAL 
PACKAGE, COUPLED WITH "CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES," WOULD 
NOT BE ENOUGH, SAID BUCCINO.  TURKEY WILL WANT A DATE FOR 
ACCESSION, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE CLEARLY NOWHERE NEAR THE 
COPENHAGEN CRITERIA.  BUCCINO THOUGHT A COMPROMISE COULD BE 
REACHED WHEREBY THE COUNCIL APPROVES STRONGER LANGUAGE 
CALLING FOR TURKISH ACCESSION, BUT WITHOUT A SPECIFIC DATE 
FOR ENTRY INTO THE EU.  BUCCINO AVERRED THAT ESDP ISSUES 
WOULD FALL INTO PLACE ONCE A CYPRUS ACCESSION AGREEMENT WAS 
HAMMERED OUT. 
 
7.  (C)  BUCCINO'S VIEW IS THAT TURKEY WOULD HAVE CONTINUING 
PROBLEMS JOINING THE EU DUE TO CURRENT MEMBER STATES' 
FUNDAMENTAL VIEWS ON THE ORGANIZATION'S ROOTS, WHAT IT MEANS 
TO BE "EUROPEAN," AND EUROPE'S CULTURE (BASED ON GREEK, 
LATIN, AND ESPECIALLY CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHIES).  BUCCINO 
THOUGHT THAT MEMBER STATES MUST BEGIN TO VIEW THE EU MORE 
LIKE THE ROMAN EMPIRE, IN WHICH ALL WERE CONSIDERED PART OF 
THE EMPIRE, DESPITE GEOGRAPHIC, CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, LANGUAGE 
DIFFERENCES. 
 
8.  (C)  BUCCINO SAID THAT THE GENERAL AGREEMENT AMONG MEMBER 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ7490 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  03313  02 OF 02  051554Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  PERC-00 
      SRPP-00  DS-00    VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00 
      L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OMB-01   PA-00 
      PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00 
      SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  EPAE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00 
      DRL-02   G-00     SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------C71287  051554Z /38 
P 051605Z JUL 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4651 
INFO EU CANDIDATE STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 
USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 003313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2007 
TAGS: PREL EU EU IT ITPREL EUN
SUBJECT: GOI VIEWS ON FUTURE OF EU; PREPARATIONS FOR 
PRESIDENCY 
 
STATES OVER THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM WAS 
ENCOURAGING.  THERE MUST BE AN OVERALL REDUCTION IN THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  03313  02 OF 02  051554Z 
NUMBER OF COUNCILS.  THE QUALITY OF LEGISLATION IS 
COMPROMISED WHEN IT IS NOT DISCUSSED ACROSS THE BOARD, AND 
THEREFORE A NEW "COUNCIL FOR LEGISLATION" WAS NEEDED, WITH 
OTHER, STREAMLINED COUNCILS ACTING AS "ADVISORY COMMITTEES." 
THE SIX-MONTH ROTATIONAL PRESIDENCY ALSO HAD TO GO, BUCCINO 
EMPHASIZED.  THE CURRENT SYSTEM HAD OBVIOUS NEGATIVE EFFECTS 
ON CONTINUITY, AND WAS AT ODDS EVEN WITH SOME OF THE EU'S OWN 
PROCEDURES.  FOR INSTANCE, THE TWELVE-MONTH BUDGET PROCEDURE 
SHOULD HAVE OVERSIGHT BY SINGLE PRESIDENCY. 
 
9.  (C)  BUCCINO SAID THE CONVENTION WAS PROGRESSING 
STEADILY, BUT SLOWLY, AND HE WAS CONCERNED THAT DEBATE ON 
FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, SUCH AS LIMITATION OF 
COMPETENCIES, COUNCIL PRESIDENT SELECTION, THE POWERS OF 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER EU BODIES, 
HAD YET TO BE ADDRESSED.  THE CONVENTION'S GOAL WAS TO 
PRODUCE A DOCUMENT OF NO MORE THAN 140 ARTICLES WITH 2-3 
ANNEXES TO PRESENT TO THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL IGC), 
CONTAINING, INTER ALIA, A HUMAN RIGHTS CHARTER, DEFINITION OF 
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCIES, AND LEGAL PRESENCE 
OF THE EU. 
 
10.  (C)  BUCCINO WAS HOPEFUL THAT THE DOCUMENT COULD BE 
COMPLETED BY THE JUNE 2003 COUNCIL.  THE IGC WOULD THEN BEGIN 
AFTER A SHORT "COOLING OFF" PERIOD.  IF THE QUALITY OF THE 
DOCUMENT WAS HIGH, AND THERE WERE NO AMBIGUOUS AREAS, IT 
WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY IN 
DECEMBER 2003.  IF THE DOCUMENT HAD "OPEN QUESTIONS" LEFT FOR 
THE IGC TO SOLVE, MEMBER STATES WOULD LOOK FOR COMPROMISES 
WHICH COULD ULTIMATELY WEAKEN THE UNION AND DELAY REFORM. 
 
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PAGE 03        ROME  03313  02 OF 02  051554Z 
11.  (C)  THE GOI HAS, UNCHARACTERISTICALLY, STARTED EARLY 
PLANNING FOR ITS PRESIDENCY IN THE LATTER HALF OF 2003. 
ACCORDING TO BUCCINO, PM BERLUSCONI HAS DECIDED THAT IN 
KEEPING WITH THE NICE TREATY, BOTH EUROPEAN COUNCILS DURING 
THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY WILL BE HELD IN BRUSSELS.  TWO OFFICES 
IN THE MFA WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN SEPTEMBER OF 2002 TO 
HANDLE PRESIDENCY ISSUES.  ONE WOULD BE A "PROTOCOL" OFFICE 
HEADED BY LEONARDO VISCONTE DI MADRONE, ASSISTED BY 2 OR 3 
DIPLOMATS PLUS A SUPPORT STRUCTURE.  THIS OFFICE WOULD BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING MEETINGS (INCLUDING U.S./EU 
MEETINGS) AND COMMUNICATING WITH MEMBER STATES AND OTHER 
INTERESTED PARTIES ON UPCOMING EVENTS.  THIS WILL BE A 
"TERRIBLE JOB," ADMITTED BUCCINO, GIVEN THE ITALIAN 
BUREAUCRATIC PREDILECTION TO DELAY DECISIONS TO THE LAST 
MINUTE. 
 
12. (SBU)  THE OTHER OFFICE WOULD BE CHARGED WITH PRODUCING 
SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENTS, HORIZONTAL COORDINATION OF POSITIONS 
WITHIN THE GOI, AND COORDINATING COREPER ACTIVITIES.  THE 
OFFICE WILL BE HEADED BY VINCENZO GRASSI. 
 
BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES OF VISCONTI DI MADRONE AND GRASSI FOLLOW: 
 
LEONARDO VISCONTI DI MODRONE:  BORN IN MILAN IN 1947. 
GRADUATED FROM MILAN'S PRIVATE AND PRESTIGIOUS BOCCONI 
UNIVERSITY IN 1970, IN ECONOMICS. JOINED THE FOREIGN SERVICE 
IN 1971. WORKED IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS OFFICE IN THE MFA. TO 
THE ITALIAN MISSION TO THE UN, NYC, 1974-1977. 
TO CAIRO, 1977-1981. TO PALAZZO CHIGI (OFFICE OF THE 
DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TO THE PM), 1981-1988, WAS PROMOTED TO 
DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISER TO THE PM WHILE THERE. TO LONDON, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  03313  02 OF 02  051554Z 
AS FIRST COUNSELOR, 1988-1992. TO PALAZZO CHIGI AS FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS PROTOCOL ADVISER, 1992-1997. TO VIENNA AS FIRST 
COUNSELOR, 1997-2002, WAS PROMOTED O MINISTER COUNSELOR 
WHILE THERE. TO THE MFA'S PLITICAL BUREAU, EARLY 2002-TO 
DATE, ON SPECIAL ASIGNMENTS.  HAS THE PERSONAL RANK OF 
MINISTER. 
VINCENZO GRASSI:  BORN IN NAPLES IN 1959. GRADUATD FROM THE 
UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES IN 1982, LAW DEGRE. JOINED THE FOREIGN 
SERVICE IN 1984, SPECIALIZD IN COMMERCIAL ISSUES. WORKED IN 
THE ECONOMIC BREAU.  ATTENDED FRANCE'S PRESTIGIOUS ENA 
(ECOLE AZIONALE D'ADMINISTRATION) IN PARIS, 1985-1986.  T 
CAIRO, 1987-1988, (COMMERCIAL). TO ITALIAN MISSIN TO EC 
BRUSSELS, 1990-1994 (COMMERCIAL). TO THEMFA'S ECONOMIC 
BUREAU, 1994-1995.  TO PARIS AS CUNSELOR, 1998-TO DATE.  HAS 
THE PERSONAL RANK OFCOUNSELOR. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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 2002ROME03313 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL