This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 HARARE 001377 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
AIDAC 
 
AID FOR DCHA/FFP LANDIS, BRAUSE, SKORIC, PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA HALMRAST-SANCHEZ, BYRAN, MARX 
AFR/SA WILLIAMS, MENDELSON, HAGELMAN 
AFR/DPSMITH, KNEPP 
AFR/SD WHELAN 
NSC FOR DWORKEN 
STATE FOR AF/S, INR/GGI, PM/ISP 
NAIROBI FOR WISECARVER, SENYKOFF, RILEY 
MAPUTO FOR JENCKS 
LUSAKA FOR GUNTHER 
LILONGWE FOR SMITH 
PRETORIA FRO DIJKERMAN AND PAS HELM 
GABORONE FOR BRODERICK 
ROME FOR FODAG LAVELLE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREF AORC ZI
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: JOINT FFP/OFDA 
ASSESSMENT REPORT, MAY 2002 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
NOT SUITABLE FOR INTERNET POSTING. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: This cable reports findings of 
joint visit by REDSO/FFP and OFDA/ARO reps to 
Zimbabwe to review humanitarian crisis, including 
participation in FAO/WFP crop and food supply 
crisis will be much worse due to the minimal 
carryover stocks, the continuing impact of poor 
economic policy management and the so-called "fast- 
track" land reform program.  Of particular concern 
is the impact of continuing prohibitions of 
private sector imports and foreign exchange 
controls.  A combination of urgent economic policy 
reforms and humanitarian assistance is needed now 
to avert the advent of a large scale famine that 
would have grave social and economic impacts on 
Zimbabwe and the region.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Overview of situation:  Historically a 
breadbasket for the Southern African region, 
Zimbabwe is now in need of massive food imports 
and humanitarian assistance.  This staggering 
reversal has been brought on by a combination of 
commercial farm invasions in the guise of land 
reform, poor economic policy management, and 
drought.  Production on commercial farms has 
fallen dramatically, and many communal farming 
areas, particularly in the South and East, have 
experienced near total crop failure.  The hunger 
season, which would normally end with the maize 
harvest in April/May, has instead been extended 
and deepened.  There is a lack of maize available 
for sale in local markets, and even individuals 
with funds are finding it increasingly difficult 
to obtain food.  While the climatic severity of 
this year's drought may be less than that of 1992, 
the food security crisis will be much worse due to 
the minimal carryover stocks, the continuing 
impact of poor economic policy management and the 
so-called "fast-track" land reform program.  Of 
particular concern is the combination of 
continuing prohibitions on private sector imports 
and GOZ foreign exchange controls.  A combination 
of urgent economic policy reforms and humanitarian 
assistance is needed now to avert the advent of a 
large scale famine that would have grave social 
and economic impacts on Zimbabwe and the region. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Crop and food supply assessment mission: 
FAO and WFP led a multi-agency crop and food 
supply assessment mission in Zimbabwe from April 
23 to May 10.  On May 9, the assessment team 
debriefed donor representatives on its preliminary 
findings (assessment details were reported in 
September).  A final written report of assessment 
findings should be released by WFP/FAO before the 
end of May.  REDSO/FFP rep participated in part of 
the field portion of the mission, traveling to 
Masvingo and Matabeleland South provinces. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Crop production estimates:  The 
assessment mission concluded that maize production 
levels are even less than the 600,000 mts 
previously estimated, perhaps around 500,000 mts, 
this compares to a normal year production of over 
two million mts.  Annual domestic consumption 
requirements are over 1.8 million mts, leaving a 
maize import requirement of roughly 1.3 to 1.4 
million mts.  The assessment mission also forecast 
that wheat production would fall to about one- 
third of last year's harvest of about 330,000 mts. 
The poor winter wheat crop is due to the dramatic 
reduction of acreage planted on commercial farms, 
and is a direct consequence of uncertainty created 
by the GOZ's fast track land reform program and 
commercial farm invasions. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Effects of drought:  Poor rainfall has 
affected most of the country, with the effects of 
drought on crop production most pronounced in the 
Southern and Western provinces of Masvingo and 
Matabeleland (areas assessed by REDSO/FFP rep), 
where a long dry spell in January/February (midway 
through the growing season) led to widespread crop 
failure.  Many households and communities observed 
during the assessment mission had virtually no 
harvest al all.  Most maize in these areas is 
grown by communal farmers, with commercial farms 
focused more on ranching.  Given the dry climate, 
these areas are not self-sufficient in maize 
production even in normal years, and most farm 
households normally supplement crop production 
with market purchases.  Livestock, remittances, 
gold mining, and farm labor are among key income 
sources.  The one bit of good news is that 
livestock has not been seriously affected. 
Pasture and water conditions are expected to be 
adequate for the rest of the year, assuming normal 
rains next season.  In this respect the drought is 
less severe than the 1992 drought, which caused 
heavy cattle losses. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Fate of commercial farm workers: 
Commercial farm invasions have caused loss of 
employment and displacement for many farm workers 
and their families.  Over 2000 commercial farms 
are reported to have been taken over to date, and 
an additional 3,000 are slated for fast track 
takeover by the end of August 2002.  In most 
cases, farm workers on invaded commercial farms 
have been chased off the land with little or no 
notice, sometimes with only the personal 
possessions they could carry, or were wearing. 
While it is difficult to get a firm grip on the 
numbers, a conservative estimate is 40-50 workers 
per farm and 3-4 persons per farm worker family. 
By this calculation, the numbers of dispossessed 
and now internally displaced farm workers and 
family members would be around 300,000 people. 
This number is expected to rise dramatically over 
the next several months when additional 3,000 
farms are slated for fast track takeover. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) As yet, displaced farm workers and their 
families have not begun to congregate in makeshift 
camps or descend masse to larger urban areas.  It 
is believed that some have moved to neighboring 
farms, that others are still on the invaded farms 
themselves, and that still others have either 
blended into communities, or moved in with 
relatives in other urban and peri urban areas.  It 
is anticipated that the problem of displaced 
workers will be most serious in the area of 
Mashonaland in the north, which accounts for an 
estimated 80% of all commercial farm workers. 
Assessing the gravity of the problem has been 
complicated, since those seeking to analyze the 
situation (e.g., the FAO/WFP assessment mission) 
have been unable to visit affected areas due to 
restrictions or intimidation by government and/or 
so-called "war veterans".  To date, only limited 
numbers of displaced farm workers have assembled 
in group sites.  OFDA/FFP reps visited two of 
these sites near Harare, where NGOs are providing 
food, shelter and other assistance to 
approximately 270 displaced workers and family 
members.  As the number of farm invasions 
continues to increase, it is likely that the 
numbers arriving in such sites will rise 
substantially. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Economic policy effects:  Have 
compounded the problems caused by drought and the 
invasion of commercial farms.  Economic policies 
that have discouraged crop production and greatly 
restricted the country's capacity to import maize. 
Key among these policies are food price controls, 
the monopoly of the GOZ's Grain Marketing Board 
(GMB), and foreign exchange rate controls. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Market access to food:  In past years, 
when crop performance was poor, rural households 
could satisfy their food needs with purchases in 
local markets - and, in particular sales from the 
government's Grain Marketing Board (GMB) where 
maize was usually readily available and 
affordable.  This is no longer the case in many 
areas, since access to maize in local markets and 
from the GMB is increasingly difficult.  In all 
the areas visited, including the cities of Harare 
and Bulawayo, maize is increasingly in short 
supply, with a marked drop off in availability 
since the election.  While the GMB's official 
prices remain reasonable (despite a recent 
increase), very little maize can actually be 
bought at this price.  GMB's imports have been 
inadequate for meeting demand, and much of their 
supplies are going through traders or "insiders" 
who are reselling at prices above the official 
prices.  No surprisingly, it is alleged that 
affiliation with the ruling party is a determining 
factor in who gets direct access to GMB supplies. 
Given the government policies prohibiting both the 
import of and wholesaling of food by the private 
sector, privileged traders with access to GMB 
supplies can readily take advantage of the 
situation to charge prices double, triple or more 
than the official price.  At one rural GMB depot 
(visited by REDSO/FFP rep), women had been queuing 
for several days, waiting to purchase maize that 
had not even arrived yet.  There was wheat 
available at the depot, but it was twice as 
expensive and thus unaffordable.  In other places, 
many consumers have no access to maize from GMB 
and must either rely on private traders or 
substitute other food.  This scarcity of maize in 
markets will only get worse as the year 
progresses.  With a limited supply of foreign 
exchange, the GOZ is expected to be able to 
purchase only about a quarter of the cereal import 
requirement, leaving a consumption gap of 
approximately one million mts. 
¶10.  (SBU) Health/nutrition concerns:  UNICEF, WHO 
and related NGOs are reporting serious 
deterioration of the health service network in 
Zimbabwe, as well as the general health of people. 
Many health workers have left the country or are 
doing other jobs, and NGOs report that remaining 
health post personnel are desperately in need of 
training.  Health posts and clinics also lack 
basic medicines.  In particular, cholera has been 
reported, since accessing medicine for treatment 
of cholera is difficult.  DFID and EU have 
recently provided several million USD to WHO and 
UNICEF for medicines.  In addition measles 
vaccination coverage has fallen from 70-80% in 
previous years to only 43% in 2001.  Problems of 
inadequate health services are reportedly worse in 
rural areas than in urban areas.  UNICEF and WHO 
have been working with the GOZ Ministry of Health 
to conduct health and household surveys in 24 of 
59 districts, data from which should be available 
soon.  However, OFDA rep expressed serious 
concerns about the quality and reliability of the 
survey work being done. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Food aid needs:  While food aid has 
already helped to mitigate the food availability 
problem in many areas, food aid alone will not be 
able to meet this large consumption gap, nor 
should it be expected to.  Availability of donor 
resources, logistical constraints, and the limited 
capacity of NGOs to effectively implement and 
monitor large scale food aid distributions are all 
factors that will limit the scale of the food aid 
response.  To be effective, the food aid response 
must be accompanied by reversal of GOZ policies 
that have closed import and wholesale markets to 
the private sector and severely restricted access 
to foreign exchange.  It is essential that 
commercial imports be dramatically increased so 
that the bulk of consumers that have economic 
means can obtain food in local markets and thereby 
allow emergency food aid to be targeted only to 
households that lack purchasing power. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Political manipulation of humanitarian 
aid:  Donors are very concerned about the 
potential (and actual) political manipulation of 
food aid and other humanitarian assistance.  There 
are reports of humanitarian aid being directed 
only to pro-ZANU/PF supporters and to government 
officials "attaching themselves" to food aid 
deliveries in order to gain political support from 
beneficiaries.  USG and other donors are therefore 
emphasizing that close "external" monitoring 
(i.e., monitors outside of the implementing 
agencies themselves) is essential to ensure 
effective targeting of resources and minimizing 
political manipulation of donor aid. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) GMO maize acceptability:  As of the end 
of May, the GOZ had not accepted the 10,000 mts of 
U.S. yellow maize that has been allocated for 
Zimbabwe from the regional shipment of 30,000 mts 
of yellow maize (plus other commodities) that is 
expected to dock in Dar Es Salaam around May 26. 
(Note: This shipment has been rerouted to other 
regional beneficiaries).  The GOZ's refusal is 
based on concerns about the maize being 
genetically modified (i.e., GMO).  It is unclear, 
however exactly what the GOZ is concerned about, 
since they have switched back and forth between 
risks of contamination of local (hybrid) varieties 
and risks to EU export markets (even though the EU 
denies any prohibitions on GMO-fed beef). 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Cereal alternatives:  If the GOZ does 
not agree to accept the maize allocated from the 
regional stock, an immediate implication is that 
the 10,000 mts of maize from the regional shipment 
will have to be reallocated to other countries in 
the region.  (See note above).  This will have a 
major negative impact on the Zimbabwe food aid 
pipeline at a time when distributions need to be 
substantially increased.  An additional 
implication is that it will be necessary to 
identify an alternative cereal for future 
shipments.  While GMO yellow maize meal (as 
opposed to grain) is acceptable (and is already 
being used) FFP/W has indicated that it will not 
be able to supply meal in great enough quantities 
to address the Zimbabwe crisis.  A second 
alternative would be immediate milling of yellow 
corn that is not certified GMO-free upon arrival, 
at GOZ expense.  While traveling in the field, 
REDSO/FFP rep queried many people about the 
acceptability of sorghum.  While it is clearly not 
the preferred option, it appears that sorghum 
would be an acceptable alternative to maize grain 
in Zimbabwe (it could also be used in some other 
countries in the region).  The fact that sorghum 
is less preferred could also have advantages for 
targeting purposes. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Addressing urban food needs:  While 
food aid activities are currently targeted only to 
rural areas, the lack of maize in urban markets, 
the resulting higher prices, and the general 
decline and rising unemployment are causing 
increasing food insecurity in urban areas. 
However, distributing food aid in urban areas 
through conventional distribution approaches would 
be very difficult due to the large numbers 
involved as well as the lack of NGO capacity. 
Ideas are under discussion by WFP and donors on 
how to channel food aid through the private sector 
(e.g., subsidized sales).  However, a prerequisite 
for any such approach is GOZ enactment of a number 
of policy changes to liberalize markets (as 
described above).  There is presently little sign 
that GOZ will make such changes.  It is also not 
clear at this point that allocating substantial 
amounts of emergency food aid to this type of 
urban intervention would be the most effective use 
of this scarce resource, as needs in rural areas 
are currently more acute than in urban areas, with 
the possible exception of the so-called "informal 
settlements" areas.  It is also unclear that 
subsidized food aid sales would directly benefit 
the most needy urban dwellers, who may have little 
or no purchasing power.  This issue does require 
further consideration, however, and in particular 
more attention must be directed to informal 
settlements, where urban poverty is greatest. 
¶16.  (SBU) Future assessments and regional food 
appeal:  This cable does not provide specific 
numbers on food aid and non-food aid needs.  In 
part this is because UN is not prepared at this 
time to release specific numbers until completion 
and analysis of the data and discussion at the 
regional meetings to be held June 6 and 7. 
OFDA/ARO and REDSO/FFP reps plan to participate in 
these meetings and will subsequently report on 
estimated levels of regional needs.  In addition, 
OFDA/ARO and REDSO/FFP are also planning for a 
series of follow-up assessments to further refine 
needs assessments and recommendations for 
response. 
SULLIVAN